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Who are you? What do you want?
- Number Six
The present study strives to enhance our understanding of the political use of language 
by focusing on a very specific aspect of human interaction, namely, the social construc-
tion of security issues, and even more specifically, the “power politics of a concept” (Bu-
zan et al. 1998, 32). What is investigated here is a set of techniques “concerned with 
exploiting the power of words to underpin or undermine the construction of our social 
world” (Skinner 2002, 5). This philosophical and theoretical engagement takes place in 
the empirical context of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国, Zhōnghuá Rén-
mín Gònghéguó; PRC, China). The aim or purpose is to critically develop the theory of 
securitisation, originally introduced by Ole Wæver,1 and to illustrate how the explication2 
of acts of securitisation through speech act logic increases the analytical reach of the 
framework through application to Chinese politics. 
The analysis of four empirical cases from the PRC – the beginning of the ‘Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution’, the ‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen 
Square’, the ‘Tiananmen Counter-revolutionary Rebellion’, and the ‘Evil Cult of Falungong’ 
– will deepen our understanding of how social groups and forms of behaviour, as well as 
ways of thinking are constructed as issues of security in a totalitarian (Mao-era) and, in 
Václav Havel’s (1992) terms, a post-totalitarian (post-Mao era) political order. This en-
hances the analytical scope of the theory of securitisation and thereby answers several 
calls for empirical studies of securitisation outside Europe and liberal democratic politi-
cal orders. In so doing, this study demonstrates how the scope of the theory of securiti-
sation can be expanded beyond its original formulation, without distortion or loss of its 
original applications. At the same time, it provides an analytical framework for research 
1  Wæver (1989a) is the study that introduced the concept of securitisation and which Wæver’s other writings 
(Wæver  1989b; Wæver et al. 1993; Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 2000a; Wæver 2004a; and Wæver 
2008b for example) on the theory are based on. Wæver (1997a) compiles his views on security and securi-
tisation while Buzan et al. (1998), Buzan & Wæver (2003), and Buzan & Wæver (2009) combine the theory 
of securitisation with Barry Buzan’s (e.g., 1983; 1991) work on multisectoral security and regional security 
complexes. For discussions on this ‘Copenhagen school’, see Huysmans (1998a), Hansen (2000), Williams 
(2003), Guzzini & Jung (2004a), Wæver (2003; 2004a), and CASE (2006). For an extensive bibliography on the 
Copenhagen School, see Guzzini & Jung (2004b). For various criticisms of the approach, see Chapter 6. below.
2  The idea of explicating is to clarify an unclear concept in a systematic and precise way (Carnap 1943). For 
Hempel (1952, 12): “conceptual explication attempts to specify the logical structure of given expressions.”
2
Introduction
that is crucial in order to understand the political use of language in the PRC.
Despite its empirical China focus, this study is situated in the field of European critical3 
approaches to security and its study.4 One of the frequent criticisms raised against this 
specific subfield of ‘International Security Studies’ (ISS) has been its narrow European fo-
cus (Walker 2007; Behnke 2007; Salter 2007). There has been a constant flow of articles 
and books that identify problems with the application of the framework of securitisation 
outside the European context, in which it was originally developed and applied (see e.g., 
Hansen 2000; Emmers 2003; Bubandt 2005; Caballero-Anthony & Emmers 2006; Kent 
2006; Jackson 2006; Wilkinson 2007; Barthwal-Datta 2009).5 However, most of these 
critics have not provided solutions for how to deal with the issues they raise; most critics 
of the ‘Copenhagen School’ (CopS) approach have been satisfied to identify problems in 
the approach. The number of critiques without solutions reveals the need to refine the 
theory of securitisation, as well as the relevance of the aims of the present study. I shall 
claim here to have answers for some of the issues previous criticisms have identified. 
Through the explication of speech acts of securitisation I demonstrate how securitisation 
has political functions beyond the provision of legitimacy for ‘extraordinary measures’ 
and how securitisation may also happen after the fact.6 Indeed, there is no need for the 
3  One of the issues debated in this field is the meaning of criticality. The c.a.s.e. collective (CASE 2006, 476) 
identifies a particular stance vis-à-vis taken-for-granted assumptions and categorisations of social reality as the 
important criterion of being critical: being critical means rigorous sceptical questioning, being reflexive, and 
breaking away from naturalised correspondences between things and words. This understanding of criticality 
is also applied in the present study, as it concurs with the emancipatory interest of knowledge (Habermas 2007; 
Vuori 2008a).
Interestingly, Edward Said insisted that any critical intellectual endeavour has to begin by asking the questions: 
critical of what, for whom, and for which purpose (Duvall 2007, 85). Indeed, being critical also means being 
critical of one’s own practices and goals. Accordingly, some of the footnotes of the present study contain meta-
narratives which seek this path; hence the ethos of irony.
4  This field is quite comprehensively described in Wæver (2004a) and the Critical Approaches to Security in 
Europe Networked Manifesto (CASE 2006) (see also Buzan & Hansen 2009). For criticisms and discussion, 
see Walker (2007), Behnke (2007), Salter (2007), Sylvester (2007), CASE (2007), and Mutimer (2009).The 
European field can be described as consisting of the three ‘schools’ of Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris, as 
well as post-modernist, post-structuralist, feminist and realist positions. For examples of critical scholarship 
beyond the ‘schools’ and even Europe, see for example Tickner (1992), Klein (1994), Campbell (1998), Der 
Derian (1995), Dillon (1996), Weldes et al. (1999), Constantinou (2000), Burke (2002) and Hansen (2006). 
For a study on the intellectual development and history of the entire field of ‘International Security Studies’, 
see Buzan & Hansen (2009). How the present study relates to this field is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
5. below.
The abbreviation CASE refers to the ‘critical schools’ of security studies developed in Europe while CSS (Critical 
Security Studies) refers to the Aberysthwyth school. The c.a.s.e. collective refers to the scholars of this collec-
tive work while critical security studies without capital letters refers to general critical approaches to security 
beyond the European ‘schools.’ The Copenhagen School is abbreviated as CopS, and International Security 
Studies as ISS while International Relations Theory is abbreviated as IR.
As Buzan & Hansen (2009, 1) note, ISS works as an umbrella term that can bring together scholars working 
under different labels e.g., ‘international security’, ‘national security studies’, ‘security studies’, ‘strategic studies’ 
and even ‘war studies’ or ‘peace studies.’ ISS is one of the cores of IR, as also reflected by the stature of the 
journal International Security in the field of IR, and journals like Review of International Studies and European 
Journal of International Relations that have published important forays into the discussions of security and its 
study (at least from a European perspective). As Albrecht & Brauch (2008, 506) note, various reviewers have 
at times used international and national security, strategic, and war studies as synonyms, while others have 
taken security studies as broader and strategic or war studies as narrower fields of study. See Figures 2 and 3 
in Chapter 5. for different ways to depict these overlaps and distinctions.
5  Even Wæver (2004a, 2) asks whether the CopS and other ‘European’ critical approaches to security can travel 
to other parts of the world in a helpful role.
6  Wæver (2004a, 9) emphasises that the real functions of the term ‘security’ are to be found where it is 
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theory of securitisation to be restricted in its outlook when it is used to analyse security 
dynamics in socio-political contexts beyond European or American democracies, as some 
critics suggest (e.g., Jackson 2006; Wilkinson 2007; Barthwal-Datta 2009).
Some of the debates among developers and appliers of the theory of securitisation 
have revolved around disagreements on the type of theory securitisation theory is or 
should be. This discussion has produced at least two sets of positions: that in which the 
theory is argued to be a constitutive or causal theory, and that in which the theory is ar-
gued to be a philosophical or sociological one.7 I engage these debates by starting from 
one of securitisation theory’s multidisciplinary roots, namely, language philosophy, and 
by then moving to linguistics in the form of cross-cultural pragmatics. The theory of se-
curitisation is a prime example of the ‘linguistic turn’ in International Relations Theory.8 
Since the identification of the linguistic turn in IR by the turn of the 1980s-1990s, there 
have been several other claimed ‘turns’ within the field. But before taking the theory of 
securitisation through the next twist in the road, it may be prudent to investigate its roots 
with more rigour than before. I consider the linguistic root of securitisation theory sig-
nificant, and therefore take a systematic approach to investigate what this entails for se-
curitisation theory as an application of speech act theory.9 There are several approaches 
to the theory of speech acts, but I focus on the intellectual ‘root’ that Wæver draws on the 
most i.e., John Langsham Austin, as well as Austin’s student John Rogers Searle, which is 
already suggested by the title of this study.10
There have been several rounds of debate on securitisation theory that have focused on 
different aspects of securitisation or its study.11 Some of these debates are more relevant 
employed in political practice.
7  Another dimension is whether the focus should be on ‘internal’ or ‘external’ aspects of ‘acts of securitisation.’ 
This debate is discussed further in Chapter 6.3.3. below.
8  The term ‘linguistic turn’ is from Richard Rorty. See e.g., Onuf (1989) and Der Derian & Shapiro (1989) for 
early examples in IR, even though Onuf (1989, 43, 46) views his approach as part of an ‘ontological turn’ as it 
emphasises ‘deeds’ as its starting-point of ‘bounded constructivism.’ 
9  Unlike Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1991, 69), I believe that international relations theory has to grapple 
with the nature of language in some depth.
10  While the title of the present study refers to Austin’s published lecture-series How to do Things with Words, 
it has to be stated right away that speech act theory is actually not about words, or verbs, but about the ‘force’ of 
an utterance (Searle 1973). This means that rather than words, the present study deals with illocutionary force 
and how this aspect of human interaction and communication plays a part in the social construction of security, 
the aspect of International Relations theory similarly present in the main title.
Austin (1975) obtained the term of force from Frege (e.g., 1977a; 1977b) for whom it, in addition to sense and 
denotation, was one of the basic components of sentence meaning.
11  The initial round was initiated by Bill McSweeney (1996; 1998; 1999) and it also provided the approach with 
the label Copenhagen School. Just as Richard K. Ashley’s (1984) critique of ‘Neorealism’ quite possibly contrib-
uted more to the strength of ‘neorealism’ than to its critique, McSweeney’s critical label proved to be rather 
fruitful for the intended target of criticism. The McSweeney debate (see Buzan & Wæver 1997 and Williams 
1998 for replies to McSweeney) revolved around the concept of societal security and the CopS’s conceptualisa-
tion of society and identity. The second round of debate, i.e., the ‘Eriksson debate’ was on the normative aspects 
of security scholarships (Eriksson 1999a; 1999b; 2000; Goldman 1999; Wæver 1999; Williams 1999; Behnke 
2000). A similar debate on the ethical and political role of scholarship was in the journal of International 
Relations and Development (Aradau 2004; Taureck 2006a; Behnke 2006; Alker 2006; Aradau 2006; Floyd 
2007a; see also Wyn Jones 2005). There have also been discussions on the role of political theory vis-à-vis the 
theory of securitisation (e.g., Huysmans 1998a), and whether the spectacle of ‘high politics’ is the most relevant 
aspect of security, or whether the study of ‘security experts’, and techniques of power would be more appropri-
ate (e.g., Bigo 2000; Huysmans 2006a). More recently there has been a discussion on the role of audiences and 
contexts (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Salter 2008; Ciuta 2009; Léonard & Kaunert 2010), the applicability of 
the CopS’s understanding of speech acts (Hansen 2000; Balzacq 2005; Wilkinson 2007), the role of images in 
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for the present study than others. Accordingly, I take a stand on the usefulness of the 
speech act approach to securitisation, and how this relates to issues such as ‘silence’ 
(Hansen 2000; Wilkinson 2007) and ‘images’ (Williams 2003; McDonald 2008a; Hansen 
2011). I also contribute to debate on whether securitisation should be a constitutive or 
a causal theory, as well as the discussions on securitisation theory’s similarity to Carl 
Schmitt’s (1996; 2003) decisionism. The most important debates are however centred 
on the applicability of the securitisation framework to political orders beyond liberal de-
mocracy and Western Europe,12 and accordingly, the main theoretical contributions of 
this study affect and are most relevant for these debates.
To shift the focus to the empirical realities of the PRC, we can note, in accordance with 
Michael Schoenhals (1992), that the analysis of speech acts is one of the best ways to 
comprehend the constitution of power structures in China. Despite such potential for 
fruitful research, this focus has been lacking in China Studies. This lack is even more strik-
ing in that there have been several studies which have dealt with the political use of lan-
guage in the context of Chinese politics (e.g., Apter & Saich 1994). Many of these studies 
focus on propaganda, which has been an important tool to create a political lexicon which 
has defined and restricted political discourse (Starr 1973, 127-43). Schoenhals (1992) 
argues that this kind of formation of strictly defined official language has been the strong-
est means of political control in China. The government has issued, and still issues, official 
lists of ‘scientific’ formulations of phrases (Schoenhals 1991) which imply a close and 
rigid connection between the signifier and the signified (cf., Culler 1994). Through these 
lists, form and content have become one, which restricts language to ‘what is’ instead of 
‘what could be’; the use of formalised language is a means for the deliberate formation of 
hegemonic discourses and a way to violently circumscribe rhetorical space and therefore 
the construction of social reality (cf., Laclau & Mouffe 2001).13
In the context of China, I propose that the theory of securitisation provides a frame-
work to study the political language of security, suppression, and resistance. While there 
is a vast literature on social mobilisation and its suppression in China, much of this is bi-
ased with either a focus on the social movements, or on their suppression. In my view, the 
theory of securitisation is a means to deal with issues of suppression and resistance from 
securitisation (Williams 2003; Möller 2007; Möller 2008; McDonald 2008a; Hansen 2011; Vuori 2010a; 2011) 
as well as what kind of a theory securitisation theory should be and how it can be applied (Balzacq 2010a; 
2010b; 2010c). These and other criticisms of the CopS approach will be discussed below in Chapter 6.
12  What is seen here as the common denominator of critical approaches to security in Europe is the problema-
tisation of security, either as a practice, social field, concept, or a form of politics (cf., Wæver 2004a; CASE 2006). 
Even though the various approaches do not agree on what emancipation means, the normative goal of critical 
studies of security here is taken to be emancipation; While for CSS security is emancipation, here the idea of 
emancipation is closer to the approach of the CopS and some other approaches where the objective is closer to 
being emancipated from ‘security’, where politics as emergency is not necessarily seen as the most appropriate 
course of action. This however does not mean that the empirical focus of critical studies of security should, 
or has to be in Europe or liberal democracies. Populaces in authoritarian or totalitarian political systems also 
need and yearn for emancipation, perhaps even more so than people in liberal democracies. Critical studies of 
security should not set its normative objective as the premise that defines what kinds of political systems to 
study. If democracy is the normalcy aimed for, non-democracies are excluded. Yet, does liberal democracy equal 
emancipation?
13  Link (1992, 6-7) also identifies these ‘two Chinese languages’, where the bifurcation of the official formula-
tions and the kind of language people use in informal situations encompasses content, style, vocabulary, and 
even grammar. Yet both of these languages are equally ‘real’: while one can be used to resist the other, both have 
real effects on real people; cf., Scott’s (1990) division of public and hidden transcripts.
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the point of view of both authorities and resisters within the same framework. Further, 
through the use of this framework of analysis, I shall indicate that China can be studied 
with the same approach as other societies and types of political orders, which opens av-
enues for comparative studies.14 In other words, China does not have to be studied as if it 
were sui generis.15
Beyond theory development and the opening up of options for comparative research 
on China, I shall also make empirical claims on the use of securitisation and desecuritisa-
tion moves in Chinese politics. I argue that ‘security’ can be used to legitimise political 
actions which run counter to the declared mores of political orders.16 This was the case in 
1966 when Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, and again in 1989, when the govern-
ment used military force against broad social protest initiated by students. Securitisation 
can also be used as a means of control or compulsion. I shall argue that this was the case 
in 1999 during the anti-Falungong campaign. While security arguments were also used 
here as a means of legitimacy, they also served the function to compel loyal citizens to 
stop the practice of Falungong.
In addition to analysing the construction of official security realities, I shall also dis-
cuss the reactions of the ‘target’ of securitisation i.e., those assigned the quality of a 
threat. The focus here is on the interaction between securitising actors and the ‘targets’ 
of securitisation. While the meaning of security as contested and negotiated has been 
identified and emphasised by various constructionist approaches to the study of security 
(see e.g., McDonald 2008b, 64), these investigations are usually limited to how political 
leaders and domestic audiences negotiate the meaning of security, or to how various ac-
tors elaborate how ‘our’ values should be defined or how ‘we’ should act. In such discus-
sions, the assumption of negotiation and contestation seems to focus on ‘us’ and ‘our’ 
security. These investigations do not focus on the interaction between the claimed ‘us’ 
and the claimed ‘threat’, or the ‘other.’ I believe that unravelling the interactions and en-
gagements between the claimed ‘us’ and ‘them’, opens up a new avenue of investigation 
14  The study also contributes to the culturalism – universalism debate that is prevalent in China Studies. By 
using a theory that is based on a universalist premise (that all human languages are conventional realisations of 
certain universal constitutive rules) the research takes a step towards universalism. The theoretical framework 
used in the study still leaves a major role for the cultural conventions of securitisation. However; securitisa-
tion is not a purely linguistic phenomenon, it is dependent on conventional cultural practices. The study thus 
suggests a mixture of universalism and culturalism. By using a framework developed in Europe, the ‘double 
burden’ of interpreting foreign cultures to domestic and international audiences is somewhat relieved as the 
results are derived from a ‘familiar’ framework. At the same time, China is brought into a framework where it 
can be subjected to international comparison without conceptual stretching.
15  While some of the emphasis on the uniqueness of China within China Studies can be seen as a form of 
‘orientalism’ (Said 1979), Chinese officials have at times engaged in a form of ‘self-orientalism’ themselves (Dai 
2002, xiv).
16  Legitimacy here refers to reasons for the acceptance of something, which cannot be coerced; something 
legitimate thus means that it is morally accepted (Berg 1988, 20). Securitisation is one way to make policies 
morally acceptable, when without the label of security they would be considered as morally unacceptable, i.e., 
illegitimate. In Berg’s (1988, 22) categorisation of acceptance, categories d-h require moral acceptance and 
thereby equal legitimacy: a) Unreasoned acceptance, b) Reasoned, coerced acceptance, c) Reasoned, uncoerced, 
immoral acceptance, d) Moral acceptance despite moral disapproval, e) Moral acceptance based on moral indif-
ference, f) Moral acceptance based on negative moral approval, g) Moral acceptance based on positive moral 
approval and h) Moral acceptance but non-moral rejection. For something to be morally accepted, i.e., legiti-
mate, means that it has to be in accord with the norms or moral principles of those whose moral acceptance is 
in question. The continuance of the existence of something whose existence is considered as legitimate is a very 
powerful way of legitimising political action; if something is portrayed as ensuring the continued existence of 
something legitimate that is under threat, it is likely that the former something is also considered legitimate.
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for Securitisation Studies. While this kind of analysis is not possible in all of the cases 
investigated here, the Tiananmen and Falungong cases provide suitable opportunities 
to discuss this dynamic.17 This part of the study focuses on the struggle of interpreta-
tions between the securitisers and the groups being securitised. Such struggles contain 
desecuritising moves, reverse-securitisation, and counter-securitisation by the groups 
affected by the securitisation moves and labels enounced by the authorities.
These kinds of ‘competitions’ are not only a feature of democratic political orders: 
securitisation moves can be contested and resisted even in non-democratic political or-
ders.18 I will demonstrate how this occurred in 1989 and in the case of the Falungong, 
but my reasoning is that interpretations of history may themselves function as a form 
of desecuritisation, which I examine in the case of the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, 
the 1976 ‘counter-revolutionary political incident at Tiananmen Square’ demonstrates 
how securitisation may not be successful even when a security status for an issue has 
been achieved. I shall therefore argue that the success or failure of securitisation should 
not be understood as only a mere felicitous achievement of speech acts vis-à-vis relevant 
audiences. The success or failure of securitisation is more broadly about the success or 
failure of the politics of securitisation. This is a question of whether or not the political 
move of securitisation has been beneficial to the securitising actor.19 In the case of 1976, 
even though an authoritative security status was achieved, in the end the politics of this 
move backfired on the party-factions that supported it.
While there has been considerable theoretical debate around the concept of securitisa-
tion, its negative corollary, desecuritisation (i.e., the removal of the ‘security label’ and 
logic from issues), has remained ‘under-theorised’ (see e.g., Aradau 2003). Desecuritisa-
tion has largely been understood in terms of the deconstruction of collective identities in 
situations where relations between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ are constituted by existential 
threats (Roe 2004, 280) i.e., they are securitised.20 In my view, while it is possible to argue 
for desecuritisation explicitly, a ‘withering away’ (Behnke 2006, 65) may be a necessary 
condition for successful desecuritisation.21 The key question here is about whether or not 
17  I focus in these discussions on an aspect of real securitisation processes that has not received much atten-
tion: the interaction between securitising actors and the ‘targets’ of securitisation. How do securitisation moves 
affect the inter-unit relations of securitising actors and the claimed threats present in securitisation moves? 
How do securitisation moves become part of the context of the subsequent stages of the process of securitisa-
tion and its possible contestation? How are securitisation and desecuritisation moves used to suppress social 
mobilisation or to resist its suppression?
18  Curley (2008, 28-29) discusses the possibilities of civil society and state bureaucracies to resist the securi-
tisation moves of elites in various types of Asian political orders. In the terminology applied in the present 
study, activities such as bureaucracies that work against elite securitisation moves is termed contestation while 
resistance is reserved for actors who do not have any formal public authority. While contestation is an impor-
tant aspect of studying ‘real’ securitisation processes, focusing on this still leaves out the interaction between 
securitising actors and threats (e.g., resistance to securitisation moves by the threat).
19  In a Habermasian (1984) vein, securitisation in this sense can be viewed as strategic action, even though 
some strands of securitisation require argumentation and genuine acceptance by various audiences.
20  Such a position has been criticised to represent and reinforce a realist view of security (see, for example, 
McDonald 2008a, 579–580). From this critical viewpoint, ‘security as emancipation’ (see, for example, Booth 
2005, particularly Wyn Jones 2005) would be preferable to the negativity of security bound to threats that 
Buzan et al. (1998) highlight. Indeed, for Wæver (e.g., 1995; 2000a), desecuritisation is a process by which 
security issues lose their ‘securityness’ and are thereby no longer restrictive by nature, as there is no need to 
repel threats, but become ‘open’ in an Arendtian sense.
21  Jef Huysmans (1995, 65-67) has proposed three approaches for desecuritisation strategies: 1) the objectiv-
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security is an institutional fact that needs maintenance.22
Desecuritisation is approached here as one of the options to ‘contest’ and ‘resist’ se-
curitisation moves, or the security status of already existant issues. Just as securitisation 
can be seen as a tactic in a politician’s ‘playbook’, desecuritisation can be seen as a coun-
termove to these types of ‘plays.’ The cases studied here show how the various identity 
frames23 that social movements and authorities produce in their interactions can be seen 
as attempts to both legitimise and illegitimise social mobilisation and through security 
discourse. The combination of securitisation and identity frame theory24 can be used to 
analyse and conceptualise the interaction between social movements and authorities, 
which has been absent in prior studies on Chinese social mobilisation and its repression, 
even though there is otherwise extensive research on the subject.
Similarly, in addition to its interactive features, resistance to securitisation has, thus 
far, not been one of the major focuses of Securitisation Studies, even though some of the 
earliest articles on securitisation by Ole Wæver (e.g., 1989b; 1995) specifically discussed 
the possibility and possible effects of failed securitisation.25 Foci in the literature have 
been those who can securitise, rather than those who can resist securitisation.26 The 
‘targets’ of securitisation have also been absent from most analyses. This is an oversight 
this study aims to remedy. Indeed, examining securitisation processes as an interaction 
between the securitising actor(s) and the target(s) of securitisation(s) may advance un-
derstanding of who (securitising actors) can securitise (political moves via speech acts) 
which issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why (perlocutionary intentions), 
with what kinds of effects (interunit relations), and under what conditions (facilitation/
impediment factors) (cf., Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998, 32). As such, these are the core 
questions of the research programme of Securitisation Studies.27
With these general objectives in mind, the present study has engaged a variety of prob-
lems and questions. A major problem that needed clarification has been how to infer po-
ist strategy, 2) the constructivist strategy, and 3) the deconstructivist strategy. 
22  Searle (1995, 43): as long as people continue to recognise X as to have the status function of Y, the institu-
tional fact is maintained.
23  Frames are here understood as interpretive schemata that simplify and condense “the world out there by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions in one’s 
past” (Snow & Benford 1992, 137).  For security analysis that utilises frame theory, see Eriksson (2001a; 2001b) 
and Bendrath et al. (2007).
24  Paltemaa & Vuori (2006); see Chapter 6.1.2. below.
25  Failed securitisation has recently received more attention; see for example Mak (2006); Salter (2008; 2009); 
Stritzel (2009); Ruzicka (2009); Vuori (2005; 2010a).
26  The reasoning here is that, especially in non-democratic settings such as the PRC, securitisation and desecu-
ritisation provide a logic for legitimising suppression and resistance respectively, while the vocabulary of both 
of these is drawn from the resonant values, myths, laws, and proclamations of the authorities.  As an attempt 
to raise the cost of resistance, authorities resort to framing activists with identities that make them appear as a 
threat to certain referent objects which are usually some valuable goals of the regime. Activists then attempt to 
desecuritise their movement by invoking identities that are aligned with these same values and framing their 
activities as conducive to them, rather than as threats. The necessity of responding to the issue of security is 
forced on activists and becomes a prime constraint on their identity framings.
27  For Wæver (2008b, 582), the task of Securitisation Studies is not to settle the question of ‘what is security’, 
but to empirically study “who manages to securitise what under what conditions and how,” and “what are the 
effects of this, […] [h]ow does the politics of a given issue change when it shifts from being a normal political 
issue to becoming ascribed the urgency, priority and drama of ‘a matter of security.’” Further, “national security 
is […] social in the sense of being constituted intersubjectively in a specific field, and it should not be measured 




litical functions from political speech in general and in ‘security speech’ in particular. In 
more specific terms, this issue is about the identification of a ‘security modality’ (Hansen 
2000, 296) or a ‘security rationale’ (Huysmans 2006a, 147) in a sample of discourse, 
in the absence of ‘security words’. The key problem then is to discern how security can 
be achieved with words. Beyond such general methodological issues, of interest is to in-
vestigate how securitisation functions in non-democracies, and outside the ‘West’. A key 
methodological problem to solve here is how to shift from one socio-political context to 
another, without stretching the concept of securitisation.
Beyond such general problems that relate to both language theory as well as the study 
of concepts, securitisation has generally been viewed as a means to bypass the ‘normal’ 
rules of the political process (see for example Wæver 1995 and Buzan et al. 1998), which 
has often led to a ‘democratic bias’ in the theory: normal politics easily translates as the 
democratic process. Of interest here is to investigate the role of securitisation in political 
systems where there is no democratic process to move issues away from. In other words, 
to study the utility of security issues, when they are not used to legitimise decisions and 
policies that go beyond democratic decision-making.
The above problems have to be solved in order to apply securitisation theory to the 
study of Chinese politics. These research problems are discussed in this study through 
four empirical examples from the People’s Republic of China. All of the selected cases 
have been subjected to the following set of questions, which have worked to guide and 
structure the analysis, as well as to make it systematic:28
How is the issue constructed as a matter of security (speech act analysis)? What 
is the threat? What is the referent object of security? Who frames something as an 
issue of security / who or what is the securitising actor? Who or what is the audi-
ence of securitisation? Who or what are the functional actors (actors influencing 
securitisation without being referent objects or securitising actors)? What are the 
facilitation and impediment factors in the processes of securitisation? How do secu-
28  Similar sets of questions have been suggested by other appliers of the securitisation framework.
Curley & Wong (2008b, 5-6) asked a set of seven questions from the authors of their edited volume (Curley & 
Wong 2008a): 1) Issue area: What is the issue under threat, and what/who is posing an existential threat? Is 
there consensus among various actors on the threat posed? 2) Securitising actors: Who are the main securitising 
actors? In the case of governmental representatives, which branches of bureaucracies have interests to securi-
tise/desecuritise the issue? What other actors are involved? 3) Security concept: What type of security concept 
is being used to identify a referent object? What is the interaction and power balance of possible contending 
security concepts in the securitisation process? 4) Process: What is the process by which speech acts are used 
to identify threats? Who or what are ‘speaking’ security? What are the politics of threat identification? Is the 
focus on speech acts sufficient or should other forms of political communication be considered (e.g., persuasion 
via images)? 5) Outcome I: Has securitisation actually taken place? What indicators can be used to identify 
the outcome of securitisation? What resistance is there to securitisation, and what/who is active? What is the 
overall outcome: success, failure, uncertain, unintended consequences and/or mixed evidence? 6) Outcome II 
(impact of the threat): What impact has the securitisation (or securitising move) had on the handling of the 
threat? Are calls to invoke national or military security conducive or undesirable to solving the issue? What are 
the potential downsides of securitisation? 7) Conditions affecting securitisation: How does the nature of the 
issue area and its linkages, the role of powerful actors, the domestic political system, and international norms 
affect the process of securitisation? 
Ciuta (2009, 317) proposes a set of five questions for identifying relevant dimensions that can reveal how 
security is constructed in context: 1) How are threats constructed; which issues become threats? Are pre-exist-
ing threats attached to referent objects; what is the role of actors’ histories, identities, and strategic myths? 2) 
How does something become a referent object of security? 3) How are securitisation actors constructed? 4) 
How are security measures constructed? 5) What does security mean?
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ritisation moves affect the inter-unit relations of securitising actors and the claimed 
threats present in securitisation moves? How do securitisation moves become part 
of the context of the subsequent stages of the process of securitisation and its pos-
sible contestation or resistance? More specifically, how are securitisation and dese-
curitisation moves used to suppress social mobilisation or to resist its suppression? 
Finally, how successful were the politics of securitisation/desecuritisation?
While the present study is not a historical narrative of securitisation in China, even in 
the political sector, the case studies have been used to obtain some sense of the politi-
cal use of security over the longer term. Many scholars who study Chinese politics have 
argued that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the Chinese political 
order. Some argue, for example, that while Mao’s China was totalitarian, post-Mao China 
with its various reforms and openings up has become authoritarian, or that it is moving 
towards the eventual ‘teleological’ goal of democratisation. Others, however, see China 
as still totalitarian or post-totalitarian, which entails that the Chinese political order is 
something beyond mere authoritarian autocratic rule. Of interest here is: what can the 
case studies situated in three leadership eras of the PRC tell us about the type of the Chi-
nese political order? Has the use of security in the identification of enemies altered? To 
combine these two issues: do the case studies reveal continuities or changes in terms of 
the core values of the Chinese political order and the way asymmetric concepts are used 
in Chinese politics?
1.1. The Theoretical Framework of the Study
Even though considered for a long time merely an offshoot of International Relations – 
and a conservative and policy oriented one at that – ‘Security Studies’ has been identified 
as the source of some of the most vibrant theoretical discussions in the field of IR (Huys-
mans 1998a; Eriksson 2001a; Williams 2003). One of the most notable parties in this 
discussion has been the Copenhagen School with the theory of securitisation as perhaps 
the most interesting and controversial contribution.
Securitisation theory has been broadly embraced and it can already be considered 
an extensive research programme that covers a variety of topics (Wæver 2003).29 The 
research programme allows scholars to approach security issues from several angles that 
range from philosophy and ethics to the sociology of security practices.30 The core of the 
research programme (in the vein of Imre Lakatos [1970]) is the premise that security 
is an intersubjective and self-referential practice, achieved through speech acts. 31 This 
29  Lakatos’s (1970) notion of research programmes is more befitting here than Larry Laudan’s (1977) notion 
of research traditions. In the field of IR, the label of research traditions is stuck to approaches such as realism, 
liberalism, Marxism, neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, postmodernism, and feminism 
(see e.g., Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008). For examples of IR approaches discussed through Lakatos’ notion, see 
Vasquez (1997), and Elman and Elman (2002).
30  CASE (2006) displays how approaches near the Copenhagen School can study similar or related issues from 
other angles.
31  The core of securitisation theory is often presented by both Wæver (1995, 55) and his critics as the phrase: 
“security can be considered as a speech act.” In my view this is, however, not entirely accurate: security is not 
a speech act, but securitisation is. It would be more precise to express the CopS’s idea by noting that security 
issues are constructed or labelled through securitisation speech acts. Although many threats, referent objects 
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leading idea brings disparate approaches to security and securitisation together (see e.g., 
Balzacq 2010b). The different approaches can be seen to form the research programme’s 
secondary hypotheses which can be adjusted or dismissed, in accordance with empirical 
anomalies, without compromising the core assumption of the programme; the core con-
tains the most basic assumptions, while the ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ are used to apply the 
theory to specific cases.
The theory of securitisation forms the theoretical framework for the present study. 
This approach does not take security as a given necessity, but sees it as an intersubjective 
construction. By drawing on constructionist language theory, securitisation is considered 
to be about the power politics of a concept, that of security. According to this view, the 
construction of security issues does not make it necessary to have ‘objective threats’, but 
intersubjective ones. Issues can be saddled with ‘security’ implications irrespective of 
whether there is a ‘real’ threat or not, yet issues have to be labelled for them to have the 
status function of ‘security.’ Murray Edelman (1972, 69) already noted that many threats 
claimed by state administrations are actually intangible in that the reality of the threat is 
itself unverifiable and a subject of dispute. The CopS’s understanding of the social con-
struction of security concurs with this observation. For Edelman (ibid., 71), only intangi-
ble threats allow polarising role-taking, which permits exaggeration and the justification 
of unfavourable policy choices. If the claimed threat is clearly observable, tangible and 
undergoes systematic scrutiny, perceptions of its character and the techniques required 
to deal with it, converge. This would make the political use of threats more difficult, which 
may be why intangible threats may be preferable to definite, tangible examples of threats. 
Indeed, the labels ‘real’ securitisation processes offer, work towards providing legitimacy 
for the political actions the actor enunciating these concerns is trying to achieve.32 This 
approach and understanding does not deny that many issues on the security agenda have 
to do with the existence of referent objects, but deals more with problems that follow 
from the possibility to construct almost any issue to be of an issue of ‘national security.’33 
The framework thus supplements other ways of studying security34 through a problema-
tisation of the concept and practices of security. 
When viewed more specifically than Edelman’s (1972) general observation of the 
symbolic uses of politics, securitisation is revealed to be an illocutionary speech act (Aus-
tin 1975; Searle & Vanderveken 1985), where an existential threat is ‘produced’ in rela-
and means of repelling threats are based on ‘brute reality’, security is a socially constructed, intersubjective and 
self-referential practice (Buzan et al. 1998, 24, 31), the important criterion being the “securityness of security” 
(Wæver 1997a, 24). This means that security itself is not a speech act. For Wæver (1997a, 14), security signifies 
(X counts as Y in context C [Searle 1969, 35]) the presence of an existential threat and adequate measures for 
dealing with it (while insecurity signifies the presence of a security problem without the means of handling it). 
Securitisation on the other hand is a complex speech act, which has a key role in the social construction of the 
status function of security; ‘security’ follows from the perlocutionary effects of this constellation of elementary 
speech acts. I shall elaborate on this argument in Chapter 6.3.1. below.
32  See Chapter 6.3.1. on how securitisation relates to theories of action.
33  For example Upadhyaya (2006, 17) has observed a tendency in Asian post-colonial states to hoist “the 
spectre of external threat” through securitising speech acts; this caters well to domestic constituencies in terms 
of electoral gains. In post-colonial states the state itself may well be a site of contestation among various social 
groups, and the political and military constellations may find it expedient to see ‘enemy aliens’ threatening to 
disrupt the territorial integrity of the state (Alagappa 1998). 
34  See for example Baylis et al. (2007), Collins (2007), Williams (2008a), and Buzan & Hansen (2009) on preva-
lent contemporary approaches to the study of security.
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tion to a referent object; an act of securitisation is to classify an issue as an existential 
threat which requires drastic measures.35 If securitisation is ‘successful’, legitimacy or 
some other perlocutionary effect sought by the enunciator created through the widening 
social process, that consists of increased and possibly escalated instances of acts of secu-
ritisation, or securitisation moves, enables the speaker to ‘break the rules’ that normally 
constrict behaviour and policies. This allows the question to shift into an area of ‘special 
politics’ – the politics of utmost priority.36
In a way, the theory of securitisation describes the frame, script, plot or grammar of 
security (see Chapter 6.) – the way we have learned to understand what security is and 
what is security, as well as how something becomes security. Securitisation describes the 
process of creation of the social fact of security, but the script or plot of security contains 
further elements. The script of security entails priority and utmost importance. A schema 
or prototype of security has six variables: a securitising actor, a referent object, a threat, 
an audience, facilitating conditions, and functional actors.
Within the framework of securitisation, security is understood as a ‘structured field 
of practices’ (Buzan et al. 1998, 31; Bigo 2000; Wæver 2000a; Williams 2003; Huysmans 
2002; Balzacq 2005; cf., Bourdieu 1991) where some people and collective actors are 
more privileged to speak and construct security issues than others. These securitising 
actors securitise issues by claiming/declaring the existence of something – the referent 
object – to be threatened. Relationships among subjects are not equal or symmetrical. 
The chance of successful securitisation is highly dependent on the position, or the socio-
political capital,37 of the actor who is attempting to securitise a target. Since security re-
ality is intersubjective, a securitising move is an attempt as no person is guaranteed the 
ability to force others to accept a claim of the necessity for security action (Wæver 1995). 
35  Buzan (2008, 553): “Securitization is when something is successfully constructed as an existential threat 
to a valued referent object, and that construction is then used to support exceptional measures in response”; 
Wæver (2008b, 582): “Securitization is the discursive and political process through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a 
valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”
36  The logic is that if ‘a’ claims all of ‘A’ to be threatened by ‘B’, this is generally accepted as valid and powerful 
and ‘a’ gains acceptance for doing ‘X.’ If we take Matti Wiberg’s (1988, 65) definition of legitimacy: “some politi-
cal entity X has political legitimacy in relation to some actors or criteria Y judged by Z to do acts A at the time t 
on grounds G,” as a basis, we can say that the acts A of the securitising actor X, that would normally be judged 
as non-legitimate in relation to criteria Y at the time t by Z, are considered legitimate in relation to the criteria Y 
at the time t by Z on grounds G. Thus, the perlocutionary effect of securitisation in its original conceptualisation 
is political legitimacy; securitisation legitimates action otherwise deemed non-legitimate. See Chapter 6.4.2. on 
other possible political functions securitisation may serve.
37  The notion of socio-political capital refers here to the various assets people engaged in political activities 
can draw on to garner support for their views and suggestions. Such assets include formal positions, social 
networks, as well as the possibility to deploy symbols and frames. Such symbols and frames are viewed here as 
repositories of symbolic capital (e.g., prestige, honour, attention), which can be used to wield symbolic power, 
and to commit symbolic violence. This kind of a view on social assests is mainly influenced by Bourdieu (1977; 
1991).
The notion of socio-political capital is closely connected with other concepts, such as practice, habitus, and field. 
For Bourdieu (1984, 101), the relationship between habitus, social capital and practice, can be symbolically 
represented as: “([habitus] + [capital]) + field = practice.” Here, ‘habitus’ is “a set of dispositions which incline 
agents to act and react in certain ways” (Thompson 1991, 12), i.e., habitalised conduct of life, ‘capital’ is the 
distribution of resources, and ‘field’ is analogous to a game with a structured space of positions where actors 
play as enabled by their capital and habitus. A practice then is how the various positions, dispositions and 
resources are played out. Different fields demand different kinds of habitus and capital. From this point of view, 
security can be seen to form its own ‘cultural field’ (Williams 2007c, 40). 
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Despite this, security is a structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of 
power by virtue of their accepted voices of security. Indeed, some sectors of security poli-
tics even have institutions, the authority of which is required to bring about a security re-
ality.38 In China, for example, the Communist party (中国共产党, Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng; 
CCP) has authoritative positions from which official security issues are phrased. The par-
amount leader has a key role in the ‘trickle down effect’ of official propaganda and also a 
major role in the construction of security issues. 
For Buzan et al. (1998, 23) securitisation raises an issue into the special domain of 
security, where issues are no longer debated as political questions, but dealt with in 
ways that may violate existing legal or social rules in an expedient way. Acts of securi-
tisation bring together, or even constitute, both actors and objects.39 Securitising actors 
are “actors who securitise issues by declaring something – a referent object – existen-
tially threatened” (ibid., 36). Referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially 
threatened and that they have a legitimate claim to survival” (ibid.). Other relevant ‘vari-
ables’ in processes of securitisation include functional actors who “affect the dynamics 
of a sector [w]ithout being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf 
of the referent object” (ibid.), and facilitating/impeding conditions which “are the condi-
tions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or 
is abused” (ibid., 32). These conditions fall into two categories: “1) the internal, linguistic-
grammatical – to follow the rules of the act, and 2) the external, contextual and social – to 
hold a position from which the act can be made” (ibid., 32-33).
More specifically, the referent object of security is something that is considered to de-
serve a continued existence, while its existence is claimed/declared to be under threat 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 36; see also Wæver 2008b, 582). The issue of the ‘proper referents’ 
of security is the aspect of security that has been the focus of the ‘widening debate’ that 
was especially prevalent in ISS during the 1980s and 1990s.40 Even though societies differ 
in assessments of what is generally considered necessary to survive, the referent object 
of security in the political sector has traditionally been the state. The CopS framework 
contains other sectors, but in the present study the focus is on the political sector: it is 
assumed to provide the greatest contrast among types of political order, and thus is the 
only sector considered here.
Who ‘speaks’ security is especially relevant for the construction of security issues. 
Even though securitising actors are usually governments, politicians, bureaucrats, lobby-
ists, or pressure groups, they usually speak of security on behalf of some larger communi-
38  The original CopS framework contains five sectors of security i.e., military, political, societal, environmental, 
economic. Laustsen & Wæver (2000) proposed the addition of a religious sector and Wæver (2008b) also 
discusses the possibility of considering gender and ‘functional’ security as sectors as well. Beyond the ‘core’ 
of the CopS, Nissenbaum & Hansen (2009) have promoted the addition of ‘cybersecurity’ as its own sector of 
security.
39  As Huysmans (2006a, 49) notes, to frame something as a danger is not only just about the identification of 
urgent threats to referent objects, it is also a politically constitutive act that ‘asserts and reproduces the unity 
of the political community’ it is being voiced in or in the name of. Securitisation is not only about attempts to 
defend the autonomy and existence of a referent object from threats, it is also a ‘mode of carving out a place of 
one’s own’ in the world; it is about reproduction of the referent object itself.
40  Despite this debate, the role of the referent object in regard to the audience has not been the subject of much 
theoretical discussion. Can Mutlu (2011) suggests that the referent should have an ‘a priori affective relation to 
the audience’ in order for a securitising move to be successful.
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ty e.g., the state or nation.41 Thus, it is not as informative to consider the actual individual 
who articulates the speech act, but the collective she claims to represent as the securitis-
ing actor. This is rather challenging, because unlike with referent objects, speech acts of 
securitisation are not always self-defining in terms of who or what speaks. Securitising 
actors in the political sector are, however, relatively institutionalised and thereby well 
defined, when compared to other sectors of security. States by definition have authorita-
tive leaders, of which governments generally are those which formally articulate security 
on behalf of the state.
The audience(s) of securitisation(s) are those the securitising actor attempts to con-
vince to accept the security nature of an issue. Indeed, for Buzan et al. (1998) the audi-
ence has to be convinced, in order for the securitisation move to be successful. From this 
point of view, as securitisation is an intersubjective practice, the perlocutionary effects 
of securitisation acts are what should be used to estimate the success or failure of se-
curitisation, by which audiences have major roles in processes of securitisation.42 The 
empirical estimation of legitimacy is a very tricky prospect, and thereby the study of only 
the perlocutionary effects of certain securitisation acts is not enough: the estimation of 
the success of a certain policy requires socio-political analysis beyond speech act theory. 
Such an analysis is made even more difficult because just as the issue of who speaks is 
pertinent to identify securitising actors, the audience is similarly not as clear as it may 
at first seem. There may be plural audiences, and various types of acts of securitisation 
require or work with different audiences.
For Pierre Bourdieu (1991, 72-75), performative utterances are effects of symbolic 
domination. The power of different speakers depends on their symbolic capital i.e., the 
recognition they receive from a group. This symbolic capital, be it institutionalised or 
informal, can only function if there is a convergence of social conditions, distinct from 
the linguistic logic of discourse. Appropriate senders and receivers have to be present in 
the social situation (cf., Austin 1975). For Bourdieu, speech acts are acts of institution, 
and they are inseparable from the existence of the institution that defines the conditions, 
which have to be fulfilled for the ‘magic’ of the words to operate.43 For Bourdieu then, the 
conditions of felicity are social conditions; the real source of the magic of performative 
utterances lies in the ‘mystery of ministry’, where the representative embodies physically 
the constituted body of the aggregate of individuals.
The framework of securitisation directs our attention to how issues of security are 
‘made’ in social fields of practice. While features of the contexts of such processes of con-
struction are important for empirical investigations, instances of speech acts of securiti-
sation constitute the point of departure for analysis. This sets limits for what the approach 
can be used to study. What is of interest here is ‘intersubjective text’ in that the theory of 
41  De Wilde (2008) divides securitising actors into public and private actors, which accordingly have different 
formal positions from which they can claim to be speaking on behalf of something.
42  It is important to note here that while the audience has a key role in regard to the success and failure of the 
illocutionary act of securitisation, the illocutionary aspect is of great import: in illocution the move is made 
towards a ‘status transformation’ towards ‘security’, and irrespective of the success and failure of such a move, 
it already can have a bearing on the social situation. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.2.3.
43  As Habermas (1984) however notes, some speech acts are more formal and institutionalised than others. 
Habermas himself is interested in speech acts that are unfettered by institutions and strategic goals; he is inter-
ested in speech acts that allow communicative action, while, for him, institutionalised speech acts are more 
often about strategic action.
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securitisation does not allow access to ‘other minds’ or to the ‘real’ motives of political 
speakers. It does, however, allow the analysis of what securitisation ‘does’ in such texts; 
the theory of securitisation allows the analysis of how a text reasons, and thereby what it 
means. While we cannot know what someone meant by producing, or indeed why some-
one elected to produce, an utterance, we can use the theory of securitisation to infer what 
such an utterance does conventionally and thereby what it means conventionally. While 
something can be intended as a reassurance, it can also be received as a threat; yet both 
of these possibilities can be inferred from the speech act.
As was already suggested above, the language philosophical or linguistic root of secu-
ritisation theory is taken seriously in this study and the foundations of the approach are 
sought along it. Therefore, the focus here is on certain aspects of processes of securitisa-
tion: instead of branching out into multiple aspects (e.g., political spectacles, technocratic 
fields of power, political theory and techniques of government; cf., Huysmans 2006a), the 
focus here is principally on speech acts.44 While working along this root of the framework 
has its limitations, making the roots of the approach stronger also makes its trunk more 
solid, and this actually facilitates the branching out of the approach into other directions. 
Furthermore, such a strengthening of this root makes it possible to plant the approach 
into foreign soil. 
1.2. The Research Methods, Materials and the Case-Selection of the Study
In Max Weber’s (1994) terms, research is only interested in a part of the (significant) 
reality of infinitely complex phenomena. The part of reality under analysis in the present 
study is the use of security arguments in specific cases. Case studies have long been stere-
otyped as “a weak sibling among social science methods,” as they are considered to pro-
vide a poor basis for scientific generalisation (or just to have poor external validity) (Yin 
1994, xiii). This kind of prejudice against case studies confuses case studies with survey 
research, where samples are used to generalise into a larger population, and where gen-
eralisation is based on statistical methods. Yin (1994) contends that case studies, like 
scientific experiments, attempt to generalise a particular set of observed results into a 
broader theory and not to a broader population, as in survey research. The goal is not to 
enumerate sample frequencies (‘statistical generalisation’) but to expand and general-
ise theories (‘analytic generalisation’). In analytic generalisation, a previously developed 
theory is used as a template to analyse and compare the empirical results of case studies. 
If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication will be claimed. 
According to Eckstein (1975) and George & Bennett (2004), the analysis of crucial cases45 
is the most appropriate way to construct or develop theory. As critical theory develop-
ment is one of the purposes of the present study, cases beyond the usual scope of the ap-
plication of the theory of securitisation are subjected to standardised, general questions, 
44  Political spectacles can be on a massive or majestic scale, which emphasises the difference between the 
mundanity of everyday life, and the importance of the political ritual. Artificial settings facilitate an audience’s 
concentration on suggestions, connotations, emotions and authority (Edelman 1972, 96). The symbolic setting 
of the political act guides the emotional response of the audience, and can have important facilitation or impedi-
ment influences on the perlocutionary effect of the illocutionary political act.
45  Although observation cannot tell us whether something is ’true’ or not, broadening the study of empirical 




the aim of which is  to make the research ‘structured and focused.’ In Lijphart’s (1971) 
classic categorisation of case studies, the research fits into both theory-confirming/
infirming and interpretative categories. In other words, the cases are instrumental for 
theory development.
In addition to expanding the extension of the theory of securitisation, by proposition 
of further ‘strands’ of securitisation beyond the original formulation of Wæver (1989a; 
1995), this study develops a method to analyse the constitution of securitisation moves. 
This method is explicitly based on speech act analysis, and builds on the logical analysis 
of speech acts (Searle 1969; Searle & Vanderveken 1985). While Wæver’s theory of se-
curitisation is based on speech act theory, the majority of empirical studies done within 
the framework have not relied on speech act analysis as such (Balzacq 2010a, 60). I argue 
that the explication of securitisation via speech act logic, provides clarity for various oth-
er means to analyse processes of securitisation (see Balzacq 2010b for various methods 
to study securitisation).
The starting-point for securitisation analysis here, is the constitution of securitisation 
moves. That the analysis of such moves is based on illocutionary logic (Searle & Vander-
veken 1985; see Chapter 6.4.1.2.) does not, however, imply that the linguistic rules of 
speech acts are entirely determinant, or that the study of securitisation should only focus 
on linguistic analysis. The research methods applied in the study combine both linguistic 
and socio-political analysis that are necessary to understand the performative of securiti-
sation in real situations and contexts. The method of inquiry is based on pragmatics (the 
study of the ways in which meaning is derived from the interaction of utterances, with 
the contexts in which they are used) and not purely on semantics (the study of meaning) 
or universal linguistic rules. By departing from cross-cultural pragmatics in this way, the 
present study rests between the poles of current debates, which revolve around whether 
securitisation should be a constitutive or causal theory and around whether a philosophi-
cal or a sociological approach to the study of securitisation is more appropriate (e.g., 
Balzacq 2005; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Stritzel 2007). The argument here is that a linguistic 
or a sociological approach to the study of actually occurred acts of securitisation cannot 
replace one or the other. Instead, they should be seen as complementary. Norman Fair-
clough (1992, 72-73) has put forward a similar argument with his three dimensional, tex-
tually oriented approach to discourse analysis. His goal was to bring together textual and 
linguistic analysis, analysis of social practices and structures, and the analysis of com-
monsense social procedures. For Fairclough, all of these analytical traditions are indis-
pensable for textually oriented discourse analysis. For securitisation analysis, the most 
relevant social practices, structures and procedures are, by nature, socio-political. Here, 
the sociological aspects of securitisation are based or built on linguistic aspects: I reason 
that just as the sociological study of conversation should be developed from a basis of 
illocutionary linguistics (Wierzbicka 1991, 254), the sociological study of securitisation 
should similarly have a linguistic founding.
I believe that such a linguistic foundation for securitisation theory allows it to be used 
in cross-cultural investigations. In this way, moving to historical, social and political con-
texts beyond the original application of securitisation theory, means that care must be 
taken not to ‘stretch’ the original concepts (cf., Sartori 1970). Moving from one social 
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context to another, or use of cross-cultural comparisons, requires a culture-independent 
descriptive framework. In order to study different ‘cultures’ in their culture-specific fea-
tures, both a universal perspective and a culture-independent analytical framework are 
required.46 To avoid the distorting effect of the assumption that our concepts are culture-
free analytical tools, a near universal perspective from within one’s own culture must be 
sought to develop a framework of near universal human concepts that will be accessible 
to most specific languages. The cultural specificity of our analytical concepts cannot be 
escaped, yet at the same token, a distant culture cannot be understood ‘in its terms’ with-
out, at the same time, understanding it ‘in our own’ too. 
Illocutionary logic provides a meta-language to undertake cross-cultural studies of 
securitisation: it can be used to decompose illocutionary forces and thus avoid the an-
glocentrism of supposing universalities from the use of the English language. Acts of 
securitisation may not be achieved, or indeed manifested, in all societies or languages, 
but illocutionary logic can be used as a tool in the empirical study of whether illocu-
tionary acts of securitisation do occur in specific situations, in any social context.47 Thus, 
even though security means different things to different societies, as the core fears of 
any group or nation are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences 
(Wæver 1989b, 301), the social constitution of security can be studied with illocution-
ary logic, since human utterances universally exhibit ‘force.’ Which particular forces are 
universal or near universal, though, is a question for empirical linguistics, not securitisa-
tion studies.48 Nevertheless, illocutionary logic provides a means to describe illocution-
ary forces encoded into different languages, as well as specific utterances, in considerable 
detail (when necessary) and to compare these forces both intra- and inter-linguistically. 
The linguistic comparison of acts of securitisation provides a basis to undertake cross-
cultural comparisons of processes of securitisation; a broader categorisation of securiti-
sation49 allows movement beyond the European and liberal democratic political context 
in studies of securitisation.
46  As well as a semantic language that is in essence independent of any particular language or culture and that 
is accessible and open to interpretation through any language (Wierzbicka 1991, 6-9).
47  While thanking, requiring, and ordering may be ‘folk-taxonomies’ (Wierzbicka 1991, 151-153), illocutionary 
logic does not deal with illocutionary verbs like Austin (1975) did, but with illocutionary force instead. While 
criticising Searle (1975) of anglocentrism, Wierzbicka (1991, 196) herself uses the idea of ‘directives’ to display 
a cross-cultural practice; “the point is that orders, commands, and requests have something in common” (ibid., 
200), i.e., they are ‘directives’ in terms of their illocutionary force (Searle & Vanderveken 1985). While illocu-
tionary verbs may be based on culture-dependent ‘folk-taxonomies’, illocutionary logic is an artificial language 
that describes illocutionary forces in an abstract way which suffices for the tasks of the present study.
48  Languages are self-contained systems (unlike texts, which are intertextual) and no words or construc-
tions can have absolute equivalents in different languages. But as soon as we abandon the notion of absolute 
equivalents and universals, we may be able to find partial equivalents and ‘partial universals.’ Even though two 
languages do not have identical networks of relationships of signs, we can expect to find some correspondences 
between the networks of relationships of two different languages. (Wierzbicka 1991, 10.) We should also not 
confuse illocutionary verbs with illocutionary forces; verbs are language specific, but illocutionary forces may 
have broader universality across languages than certain verbs.
While Wierzbicka (1991, 8) develops a ‘natural semantic metalanguage’ consisting of some 20 lexical univer-
sals (Pronouns: I, you, someone, something; Determiners: this, the same, two, all; Classifiers: kind of, part of; 
Adjectives: good, bad; Verbs: want, don’t want, say, think, know, do, happen; Modals: can, if/imagine; Place/
Time: place, time, after [before], above [under]; Linkers: like, because), the present study does not require a 
metalanguage that would cover all possible forms of interaction: illocutionary logic is a sufficient tool to analyse 
securitisation speech acts.
49  See Chapter 6.4.2. below.
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While illocutionary logic provides the means to study the ‘grammar’, or necessary cul-
ture-independent meta-language for the cross-cultural study of securitisation processes, 
identity frame theory is used here to decipher the specific ‘vocabulary’, the situated pools 
of resonant values (Stritzel 2007), or the heuristic artefacts (Balzacq 2010a; 2010c) of 
the empirical case under investigation. In a way, while illocutionary logic is used to study 
the “langue” of securitisation, frame theory helps us to study the “parole” of the cases 
investigated here (cf., Culler 1994). The ‘grammatical’ models50 of securitisation are used 
to identify relevant texts and discourse samples for analysis; as Wæver (2004a, 9) notes, 
it is necessary to be able to discern and separate security issues from non-security issues. 
Once the relevant discourse samples have been identified, collected and analysed with 
speech act analysis, it can be determined whether or not a securitisation discourse is 
present. Thereafter discourse samples can be analysed further by socio-linguistic means. 
Finally, the analysis can be broadened into the historically situated socio-political con-
texts beyond the specific samples of discourse.51
The way to study securitisation here is to examine discourse which has actually oc-
curred through a ‘lens of security’ (Buzan et al. 1998). In practise, this means analysis 
of texts to identify the rhetorical structures that define security and the rhetorical and 
other means of facilitating the various securitisation speech acts. The relevant arguments 
of these texts are deconstructed using speech act analysis and the securitisation frame-
work. This analysis aids comprehension of the basis to the legitimacy of the arguments, 
the referent objects, threats and other aspects, that are relevant to the social construction 
of security. This is a means of getting to the bare bones of security arguments and thereby 
emphasise the argumentative nature of security claims. No issue is one of security by 
‘nature.’
As Norman Fairclough (1992, 225) notes, there is no general blueprint for how to un-
dertake discourse analysis.52 This becomes evident on realisation that there is no com-
50  It has to be kept in mind that no grammar is complete, and that grammars are abstract models. This works 
in tune with the instrumentalist take on science applied in the present study: the study is conducted ‘as if ’ there 
were such a thing as ‘securitisation.’
51  Wæver (2005, 39-40) describes a model for doing discourse analysis which consists of synchronic and 
diachronic components. The synchronic component comprises of developing a structural model consisting of 
contexts, actors, and years. The diachronic component moves through time with the actors to see if the struc-
tures shape action and how the structures are modified and reproduced. While the synchronic component 
focuses on internal relationships of structures and agents as instances of discourse, the diachronic component 
treats these as external and interactive. This also means that the second aspect of the analysis requires the 
study of actors and processes beyond specific discourse samples.
This distinction has been used at least since Saussure’s sign theory. Reinhart Koselleck’s (2004a) ‘Begriffs-
geschichte’ also combines diachronic and synchronic aspects. For Koselleck (Tribe 2004, xiv-xv) concepts’ 
meanings involve their placements in hierarchies of meaning: varying concepts can play various roles in 
complex networks of semantic change. Here, basic diachronic perspectives are similarly supplemented with 
synchronic insights. 
52  As Wæver (2005, 41) notes, one has to ask how texts argue, not what they say. For him, discourse analysis 
has to be limited to public aspects of texts (Wæver 2001, 26-27): “Discourse analysis works on public texts. It 
does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans. […] What 
interests us is neither what individual decision makers really believe, not what are shared beliefs among a 
population, but which codes are used when actors relate to each other.” Such an approach to discourse analysis 
often receives criticism that belittles ‘rhetoric’: politicians’ talk is often presented as ‘mere’ rhetoric, or even 
worse, as ‘mere constructions’, implying that people’s ‘real’ motives remain hidden.
Wæver (2005, 35) however argues that working with public text should be turned into a strength rather than 
a weakness: texts both allow and disallow possibilities; structures both enable and restrict. The types of criti-
cism that would prefer to get at speakers’ ‘real’ motives would require a causal theory of securitisation. Wæver 
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mon agreement on what ‘discourse’ means. Different uses of the concept of discourse, 
discourse theory, and discourse analysis have to be distinguished. Some types of analysis 
focus on different discursive forms used in communication (e.g., Brown & Yule 1983), 
while the discourse analysis practised by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) and 
Slavoj Žižek (2002a) for example, conceptualise discourses as broader totalities; their 
aim is to unveil some local truths by questioning ideological horizons, which deny the 
contingency of criteria for truth and falsehood (cf., Torfing 2003). Two further options 
for ‘discourse’ are provided by Michel Foucault. In his ‘archeological’ works (e.g., Foucault 
1970; 1972), Foucault views discourse analysis as concerned with the analysis of ‘state-
ments.’ For Foucault, such analysis of language does not replace other types of analysis. 
As Fairclough (1992, 40) argues, this understanding of discourse has the consequence 
that discourse analysis should not be equated with linguistic analysis: Foucault was in-
terested in systems of rules that make certain statements at various times, places and 
institutions possible, yet not others.53 This deeply structuralist position shifted some-
what in Foucault’s works (e.g., 1979a; 2007) which emphasised systems of power and the 
management of populations through ‘techniques of power.’54 Both of Foucault’s insights 
influenced Fairclough (1992, 56-57) in developing his textually oriented discourse analy-
sis, which takes into account three dimensions, viz. analysis of text, analysis of discourse 
processes of text production and interpretation, and analysis of the discursive ‘event’ 
in terms of its social conditions and effects on various levels. We should thus separate 
discourse as communication above the sentence from discourse as knowledge-power 
nexuses. Indeed, there are numerous ways to approach discourse and thereby various 
approaches to the study of discourse.
While speech act theory is the main theoretical focus here, there are other possibilities 
to approach human interaction, even in terms of communication. While securitisation 
i.e., the social construction of security issues, is the form of social practice centred on 
here, a variety of traditions of thought influences the way it is studied. Speech act theory 
and discourse analysis, as guided by a multidisciplinary amalgam of approaches includ-
ing International Relations theory, Securitisation theory, political theory and linguistics, 
is the method used to analyse this form of social practice in the PRC. This kind of focus 
on the constitution and the political and social functions of securitisation sets limits on 
(2007a) is however post-structuralist in his understanding of politics as an openness, also in terms of surpluses 
of meaning. For him, securitisation is a constitutive theory. It is about how issues are constituted as issues 
of security. He similarly argues for the study of securitisation within text. Scholars should look for transcen-
dental signifieds, the centre of discourses featuring securitisation. In his Derrida-inspired approach, it is not 
possible to define or reach a ‘genuine’ context of the text, as texts always have a surplus of meaning and thereby 
always retain a possibility of reinterpretation. In my view it makes sense to separate the type of constitutive 
moments Wæver is interested in from the politics of securitisation that a certain sample of discourse is part of. 
Analysing the politics of securitisation requires different methods from the analysis of securitisation discourse 
as discourse.
We also have to recognise the difference between the analytical possibilities of reading text, and the ‘realities’ 
of political practices; that Jacques Derrida could never ascertain Nietzsche’s intentions or motives, does not 
necessarily mean that Nietzsche would not have had intentions and motivations in some particular context, 
which may have been quite relevant for the intentions and motivations in question.
53  Foucauldian discourse analysis deals with logical spaces, with systems that define something as possible 
(Wæver 2005, 36).
54  For example security is modulated for Foucault (2007, 4-6) in three stages, namely those of the legal or 
judicial mechanism, the disciplinary mechanism, and the mechanism of the apparatus (dispositif).
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which aspects of language, discourse and social contexts and structures are of interest 
and relevance to this study.55 This influences both case-selection and the selection of rel-
evant corpuses for analysis. All such selections entail limits for the kinds of claims that 
can be made here. Similar limits are already set by the theoretical approach applied. The 
empirical arguments here are about: how security is constituted in the political sector in 
the PRC, what ‘security’ has meant for the CCP, how ‘security’ has been used politically 
and what the socio-political context has been in the moves studied here.
Case-selection had a significant impact on the types of data that were deemed relevant 
for this study, and on the corpuses of discourse samples that were used, as well as the 
types of supplementary data collected. As the intention of case studies is not to draw 
generalisations on a population, but to engage in ‘analytical generalisation’ (Yin 1994, 10, 
30-32), the number of cases can be relatively low. For this study, the number of cases was 
limited to four, which is a standard in case study research. The cases under scrutiny were 
selected through a reading of the official history of the Communist Party of China.56 This 
was the basis for the mental map or model that guided the initial entries into the avail-
able data. The intention was to investigate cases that together would cover a relatively 
long period of time, and that would allow the examination of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in 
the ‘politics of security’ in China. The main criterion for the selection of a case was that 
it had had major, ‘visible’ political outcomes discernible from official history writing and 
academic scholarship.57 The cases that were selected represent ideological threats articu-
lated by the party-leadership and include A) the beginning of the ‘Great Proletarian Cul-
tural Revolution’ (1966), B) the ‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen 
Square’ (1976), C) the ‘Tiananmen Counter-revolutionary Rebellion’ (1989) and D) the 
‘Evil Cult of Falungong’ (1999). These cases provide instances from three major leader-
ship eras of the PRC, as well as examples of both the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of the politics 
of securitisation. This allows the analysis of continuity and change in the ‘grammar’ of 
securitisation, through the framework utilised in the research: the study of speech acts 
and language in a more general sense are important tools to identify conceptual changes 
at certain moments, or over periods of time (Brauch 2008b, 67; cf., Skinner 2002 and 
Wæver 2008a, 100).
As the objective of the present study is not to reconstruct history, but to deconstruct 
arguments in history, documentary collections already published were used to form the 
corpuses of discourse samples; the intent was not to ‘find new sources’, but to utilise 
documentary collections and the historical research of other scholars.58 Indeed, there is 
55  The observations of Chinese politics conducted here are theory-laden indeed (cf., Hanson 1958).
56  For official CCP histories, see for example CCP CC (1991) and Hu (1994); for academic histories of and 
an introduction to Chinese politics see for example Baum (1996), MacFarquhar (1974; 1983; 1997), Dietrich 
(1998), Starr (2001), Lieberthal (2004), Dutton (2005), MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008), and Paltemaa & 
Vuori (forthcoming).
57  See Chapter 6.2. below on the problems of using political eff ects as a criterion for ‘successful’ securitisa-
tion.
58  The Cultural Revolution Database accessed at Lund university provided documents on the Cultural Revolu-
tion.
The documentary collections of James T. Myers et al. provided material on the Cultural Revolution and its after-
math, including the 1976 Tiananmen incident: Myers et al. (1986) is a collection of documents on the Cultural 
Revolution until the year 1969; Myers et al. (1989) is a collection of documents from the Ninth Party Congress 
to the death of Mao; Myers et al. (1995a) is a collection of documents from the death of Mao to the fall of 
Hua Guofeng; Myers et al. (1995b) is a collection of documents from the fall of Hua Guofeng to the Twelfth 
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also value in discovering new ways to view old theories and facts.59 Accordingly, all the 
sources utilised in this research are either ‘open’ or have been already published else-
where. Thus, this study does not contain any new revelations of previously unknown 
archival or documentary data; beyond its theoretical development, the empirical value 
of this study is in the new theoretical interpretations of events and arguments in Chinese 
politics. Thereby, the majority of the empirical material analysed in the study is either 
public and official, or published leaks of confidential documents, or a published form of 
counter-discourse.60 
In the initial stages of the research process, sources translated into English were used 
to detect relevant discourse samples. Chinese versions of these samples were then ana-
lysed within the framework. In later stages of the process (as my language skills had 
developed), Chinese sources without English translations were also utilised.61 In these 
latter cases, ‘official’ or ‘authoritative’ translations in English (e.g., translations provided 
by the CCP or the Falungong) have been sought, although it has not been successful for all 
samples.62 The discourse samples are not statistically representative of some populations 
of discourse; the present study uses case studies to show how the explicated framework 
of securitisation can be used to study types of processes that the original model could not 
deal with. This approach is also justified in that the theory of securitisation is concerned 
with the constitution of security issues and not how ‘security’ has been produced caus-
ally in specific instances. 
The kinds of materials used here include speeches, canonised ideological texts, news-
paper editorials and articles, central documents (中发, zhōngfā), film and news reports, 
Party Congress.
两次天安门事件 (1989) puts together and compares documents from the 1976 and the 1989 Tiananmen 
‘incidents.’ Hook et al. (1976) also contains contemporary accounts of the 1976 events.
Oksenberg et al. (1990) presents the ‘basic documents’ of the 1989 case, while Nathan et al. (2001) contains 
a more comprehensive collection of documents on it; 張良 (2001a; 2001b) contain even more documents in 
Chinese. Han & Hua (1990) is a collection of various forms of student discourses during the spring of 1989. Yu 
& Harrison (1990) similarly contains texts from students, but also from workers and some military personnel. 
Zhao (2009) provides Zhao Ziyang’s ‘memoirs’ of the events and the party-politics involved. 
北京之春 (2001) and Zong (2002) contain material on the initial handling of the Falungong issue within the 
premier leadership. Beyond leaked inner-party documents, there have been several official publications focus-
ing on the anti-FLG campaign (e.g., 不是“ 真善忍”而是真残忍 2001). Most of Li Hongzhi’s texts have been 
published on the Falungong’s websites.
Source gathering missions, mainly focusing on Chinese newspapers were conducted to China in order to supple-
ment published collections. The人民日报 (Rénmín rìbào) database at the National Library of China provided 
material for all of the cases studied here.
59  I owe this formulation to Hiski Haukkala.
60  This naturally rules out the types of ’private’ or undocumented discourses that may have worked against the 
official narratives analysed here.
61  Published speeches, collections of official material, published leaked documents as well as various databases 
(e.g., Renmin Ribao database at the National Library and the Cultural Revolution Documentary Database at 
Lund University) were used to locate relevant discourse samples.
62   Philosophers and theorists of translation tell us that ‘translation is impossible.’ Indeed, languages are 
unique systems of difference, and thereby it is difficult and quite often impossible to find ‘absolute equivalents’ 
between two such systems. But once we stop to look for absolute equivalents, we realise that translation occurs 
all the time and that translation creates something new.
For points of view on issues of translation, see for example Benjamin (1999a), Schleiermacher (2007), Derrida 
(2007), and Berman (2007).
As the intended main audience of this study is in the field of IR and ISS, the use of English is justified in the 
presentation of the analysis. The use of translation is also justified in that the unit of analysis here is illocution-
ary force and not rhetorical style or conceptual space.
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and other relevant documents. The texts chosen should be and are central in the sense 
that a securitisation discourse materialises in them.63 Due to the way Chinese politics 
and the construction of political realities in China work, these types of authoritative texts 
indeed are the most relevant empirical source for this study.64 The discourse samples 
used were categorised into several ‘genres’ e.g., party circular, meeting minute, edito-
rial, speech, open letter, protest poster.65 A relevant aspect of the discourse samples are 
their intertextual chains (Fairclough 1992, 232-233). How is the sample connected to 
other texts and how does this facilitate, or impede, the possible aspect of securitisation 
evident in it? How does the sample draw on culturally resonant ideas, cognitive maps, or 
precontracts? What kinds of signs are there of the assumed audience(s) in the sample? Is 
it possible to determine who consumed the sample and ‘who’ is speaking in the sample? 
What kinds of systems of knowledge and beliefs are evident in the sample? What about 
social relations and social identities (selves and others)? These aspects of the discourse 
samples were then related to the framework of securitisation theory. Securitisation is 
viewed here as one way asymmetric concepts (Koselleck 2004b, 155-157) are used in 
politics. Of interest here is also how identity frames are used to legitimise mobilisation 
and its suppression. Security language is one means of framing, that activates certain per-
ceptions and possibly responses to the issues and identities being framed (cf., Huysmans 
2006a, 24).
Securitisation is an aspect of a sample of discourse or text: even those texts identified 
as constituting securitisation moves have other relevant aspects to them and there are 
many methods to analyse text and discourse. What securitisation theory brings to this 
analysis is the means to identify something as a securitisation move or as the mainte-
nance of a security discourse. The textual analysis of securitisation has to then be related 
to the political context, where theories of politics and models of political orders become 
relevant as well as the capabilities and capacities of both agents and structures (e.g., by 
utilising Bourdieu’s field theory). Securitisation moves can have various political func-
tions66 and effects that may depend on the political order they are performed in. Similarly, 
securitisation is only one tactic among others as regards social mobilisation and its sup-
pression.
The analysis of text through the securitisation framework can be used to deem wheth-
er or not a securitisation discourse is manifest in it or not (value 0 or value -1/1). The suc-
cess or failure of securitisation moves requires analysis of the political and social context 
beyond the specific text (value 1 or value -1) e.g., opinion polls, demonstrations and shifts 
in inter-unit reactions. Assessing the success of the politics involved necessitates the de-
ployment of even further methods of analysis. This is also suggested by Regional Security 
Complex Theory (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003): whether or not something 
is securitised is first used to deem whether a security complex ‘exists’ or not. After the 
63  See Chapter 6.3. on how securitisation discourses may also not appear in texts, and what this entails for the 
theory.
64  For example the zhōngfā (中发), or Central Documents were the most authoritative bureaucratic means of 
informing the party apparatus of Mao’s major policies and decisions (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 19). 
65  Relevant questions posed about discourse samples were: Is there an obvious way of characterising the 
sample overall (in terms of genre)? Does the sample draw on more than one genre? What activity types, styles, 
or discourses does the sample draw on? Is the discourse sample conventional in its interdiscursive properties? 
(Fairclough 1992, 232.)
66  My reasoning is that speech act analysis can be used to infer some of these.
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identification of a complex, other means are used to assess it. If securitisation theory 
can be combined or connected to regional security complex theory, in this way, I reason 
that securitisation theory can be combined to other analytical or theoretical frameworks 
too.67 Indeed, the theory of securitisation is not a theory of everything, but rather a con-
stitutive theory of how issues receive the status-function of security. This is something 
that some critics of the approach seem to have overlooked; they seem to try to insert all 
relevant aspects of politics into the theory of securitisation. In my view, a better approach 
would be to see securitisation theory as a useful entry-point for a variety of studies that 
deal with broader fields of human action. The question should be: what can the study of 
securitisation offer for, say, debates on political theory or the study of persuasion, legiti-
misation, and social mobilisation, rather than the other way around.
By focusing on speech acts, other aspects of communication were omitted from the 
analysis here. For example, various rhetorical means of influence and hegemonic lan-
guage styles, not to mention issues of intonation in actual speech situations, were exclud-
ed from the analysis.68 Rather, the illocutionary forces of utterances as part of the social 
construction of security issues, is the point of interest here. This creates biases as to what 
is considered relevant,69 but this is an aspect of all scholarship: the ‘wild’, as such, cannot 
be analysed but usually only those specimens that can be stopped and transported are 
analysed (Certeau 1988). 
Studies done within the framework of the Copenhagen School have mainly concen-
trated on the middle levels of securitisation where states (or other egotistically collective 
political actors) often construct their securitisation against each other (Buzan & Wæver 
2009).70 While a brief look at China’s alignment within the contemporary and prevalent 
‘macrosecuritisation’71 discourses is taken in Chapter 6.3.2. below, the research here fo-
cuses on the political sector of security in the PRC i.e., the security of the Communist Par-
ty of China. This is done under the assumption that it will provide the greatest variance 
to the context of liberal-democratic political orders from which the theory was originally 
developed.72 The limitation of the research focus on the political sector also underlines 
67  For examples of previous combinations of securitisation theory, see Buzan et al. (1998) and Buzan and 
Wæver (2003) with RSCT, Eriksson (2001a), Paltemaa and Vuori (2006), Vuori (2010b), and Vultee (2010) with 
frame theory, Vuori (2004; 2007) with models of totalitarianism, Limnéll (2009) and Léonard & Kaunert (2010) 
with agenda setting theory, and Hayes (2009) with democratic peace theory.
68  Li Peng used both body language and intonation quite effectively in his speech (see e.g., Tiananmen – 20 
Jahre Nach den Massacre, directed by Shi Ming and Thomas Weidenbach 2009, Längengrad Filmproduction), 
much more so than George W. Bush who securitised terrorism while playing golf (Fahrenheit 9/11, directed by 
Michael Moore 2004, Fellowship Adventure Group). While interesting and important aspects of ‘real’ securitisa-
tion processes, they are gladly left for future study here.
69  One of the most evident biases of securitisation studies in general is the study of ‘successful securitisation.’ 
While the cases studied here exemplify the success and failure of the politics of securitisation, an examination 
of China’s positioning in prevalent global level security discourse reveals that there is also ‘silence’ regarding 
certain possible issues where there could be, and elsewhere indeed are visible securitisation moves.
70  Emmers (2003; 2004), Emmers et al. (2008), and Haacke & Williams (2008) however study securitisation 
in regional organisations.
71  Buzan and Wæver (2009; see also Buzan 2006 and 2008) have termed the overarching conflicts that struc-
ture international security macrosecuritisations. In a macrosecuritisation a higher order securitisation embeds 
itself in a way that aligns and ranks more parochial securitisations ‘beneath’ it. In these instances separate 
securitisations are bound together into durable sets. The most powerful macrosecuritisations will impose a 
hierarchy on lower levels (cf., overlay in Regional Security Complex Theory) but macrosecuritisation may also 
simply group and tie other securitisations together without necessarily outranking them.
72  “European security between 1960 and 1990, the period of change and détente, which provided the frame-
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that the present study, as research in general, is only interested in a part of the (signifi-
cant) reality of infinitely complex phenomena, namely security arguments prevalent in 
the People’s Republic of China. The intention of the present study is not to make gener-
alisations about a population (the totality of Chinese security arguments) but to refute or 
support assumptions derived from the theory of securitisation.
1.3. Introduction to the Empirical Cases
The main contributions the present study aims for are theoretical and methodological: 
I contend that the refined model of securitisation developed in the ensuing chapters ad-
vances the research programme of Securitisation Studies. The analytical power of the re-
fined model of securitisation is demonstrated through four case studies in the context of 
the PRC, which indeed produces results that would not have been possible with the origi-
nal model. Thereby, the cases also provide empirical insights and new vantage points for 
understanding Chinese politics – a central sub-aim of this study.
The cases analysed here represent various leadership eras of the PRC, and thereby 
allow the identification of possible transformations and consistencies in how something 
becomes an issue of security in the political sector of security in the PRC.73 The study of 
speech acts and language in a more general sense are important tools to identify concep-
tual changes at certain moments, or over periods of time (Brauch 2008b, 67; cf., Skinner 
2002 and Wæver 2008a, 100). These cases also represent some of the most recognised 
political crises in Chinese contemporary history. This suggests that if security language is 
used in the PRC in political crises, the cases studied here should be prime candidates to 
discover discourses and narratives that contain the kinds of speech acts that are assumed 
to construct issues as issues of security. These cases are also among the most ‘spectacu-
lar’ in China, and thereby are assumed to deal with issues nearest to the raw core of the 
political order.74
1.3.1. Case I: The Beginning of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”
The first case analysed here is perhaps the most tumultuous political process in the PRC, 
namely the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (无产阶级文化大革命, wúchǎnjiējí wén-
huà dàgémìng). There have been many interpretations on the origins of and the reasons 
for the Cultural Revolution (CR). Some see it purely as a power struggle between Mao and 
other leading figures of the premier leadership, while others view it as a genuine ideolog-
ical struggle on the direction of the PRC. Whatever variation or combination of motives 
Mao may have had to launch the Cultural Revolution, it was a means to deal with even the 
highest party cadres in a way that reinforced factional divisions and competition. Indeed, 
work for developing the speech act interpretation of security” (Wæver 1995, 58).
73  While the present study is not one of conceptual history, à la Quentin Skinner (e.g., 2002) or Reinhart Kosel-
leck (e.g., 2004a), in my view, the theory of securitisation as explicated in the present study can work as a 
tool for studies that deal with the history of concepts, in this case the history of constructing threats and the 
concepts that are operated in such processes.
74  While bureaucratic practices and interests are assumed here to change gradually and incrementally, the 
kinds of spectacular ‘events’ as the ones studied here are assumed to most likely break through bureaucratic 
politicking and show the greatest amount of continuity or the most radical breaks with past practices and 
principles. For the tasks presented for the present study, such spectacular instances are the most interesting.
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I am not interested in what Mao’s ‘real’ motives were, nor do I claim to present an expla-
nation for why he elected to pursue the line of politics he did. Instead, the focus here is 
his tactics in pursuing his politics and especially how securitisation discourses played 
a part in these.
Of interest is also how national security was woven into the political fabric that became 
the Cultural Revolution. Mao was the moving force behind the scenes, but ‘Mao’s comrade 
in arms’, Lin Biao, was the formal securitising actor in the initial stages of launching the 
Revolution. He claimed that China was under a severe counter-revolutionary threat in 
1966 (林彪 1966): “Today, coup d’états have turned into a general mood. Coups have be-
come a common practice in the world.” For Lin, success at this critical junction was to pre-
vent a counter-revolutionary coup: “This is the utmost essence, the crux of the issue. [...]  If 
we do not direct our actions according to the needs of the revolution, it will inevitably lead 
to great errors, it will inevitably lead to defeat.”
Such claims of an acute threat of a coup were integral to the legitimisation of the 
‘putsch’ Mao organised within the top leadership of the CCP, whereby he effectively abol-
ished the system of collective leadership. Political power was seemingly transferred to 
the streets when Mao declared that “it is justified to rebel against the reactionaries” (Mao 
1974a, 260), and called on the Red Guards to “bombard the headquarters” (毛泽东 1966) 
and remove the counter-revolutionaries from the party. During the Cultural Revolution, 
Mao gave the People’s Liberation Army (人民解放军, Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn; PLA) a major 
role in first taking over government offices and enterprises and later in suppressing the 
Red Guards. Mao used the argument of fighting against foreign and domestic threats to 
take hold of supreme power. Hundreds of thousands of people were sent to the country-
side and harassed as class-enemies or other undesirables. Even the ‘number two’ of the 
Party, Liu Shaoqi, died in prison after Mao labelled him as a counter-revolutionary.
The Cultural Revolution is the Chinese paragon of ‘exceptional’ politics justified with 
the threat and subsequently necessary eradication of inner enemies. The Cultural Revo-
lution had drastic effects on Chinese society and individual people. Political persecution 
rose to unparalled heights at all levels of society extending from grass-roots to the high-
est echelons of the party. Over a hundred million people were involved in the mass-cam-
paigns of the revolution, while some 75 percent of the full or alternate members of the 
Eighth Central Committee had come under suspicion of being ‘counter-revolutionaries’ 
or some other form of ‘traitor’ (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 298; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 
2008, 273).
The case study on the Cultural Revolution begins my investigation of how specific but 
grand scale or ‘spectacular’ security issues have been constituted in the political sector 
of security in the PRC. Of interest here is what ‘security’ meant for the CCP in the late 
1960s, how ‘security’ was used politically, and what the socio-political context was like 
in the moves studied here. The set of heuristic questions presented above can be opera-
tionalised for this case as follows: How did the securitisation of counter-revolutionaries 
within the party come about in 1966? What functions can be inferred from specific se-
curitisation moves in this process? What appeared to be the political functions that the 
general politics of securitisation served? What were the effects of securitisation, and how 
successful can it be deemed to have been? Was the securitisation contested or resisted? 
What were the dynamics of possible desecuritisation processes? And finally, more spe-
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cifically, how did securitisation moves affect the inter-unit relations of securitising actors 
and the threats claimed to be present?
1.3.2. Case II: The “Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square” 
           of 1976
The second case coincided with inner-party conflict and preparation for leadership 
change. In the early 1970s, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the humiliation 
that even high level party cadres had been subjected to, had eroded the authority of both 
the party and Mao himself. The vilification of Liu Shaoqi and the defection of Lin Biao 
added to this general long-term development in attitudes. This distal context, combined 
with the proximate context of the death of the respected premier Zhou Enlai in January 
1976, resulted in unprecedented autonomous social mobilisation in major Chinese cit-
ies. Mass campaigns and the search for inner enemies was nothing new in the People’s 
Republic, but the 1976 ‘counter-revolutionary incident at Tiananmen Square’ (反革命天
安门事件, fǎngémìng Tiān’ānmén shìjiàn) was not a top-down organised movement but an 
uncoordinated social movement, the unfolding of which could not be predicted.
The grievances expressed through the mourning for Zhou came to a head during the 
Qingming (清明, Qīngmíng) festival in early April 1976. Thousands of Beijing residents 
brought wreaths and poems to the Monument of the People’s Heroes. These were shows 
of respect for Zhou, whilst this was officially forbidden, and attacks on Jiang Qing, Mao’s 
wife, and other leading radicals within the Politburo. After the Politburo decided to re-
move the wreaths from the Monument, the residents became agitated and even destroyed 
property including security-vehicles. The demonstration that effectively fought against 
the leftist faction, was suppressed by using force and branded as counter-revolutionary, a 
threat to the national security of the PRC (人民日报 8.4.1976a): “A small handful of class 
enemies used the Qingming festival’s mourning of premier Zhou as a pretense for creating 
a counter-revolutionary political incident in a premeditated, organised and planned man-
ner.” The nature of the political order was claimed to be at stake (ibid.): “By directing their 
spearhead at our great leader Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee headed by 
Chairman Mao, and lauding Deng Xiaoping’s counter-revolutionary revisionist line, these 
counter-revolutionaries further laid bare their criminal aim to practise revisionism and re-
store capitalism in China.” 
The radical faction of Jiang Qing used the securitisation of this incident to remove 
Deng Xiaoping from the Politburo. However, this ‘success’ was short-lived as the premier 
Hua Guofeng arrested the leading radicals soon after Mao’s death in September 1976. 
In the struggle for power that followed, Deng was able to use the unpopularity of the 
verdict of the 1976 ‘incident’ to increase his own support. In 1978, along with the re-
habilitation of the vast majority of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ convicted in the 1957 Anti-
Rightists Campaign, the incident of 1976 was deemed “completely revolutionary” (人民
日报 21.12.1978) i.e., its nature as an issue of national security was desecuritised. It has 
even been integrated into the myth of the Chinese revolution.
The analysis of the securitisation of activities on Tiananmen Square in 1976 and their 
subsequent desecuritisation is used here to investigate how securitisation arguments 
become part of Chinese authorities’ responses to challenges to their hegemony. Beyond 
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this general question (and with which the other cases selected here deal with too), of 
particular interest here is how and why the politics of securitisation can fail in China. 
The following heuristic questions can thus be operationalised: How did the securitisa-
tion of the ‘Incident’ come about in 1976? What functions can be inferred from specific 
securitisation moves in this process? What appeared to be the political functions that 
the general politics of securitisation served? How did securitisation moves become part 
of the context of the subsequent stages of the process of securitisation, and its possible 
contestation, resistance, and eventual desecuritisation? More specifically, how did se-
curitisation moves affect the inter-unit relations of securitising actors and the claimed 
threats present in securitisation moves? What were the effects of securitisation, and how 
successful can it be deemed to have been? Overall, what were the dynamics of the dese-
curitisation processes?
1.3.3. Case III: The “Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion” of 1989
The third case deals with the culmination of Chinese student activism of the 1980s. The 
reform period that had begun in 1978, had not shared out its benefits in Chinese society 
evenly and students and intellectuals were concerned about their future and the corrup-
tion that seemed to be chronic in the CCP. The continuation of economic reforms was 
under threat from leftist conservatives, while many proponents of the economic reforms 
advocated reform of the political system too. The sudden death of the previously deposed 
reformist CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang provided a chance to protest. The authori-
ties’ initial tolerance of the mourning cum protest gave the students a political opportuni-
ty to widen their activities, which then spread quickly from the campuses to Tiananmen 
Square in Beijing and to other cities and provinces.
The student movement protesting at Tiananmen Square was labelled a ‘counter-rev-
olutionary rebellion’ (反革命暴乱, fǎngémìng bàoluàn) in a public process from a Ren-
min ribao75 (人民日報; People’s Daily) editorial (26.4.1989) to Deng Xiaoping’s (邓小平 
2004 [1989]) speech after a violent crackdown. The process coincided with inner-party 
conflict, as the liberal and conservative factions of General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and 
Premier Li Peng were engaged in a power struggle over Deng Xiaoping’s legacy. The in-
ternational media that were covering the historic visit of the Soviet premier brought the 
events in Beijing to the center of focus around the world.
The protests lasted for some two months and eventually involved millions of people. 
The authorities, split in a factional struggle, sent mixed messages on the government’s 
stance. While the authorities missed some initial opportunities to curb the enthusiasm 
of the students, the crux of the whole issue between the protestors and the authorities 
became the April 26 Renmin ribao editorial, where the activities of the students were la-
beled as ‘turmoil’, which implied a threat to national security: “This is a well planned plot 
[…] to confuse the people and to throw the country into turmoil […]  its real aim is to reject 
the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system at the most fundamental level. […] 
This is a most serious political struggle that concerns the whole Party and nation.”
75  Renmin ribao is the official paper of the Communist Party and the most circulated daily in China with a 
circulation of three million in 2006. It has been the arena where many political campaigns have been launched 
and proper and improper political and social behaviour defined.
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The 1989 clampdown was legitimised through national security and the salvation of 
China under the leadership of the CCP. These themes have remained the basis for the CCP 
to legitimise its rule even in the post-Deng era: for the post-1989 premier leader Jiang 
Zemin, the CCP is the party of national salvation which ensures the survival of the Chinese 
nation-state in a globalising world (江泽民 1998, 408-409). This clampdown practically 
froze political reform. Zhao Ziyang, a liberal leader, was removed from power and the 
conservatives gained the upper hand. This did not last long, however, as Deng Xiaoping 
put the country back onto its course of modernisation and opening up.
While there has been a multitude of studies which have dealt with the events of 1989, 
especially from the point of view of the student movement and the various ways they 
performed and acted during the spring of 1989, the focus here is on the role security 
arguments played on both sides of the struggle. Thereby, the set of heuristic questions 
for this case is as follows: How was the student movement constructed as an issue of na-
tional security? What functions can be inferred from specific securitisation moves? What 
seemed to be the political functions the politics of securitisation served? Was the securi-
tisation contested or resisted? More specifically, how did securitisation moves affect the 
inter-unit relations of securitising actors and the claimed threats present in securitisa-
tion moves? How did securitisation moves become part of the context of the subsequent 
stages of the process of securitisation and its contestation and resistance? How were se-
curitisation and desecuritisation moves used to suppress social mobilisation or to resist 
its suppression? What were the results of securitisation, its contestation or resistance, 
and how successful have they been?
1.3.4. Case IV: The Campaign Against the “Evil Cult” of the Falungong
The fourth case examines a threat discourse that does not concern counter-revolutionar-
ies and, thereby, reflects continued change in Chinese society. The 1980s was a decade of 
a crisis of faith for Chinese socialism. The last decades of the Mao-era had reduced the au-
thority of party administrators and moreover, the loosening of socialist moral standards, 
along with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, increased cynicism towards the party. 
This led many people to search for a new spirituality from qigong (气功, qìgōng),76 espe-
cially as the party had, to an extent, loosened its control on religious practice. In the early 
1990s, even the party supported the practice of qigong, which was seen as an apolitical 
activity, together with other aspects of traditional health care that became part of ‘Chi-
nese traditional medicine’ that the party promoted. Indeed, the Chinese origin of qigong 
fit well with the calls for patriotism and nationalism that the party emphasised. Other 
sources of qigong’s appeal had included firstly the failure of the health-care system which 
left poor elderly people seeking alternative ways to maintain their health, secondly the 
negative effects of a modernising society, which led to resistance against modern ideas 
and modernity, and thirdly, new opportunities to build solidarity networks when, for ex-
ample, those of the work-unit were lost. 
Li Hongzhi, who introduced a new qigong-system called Falungong (法轮功, Fǎlúngōng; 
76  Qigong means the cultivation of qi- or cosmic energy, and is a general label for various styles of breathing 
exercises that often include esoteric beliefs.
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FLG) or Falun Dafa77 in 1992, was the master of the qigong-group which claimed to be 
the largest in China. The problem with Li’s doctrine was that it included semi-religious 
elements, and that Falungong adherents began to protest the gradual suppression of its 
practice more and more spectacularly. As the popularity of the FLG began to rise, its reli-
gious and ethical aspects received more attention. In 1996, Li’s main work, Zhuan Falun (
转法轮; Turning the Law-Wheel) was banned and there were investigations into the FLG 
as operating ‘illegal religious activities’ and of being a ‘heterodox cult’ in 1997 and 1998 
respectively. Concomitantly, the FLG seemed to become more and more bold in its own 
campaign against such bans and the negative representation of the doctrine. The water 
margin of tolerance was reached on April 25 1999, when some ten thousand FLG prac-
titioners were seeking the attention of political elites by protesting near the leadership 
compound of the CCP.
In the context of international and domestic crises, and in a time when Jiang Zemin 
was preparing to canonise his political legacy, the party deemed the Falungong a serious 
concern “involving the fundamental belief of the communists, the fundamental ideological 
foundation of the entire nation, and the fate of our Party and state” (人民日报 23.7.1999c), 
while the activities and teachings of Falungong had “seriously endangered the general 
mood of society, endangered social stability, and endangered the overall political situation” 
(ibid.). The anti-FLG campaign resulted in the largest series of arrests since 1989 and 
maltreatment, even torture, of captive practitioners has been reported (Schechter 2001; 
Chang 2004; Ownby 2008). The active phase of the campaign (1999-2001) brought the 
Falungong to the world headlines.
While relevant for the proximate and distal context of the securitisation of Falungong, 
the interest here is not mainly on what the FLG is about, or why it became as popular as 
it did. The investigation here focuses on how the Falungong came to be constructed as an 
issue of national security in China. The operationalised heuristic questions include: How 
did the process come about; what functions can be inferred from the specific securitisa-
tion moves; and what appeared to be those political functions that the general politics 
of securitisation served? Was securitisation contested or resisted, and more specifically, 
how did securitisation moves affect the inter-unit relations of securitising actors and 
the articulated threats present in securitisation moves? Further, how did securitisation 
moves become part of the context of the subsequent stages of the process of securitisa-
tion and its contestation and resistance? How were securitisation and desecuritisation 
moves used to suppress social mobilisation, or to resist its suppression? What were the 
results of securitisation, its contestation or resistance, and how successful were they?
1.4. The Structure of the Study
This study is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with theoretical issues. It 
begins with chapters on meta-theoretical problems and dilemmas of undertaking social 
science scholarship based on social constructionism, and those that theory-development 
confronts. The first chapter deals with various points of contention that have been preva-
77  Fǎlúngōng (法轮功) literally means law-wheel cultivation, or law-wheel qigong, while Fǎlún dàfǎ (法轮大法), 
the other name used by the FLG means the great law of the law-wheel. Falungong is usually written Falun Gong 
in English, but the direct pinyin transliteration of Falungong is used here. 
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lent between social constructionist and more mainstream positions concerning ontology 
and epistemology. The approach to social constructionism that this study is built on is 
derived from the sociology of knowledge of Berger & Luckmann (1994) and the philoso-
phy of John R. Searle (1995). In this chapter, my position is navigated through the various 
grades and points of social constructionism as identified by Ian Hacking (1999). What a 
social constructionist position entails as regards issues of ontology is also discussed. 
Overall, the study is conducted from an instrumentalist stance as regards science, 
truth and realism. The second chapter contends that a fallibilistic position on knowledge 
claims is both compatible with instrumentalism and middle-ground between naive em-
piricism and radical relativism within the philosophy of science. Issues such as obser-
vation, falsification and theory development are entered into here. These are linked to 
questions of how the progress of science and knowledge can be estimated. Such discus-
sions inform my position of how knowledge can be produced in a scholarly work based 
on social constructionism, and how research can be argued to progress the general tasks 
set for groups of scholarly works.
I then turn to various dilemmas present in theory development and the application 
of theory. The issue of conceptual stretching and theory travel is the first focus of in-
terest here. While scholars want to test their assumptions in various contexts in order 
to strengthen the explanatory potential of their theories, they have to be careful not to 
stretch their concepts too far beyond the initial application of the concepts they use. An-
other problem with moving to social, political and historical contexts beyond the scholar’s 
or the theory’s ‘own’ is the issue of culturalism and evaluative universalism. Discussions 
of orientalising tendencies have been prevalent in post-colonial studies, China Studies in-
cluded. I present my own viewpoint on how these issues affect the application of ‘foreign’ 
theories and concepts and how the kinds of dilemmas this raises may be transcended. 
Another dilemma considered in this chapter is that of the ‘normative dilemma’ of writ-
ing security for emancipation: if the normative intention is to be critical, or work against 
the naturalising assumptions of ‘security arguments’, how can a scholar deal with the 
dilemma of possibly constituting, or even reifying, issues of security by analysing them?
After such metatheoretical issues, the first part moves on to deal with the theoretical 
framework, with a focus on theory development which I view to be the study’s main con-
tribution. Chapter 4 presents a brief intellectual history of ‘security’ (as it is most com-
monly presented) as the conceptual basis of contemporary International Security Stud-
ies. Chapter 5 moves to situate the present study within the field of International Security 
Studies in general and critical approaches to the study of security in particular. Security is 
viewed here as a socially constructed practice and the focus is on ‘how security is made’ 
through socio-linguistic practices. The approach applied and developed here centres our 
attention on the power politics of a concept. This stance is critical, yet it remains at the 
level of unmasking: my reasoning is, along with the Copenhagen School, that a student 
of security issues cannot state what ‘real’ security is, without thereby making a political 
statement.
Chapter 6 presents the theory of securitisation as well as the main criticisms that it 
has encountered and that are relevant for the tasks set in this study. The argument is that 
some of these criticisms are fundamental disagreements, while others identify anomalies 
that the original formulation of the ‘theory’ cannot deal with. This is where the theoreti-
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cal development presented in the study provides an answer: the explication of securitisa-
tion speech acts shows that there can be securitisation acts with various functions, and 
that by developing a more nuanced set of models for securitisation speech acts, the new 
formulation allows the incorporation of the initial formulation, together with the anoma-
lies that the model could not previously account for.
The introduction of the formulation and the relevant elements of the theory of se-
curitisation as presented by the leading figures of the ‘Copenhagen School’, is followed 
by sub-chapters that discuss the various types of criticism raised over the approach in 
general, or certain aspects or even details of it. These debates begin with the introduction 
of the concept of desecuritisation and the criticism this has aroused. The position taken 
here on this undertheorised corollary of securitisation is one where desecuritisation is 
viewed as a counter-move to securitisation, as if they were part of a game. I contend 
that the combination of securitisation theory and identity frame theory can be used to 
analyse social mobilisation, its suppression, and resistance within the same framework. 
The argument that desecuritisation can be viewed as a termination of social facts, when 
securitisation is part of a process to constitute such facts is also presented.
The issue of criteria for the success or failure of securitisation has attracted much de-
bate. I focus here on the issue of when securitisation can be deemed as either having 
taken place, or been successful. My reasoning is that securitisation – and not security – 
should be considered a speech act. What such a view entails for the success and failure 
of securitisation is then examined. I posit that the perceptions of threats, securitisation 
and security action are logically, and at times also practically, separate. This is why stud-
ies of securitisation should begin from securitisation moves. Based on this reasoning, my 
argument is that security action alone cannot be a sufficient criterion for the success or 
failure of securitisation. 
Another point of contention here is the problematic issue of ‘silence’ for the theory. In 
my view, the possibility of silence is actually advantageous for the theory as a theory – as 
it provides it with an explanatory potential. This position is exemplified by demonstrat-
ing how securitisation discourses that are in place in some political contexts, can be non-
existent in others, which is achieved through the examination of the four macrosecuriti-
sation discourses Buzan & Wæver (2009) have ‘postulated’ in the context of the PRC.
Yet another critical discussion of the theory of securitisation has revolved around the 
issue of structure and agency, which also connects closely to debates on what kind of a 
theory securitisation ‘theory’ is or should be. Various critics have emphasised different 
aspects of the context of securitisation processes in a sociological vein, while the original 
formulations of the theory were closer to a post-structuralist position that emphasised 
the performativity and creativity of speech acts. I reason for a middle-way between these 
positions, and show how the illocutionary aspect of securitisation is important in order 
for analysts to be able to infer political functions, even meaning from ‘security speech.’ 
The numerous calls to include images in the analysis of securitisation and the social con-
struction of security issues are also relevant here. My reasoning in respect of this critical 
debate is that while images and symbols can facilitate, or impede, securitisation moves, 
it is difficult to fathom how images, without anchorage, could bring about securitisation 
that would not have been institutionalised previously.
The issue of structure and agency, and the ‘event’ of securitisation have raised concern 
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due to seeming similarities with Carl Schmitt’s decisionism. Whereas Schmitt’s (1996) 
“political” can be seen as one way to wield asymmetric political concepts, my reasoning 
is that the theory of securitisation does not equate Schmitt’s political. This sub-chapter 
also presents a Daoist double reading on sovereignty and deciding, which opens up the 
vitalist foundation of Schmitt’s metaphysical approach. After the differences between 
securitisation theory and Schmitt’s political have been established, I proceed to present 
my argument for why securitisation theory is more fortuitous in the study of Chinese 
politics than the political is.
Another batch of criticisms of the theory of securitisation has identified problems and 
anomalies through studies that have applied the approach to political orders beyond lib-
eral democracy and Euro-America. After presenting the various criticisms of and anoma-
lies in previous research, I use illocutionary logic to explicate acts of securitisation and 
posit how various ‘strands’ of securitisation can have different political functions. My ar-
gument is that the illocutionary analysis of actually occurred speech can be used to infer 
the political functions of security speech in specific instances. Each explication of the five 
strands of securitisation is illustrated with an empirical example. The final sub-chapter 
of the theoretical part of the study presents the conclusions of the theoretical discussion 
for the theory of securitisation.
The second part of this study deals with the empirical analysis of actually occurred 
speech and securitisation processes in the People’s Republic of China. This part contains 
a chapter that outlines the socio-political and historical contexts that are relevant for the 
analysis of the four case studies selected. Here, issues of studying securitisation in the 
Chinese political context are engaged by discussing Chinese security narratives. Some in-
stitutionalised master signifiers of security as well as a brief historical contextualisation 
of official security narratives are introduced. Discussion progresses on to the foundations 
of the Chinese political order and its totalitarian and post-totalitarian features which are 
also relevant to investigate in order to see how security issues are constructed. The party-
state and particular functional actors within it are also presented. 
Each of the four case studies that follow presents a brief socio-historical context for 
the process of securitisation and outlines some of the tactics involved in them. This is fol-
lowed by a more detailed analysis of the securitisation processes and specific speech acts 
evident in them. An analysis of possible contestation of and resistance to such securitisa-
tion moves is then examined, as well as the possible desecuritisation of the issue. The 
case studies are followed by the conclusions that draw the study to an end.

Part I: 
The Theory of Securitisation 
and its Critical Development
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The aim here is to study the social construction of security. However, ‘social constructiv-
ism’ is a label that is given or subscribed to a wide variety of topics, and there has been 
considerable confusion as regards the methods, commitments and even the research 
agenda of the nebulous group of (labelled or self-professed) constructivist scholars with-
in the field of International Relations (IR). The heterogeneity of this group has partly 
contributed to constructivism being ill-defined in IR: constructivism, constructionism 
and constitutiveness are used by different scholars to describe different things.1 Further 
confusion arises from the contradictory epistemological and ontological commitments 
of different scholars. Even the understanding of language differs from one constructivist 
scholar to the other – even in the field of critical studies of security: some focus on speech 
acts (e.g., Buzan et al. 1998), some on social fields (e.g., Bigo 1994), some on symbolic 
interactionism (e.g., Balzacq 2005) while others (e.g., Hansen 2006) emphasise the per-
formativity of language in a post-structuralist vein. These are all valid reasons for why 
one should make explicit what social constructionism is envisaged to entail, both episte-
mologically and ontologically: every piece of research makes ontological and epistemo-
logical commitments, be they unwitting or explicit.2 Perceptively, Peter Winch (2008, 3) 
has noted that any worthwhile study of society, will concomitantly be philosophical in 
character. In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt (1999) has suggested that all scientists have 
to ‘do ontology’, whether this is explicit or not.3
1  For example Nicholas Onuf (1989, 1) uses the terms ‘construct’ and ‘constitute’ interchangeably, in addition 
to often referring to co-constitution. Wendt (1998) criticises especially the use of the last term as confusing.
Constructivism is the term and label used in most IR studies that focus on the social construction of various 
issues, even though social constructionism would be more befitting to most of the approaches in terms of socio-
logical terminology. In this study, social constructionism is mainly used, but constructivism is, by convention, 
the label used for ‘constructivist IR studies.’
2  Ontology refers here to the world and its structure outside language. The ontology of a situation on its own 
is ‘dead’: for it to have meaning in human society, it has to be embedded through social reality into the function 
its form has. In this vein, Itkonen (1997, 1-3) argues that the relationship between language and the world is 
asymmetrical: language depicts the world and the world becomes depicted, but not the other way around. This 
is analogous to the use of any instrument: instruments are always directed at something, which defines their 
function.
3  Robert Cox (1986) argues that one cannot do research without explicitly or implicitly defining the basis on 
2. The Metascience of a Constructionist Study
Before me things created were none, save things
Eternal, and eternal I endure.
All hope abandon ye who enter here.
- Gate to Hell
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Indeed, social constructionism is not a theory of international relations, but an onto-
logical or meta-theory of how subjective meanings are transformed into intersubjective 
facts that appear to be as real as the observable material world around us. Thus, social 
constructionism is interested in how human action produces a world which consists of 
objects and entities. As in all social sciences, this interest eventually leads to questions 
about ‘human nature’ and the nature of the world (Chomsky 2006; Chomsky & Foucault 
2006). Unlike the two most traditionally dominant camps of IR theory, namely Political 
Realism and Idealism that view human nature as either inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’, a con-
structionist is concerned with innate human abilities and capabilities e.g., the ability to 
learn languages and the drive to be social. The effects of these kinds of understandings 
will be viewed here in the formation of scholarly knowledge in general, and in the study 
of International Relations in particular.
The entry of social constructionism into the field of IR has raised a great deal of debate. 
One of the most famous of these took place between John Mearsheimer (1994/1995; 
1995) and Alexander Wendt (1995). In this debate, Mearsheimer positioned ‘rationalist’ 
and ‘critical’ approaches as a continuation of the debate between realism and idealism 
in IR.4 He argued that Political Realism and the various critical approaches had funda-
mental differences both in their epistemological and ontological understandings. While 
realists take the world as objective and knowable, for Mearsheimer, critical approaches 
represented the possibility of endless interpretation. Similarly, he argued that critical ap-
proaches have a ‘relativist’ epistemology and an ‘idealist’ ontology, whereas realist theo-
ries emphasise that state behaviour is largely determined by material structures.
In his reply, Wendt (1995) argued that Mearsheimer had an anachronistic view of the 
philosophy of science. For Wendt, ‘constructivist’ approaches are still committed to ob-
jective knowledge, even though the empiricist basis for this knowledge is in question. 
The strict separation of the subject and object in scholarship represents a naïve positivist 
epistemology, which is hardly subscribed to by anyone engaged in the field of contempo-
rary philosophy of science.5 Thus, for Wendt, rather than repeat the idealist versus realist 
debate, the issue between Political Realism and ‘critical approaches’ was about differ-
ences in epistemology. The Mearsheimer-Wendt debate was, however, about more than 
a disagreement on epistemology. This becomes apparent in Mearsheimer’s (1995, 92) 
reply to Wendt, where Mearsheimer seems to suggest that ‘critical approaches’ cannot 
guarantee that they would not turn into politically irresponsible hegemonic discourses 
similar to fascism. For Williams (2005, 151), this reveals the connection of Mearsheimer’s 
Political Realism to cognitive liberalism.6 Due to the common intellectual roots of Political 
which the research is built. It seems that in most cases this is done implicitly. Yet a scholar should be able to 
reflect on the foundations of her knowledge claims in addition to providing descriptions, explanations, and 
predictions on her topic. For Cox, there are then two aspects of scholarship: reflection (the analysis of inten-
tions and foundations of knowledge) and the interpretation and modelling of the factual world (see also Wendt 
1991).
4  Lapid (1989) had already continued the lineage of identifying ‘great debates’ within IR by naming the third 
debate.
5  The main agreed-upon principles of modern logical positivism can be summarised into three theses: 1) 
a statement that cannot be verified by sensory perception is meaningless or nonsense, 2) science should 
be reducible to statements on directly observable facts, and 3) science is based on methodological monism 
(Raatikainen, 2004, 24).
6  Williams (2005, 151) shows how Mearsheimer transpires to be the kind of ’idealist’ he claims to criticise: 
if Mearsheimer’s position was a positivist theory of the objective dynamics of international security, these 
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Realism and constructionism (Williams 2005; 2007a), such a strict opposition between 
the two approaches would be misleading.7 In order to break free from the understanding 
of human nature of reified rationalist social science and rational choice theory, we have 
to ‘do some constructionist ontology.’
2.1. The Dialecticism of Social Constructionism
One of the prominent issues in the Mearsheimer-Wendt debate was the role of material 
and ideational factors in international relations and its study. The question construction-
ist IR has to answer is: how does the transition or transformation from material to idea-
tional and social facts occur?
The issue of how subjective meanings are transformed into intersubjective and objec-
tive reality was one of the major interests of Berger and Luckmann (1994) in their work 
on the sociology of knowledge. They argued that our experience of reality – our sense of 
reality as other, as independent of us – is the result of processes and activities which they 
aptly called ‘social construction.’8 Further, they were interested in how the everyday com-
monsense experiences are constructed socially.
Berger and Luckmann were not IR scholars, but wrote their treatise as a reaction to the 
dominance of structural-functionalist approaches in the sociology of the 1960s (Aittola & 
Raskila 1994). They argued that approaches that only promoted holism or individualism 
could not fully explain or understand the realities of individual people and society.9 For 
them, the relationship between the individual and society was dialectical: the individual 
is both the producer and the product of the same reality.10 The structures of society have 
dynamics should be independent from the theories that seek to explain them. Therefore changing explanatory 
theories should not affect the dynamics and thereby also not be more or less responsible on the level of practice. 
But if Mearsheimer concurs that theories of Political Realism are practices that can influence actual policy, then 
his criticism of the causal insignificance of ideational factors becomes untenable. 
This issue deals with how independent and non-constitutive human-developed theories are of the realities they 
claim to enlighten. In most segments of the natural sciences, the realities that are studied are taken as indepen-
dent from human theorising of them, yet the diametrically opposite seems to be the case in fields of study such 
as literature. Onuf (1989, 15-16) argues that the social sciences fall somewhere in between these two extreme 
poles. The problem with Mearsheimer is that he, like much of the mainstream in the field, sees IR as operating 
like a natural science, in that IR should correspond to an operative paradigm (cf., Onuf 1989, 16).
7  See also Wyn Jones (1999), Scheuerman (2008), Cozette (2008), and Behr & Heath (2009).
8  Their work has been seen as a descendant of phenomenology. They explicitly note the work of the Viennese 
social theorist, Alfred Schutz (1953; 1954) , whose roots lie with Edmund Husserl and Max Weber and who 
popularised Husserl’s ‘Lebenswelt’ approach to the English speaking world (Onuf 1989, 53-54), as a major 
source of inspiration. Schutz’s ’principle of adequacy’, or the necessity of social sciences utilising the under-
standings and concepts of its objects of study can also be seen in Hans Morgenthau’s (2006) views of what the 
study of international relations should be like. 
9  Berger and Luckmann (1994, 209) highlighted the problem that was prevalent in much of structuralist sociol-
ogy: even though scholars who utilise a purely structural approach in their studies are initially satisfied with 
those structures having a merely heuristic function, eventually they tend to understand their own conceptual 
constructions as similar to laws of nature.
This seems to have happened to many ’followers’ of Waltz (Onuf 2009; Wæver 2009). Already Hedley Bull 
(1969, 31) identified a similar problem with proponents of the ‘scientific approach’ to IR: “he easily slips into 
a dogmatism that empirical generalisation does not allow, attributing to the model a connection with reality it 
does not have.”
10  Giddens’ (e.g., 1984) theory of ’structuration’ makes the same argument in a much more elaborate way. 
The core idea of structuration is that social reality is formed by structures that exist in the memory of social 
agents. Structures both limit the options of action and are a resource for action. Structures are independent 
from individual agents in that if they are prevalent they cannot be wished away by individual agents. At the 
38
Chapter 2
been constructed by individuals, and thus society and its structures can only be main-
tained by human action. Successful scholarship will take this dialectic into account.
For Berger and Luckmann, such a dialectic comes about through three ‘moments’, viz. 
externalisation, objectification and internalisation. In the first ‘moment’ the individual 
externalises meanings into the natural environment and society. As a result of the innate 
instability of the human organism, it has to construct its own social environments. The 
externalisation of meanings thus becomes habitual and institutionalised and thus brings 
about predictability to human action and behaviour. 
This leads to the second ‘moment’, namely the objectification of the externalised social 
reality, or in its extreme form, the reification of the objectified social reality.11 As a result, 
the world of social institutions becomes indisputable. Even though openness vis-à-vis the 
world and its meanings is a feature of the biological composition of the human species, 
its members must constantly adapt to social structures and conditions. When the exter-
nalised and objectified social reality becomes reified, the dialectic between the individual 
and the construction of society seems to be lost; a reified world becomes inhuman. Reifi-
cation turns human institutions, even bureaucracies, into apparent permanents, thereby 
concealing their human and social origins. Also institutions then appear as indisputable 
and objective, as if they were something beyond human creations (Berger & Luckmann 
1994, 103). Institutions become part of the reality beyond the individual, but then retain 
their existence whether individuals desire this or not (ibid., 73). Nevertheless, no matter 
how objective social realities may appear to be, ontologically they have no other basis 
than the human action which created them.  
The third ‘moment’ for Berger and Luckmann (1994) is the internalisation of the ob-
jectified world, which reconnects the externalised social reality back into the individual 
consciousness. The process whereby this happens is aptly called socialisation: the in-
dividual is imbued with structures of meaning and readiness to take part in the social 
dialectic to perpetuate the process of constructing social reality. The individual is not 
born with a ready-made society; the individual has an innate drive for sociality and the 
ability to learn language (or some other systematic structure of symbols).12 When an in-
dividual develops in an environment that reciprocates both in terms of providing social 
same time, structures are completely dependent on agents as the means of reproduction and maintained 
through their repetition in routinised social processes. Should this repetition cease, so would the structures, 
similarly cease to exist. This kind of approach allows for both the constraining function of structures in the 
case of individuals, as well as for the change in structures both as a result of conscious efforts, and unintended 
consequences.
11  According to Theodor Adorno (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002) all reification is forgetting. Roland Barthes 
(1977, 165) presents a similar idea with his concept of myth: “Myth consists in turning culture into nature or, at 
least, the social, the cultural, the ideological, the historical into the ‘natural.’” As with reification, with becoming 
‘myths’, things lose the memory of them once being ‘made’.
Dereification, the dismantling of reifications, or the revealing of the human origin of institutions can be seen as a 
motive behind Jürgen Habermas’s (2007) emancipatory interest of knowledge, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1999a) 
‘linguistic misunderstandings’, as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1995, 74) dismantling of 
doxa: in a reified world, meaning is no longer understood as producing the world we live in but as reflecting “the 
true nature of things” (Berger & Luckmann 1994, 104). For Berger and Luckmann (1994, 106), the investigation 
of reification is important as it provides an antidote for the reificatory tendencies of sociological and theoretical 
thinking. Indeed, this was one of the insights that motivated the initiation of the present research project.
12  Markku Koivusalo (2001, 95) puts the principle succinctly: human beings are genetically predisposed at 
birth with the ability to acquire any human language, and any phonemes that they contain, yet human beings 
are not genetically predisposed to learn any specific historical language, culture, or meaning, which are only 
received as an external inheritance.
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interaction and a system of symbols, the individual becomes a part of human society.13 
Internalisation is both the foundation to understand the behaviour of other individuals, 
and to experience the world as a meaningful social reality. As a result of successful inter-
nalisation, the individual not only comprehends the single actions or momentary subjec-
tive states of other individuals, but also ‘understands’ the world they and others inhabit. 
Eventually the individual comes to realise that the world does not comprise only of her-
self and the other individuals she has perceived: the individual thus develops a concept 
of the ‘general other.’14
Berger and Luckmann were not the only scholars to have emphasised dialecticism as 
the answer to the agent-structure problem.15 Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault (2006), 
for example, approached the issue of creativity from two sides of the ‘mountain’ in their 
debate on human nature. At the end they were in agreement: human creativity is made 
possible by the individual, but certain things can only become ‘possible’ through society 
and its structures. For Chomsky (2006, 132), scientific creativity is dependent on both 
the innate creative ability of the human mind, as well as social and intellectual condi-
tions. Similarly to both Berger and Luckmann and Chomsky, many critics of the Neo-neo-
synthesis (Wæver 1996; 1997b) in IR have emphasised the problem of the overestima-
tion of the effects of structures in IR theory. The appropriateness of dialectic approaches 
is evident, for example, in Richard Ashley’s (1984, 249) views on theoretically oriented 
research. For him, all research that strives towards theoreticism is positivist by nature. 
This does not mean, however, that we should simply reject this type of reasoning, but 
that the positivist, objectifying moment should become the target of continuous practical 
criticism.
Although the main focus of Berger and Luckmann was on the interaction between sub-
jective meaning and objectified social reality, they also discussed the relationship of the 
human organism and human society. The nature of humans as biological organisms af-
fects all of the stages in the construction of human realities. But the relation between the 
human organism and its society works both ways: once constructed, human society will 
also affect human organisms. The dialectic relationship is not only limited to subjective 
consciousness and social reality, but also represents the relationship of the biological and 
the social. On the one hand, a human being is a body, but on the other, that body is also 
used to do various things, including speech acts;16 a person will often perceive herself as a 
13  Children who have been deprived of human contact and interaction do not develop language or social 
capabilities in the manner that children who have human contact and interaction do. While such children may 
eventually gain these skills when exposed to human interaction, there seems to be a “cut-off age” for learning a 
full range of adult-level language use. (Trask 1999, 179-181.)
14  For Wittgenstein (1999a), the object is the internalisation of a large group of forms of life and language 
games, which form the Weltbild that render the world comprehensible and functionable. Whilst for Habermas 
(2007), interests of knowledge are the basis of rationality of scientific knowledge, from a Wittgensteinian 
(1999a; Winch 2008) point of view, they can be taken as three sets of rules for the language game or form of life 
of science and scholarship.
15  For debates and discussion of the agent-structure problem in IR, see Wendt (1987; 1999), Hollis & Smith 
(1991), Carlsnaes (1992), Buzan (1995), and Wight (2006).
For social constructionism, neither agents nor structures take precedence, but rather have a dialectical relation-
ship.
16  Bodies and physicality are part of all speech acts, be they accomplished through speaking, writing, hand 
signals, images or any other system of symbols and meaning. It is important to keep in mind that what speech 
act theory – and thereby also securitisation theory – is about, is not words, or verbs, but illocutionary force. 
These forces may be brought about by words and utterances, but other forms of interaction (e.g., silent physical 
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creature who uses her body to do things, a person does not necessarily, exclusively, iden-
tify herself as consisting merely of her body,17 but also of her consciousness and social 
identity i.e., both the physical and social aspect is present in most human activities.
The dialectic of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ is evident in both the human organism and soci-
ety setting limitations on one another. Society and its circumstances can enhance the liv-
ing conditions of human organisms, but social conditions can also maim and kill.18 In the 
end, society even guides and moulds the biological tendencies of the human organism. 
For Berger and Luckmann (1994, 206), the task of the human organism is to construct 
realities and exist in them along with others. These realities become dominant and define 
the world for the individual. The physical limits of this world may well be set by ‘nature’, 
but once the world is objectified and internalised, it also begins to have its own effects on 
‘nature.’ Thus, the dialectic of nature and social reality moulds and remoulds the human 
organism; in this dialectic, humans produce social reality, ergo themselves.
2.2. Points of Constructionism
Since social constructionism is a meta-level theory, it is not surprising that many fields 
of study have adopted this kind of an approach to how knowledge is produced in human 
interaction. Indeed, in a survey of the field of social constructionism, Ian Hacking (1999) 
lists some sixty-odd titles that have been described as socially constructed, inclusive of 
such matters as: authorship, brotherhood, the child viewer of television, danger, emotions, 
facts, gender, illness, knowledge, literacy, nature, oral history, postmodernism, quarks, 
serial homicide, technological systems, urban schooling, vital statistics, youth homeless-
ness, zulu nationalism, deafness, mind, panic, the eighties, and extraordinary science. In 
the field of IR there has also been a large body of titles based on constructionism of one 
stripe or another. The topics of social construction differ somewhat here as well: anarchy 
(Wendt 1992; 1999), nationalism (Hall 1998), post-Soviet international political reality 
(Matz 2001), rules (Onuf 1989), state sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996), Western 
action in Bosnia (Fierke 1996), and, of course, security (Buzan et al. 1998).
As can be gauged from this by no means exhaustive list of matters viewed as socially 
constructed in recent scholarly literature, the topics are remarkably heterogeneous: real-
ity, truth, facts and knowledge are accompanied by people, inanimate objects, states, ac-
tions, events, experiences and an assortment of other things. What, then, might all these 
objects of interest have in common? Hacking (1999, 5) suggests that we should not “ask 
for the meaning” but, rather, “ask what’s the point?”19
presence) may at times also achieve perlocutionary effects. This point becomes important when various criti-
cisms of the CopS are examined below.
17  This is one of the problems of the spread of biometric means of identification: people want to have identities 
beyond their physical existence (Lyon 2007).
18  An important point of Galtung’s (1990) concepts of structural and cultural violence.
19  Habermas’s (2007) interests of knowledge in a way also asks for the ‘point’ of scholarly endeavours.
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Hacking (1999, 6) maintains that social constructionists contemplating ‘X’ usually work 
against the status quo and tend to hold that:
X need not have existed, nor need be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not de-
termined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.20
Hacking (1999, 6) further notes that social constructionists tend to urge that:
X is quite bad as it is.
We would be much better off, if X were done away with or at least radically trans-
formed.
Hacking (1999, 12) also formulates a zero-clause for the approach of typical construc-
tionists:
In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted, indeed, X appears to be inevita-
ble.
Furthermore, Hacking argues that the basis for the other clauses, “0)”, is what construc-
tionists take for granted, “1)” is what constructionists ‘hold’, while “2)” and “3)” are what 
constructionists ‘urge.’ Beyond this general argument-structure of social constructionist 
studies, Hacking (1999, 19-21) divides constructionist approaches into six types in ac-
cordance with what ‘the point’ of each approach is claimed to be: A) historical i.e., some-
one presents a history of X, which has been constructed in the course of social processes, 
B) ironic i.e., X is taken to be an inevitable part of the world of our conceptual architecture, 
but which could have been quite different; X though has become permanent, as it forms 
an integral part of our thought, which would be futile to attempt to alter, even though it 
may gradually change; thereby X is highly contingent as a product of social forces and his-
tory and cannot be avoided as an integral part of the universe we inhabit, C) reformist i.e., 
after the realisation that X is not necessarily inevitable, aspects of it should be changed 
since it is negative but still necessary in that we cannot live without it, D) unmasking i.e., 
ideas should be unmasked to demonstrate their ‘extra-theoretical function’ which will 
strip them of their ‘practical effectiveness’ and their misleading appeal or authority,21 
E) rebellious i.e., while unmasking is an intellectual affair and not necessarily reformist, 
those who actively maintain (1), (2), and (3) can then be considered rebellious on X, and 
lastly F) revolutionary i.e., an activist who moves beyond the world of ideas and endeav-
ours to change the world in respect of X.
When his schema of the points of social constructionist studies is applied to the criti-
cal study of security, a very familiar narrative unfolds (cf., Krause & Williams 1997 and 
CASE 2006): There is a presupposition (cf., “0” above) that: (national) security seems an 
inevitable categorisation in this day and age. The constructionist scholar, critical of se-
20  André Kukla (2000, 2) notes that by saying: “’X is constructed’ entails that X is not inevitable,” Hacking 
presents us with a necessary condition for the validity of constructionist claims.
21  This avenue of thought follows Karl Mannheim’s (1952; 1954; 1997) idea of ‘the unmasking turn of the mind’, 
which does not aim to refute ideas, but rather to undermine them via exposure of the function they serve.
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curity (concepts, practices, or studies) will argue (“1”): Not at all. National security need 
not have ever been conceptualised as a distinct kind of entity. What seems like a sensible 
classification to us when we think about the activities of states and politicians is ‘forced’ 
upon its adherents and opponents, in part as a result of political interests. Thus, it can 
be argued that (“2”) this category, concept, or practice is not an especially positive one. 
Perhaps it could be suggested (“3”) that the world would be better off without it. Talk of 
(national) security is not exactly false, but it uses an inapt idea. It presupposes that there 
are coherent objects, threats and referent objects (cf., Wæver 1997a). True, we can collect 
data on military spending and manoeuvres, diplomacy, the economy, and other indicators 
of national power. These are however not very meaningful data: they are artefacts of a 
construction that we would be better off without, according to the social constructionist, 
who is critical, rebellious or even revolutionary in regard to security.
Constructionist scholars in the field of ISS could further argue that ‘national security’ 
is a potent metaphor, as it has the ability to instantly conceal its use as a metaphor: once 
an issue is labelled, it should not be further questioned, even by a policymaker. Which 
label sticks to which issue has less to do with the intrinsic merits of the issue than with 
the networks and other resources of power of interested parties wishing to attach these 
labels. Once we have the phrase, the label, the audience becomes convinced that there 
is a definite kind of thing: national security. This becomes reified and reproduced, as do 
the artefacts of its construction. Some politicians start to conceive of their activities as 
national security, a special kind of politics – as opposed to the usual kind – and start to 
interact with other domestic and international politicians and officials, but now no longer 
regarded as just politicians, but rather as agents of national security. Further, since politi-
cians are self-aware creatures (or so they would seem to claim) they may then become 
not only politicians who deal with national security, but rather, in their own conceptuali-
sations, agents of national security. Such species of politician can be well aware of theo-
ries on national security and its agents, so that they can adapt to, react against, or reject 
them.22 As such, researchers of security should keep this in mind i.e., that their studies 
may alter the ‘species’ of national-security-politicians, even, possibly, affect which issues 
may be considered issues on national security.
The interpretation or understanding of what this kind of ‘critical’ entails is largely 
dependent on the intellectual temperament of individual scholars. The manifesto of the 
c.a.s.e. collective (CASE 2006) implicitly exhibits the problem of the various ‘points’ of 
constructionism as identified by Hacking. A challenge for this group of critical scholars 
of security is that they do not agree on how willing they are to take part in critical po-
litical agendas, and whether their objective is the achievement of ‘real security’, ‘normal 
politics’ instead of ‘security politics’, or to become freed from the concept and practices 
of ‘security’ itself.
The c.a.s.e. collective seems to be so convinced by social constructionism that it does 
not appear to be necessary to discuss this meta-theoretical approach in their manifesto.23 
As such, these critical scholars of security appear to be of like mind with other ‘critical’ 
22  This kind of ‘double hermeneutics’ (Giddens 1984, 284; Ciuta 2009, 322) has relevance for the ‘normative 
dilemma of writing security’ (see Chapter 3.4. below).




scholars in other fields of scholarship. More ‘conservative’ scholars who favour ‘normal 
science’ are more frequently critical of constructionism (and particularly post-structural-
ism) (see e.g., Sokal & Bricmont 1998 and Sokal 2008), while more radical ‘paradigm bust-
ers’ tend to congregate around constructionist or some even more ‘radical’ approaches.
While most critical approaches to security seek some sort of liberation, the differing 
‘points’ of such critical studies are confounded by the lack of a common understanding of 
what ‘emancipation’ means in IR in general, but also within this field in particular.24 For 
some, emancipation from some form of oppression always leads to other forms of op-
pression.25 For others, emancipation is an attainable state of affairs. Both of these under-
standings, however, essentially connect emancipation with power and the possibilities of 
its just use and application. Research aimed at the emancipatory interest of knowledge 
(Habermas 2007; Vuori 2008a), seeks to produce criticism and knowledge that disman-
tles or undermines structures of power and oppression of one form or another. Thereby, 
emancipatory research strives for a better society.
While emancipation can be about the release from power-relations that are considered 
unjust, perhaps the most characteristic mode of emancipatory research is the dismantle-
ment of unconscious or ‘naturalised’ structural limits or impediments. The objective of 
this type of research may be to demonstrate how a phenomenon or practice that was 
considered self-evident or natural, is actually arbitrary and contingent.26 Critique and re-
flection are the key means to achieve this. The aim of deconstruction can, for example, be 
viewed in this way: for Derrida (e.g., 2003) deconstruction through double reading was a 
prerequisite to make an ethical intervention into human practices. Giorgio Agamben (e.g., 
2005, 88) also has similar objectives in unmasking the ‘fiction’ of the unity of law and life, 
which opens up a space and possibility for ‘politics.’27 
24  See for example Booth (2007, 111). For Habermas (2007, 310), emancipation is about expressing “ideologi-
cally frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed.” As Onuf (1989, 274) notes, this 
entails that critical social science and emancipation are the means to an end.
25  This kind of circular criticism raises an issue for scholars who like to speak ‘security’ on behalf of muzzled 
groups or groups of people who do not have a ‘voice’: acting as a vanguard or speaking on behalf of someone is 
paternalistic. Further, scholars whose task is to speak truth to power, should also speak truth to the power of 
the powerless. Indeed, how would the power of the powerless be more virtuous that the power of the powerful 
once the powerless become the powerful (consider the revolutions accomplished in the name of the proletariat 
in the USSR and the PRC)? It is difficult to agree with Foucault (Chomsky & Foucault 2006) that the proletariat 
would be justified in using violence as a form of revenge on the bourgeoisie after a revolution. In the same 
debate with Chomsky, Foucault notes that the oppressed also fabricate masks and weapons in order to achieve 
their power ends. These should be unmasked as well.
26  For Gramsci (1971), hegemony is social and political power that is derived from a populace’s ‘spontaneous 
consent’, which is given due to intellectual and moral authority. Hegemony is exercised through power (coercion 
and consent), rather than through force (arms). Of key importance, is cultural hegemony in the form of various 
agents and arenas such as the media, organised religion, schools and popular arts. Imposed from above, these 
influence subordinate states/classes/groups to accept the hegemon’s (foreign, external) values, which posit 
the subordinate’s position as natural and inevitable. The ruling class constitutes social reality with its ideology 
that also limits alternatives. Laclau & Mouffe (2001) refined Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as a discursive 
strategy of combining discrete principles of thought (from different intellectual systems) into a coherent ideol-
ogy, thereby avoiding some of the problems of essentialism that were evident in Gramsci’s understanding of 
class for example.
For an application of Gramsci to IR, see Gill (1993).
27  For Agamben (2005, 88), “purity never lies at the origin,” and therefore unmasking ‘fictions’ only allows new 
conditions for origins. This means that ‘emancipation’ merely opens up a possibility for something new; it is not 
a revelation of something ‘authentic’ or ‘pure.’
The task set for philosophy by Wittgenstein comes close to such understandings; for Wittgenstein, this task  was 
to clear up linguistic misunderstandings i.e., to dispel perplexities that arise from the misuse of language and 
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For the ‘Aberystwyth School of Critical Security Studies’ (Wæver 2004a; CASE 2006) 
the task for security studies is the emancipation of the individual.28 Scholars such as Ken 
Booth (e.g., 2005; 2007) and Richard Wyn Jones (e.g., 1999) who have been influenced 
by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, emphasise that the military and state centric, 
zero-sum understanding of security should be replaced by a concept of security that cen-
tres on communities and individual emancipation. For them, emancipation equals secu-
rity. This is in contrast to other critical approaches, which aim for emancipation from the 
concept and practices of security. This normative disagreement is largely due to different 
approaches to normality and normativity, for, as is noted in CASE (2006, 455), attempts at 
theoretically ‘unmaking’ securitisation lead to an engagement with twofold understand-
ings of ‘normal politics’: politics as normality and politics as normativity. Here the nor-
mative push towards desecuritisation of the CopS can be seen as a preference for politics 
of normality,29 while the normative push towards emancipation of CSS can be seen as a 
politics of normativity.30 These different notions of normality and normativity create ten-
sions among critical approaches to the study of security.
Beyond such issues of the varying ‘points’ of constructionist studies, Hacking (1999) 
brings up important points of contention, or ‘sticking points’, between constructionists 
and non-constructionists in the field of the philosophy of science. The first of these ‘stick-
ing points’ is contingency. Constructionists tend to suggest that science need not have 
followed the course that it has followed. Similarly, the development of IR theory has not 
followed some preordained path: IR theories could have been very different and they 
could have been developed in a different order. According to this view, the routes and 
exits of the highway of science and scholarship are underdetermined.
The second sticking point is nominalism, on which constructionists tend to maintain 
that the world does not have an inherent structure that is discovered, but that what we 
believe to be facts is a consequence of the ways in which we represent the world. Scholars 
do not discover the structure of the world as it is: our views on the structures and content 
of the world may vary regardless of the actual changes or non-changes of the world.
The third sticking point is the question of stability, or internal versus external explana-
tions of stability. Unlike ‘scientists’ who take the stability of theories as a sign of compel-
ling evidence, constructionists often argue that theoretical stability can also be the result 
of factors outside the theories themselves, such as the power of academic ‘gatekeepers.’ 
For example the success of the various strands of ‘neorealism’ may not be fully explained 
by the explanatory power of these approaches vis-à-vis an objective reality, but a more 
thorough explanation requires an examination of the practices of academia. The methods 
thus “to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” (1999a, § 309).
28  The main contributions of this approach to security studies include Krause & Williams (1996; 1997), Krause 
(1998), Wyn Jones (1999), and Booth (1991; 2005; 2007). For applications to the Asian context, see Burke & 
McDonald (2007).
29  As Ciuta (2009, 313) notes, while ‘normal politics’ is important for the CopS, as it is on the other side of the 
threshold of securitisation, they do not define either ‘normal politics’ or ‘normality’; for the CopS, what counts 
as normal or exceptional is different in different contexts. For Wæver (2004a, 10), the aim of desecuritisation is 
the movement of issues away from a threat-defence sequence into the ‘ordinary public sphere’ (or the economy, 
or religion as religion, or whatever mechanism); desecuritisation can be viewed as an attempt at ‘retrieving the 
normality of politics’ (CASE 2006, 455).




in which dissertations are evaluated, publications approved, positions filled and resourc-
es divided may have a relevant effect of the stability of some approaches. 
Each of these sticking points, which are logically independent from each other, is a 
basis for disagreement between constructionists and non-constructionists within the 
philosophy of science. These sticking points are not, however, based on binary positions, 
but form continuums. In regard to this study, in terms of these continuums, the question 
is whether it is inevitable that (national) security is how it is, and whether the study of 
(national) security has inevitably had to follow the path it has formed. Here my own posi-
tion is clearly constructionist, since security is taken to mean different things to differ-
ent societies at different times, as the vulnerabilities and historical experiences undergo 
change (and security has not always been the dominant concept for the types of problems 
it is used to organise today). The debates over how to study security have also not fol-
lowed an inevitable path.
Regarding the issue of nominalism: does the world itself have an inherent structure 
of which security is a part? Do threats arise naturally from the material capabilities of 
sovereign states in a world of self-help? Is the object of security the state, and can the se-
curity dilemma not be transcended? Again, I lean towards the constructionist end of the 
continuum, as concepts of ‘security’ are social constructs dependent on history, culture, 
communication and ideology and, thus, not an inevitable part of a world structure be-
yond human influence. There is, however, a physical basis for many social constructions 
(beyond all human thought requiring an organic human brain), which, logically, is often 
precursory to social constructions.
As regards stability, ‘vulgar realists’ maintain that, for at least 700 years, there has 
been ceaseless repetition of state competition for power in a world of suspicion and inse-
curity, some arguing that such features go all the way back to the beginning of recorded 
history. Transhistorical laws transcend situations and reveal the constants of power poli-
tics and insecurity. Thus, questions here are: is the stability of this belief a result of the 
merits of the theory, and does the stability of this belief provide evidence for its merit? 
Or, alternatively, is the stability a result of factors outside the theory and argument e.g., 
politics? What is the position on this sticking point? Security dilemmas have been around 
for a long time. Yet, historical accounts deny any ‘laws of history.’ The stability of utilitar-
ian beliefs can also be accounted for by scholarly politics, both in terms of funding, tenure 
and refereeing practices. To transcend the security dilemma is also logically possible, and 
it has indeed happened in some parts of the international system. On this sticking point, 
my register thus reaches the ‘maximum’ level. 
We now have a total position31 on the level of constructionism on the three sticking 
points between constructionists and non-constructionists. But where would this study 
register on the scale from historical to revolutionary constructionism? In Jürgen Hab-
ermas’s categorisation of the interests of knowledge, this study would fall under the 
category of emancipation. In Ian Hacking’s terminology, it might be characterised as an 
effort towards unmasking security arguments in a Mannheimian manner. Although not 
all issues of security are deceitful, security arguments are extremely strong political 
tools, and thus one must exhibit extreme sensitivity to them. In Mao Zedong’s and Deng 
31  This ‘score’ is, of course, not chiselled in stone, but quite malleable with the help of contemporary informa-
tion technology, i.e., it is fallibilistic and open.
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Xiaoping’s (1995) words we should “emancipate the mind and seek truth from facts,” also 
in respect of security issues.32
2.3. Turtles All the Way Down? Ontological Levels and Social 
         Constructionism
Beyond the ‘sticking points’ identified by Hacking (1999), one of the critiques levelled 
against constructionism is the claim that it denies materialist ontology. Such claims 
present constructionism as leading to the denial of ‘brute’ and material reality,33 due 
to the reasoning that people can manage reality only through language and social con-
structions.34 Such criticisms, then, raise the question: is reality social constructions 
32  In his struggle with Hua Guofeng, Deng successfully attributed the notion to Mao who had presented it at 
Yan’an, during the war with Japan (Hughes 2006, 12). See Kauppinen (2006, 29) on the issue of the temporalisa-
tion and alteration of the meaning of such “formulated ideas.”
33  At this point, it must be noted that when the works of the most frequent targets of criticism in the field of 
‘radical constructionism’ are read, much of the criticism turns out to be poking at straw men. For example, 
Barnes & Bloor (1982) make their arguments about the social construction of scientific knowledge, not about 
the ‘referents’ of that knowledge. Similarly, Pickering (1984), who studied the social construction of scientific 
knowledge of quarks, did not argue that what are referred to as ‘quarks’ in the English language, were socially 
constructed and so would not have existed before their conceptualisation. Elsewhere he argues (Pickering 
1995) that ‘the world resists’ scientists’ conceptualisations and theoretisations of it.
John A. Vasquez (1995, 225-226) presents a similar argument, starting from a very different tradition of schol-
arship. In addition to scholarly concepts and theories, the ‘world’ can also resist nonsense. Torsten Michel’s 
(2009, 404) argument that pigs, like humans can fly on the Moon is the kind of nonsense that Sokal underlines 
(Sokal & Bricmont 1998; Sokal 2008). As the physical phenomenon referred to by flying in the English language 
depends on ‘lift’ produced by ‘wings in motion’ within gaseous substances, neither humans, pigs, nor even birds 
can ‘fly’ on the Moon as it lacks an atmosphere: even if birds could survive on the Moon without oxygen or air 
pressure, their wings would not provide them with the same abilities of producing a region of lower pressure 
above and of higher pressure below their wings that would allow them to propel themselves and glide in the 
‘air’ as they do on Earth. While Michel is confused in that it would be gravity that prevents pigs from flying on 
earth, it is actually the lack of ‘wings’ that is the reason for this. Of course we cannot know that pigs cannot 
fly somewhere else, just as we cannot know that we are not in Hell, or that we are not being deceived by an 
evil scientist when we believe to be observing something, yet these kinds of questions and investigations are 
a pastime for philosophers (or for sets of very confused brains in jars on shelves somewhere), not for people 
engaged in scientific activities. Science deals with facts and knowledge claims, not with the possibilities of 
knowing in a general sense. “I cannot possibly doubt that I was never in the stratosphere. Does that make me 
know it? Does it make it true?” (Wittgenstein 1999b, § 222.)
‘The world’ can also ‘resist’ when it comes to the performance of speech acts. For Searle (2002a, 104), the 
limitations of performatives are not the result of their semantic contents, but facts in the natural world. One 
could for example make a declaration that I hereby end all wars, but facts in the world make this impossible. 
Making declarations non-defective thus requires social institutions or conventions that enable the declarations 
to change the world to fit the propositional content of the declaration. The same applies to implicit speech acts. 
It is usually said one cannot insinuate by declaring that ‘I hereby insinuate that so and so.’ This again is not due 
to the semantics of the utterance, but to the social conventions of discourse communities, i.e., social facts in the 
world. This was also evident in the failure of the securitisation speech acts in the German Democratic Republic 
in 1989: the failure was not a matter of the semantics being any different; facts in the social world did not allow 
securitisation to succeed anymore.
To again rule out any possible confusion: taking a social constructionist stance on science does not necessarily 
mean that one could not be an external realist; many constructionist approaches to science study the construc-
tion of understandings of ‘facts’ as social processes, not necessarily the physical or other objects that the ‘facts’ 
purportedly refer to.
Disregarding the straw-men, the crux of the debate on constructionism within the philosophy of science, 
is whether facts about the world are ‘discovered’ or whether they are ‘invented’ or ‘constructed’ in social 
processes.
34  While Sokal (1998a, 213; 2008, 7-9; see also Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 2) uses this kind of radical construc-
tionism as the launching pad for his parody, he fails to provide any references for such actual claims despite 
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‘all the way down’?
This question has its roots in the anecdote of a world built on the shell of a turtle. 
There are various versions of this anecdote in academic circles, but the most renowned 
was presented by Stephen Hawking (1998) in his Brief History of Time as a discussion 
between an old lady and Bertrand Russell at a public lecture. The crux of the various ver-
sions is that the debate is between a ‘Western’ scientist and an ‘Eastern’ sage. According 
to the sage, the world is located on the shell of a turtle (there may be an elephant between 
the world and the turtle in some versions, but this does not affect the point here).35 When 
the scientist asks the sage what is beneath the turtle, the answer is, another turtle. When 
the scientist persists and inquires as to what is beneath the second turtle, the sage gets 
irritated and quips that it is “turtles all the way down.”36
A belief in the world existing on the shell of a turtle seems nonsensical to us. Yet a 
scientific view of the world faces similar challenges: according to the current state of the 
field in particle physics, the lowest ‘turtle’ of our current understanding of the material 
is entirely hypothetical; the lowest turtle which might manifest mass into larger particles 
has not been empirically observed. Indeed, in the standard quark model of particle phys-
ics, the appearance of mass in larger particles relies on the so called Higgs boson and the 
graviton, neither of which have been empirically observed (to date June 2011). According 
to our current scientific knowledge of the world, we have not hit the bottom whereupon 
the lowest ‘turtle’ is apparently (still) standing on nothing.
In addition to emphasising the ‘ridiculousness’ of ontological models of the world,37 
the turtleshell-anecdote highlights the problem of infinite regress, of which ‘strong con-
structionism’, with its ontological commitment to all facts as social constructions, is es-
pecially vulnerable. However, this complaint does not require strong constructionism for 
even fig-leaf realism is subject to an accusation of infinite regress, since if all beliefs are 
socially constructed, then the belief ‘P’ is socially constructed, as is the belief that ‘belief P 
is socially constructed’ and so forth ad infinitum. Nevertheless, this kind of infinite regress 
does not need to be seen as a problem. Kukla (2000, 72) argues that this regression only 
shows that there is always ‘work to be done’, but it does not mean that this work must 
be done e.g., we can conceive of an infinite number of numbers, yet there is no necessity 
rigorous reference to a vast amount of nonsense of various other kinds (in addition to the references above, see 
also Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 50; Sokal 1998b, 259-260; Sokal 1998c, 269; even Sokal 2008, 7-9). One cannot 
help but get the sense of a straw-man as the pedantic referencing of the rest of the works is replaced in this case 
with recourse to ‘cliché’ (Sokal 2008, 8).
The position of this present study as regards the social construction of facts, can be presented here by rephras-
ing Sokal (1998c, 270): while stating ‘physical reality is a social and linguistic construct’ is plain silly (if we are 
not discussing the concept of ‘physical reality’ but what this concept commonsensically refers to), to state ‘our 
concepts and knowledge claims of physical reality are social and linguistic constructs’ is virtually a tautology. 
This should hold even for Sokal, as for him (ibid.) to state that “’social reality is a social and linguistic construct’ 
is virtually a tautology”, and as human concepts and knowledge claims are a part of social reality.
35  In Hawking’s (1998, 1) anecdote, the turtle was a tortoise, but in the discussion within US dominated IR, the 
turtle has become the norm.
It would be interesting, especially for the ontology of IR, to contemplate the consequences of the world residing 
on either the shell of a land (i.e., tortoise) or a sea habiting (i.e., turtle) creature, but I leave this for another 
occasion (I owe this flight of fancy to Paul Whybrow).
36  In Indian versions of the anecdote, the sage remarks that he does not know what is below the elephant and 
the turtle, or that they should change the subject.
37  Perhaps there is an Achilles trying to catch a tortoise at the bottom?
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to do this every time a count is begun. Thus this kind of regress is not a vicious cycle.38 
Esa Itkonen (2003) grasps the same issue when he discusses socialness and decision 
hierarchies; we usually do not go on for many rounds of contemplating whether some-
one knows that I know that she knows that I know etc. Kukla (2000, 78) also suggests 
that Zeno’s paradoxes39 fail in the refutation of (strong) constructionism, because of the 
premise that the constructions in the infinite regress required to construct even one fact, 
would each require a non-zero amount of time; it may well be that there are temporally 
finite operations, that have the effect to constitute an infinite number of facts all at once.
The third grain of wisdom conveyed by the turtleshell-anecdote, which is closely re-
lated to the issue of infinite regress, is that investigations must end somewhere and, like-
wise, that the acceptance of certain facts precedes and presupposes the acceptance of 
some other, prior, facts (Wittgenstein 1999b, §114-115, §120-121, §225, §274).40 With-
out stopping somewhere, we would succumb to the possibility of the infinite deferral 
of meaning, as emphasised by Derrida. Indeed, most discourses contain ‘trancendental 
signifieds.’ For example, to investigate the nature of the international system presumes 
the existence of the system and its units (and, ‘naturally’, a prior existence of the planet 
Earth). Such assumptions are also crucial for making queries: when we pose a question 
we have to know what our question is about in order for us to be able accept an answer 
to our question as ‘knowledge.’41 When the ‘background’ and the question that has been 
posed fit together, the answers may also seem obvious. As Chomsky (2006, 125, 135) has 
noted, when it comes to human nature, our background knowledge or pre-theories have 
not reached a level from which we could ask the right questions in order to get an encom-
passing scientific understanding of human nature. 
We know how to ask the right kinds of question only when it comes to certain aspects 
of human nature. We can, for example, ask the right kinds of questions on the nature 
of human language, since 20th century language philosophy after Wittgenstein (1999a; 
1999b) made language ‘visible’ for us. Although language and investigations relating to 
language were prominent in 20th century philosophy, this has not always been the case.42 
Before Wittgenstein, the appropriate type of questions in respect to the role of language 
38  A vicious cycle entails that we would have to do an infinite amount of ’work’, not that we can do an infinite 
amount of work.
39  I could never have written this sentence because I should first have had to move my finger half of the distance 
between I and C on the keyboard, and before that, half of the distance of that distance, and before that, half of the 
distance of that distance, and before that…
40  Derrida’s (1978) argument of ‘logocentricism’ is that the most ‘solid’ thing in texts are so called ‘transcen-
dental signifieds’ which anchor discourses into something that is believed to be stable and permanent. The 
problem is that even these remain within the system of differences a language forms. For Derrida (1998, 158) 
‘there is no outside-text.’ In other words we cannot communicate outside language. As the ‘first’ Wittgenstein 
(1996, §7) noted: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.”
Derrida’s point seems close to what Foucault (1972, 47-48) said about the relationship between ‘objects’, the 
‘ground’, and the ‘foundation of things’: “What, in short, we wish to do is dispense with ‘things.’ […] To substitute 
for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in 
discourse. To define the objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them 
to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their 
historical appearance.” (Emphasis in original.)
41  As also highlighted by Douglas Adams (2002).
42  Philosophers have been dealing with language for a long time, but language itself has perhaps never had as 
prominent and rigorous role as in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy, something lamented by Mundle (1970).
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could not be posed.43 Even the arch-skeptic, Descartes, did not think to question the use of 
language. Instead of his own cognitive capabilities, Descartes in fact unconsciously based 
his whole thought-structure on the rules of the language he used (Kenny 1975, 205). For 
Descartes, language was invisible. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s (1999b) refutation of the pos-
sibility of ‘private languages’ is perhaps the most compelling philosophical proof for the 
necessity of a reality beyond individual consciousness.44 Even though the necessity of the 
intersubjectivity of language has been recognised today and so, in this sense, language is 
visible to us, it is still impossible to step outside language to communicate our percep-
tions and beliefs. Communication remains a possibility only through the ‘glass’ of social 
reality (cf., Agamben 2007).
Just as the production of ‘right answers’ as knowledge requires the posing of ‘right 
questions’, an individual can only be conscious of something.45 Berger and Luckmann 
(1994, 30-31) argue that the imagined basic level of human consciousness can never be 
consciously reached, as an individual will always be conscious of something which can 
never be everything or nothing. Even in the era of language philosophy, the basic nature 
and structure of the world still remain unknown to us. Indeed, Williams (2005, 176) em-
phasises that for ‘wilful’ realism, the opaqueness of the nature of both the self and the 
world, sets certain limits for both claims about, and action in, the world. Chomsky (2006, 
126-127; Chomsky & Foucault 2006, 23-25) touches these limits when he asks how it is 
43  Even though there have been people dealing with issues that essentially deal with the same questions as 
speech act theory (Wierzbicka 1991, 197). See discussion on speech act theory below in Chapter 6.3.1.
44  Mundle (1970) does not agree with Wittgenstein on the impossibility of ‘private languages’ (see Itkonen 
2003, 120-125 for a recent discussion of the issue of private languages). As Mundle (1970, 262) however also 
argues that philosophers should be attentive to the findings of ‘specialists’, this means that his agreement with 
Ayer’s affirmative answer to the possibility of inventing private languages (ibid., 227) should be reconsidered. 
Linguists have found that children who have not had human contact have not developed a language of their 
own, and if they have come into contact with people after they have turned eight years old, they are not able to 
learn language beyond the level of a child (Trask 1999, 179-181). Greystoke (Burroughs 1963; directed by Hugh 
Hudson 1984, Warner Bros. Pictures) indeed turns out to be racist fantasy. 
Wittgenstein (1999b) was against the Cartesian notion of knowledge being principally private by nature. For 
Wittgenstein, knowledge has to be intersubjective because there is no way of confirming the correctness of 
knowledge based on ‘private languages’, regardless of whether it is knowledge of observable phenomena or of 
intuition. 
It is however a wholly different issue that languages and the rules that govern them have been learned or 
internalised by each individual in possibly different ways and means. The end result of this internalisation is an 
unconscious ‘mentalese’, which is psychological and not social by nature.
The term mentalese was coined by Jerry Fodor (1976), and it refers to the ‘language’ our senses and nervous 
system use to communicate with our consciousness. Fodor claims that this mentalese is a conscious private 
language, while Itkonen (1978) argues that this mentalese must remain unconscious and thus does not refute 
Wittgenstein’s argument that there can be no private languages (in this sense mentalese is not a language).
Itkonen takes the private language argument even further as he claims (1997, 10) that the necessity of being 
‘public’ is not a peculiarity of language, but the basis of all social phenomena, which in the end are all supported 
by ‘substance’ deriving from psychological and biological phenomena within individuals. Elsewhere, he (Itkonen 
1983, 8) argues that knowledge is always psychological (because social has to be psychological).
Following Wittgenstein, we have to distinguish between knowledge and its object. For example, knowing the 
meaning of a sentence is different to knowing why someone uttered it. In the first case we have knowledge of 
rules or conventions while in the second we have knowledge of intentions, i.e., of psychological phenomena. 
A description of conventions is thus not a matter of psychology, unlike a description of intentions. Rules or 
conventions are not concrete things, they cannot be observed, only intuited (Searle 1969).
45  For Norwood Russell Hanson (1958) there is no pure observation that would be interpreted since all obser-
vation is immediately interpreted; Wittgenstein (1999a) reasoned that we see everything as something; for 
Popper (1963) observation is always selective and requires an interest, point of view, or a problem. In addition, 
observation requires categories of sameness, and the description of observatibles requires a language.
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possible that science of any kind has itself been possible, when the available data on the 
world has been very limited. For him, there has to be some kind of initial limitation for 
any possible theory.46 If all kinds of theories were possible, induction would lead us no-
where as it could go in any direction.47 For Chomsky rules and free creation are not mutu-
ally exclusive; instead they include or presuppose one another. Williams similarly notes 
that the underdeterminacy of the world is not synonymous with complete freedom; the 
opaqueness of the world does not have to lead to despair, as the underdeterminacy of the 
world is actually a prerequisite for the wilful construction of the self and society, it may 
even be a prerequisite for consciousness. If the world were not underdeterminable for 
the human species, it could not enjoy a total comprehension of the nature of the world, 
for it would be oblivious, as those people in Rousseau’s state of nature.48 The basic open-
ness of human-beings vis-à-vis the world in itself already involves the paradox of order 
and disorder (Berger and Luckmann 1994, 119). The human-constructed social reality 
is tied together with a symbol-universe: people externalise themselves into this symbol-
universe and thereby imbue the world with meaning and purpose.
But where are these symbol-universes, social realities, and other metaphysical enti-
ties ‘stored’? How do we comprehend one another? There have been many attempts to 
represent ‘knowledge of the world’ as a basis for interpretation in discourse. This knowl-
edge is assumed knowledge that does not have to be specifically provided in every chunk 
of discourse, and it is the basis for social constructions and socialisation. A number of 
default elements are assumed to be present in any concrete discourse situation and this 
does not require – for some reason – that these be explicitly stated or constructed in each 
and every situation.
Even though there is a range of explanations, and terms, to describe how assumed 
or presupposed knowledge is stored and accessed by individuals, there is usually a 
large area of overlap in what these terms are used to describe (cf., Tannen 1993). The 
phenomenon has many names: Wittgenstein (1999a) calls it the Weltbild,49 Berger and 
Luckmann (1994) discuss the social stock of knowledge,50 Perelman (1996) talks about 
precontracts of discursive communities,51 Foucault (1970; Chomsky & Foucault 2006) 
46  For Charles S. Peirce the concept of abduction represents this initial limitation of possible hypotheses. For 
him abduction is made possible by the innate ability of imagining workable theories.
47  While for philosophers it may matter whether a certain theory is true or false, for practical purposes this 
may not be of great importance (Chernoff 2009, 380); practices function on different principles than ‘truths’; 
people can carve wood whether or not the current model of sub-atomic particles is ‘true’ or not. Just as Peirce 
observes the innate ability of imagining workable theories, it is important to note that there are limits to what 
can be ‘gotten at all’ (Chernoff 2009, 381). Various fields of science and other forms of human inquiry have 
limits to what can be claimed to be known as part of them.
48  If human beings were born with language, they would be connected to their ‘nature’, and would not have the 
possibility for ‘history’ (Koivusalo 2001, 103); such human beings would not have the possibility of the wilful 
construction of the social world and its meanings.
49  Wittgenstein talks about Weltbild – which should be distinguished from Weltanschau’ung – as the way we are 
able to comprehend each other. For Wittgenstein the Weltbild is an image of the world that an individual holds. 
This includes all the things that are taken for granted either through personal experience or education. This 
image is not constant however: it can change through new experiences like a river slowly changing its path.
50  Berger and Luckmann (1994, 49-61) phrase the phenomenon through the social stock of knowledge, which 
presents the validity of our everyday world as taken for granted until a problem arises which cannot be solved 
in terms of it. They argue that we have ‘recipes’ for dealing with routine problems. Mutatis mutandis, a large 
part of the social stock of knowledge consists of these recipes, and as long as problems can be mastered through 
them, people are not interested in going beyond this paradigmatically necessary knowledge.
51  ‘Precontracts’ or ‘premises’ form for Perelman the self-evident point of departure for the argument a politi-
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has his épistémè,52 for Searle (1996; 2000) it is the background,53 Minsky (1975; 1987) 
utilises frames,54 Schank & Abelson (1977) scripts,55 and Sanford & Garrod (1981) use 
scenarios.56 Fortunately, this research does not require one strict way to grasp this prob-
lem, but it is advisable to consider the different terms as alternative metaphors for how 
knowledge of the world is organised in human memory, and then how it is activated in 
the process of understanding discourse and to construct everyday reality – and thereby 
in the construction of issues of security.
In order for some institutional system to seem self-evident, it has to be legitimated as 
part of a symbol-universe or stock of knowledge as discussed above. Indeed, truth claims 
cal speaker makes to an audience.  The speaker attempts to fuse the obviousness of the shared undercurrent 
with the argument she is presenting.
52  For Foucault, an épistémè is historically formed, all encompassing and an unconscious forms of thought, 
which forms the basis for knowledge and theory. An épistémè both enables and constrains certain forms of 
knowledge in certain periods. The dominant épistémè defines what kinds of explanations are acceptable and 
constrains what kinds of theories there can be. Foucault contrasts the dominant épistémè of the renaissance, 
the classical period, and modernity.
53  For Searle (1996) the background is an indefinitely open set of skills, preintentional assumptions, and 
practices which are not representational, but enable intentional acts and states to manifest themselves.
54  The frame theory of Minsky (1975) proposes that knowledge is stored in human memory in the form of data 
structures, which are called ‘frames.’ When encountering a new situation, a stereotypical frame is selected from 
memory and this is then adapted to fit ‘reality’ by changing details when necessary. A frame is characteristi-
cally a fixed representation of knowledge about the world. The problem with frame theory, as with most other 
theories of how knowledge is stored and accessed, is that if it were truly so, then there would be a lot less 
discourse in particular situations than there actually is, as most situations that would follow the stored frame 
would require no communication, as all the participants in the situation could just follow the knowledge of the 
situation in their frames. However, that there are no comprehensive explications when people are engaged in 
discourse, speaks to these theories, e.g., as shown by the discussion on the infinite regress of constructionism.
55  The theory of scripts states that people parse and interpret text through conceptual expectations. While 
Minsky’s frames are more stable facts about the world, scripts are more about standard sequences of events 
that describe situations. The biggest problem with scripts, as with frames, is that they have no way to account 
for how we are able to limit our extra-linguistic knowledge of the world related to each conceptualisation of 
a script only to the relevant ones, i.e., how we do not end up with an infinite amount of conceptualisation for 
understanding a piece of text or discourse. Regardless, scripts can be utilised in describing ‘action stereotypes’ 
and empirical research has shown that people tend to confuse their recollections of a text they read with the 
stereotypical ‘script’ relating to the standard activity depicted in the text (Brown & Yule 1983, 245). This also 
shows how stereotypical gender relations are ‘programmed’ into us.
56  A ‘scenario’ is how Sanford and Garrod (1981) have elected to describe the ‘extended domain of reference’ 
which is used in interpreting texts in practice. They emphasise that the success of scenario-based comprehen-
sion is dependent on the text-producer’s effectiveness in activating appropriate scenarios for the reader. In 
order to elicit a scenario, a text must constitute at least a partial description of an element of the scenario 
itself. Schemata are more general than the situation specific scenarios of Sanford and Garrod. Schemata are 
related to story-grammars (e.g., tragedy and comedy) which are argued to have socio-culturally determined 
and fixed conventional structures containing a fixed set of elements. This can be compared to Northrop Frye’s 
(1957) theory of genres, Hayden White’s (1978) basic tropes of discourse, as well as Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(2001) conception of basic discourses. Thematisation and staging may facilitate the processing of text, but it 
also facilitates power structures embedded in language and social reality. Some discourses or story-grammars 
are more basic than others (Wittgenstein 1999a), and they may change or be changed more easily than others. 
Change in the most basic discourses may raise wide resistance. The strong version of schemata theory states 
that the schemata that people hold are deterministic, while the general view is much weaker. This view states 
that schemata can be seen as organised background knowledge which leads us to expect or predict discourse 
and facilitates our understanding of it. Searle (1996) is quite close to this view as he calls the abilities and 
knowledge people share a ‘background.’ Different cultural backgrounds can result in different schemata – or 
discourses – for the interpretation of events. Rumelhart & Ortony (1977) propose that schemata consist of fixed 
‘data structures’ and that these form prototypic representations for natural and semantic categories. A schema 
or prototype would thus have various variables. 
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require reasoning and proofs.57 For the latter to be understood and accepted, the pre-
senter of a truth claim and the recipient of the claim have to play the same language game 
(Wittgenstein 1999b): the recipient of the claim has to be able to form an understanding 
of how something like the presented truth claim can be known. Indeed, “‘I know’ often 
means: I have the proper grounds for my statement” (ibid. 1999b, § 18).58 Perhaps para-
doxically, both agreement and disagreement require mutual agreement of the factualness 
of certain things. 
A plural society may contain several symbol-universes, for instance, in the form of reli-
gions, sciences and various political doctrines. An individual may move from one symbol-
universe to another even though the initially socialised symbol-universe often appears 
to be the most ‘real’ and secondary socialisations seem artificial vis-à-vis the primary 
or initial socialisation. Pre-theoretical entities seem more real than theoretical entities, 
which may also turn out not to be ‘true’.
The issue of whether or not ‘theoretical entities’ have to be ‘true’, or not, is connected 
to debates on whether we inhabit many worlds or only a single one. This discussion has 
also flared up in the debates on constructionism, particularly on those on the social con-
struction of scientific facts. Perhaps the most acceptable approaches in these debates are 
those that have divided the world into ontological levels. Karl Popper (1963) presented 
us with a tripartite ontology (see Figure 1), while John Searle (1996; 2000) divides facts 
and the world into two categories viz. ‘brute’59 and ‘social facts.’ In a more elaborate man-
ner, Kukla (2000, 4) sees constructionist arguments as functioning on three levels: a) a 
metaphysical level, which produces theses about some or all facts about the world we in-
habit, b) an epistemological level, which contains theses concerning what can be known 
about the world, and c) a semantic level, which concerns itself with what can be articu-
lated about the world, all of which are not necessarily dependent on each other. Thus, 
those who espouse social constructionism, are not necessarily proponents of epistemic 
relativism (that there is no absolute warrant for any belief and that rationality makes 
sense only relative to culture, to individuals, or to paradigms). ‘Fig-leaf realists’ (or ex-
ternal realists) argue that there is a human-independent reality, but that there can be no 
absolute knowledge of its properties; what is known of this human-independent reality 
is constructed by humans.60 Fig-leaf realists will thus believe that there is something atop 
the Himalayas whether or not anyone has been there or knows about it, but as soon as 
57  Onuf (1989, 35) notes how what we understand to be truths are inextricable from the arguments offered to 
support them.
58  Larry Laudan’s (1977, 123) view of rationality seems very similar: “to determine whether a given action or 
belief is (or was) rational, we must ask whether there are (or were) sound reasons for it.”
59  Searle gets this concept from Anscombe (1958).
60  Continuing along with fig-leaf realism: even though the Wizard of Oz may be unmasked as a tiny man pulling 
on levers by drawing the curtains aside, the ‘truth’ remains behind the fig-leaf, as “what we cannot speak of we 
must pass over in silence” (Wittgenstein 1996, §7); in the cinematic version of the Wizard of Oz the tiny man 
pulling on the levers was actually an actor playing the unmasked Wizard, and the whole world was fictional, 
something which cannot be discussed within the story of the Wizard of Oz. Just as the Wizard of Oz could not 
present the ‘correct’ questions (am I an actor in a play?), we may not yet be able to ask the ‘correct’ question 
regarding human nature, or even the social construction of security. Indeed, while individual creativity has a 
role in scholarship, the current state of the relevant épistémè, or the aesthetics of the scholarly field have a major 
influence – and in the end scholars cannot have a vantage point beyond human nature, language, and most of 
the time even society (even Galileo did not transcend language no matter how heretical his claims were viewed 
as by his contemporaries).
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we attribute what there is as being snow,61 we provide it with a status-function and a 
metaphysical layer of meaning.
If we take the approach of Wittgenstein (1999a; 1999b) and believe that meaning de-
rives from use, for example the word ‘five’ has no intrinsic meaning without a context 
(how could you point to five?). We cannot ask what ‘five’ means, we can ask how ‘five’ is 
used. (Ibid. 1999a, §1.) The meanings of words are discovered by investigating how they 
are used. Once the use of a word is learned, its meaning is also learned. (Ibid. §43.) This 
implies that what a word denotes cannot be what it means (Juha is a name of a person, 
but this person is not what the name Juha means). Similarly, it can be argued that the 
concept of fact is a tool for intersubjectively assessing the validity of our perceptions and 
conceptualisations of external reality (cf., Searle 1996; 2000). From this point of view, 
facts represent an intersubjective agreement irrespective of whether this agreement 
comes about either through ‘silence’ or a public debate which abides by a certain set of 
rules (e.g., those of scholarly debate). Such agreement will usually not be reached unless 
there is agreement on the perceptions and conceptualisations that the facts in question 
are considered to represent. In any case, purely social and brute facts must further be 
distinguished: in accordance with fig-leaf realism, facts become facts through intersub-
jective agreement; however, the referents of these facts can be human-independent, but 
need not necessarily be so. Thus for all facts human action is necessary but not sufficient, 
but for social facts human action is both necessary and sufficient, and for brute facts 
necessary but not sufficient. In a way, Kukla (2000, 21) speaks of this when he discusses 
the difference between causal constructionism and constitutive constructionism; in the 
former, continuous human action sustains facts about the world, while in the latter con-
structionism, ‘facts about the world’ are only facts about human activity.62
For Searle (1969, 51-52; 1996; 2000), there is a human independent reality, but hu-
mans attribute this reality with status functions through social processes. He divides the 
various aspects of the realities into “brute facts” (Anscombe 1958), “raw feels”, and “in-
stitutional or social facts.” Unlike brute facts and raw feels, social or institutional facts 
depend on the existence of human institutions. These institutions consist of constitutive 
rules. This is one of the basic ideas of social constructionism, and the insight on which 
Ruggie (1998) builds his studies of international regimes.63 Social (including interna-
tional) institutions cannot be described or measured conclusively through brute facts, 
as even infinite observation or statistical generalisation could not reach the constitutive 
rules of certain human activities like games, which like chess and ice hockey, can only be 
understood and described conclusively through their constitutive rules. A similar critique 
concerning external observation or strict limitation to the study of brute facts in social 
sciences has been made by Chomsky (Chomsky and Foucault 2006, 35) who argued that 
limiting social science to the study of behavioural data would be akin to limiting physics 
61  How long there will be snow on top of various mountains is a topic hotly debated, not among philosophers 
of science, but the IPCC! ‘There is snow on top of the Himalayas’ may be a safe bet for some time to come, but 
‘there is snow on top of Mount Blanc’ may have its truth-value altered as an example of external realism. The 
king of France may soon be bald indeed (cf., Russell 1905).
62  This distinction has some relevance for the ‘normative dilemma’ of writing security discussed below. There 
has similarly been discussion on the theory of securitisation and whether it should be considered as a constitu-
tive or causal theory.
63  See Onuf (1989) for a dissenting view of constitutive rules.
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to the reading of meters and gauges. Thus, when it comes to the study of social realities, 
understanding turns out to be a more comprehensive approach than explanation.
Constructionist studies are often focused on social or institutional facts. For Searle, 
these facts come into existence by human ‘agreement’. The world contains objective facts 
which are facts only through human agreement (e.g., money, marriage, even ice hockey). 
Such facts are objective in the sense that they are independent of individual perceptions, 
opinions or estimations. Such facts are in contrast to those that are entirely independent 
on human perceptions, opinions or estimations e.g., the fact that there is ‘hydrogen’ in 
the ‘sun.’ The existence of institutional facts depends on human institutions, while brute 
facts exist without human institutions. This is evident when a ‘dollar bill’ is compared to 
the piece of paper it is printed on: if all humans are eliminated, the institutional fact of 
the dollar bill ceases to exist, but the piece of paper the bill was printed on will still con-
tinue to exist (as food for cockroaches for example). In order for a brute fact to be stated, 
the social institution of language is necessary, but the fact itself must be separated from 
the statement of the fact. To classify and name a piece of rock in our solar system as the 
planet Pluto or planetoid 134340 will not affect the piece of rock; it may only affect the 
human perception and understanding of it and perhaps the value ascribed to the piece of 
rock in question.
Further, social facts often tend to be self-referential. Searle (1996, 32-34) uses money 
as an example of this: in order for the concept of money to be applicable to something, 
this thing has to be something that people usually consider to be money. If everyone were 
to cease to believe the item to be money, it would no longer function as money and even-
tually no longer be money. This happened to the items designated as Finnish marks when 
Finland turned to the euro for its unit of currency in financial transactions. While there is 
still money in Finland, coins and notes denoted in Finnish marks are no longer accepted 
as legal tender in Finland.
Logically, the statement ‘a certain substance X is money’ implies that there could also 
be the statements ‘X is used as money, X is considered to be money.’ This makes the con-
cept or definition of money self-referential: people have to believe that it is money and 
thereby fill the criteria of the definition of money. This means that people cannot be fooled 
all the time: if something is continuously thought to be money, it is money, and conversely 
if something is never thought to be money, it will not be money. Similarly, in the field of IR, 
this line of reasoning can be applied to, for example, the concept of security. For Wæver 
et al. (1993, 23-24) security is a self-referential practice, as, even though many things 
can endanger the existence of something, issues are ascribed the status function of (na-
tional) security only through an intersubjective and social process.64 This brings forth a 
major difference between brute and social facts: something can be an ‘electron’ without 
any human consideration of such, or there may be ‘galaxies’ which no human being has 
observed. But social facts cannot exist without human conceptualisation, as their concep-
tualisation is a major part of their constitution. Peter Winch (2008, 117) has proposed 
that humans can comprehend natural phenomena only through concepts, even though 
these phenomena may predate the existence of human beings and certainly any human 
conceptualisations of such. However, the conceptualisations of human action are, by their 
nature, different to the conceptualisations of natural phenomena. For example, it would 
64  See Chapter 6.3.3. below for a discussion of this issue with Balzacq’s (2005) differing view.
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be nonsensical to believe that people would have commanded and obeyed one another 
before concepts that enable commands and obedience came into existence.
All social facts are ontologically subjective, yet epistemologically objective. E.g., from 
the previous example, a one euro coin is considered to be money only if people believe 
it to be money. One cannot examine a euro coin as a brute fact, as physically there is 
‘nothing’ there that would intrinsically make the object a euro coin; pieces of ‘metal’ of 
various shapes, sizes and weights, can be examined as brute entities, yet coins as ‘coins’ 
cannot. Each individual conceptualises the euro coin in their mind, making it ontologi-
cally subjective, yet the euro coin is money even if single individuals were to cease to 
consider it any longer as money, as the social fact of euros has been institutionalised and 
thereby, become epistemologically objective.65 Whether a coin is a legal tender as a euro 
is not the provenance of individuals but depends on a very complex set of legal rules, on 
the international agreements constituting the EU, on national Parliaments, the European 
Central Bank and so forth. In other words, even if they wanted to, individuals cannot print 
their own money; it has to be epistemologically objective in order to serve the function 
of money. Thus from the perspective of brute facts, the ‘nothing’ can transpire to be very 
complex in terms of social facts.
Indeed, social facts form the majority of everyday experience: the complex ontology 
of cars, keyboards, marriages as well as money is seen and not the simple ontology of, 
for example, particles on linear trajectories in fields of force. It is the intersubjectivity 
of social facts that differentiates the everyday experience of the world from other reali-
ties individuals are conscious of. Even though it is possible to question the reality of the 
intersubjective world, in daily life it is our duty to silence such questions and doubts. It 
is usually only in liminal situations e.g., in the presence of death – perhaps even a PhD 
thesis – that the ‘dark side’ of social reality comes to the surface and can endanger the 
‘sanity’ of our daily experience of the world (Berger and Luckmann 1994, 113). In these 
kinds of situations, the conventionality and contingency of social reality and the symbol-
universes that it consists of become ‘visible’ or apparent. In these kinds of occasions, 
‘reality’ e.g., ‘the world of phenomena independent of our will’ (ibid., 11), the essence of 
which we cannot alter, may turn out to be a ‘principle.’66
Children grow up in cultures where social facts are taken and taught as self evident: 
the primary socialisation process produces a reified social reality (Berger and Luckmann 
1994). Perception and use of everyday things like automobiles are encountered without 
65  Interestingly, despite his euroscepticism, the Finnish populist Timo Soini accepts his salary in euros.
66  The reality principle is one of the most important concepts of Jean Baudrillard (e.g., 2010). For him, when 
we examine and analyse images, it is revealed that there is nothing behind them. As simulations become more 
widespread and prevalent, they may become more important than the reality they simulate – and so become 
hyperreal. In hyperreality the distance between images and their referents becomes nonexistent making the 
image or representation as real – or even more real – than what it signifies. Our everyday experiences are no 
longer that relevant for, say, monetary flows realised by distance technologies. Most of our everyday experience 
may actually be more about representations based on images, than ‘events’ we experience directly. In these 
conditions, the challenge for postmodern societies is to develop practices to maintain the reality principle, as 
virtual realities may become more relevant than brute realities.
Our primary socialisation is usually experienced as necessary and it is internalised as it is (Berger and Luckmann 
1994, 166). Even the initial socialisation is however usually not entirely successful, or entirely complete. Subjec-
tive understandings of reality can be jeopardised by conflicting beliefs and ‘knowledge.’
In hyperreality, the liminal situations and environments of our understandings of reality may become more 
numerous. Security practices are one way of maintaining our dominant reality principles (Der Derian 1995). 
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consideration, even realisation, of their simple ontology. For children, tokens and concepts 
of automobiles are essentially tied to each other: the contingency and conventionality of 
the signifier ‘automobile’ and its ‘signified’ (automobileness) (Culler 1994) are perhaps 
never realised by individuals without studies of language philosophy or linguistics.67 Ob-
jects like chairs and tables seem as ‘natural’ as water or stones. But when we examine 
our everyday practices (e.g., the purchase of bread in the store), an almost limitlessly 
complex ontological network is revealed that is not about physical or chemical phenom-
ena. Indeed, it is actually more difficult to perceive and comprehend the simple, or brute 
reality of things with their social functions removed, than to perceive and comprehend 
their complex ontology of social functions. It is only through abstraction that automobiles 
can be perceived as masses on linear paths in fields of force. Thus paradoxically, complex 
ontology seems easy and simple ontology difficult. But this is because social reality is a 
human creation, for human purposes, and therefore such realities seem as understand-
able as those purposes: automobiles are for driving and money is for trading.68 It is more 
difficult to define a thing with its social function removed by only referring to its intrinsic 
features and not to social interests, purposes and objectives.
Thus when, for example, structural realists within IR have strived for parsimonious 
theories by only focusing on the material capabilities of states, social constructionists 
open up the complexity of social realities for investigation. Even though the inclusion 
of social realities into the study of IR will render it more complex and perhaps more de-
manding, constructionist ontology is no more mystical than our so called scientific image 
of the world (Searle 1996): particles in fields of force can form systems, some of which 
can be sentient, with even consciousness. Intentionality comes along with consciousness 
and the ability to form representations of phenomena in the world. In addition to sub-
jective representations there can be collective representations, which become possible 
through the social and conventional system of practices called language. These collec-
tive representations can be institutionalised (like language), when they are no longer 
dependent on individual intentions. The transition from intentions to social facts is then 
no more miraculous than the transition from particles to fluidity. What we are dealing 
with here is ‘emergence’; not all features that manifest on a ’higher’ level of ontology can 
be reduced to the features of lower levels.
The underdeterminacy and opaqueness of the world at its basic level and essence is not 
an invention or privilege of ‘irresponsible postmodernists.’ These issues, the scholarly as 
well as practical dilemmas they create, have been wrestled with by such impressive fig-
ures of Political Realism as Thomas Hobbes and Hans J. Morgenthau.69 However, the fact 
67  And even then it may be difficult to grasp Derrida’s (1978) radical interpretation of de Saussure, that the 
most ‘solid’ thing in discourse or ‘text’ is usually tied to various ‘trancendental signifieds’, and that even these 
only exist through differences in a system of difference i.e., language. 
68  It would be relatively simple to devise other social functions for both automobiles and money, which q.e.d. 
is precisely the point here.
69  Morgenthau (1947; 1970) argued that the world is in principle indeterminate, and he criticised the scient-
ism of the ‘new theories’ of the second great debate in IR (see Knorr & Rosenau 1969a). It indeed seems that 
pre-positivists and post-positivists share many similar views in respect of knowledge formation and the limits 
of epistemology.
Interestingly, Morgenthau has received a lot more attention recently (see Korhonen 1983 for an earlier intel-
lectual history) and he is used as a means of criticism of utilitarist approaches to IR as well as a means of 
building bridges between constructivism, post-positivism, and classical realism. See for example Wyn Jones 
(1999), Williams (2005; 2007b), Scheuerman (2008), Cozette (2008), and Behr & Heath (2009). See Brown 
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that there is no single universal epistemology or unambiguous access to the structures of 
reality does not mean that nihilistic relativism must overwhelm us, nor should the lack 
of a universal epistemology cause the abandonment of scientific discourse. If knowledge 
is taken as being a ‘justified, properly grounded belief’, convincing scientific arguments 
result in justified, properly grounded beliefs, and thereby in knowledge and science (cf., 
Wittgenstein 1999b, §18, §21, §165, §166, §170, §175-177, §179, §243). 
As such, viewing security as socially constructed is not a new revelation. An under-
standing of the social construction of reality has, in one form or another, been the basic 
insight that has guided sociological studies. This was merely ‘forgotten’ as timeless social 
systems, the autonomy of social structures, or a constant human nature were sought dur-
ing the era of structural-functionalist dominated sociology (Aittola & Raiskila 1994, 229). 
What is of more interest for studies based on social constructionism is the study of the 
processes of the social construction of realities or aspects of them. Whether or not the 
‘facts’ that are claimed by these kinds of studies are discovered or negotiated within the 
social fields of scholarship does not matter that much for the practicalities of empirical 
research: “‘I know’ often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement” (Wittgen-
stein 1999b, §18). What is more relevant is to abide by the ‘form of life’ of scholarship and 
the practices that constitute scientific scholarship, and eschew practices that constitute 
other ‘forms of life’ such as essayism, journalism, or art – although they all also serve im-
portant alternative functions, and share family resemblances with scholarship.
(2009) for a discussion of Waltz’s views on human nature in respect of the tradition of Political Realism, and for 
possible reasons why Waltz left human nature out of his theory.
Morgenthau is not the only 20th century classic who has been the subject of newfound interest. Other pre-Cold 
War realists raising discussion include Carl Schmitt (1996; 2003; 2005; for critiques, warnings, and applica-
tions to security studies see Huysmans 1998b, Williams 2003, Smith 2005, and to IR in more general, Odysseos 
& Petito 2007) and E. H. Carr (1946; a recent example of reinterpretations of Carr can be found in Kubálková 
1998).
As we dismantle straw-men we often come to realise that the real things were not as fierce or simple as they 
were portrayed to be. Moderation can be found in many classics, even though ‘Chinese whispers’ have distorted 
their arguments over the years and generations of scholars. The possibility of reinterpretations is, of course, 
the mark of a true classic.
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Part of being a good scholar is to have an understanding of the character and objectives 
of the broader practices of scholarship that go beyond her particular study. These include 
the role of scholarship in society and the possible ethical dilemmas that may be involved 
in research in general, or in certain topics in particular. Meta-level discussion about sci-
ence and scholarship has a key role in the provision of these kinds of insights; as Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith (1991, 27) note, any student of international relations has to think 
deeply about the nature of science.1 
Such assumptions must be clarified in this study’s context as well, because of its explic-
it theoretical aspirations, even though it is not a study in the philosophy or sociology of 
science as such. By explicitly stating the presuppositions2 and assumptions about shared 
knowledge that form the specific ontological (see previous chapter) and epistemological 
background, the likelihood of confusion and misunderstanding regarding the arguments 
is reduced, as the readers can compare the explicitly stated background knowledge to 
their own. This is necessary because we are dealing with abstract issues that go beyond 
our everyday use of language and thus move beyond our everyday experience which we 
take for granted. Since the results of this investigation are directed to both an interna-
tional and interdisciplinary audience, the margin for confusion in respect of implicit as-
sumptions is greater than in a study that is confined to an agreed upon ‘normal-scientific’ 
paradigm of a single discipline (cf., Kuhn 1996).3
1  For Thomas S. Kuhn (1996) this entails that IR has not reached the state of  ‘normal science’ but remains 
waiting in the ‘ante-chamber’ (Hakovirta 2008), which may actually be preferable to only having one paradigm, 
one puzzle to solve.
Hedley Bull (1969, 30) noted that instead of accumulating data and theory in a paradigmatic way “a more 
likely future for the theory of international politics is that it will remain indefinitely in the philosophical stage 
of constant debate about fundamentals; that the works of the new scientific theories will not prove to be solid 
structure on which the next generation will build, but rather that those of them that survive at all will take their 
place alongside earlier works as partial and uncertain guides to an essentially intractable subject; and that 
successive thinkers, while learning what they can from what has gone before, will continue to feel impelled to 
build their own houses of theory from the foundations up.” Witnessing the ‘third debate’ (Lapid 1989) and the 
current calls for naming a new great debate around issues of ontology testifies to the power of Bull’s view.
2  For Stalnaker (1978, 321): “Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the 
participants in the conversation” (quoted in Brown and Yule 1983, 29). According to Givón (1979, 50), presup-
positions are assumptions the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge.
3  Perhaps ironically, it seems that social scientists are the ones who read treatises on the philosophy of science 
3. Dilemmas in Theory Development and Application
I want the Truth!
You can’t handle the truth!
- Lt. Daniel Caffee and Col. Nathan Jessup
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3.1. Science, Knowledge, and their Progress
When people talk about ‘science’, what they usually have in mind are the natural sci-
ences. Even most philosophers of science4 use the natural sciences as their template of 
what science is and how it progresses. However, as has already been discernible from the 
discussion in the previous chapter on social constructionism, it would seem that ‘talk’ of 
‘narratives’ and (mere) ‘constructions’ in the “paradigm wars” (see Hacking 1999) of the 
philosophy of science has led to severe confusion in respect to the status and functions 
of facts and, consequently, science and its study.5 Indeed, having been corrupted by a 
plethora of ‘post-post-posts’, can a scholar truly believe in any form of science or facts?6 
If our understanding of scientific facts is the result of negotiation and contingent social 
processes (Duhemian conventionality), is ‘science’ possible for a constructionist? If facts 
and truths are not equivalent, if science is ‘just another narrative’ (Lyotard 1984), why 
should we get entangled in it in a systematic manner, and not just follow some flights of 
fancy? Can Feyerabendian (1975) cognitive relativism be avoided?
Even Aristotle deemed poetry superior to history, as poetry can confer causal logic on 
the arrangement of events when history is doomed to present events in their empirical 
disorder (Rancière 2007, 121; 2008, 36). In the field of social science, theory, be it causal 
or constitutive, has the same virtue as poetry had for Aristotle: theoretisation enables 
an abstract distance from the phenomenon under investigation, and thereby allows the 
formation of intelligible and sometimes even falsifiable arguments on it. The theory of 
securitisation, for example, is then perhaps neither true nor false, but may prove to be 
useful, simple, fruitful, elegant, or just satisfying instead. For Albert Einstein (1938) sci-
ence “is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts. Physi-
cal theories try to form a picture of reality and to establish its connection with the world 
in order to form an understanding of what science is and how science is practiced. Kuhn (1996) has had a major 
impact here (Hakovirta 2008), which is lamented by some (e.g., Sokal & Bricmont 1998 and Haukkala 2008a). 
Most scholars engaged in the natural sciences do not consult philosophers on how to start their investiga-
tions, nor on ‘how to go on’; they merely ‘do’ science. Indeed, as Albert Einstein (1949, 684) noted, scientists 
cannot take their epistemological endeavours as far as philosophers. Scientists can practice science without 
understanding how they are doing it. As we will see below, science and philosophy engage in different types of 
investigation.
4  The term ‘Philosophy of the Sciences’ was coined in 1840 by William Whewell who is also credited with the 
invention of the very word ‘scientist’ (Hacking 1999, 197). 
5  A commonly proposed definition of knowledge in philosophy is a ‘justified true belief.’ As various veins of 
epistemology have shown us, ‘truth’ seems to be too tall an order for ‘knowledge’ (Lammenranta 1993). Knowl-
edge and facts are taken here as tools for negotiating intersubjective understanding of reality, which will remain 
in part unknown to us. But it is vital to note that the concepts of ‘fact’ and ‘knowledge’ have developed to deal 
with this issue: we can go on without an ultimate truth about the world. The take on knowledge applied here 
follows Wittgenstein: “‘I know’ often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement” (1999b, § 18); “What 
I know, I believe” (ibid., §177). Knowledge then is a ‘justified, properly grounded belief.’
Sokal & Bricmont (1998, 96-97) inadvertently provide a good example of what Wittgenstein was saying. For 
them, correct answers to scientific questions depend on the state of Nature (e.g., the number of neutrinos the 
Sun really emits). For unsolved problems, nobody knows the right answer, while for solved ones the answer 
is known. Yet even correct solutions can be challenged. Enter Wittgenstein. If correct answers are knowledge 
(a justified true belief), and their correctness is determined by Nature, how can they be challenged, and how 
can our knowledge of Nature change? The answer is that we learn the right answers for the right questions, 
but our certainty does not become truth vis-à-vis Nature, but vis-à-vis the language game. This does not entail 
relativism, it entails a lack of absolute certainty. 




of sense impressions.”7 In a similar way, when discussing the relationship between fiction 
and history, Jacques Rancière (2008, 38) argues that the ‘real’ must be fictionalised in 
order to be thought. In the field of social science, this argument could be rephrased by 
stating that the ‘real’ must be theorised in order to be thought. This theoretisation al-
lows a similar kind of arrangement of facts as history vis-à-vis poetry for Aristotle, or the 
formation of a picture for Einstein. The models or leading ideas of theories and research 
programs are not exact replicas of ‘real’ situations, but they aid comprehension in order 
to deal with what is conceived to be the ‘real.’8 This is where securitisation theory reveals 
its value, be it as a heuristic device, a magnifier of contingency for ethical intervention, or 
as an avenue to understand relationships of actors, objects, and meanings, to understand 
the functioning of power. However, any such sensible reconfiguration of facts also brings 
with it an aesthetic dimension, and this argument is equivalent to the dismantling of the 
barriers and hierarchies among the forms and levels of discourse (Rancière 2008, 65-66), 
even within and without scholarship.
The breaking down of the separation of levels of discourse should not be taken the 
wrong way. Indeed, as Rancière (2008, 38-39) appropriately argues, the notion of ‘nar-
ratives’ has steered both positivists and deconstructivists to lose their bearings.9 Discus-
sion of narratives has locked the ‘real’ and the ‘artificial’ into permanent oppositions, 
when all forms of knowledge construct ‘fictions’ in rearranging signs and images, thereby 
modulating what is seen and said and also what is done and what can be done. This does 
not mean however that everything would be fiction; it only means that in the “aesthetic 
age” (Rancière 2008), the borderline between the logic of fact and the logic of fiction has 
been blurred.10 Furthermore, this has nothing to do with the reality – or unreality – of 
things. Political, scholarly and even fictional statements can still shape reality.11 State-
ments on the real, or of pure fiction, can have a modulating effect on “the seeable, the 
doable, and the sayable” (ibid.).12
What is being dealt with here, is the aesthetics of scholarship in Rancière’s (2008) 
sense of the term, that is, the a priori distribution of the sensible within scholarship i.e., 
the modes of articulation between forms of action, production, perception and thought in 
7  On Einstein’s view of science, mental models, and creativity, see Vilhu (1979).
The idea of a theory as a picture comes very close to how Kenneth Waltz (1979, 8) describes theory: “A theory is 
a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity.” Waltz (ibid., 9) similarly emphasises the 
element of creativity in the formation of theories by quoting John Rader Platt on theories as also being artistic 
creations.
8  This viewpoint is an instrumentalist one. Theories can be understood in various other ways as well. For 
example, Laudan (1984), in his debate among fictional philosophers of science, suggests that a theory can be: 
for a ‘positivist’, a system of equations (ibid., 10), or a declarative and descriptive, true or false statement about 
what there is in the world (ibid., 102-104), for a ‘realist’, a claim about basic causal processes and fundamental 
entities in a domain (ibid., 10), and for a ‘pragmatist’, a tool to anticipate and explain phenomena (ibid., 106). 
For a critical realist (e.g., Niiniluoto 2000), theories could be truth approximations.
Etymologically, theory derives from the Greek theoria (θεωρία), which meant ‘a looking at, viewing, or behold-
ing’ or being a theatre spectator. Accordingly, theory has been often viewed in contrast to practice; from an 
etymological standpoint, theory is contemplation rather than action.
9  This appears to apply to Alan Sokal (see Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 1) as well.
10  For Rancière (2007, 116) entities of representation are fictional entities, and thereby exempt from judge-
ments of existence or ontological consistency. However, such fictional entities are also entities of resemblance.
11  Think of Iraq’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and the effects of the various claims that included this 
allusion.
12  For Slavoj Žižek cinematic fiction is more real than the (desert of the) ‘real’ (see The Pervert’s Guide to 
Cinema, directed by Sophie Fiennes 2006, Amoeba Film).
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the social field of scholarship. Taking science as just another narrative entails the disman-
tlement of the barriers of various tropes of discourse. This does not, however, mean that 
all discourses are equal in terms of their persuasiveness. It merely means that scholarly 
arguments have to be convincing without recourse to the authority of ’science’: scholars 
have to make their arguments with their top hats, tail- and even lab coats removed.13 If 
the practices of scholarship lose their felicity in terms of perlocutionary effectiveness 
due to this, the practices must be deemed not worthwhile. If, however, scholarly practices 
remain convincing and effective, this attests to their worthiness as a form of life. If social 
authority is removed from arguments, so too is an aspect of mastery from science whilst 
still retaining its exactingness (cf., Certeau 1988, 13).
Rancière can also supply two additional concepts to consider how scholarship func-
tions as a human activity. His ‘police’ in the field of scholarship is comparable to Kuhn’s 
‘normal science’, while Rancière’s concept of ‘politics’ could be comparable to Kuhn’s ‘rev-
olutionary science.’ For Rancière (2008; Rockhill 2008, 3), the police is an organisational 
system of coordinates that establishes a distribution of the sensible; the police is akin to 
a law which divides communities into groups, social positions and functions. In this, his 
police is similar to a state of Kuhnian normal science: scholars know what is valuable, im-
portant, and how progress can be attained in their endeavours, and the resources avail-
able to a field of science, whether they be intellectual, social, or economic, are distributed 
accordingly. Just as Rancière’s law of the police, normal science implicitly separates those 
who participate from those who are excluded, partly based on a prior aesthetic division 
of the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, the ‘sayable’ and the ‘un-
sayable.’ Revolutionary science, however, opens perhaps all of these aspects up. Indeed, 
if a field of scholarship is defined by anomalies, this could be close to an open politics of 
scholarship, where anything would truly ‘go’ (cf., Feyerabend 1975, 27-28),14 as long as 
it is more convincing than prior theoretical arguments. The essence of Rancière’s politics 
is the interruption of the distribution of the sensible and thus the modification of the 
aesthetico-political field of possibility. It is important here, not to confuse the opening 
up of the aesthetico-political field of possibility with that of the possibilities of the ‘real’: 
the social and the material have a partly dialectic relationship, but not all material, not to 
mention energetic, lends itself to a dialectic relationship with the social. Subatomic parti-
cles could be called ‘turtles’, but while human understandings of such things may be signs 
all the way down, quite likely there still remains phenomena beyond human understand-
ing, and therefore also beyond human aesthetics (cf., previous chapter).
Examining scholarship as an aesthetic practice is akin to viewing science, or the pro-
duction of scholarly knowledge, through a sociological lens. The sociology of knowledge 
and science makes use of the practices of science, by investigating knowledge and science 
as human practices. Contemplation of science from a sociological angle should reduce the 
level of reification in a single piece of scholarship. Indeed, if the speech act framework of 
the present study is utilised to examine itself as an activity, it becomes apparent that a sci-
entific thesis is merely a very complex speech act, a complex set of arguments. The author 
is engaged in communication with her audience, with the perlocutionary intention of 
13  Science should not become a ‘transcendental signified’ (Derrida 1978).




convincing.15 Therefore, in order to make the argument speech act felicitous, one should 
follow the norms and other rules of what is considered to be science, as this is what is 
considered most convincing within the discourse, practice, and institution of science.16 
Hence, the construction of intersubjective reality and of the knowledge of securitisation 
theory, as aided by this new knowledge of certain aspects of Chinese security-speak ‘out 
there’, ‘in the wild’ is the process engaged in this study. In my view, scientific scholar-
ship is how this is achieved most convincingly. Even if science is not understood to have 
any divine, or otherwise privileged, access to ‘the truth’, science and the factual claims it 
produces are tools to communicate one’s understanding of reality ‘out there’, and thus 
science is not an impossibility for a constructionist either.17
3.1.1. Instrumentalism, Truth and the Limits of Scholarly Knowledge
It appears that the social constructedness of intersubjective agreement on what is and 
what is not a ‘fact’, is not a problem for ‘science’, but for ‘scientism’,18 and perhaps even 
15  For (sadly the now late) Derrida’s information: this is what I really meant to do by writing this thesis.
16  Science can be viewed as a practice, and a form of discipline (Foucault 1979a); if one wants to take part in 
this field of practice, one has to conform to its rules, and the social ’circles of esteem’ that manifest ’science’ as 
a social field.
Similarly, science can be taken as a form of life (Wittgenstein 1999a; 1999b; cf., Winch 2008). And scholar-
ship truly is a form of life, with seminars, publications, meetings, offices, editors, professors, colleagues, and 
students. This PhD project has for example moved my body to the spaces denoted by the signs of Stockholm, 
Toronto, New York, Singapore, Beijing, Shanghai, Paris, Reykjavik, etc., virtually (all these places can be seen 
from Google Earth! http://www.google-earth.com) half way around the world.
Whether viewed as a practice, a form of discipline, or a form of life, scholarship conforms to rules. The goal of 
science is to be convincing, and in order to be convincing, one has to follow the rules (of the game); in order 
to be convincing, i.e., intelligible, a scholar has to follow the rules and conventions of the field of science she is 
engaged in. The actions of scholars in any field of science gain their meaning from the social context of common 
activity that the scholars are engaged in (Winch 2008, 79). Does one have to believe in ‘science’ more than to 
this extent? Part of this understanding of science is that it is fallibilistic, it recognises that it may be wrong. My 
epistemological and ontological commitments are thus open, they may change.
17  Indeed, if scientific methodology is understood like it is defined by Sokal (Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 203) as: 
“a respect for empirical evidence and for logic,” I can hardly disagree. Similarly agreeable is Hedley Bull’s (1969, 
36) definition of science as “a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge.”
18  Scientistic positions view science as a means to acquire knowledge of all of reality and in general the nature 
of things, as if it were the only true methodology to acquire knowledge. This can lead to a reductionist view 
where the methods and categories of natural sciences are taken as the only proper elements of any investiga-
tion, whether they be philosophical or psychological in character. When natural science is viewed in such a way, 
the assumption is that science should dominate all walks of life, and subsequently that scientists should wield 
the greatest social capital; this can bring about the illusion that simplistic, yet ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’, methods 
allow us to solve very complex problems (Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 191). In a similar fashion, scientistic views 
can judge science as boundless and that science will, eventually, be able to explain everything (a belief aptly 
parodied in a computer providing the ultimate answer to life, the universe, and everything as 42 by Douglas 
Adams’s [2002] The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy).
A scientistic trend was discernible in the field of IR during the ‘second debate’, where the views of science 
espoused already varied greatly within IR. For some, science was about abstract theory, for some it meant 
testable hypotheses, while for some it was synonymous with the collection of quantified data (Knorr & Rosenau 
1969b, 13). Bull (1969, 20-21) summed the traditional and scientific approaches succinctly: the classic approach 
produces theories that draw on philosophy, history, and law and explicitly rely on judgement as strict standards 
of verification and proof would leave very little to be said about international relations, which leaves general 
propositions about them to be made with the scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition; the 
scientific approach aspires to a theory of international relations where propositions are based upon logical or 
mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification.
On the second debate within IR, see Knorr & Rosenau (1969a), especially Bull (1969) and Kaplan (1969).
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positivism, which itself has run aground on a variety of other fronts.19 ‘Scientistic’ ideals 
have encountered further problems, in that, while still often held in high regard, scien-
tists of all fields have lost some of their social capital (which has been transferred to 
‘experts’ in general).20 Wittgenstein’s analysis of the realities of language, of the fact that 
we cannot step outside language to say something about it, has had a significant effect 
on the relationship between facts and what is said to be the truth.21 As even philoso-
phers and scientists are trapped within ‘ordinary language’, they no longer have a privi-
leged position of mastery over ‘reality’ and its nature. Thus, ‘truths’ no longer have any 
privileged position for signification. While ‘facts’ remain, not all of them are necessarily 
‘truths’ any more (Certeau 1988, 11). The removal of the social capital of scientists and 
scholars beyond their arguments may reduce the inflation of ‘truths’ through the presen-
tation of ‘facts’, so that philosophers, scientists and scholars can no longer convert ‘facts’ 
into ‘truths.’22
This change is also apparent in that even scientists do not share a common under-
standing of what science actually is. Yet, in whatever way science it viewed (e.g., from a 
positivist, empiricist, or instrumentalist standpoint), it usually can be deemed as a pur-
poseful action irrespective of what that purpose may be. Like Ilkka Niiniluoto (2000, 60), 
19  1) The principle of verificationism is in trouble because positivists cannot produce proper criteria for what 
would count as verification (Duhem 1954; Quine 1997), 2) the principle of observability is in trouble because 
all observation is observation of something, it is theory-laden (Wittgenstein 1999a; Popper 1963; Hanson 
1958), and 3) the principle of accumulating scientific knowledge is in trouble because new theories are often 
contradictory, even incommensurate with old ones (Kuhn 1996; Popper 1963).
20  Competence is transmuted into social authority in the ‘expert’. Experts intervene in debates outside their 
particular expertise, yet often retain an aura of authority, or their social capital; experts convert competence 
in a certain field into authority in another. Through their capacity and capability of initiation in their field of 
expertise, experts gain a possibility of speaking with authority in other fields, not due to their expert knowledge 
but to the socio-economic function they play in knowledge production in another field. If an expert continues to 
portray herself as an expert or scientist in a field beyond her original capacity, she is confusing social place with 
technical discourse. (Certeau 1988, 7.)
21  The etymology of the word ’fact’ illuminates its constructedness. Facere or faktum meant in Latin performing 
or doing, a thing done or performed (Oxford English Dictionary 1989, 651-652). Although completely opposite 
to the everyday understanding of facts as something precisely independent of any judgement, this etymology 
fits well with the understanding of facts as tools in communicating and judging subjective observations in order 
to negotiate an intersubjective understanding of the state of affairs or the world that strives towards objectivity, 
or rather practicality and empirical adequacy. According to Searle (1996), the correspondence between ‘facts’ 
and the ‘physical world’ can be evaluated because the concept of ‘fact’ has been developed precisely for this 
purpose. The problems with the concept of fact arise from it being a noun: we intuitively assume facts to be the 
name of some phenomenon or thing and for the noun to be isomorphically linked to it (see for example Sokal & 
Bricmont 1998, 102; while ‘facts’ and ‘assertions of facts’ are different things, the problem is that we can only 
communicate our perceptions, beliefs, etc. on ‘facts’ by making assertions, statements, etc. on them). In French 
also bogus, false, invented, imitated, and simulated (facticé, la facticité) are derivatives of facere (Baudrillard 
2002, 79), a fact [sic] which may explain some French philosophers’ sensitivity to ’reality-principles.’
Similarly to the current factual factness of facts [sic], the concept of ‘truth’ in the English language did not have 
the impersonal and objective ring it has today (Oxford English Dictionary 1989, 627-629). As Hughes (1988, 
61-62) notes, truth evolved from being a private commitment to a publicly assessed quality. While in medieval 
times the personal aspect could overcome even evidence and testimony by means of ‘proof by arms’, in the 
modern European understanding truth is taken as the opposite to ‘lying’ and ‘concealment.’ Truth has been 
elevated to a high place among generally accepted ideas. (Wierzbicka 1991, 103.) 
22  “The concept of ‘truth’ as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of 
the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon 
pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness – the intoxication of 
power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are 
prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, 
however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.” (Russell 1991, 782.)
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we can state that scientific and scholarly methods are the means to attain the objectives 
or purposes of such activities. Neither the objectives, purposes nor the methods to strive 
for these have, however, reached their final stage or form. Scholarly methods have not 
been ground down to their core, nor become pre-givens in conducting research. Indeed, 
new generations of scholars should contemplate previous understandings of science and 
scholarship, and strive towards the formation of their own structured understanding of 
this human practice. Thereby, what then is the approach to science and its means of pro-
gression in the present study?
My approach here is that of an instrumentalist, and it thus departs from a purely ra-
tionalist understanding or viewpoint of science.23 Accordingly, ‘truth’ as a criterion of the-
oretical knowledge is viewed here as too tall an order for knowledge (cf., Lammenranta 
1993). Instead, the stance adopted here combines fallibilistic instrumentalism vis-à-vis 
scholarship and scientific knowledge with naturalism or realism vis-à-vis pre-theoretical 
phenomena.24 This is close to a pragmatist approach, and thus attempts to find middle 
ground in the kinds of claims that can be made in respect of knowledge, while still re-
taining some ‘common sense’ when dealing with abstract and unobservable notions and 
phenomena.
An instrumentalist stance on scholarship takes theories as an economical and ap-
propriate tool to organise observable or intuitive consistencies (cf., Kiikeri & Ylikoski 
2004, 204). In order to ‘save the phenomena’ (Duhem 1969; Bogen & Woodward 1988),25 
theoretical concepts that refer to unobservable objects and processes are also possible. 
These however are tools to organise observation and intuition. Theories and abstractions 
should be kept separate from ‘things in themselves’;26 an instrumentalist position on sci-
ence leaves the question of the contents of the underlying realities open. Theories are 
not ‘what is’, but they are very delineated abstractions instrumental in academic debate. 
Theories are isolated realities; theoretical concepts are a means to isolate “one realm 
23  Sokal & Bricmont (1998, 57) provide a succinct phrasing for an instrumentalist attitude in respect of scien-
tific theories: “instrumentalists may regard our scientific theories as, quite simply, the most satisfactory way 
that the human mind, with its inherent biological limitations, is capable of understanding the world.” Indeed, 
an instrumentalist stance on science is seen here to entail that scientific concepts and theories are instruments 
whose value depends on how well they serve specific interests of knowledge, not on whether they are true or 
false. This means that instrumentalism treats theoretical claims and terms as referring to theoretical objects ‘as 
if ’ they existed, rather than assuming that they are ‘real’ (Chernoff 2009, 376); theoretical concepts are useful 
tools to organise and systematise observations as well as to predict future observations based on previous 
observations (Raatikainen 2004, 26). In instrumentalism, pre-theoretical or pre-scientific objects are taken to 
be different to theoretical objects: pre-theoretical objects are assumed to be ‘real’ on the basis of non-theoretical 
knowledge claims, while there is no such assumption for theoretical objects.
Dividing concepts into those that deal with observations (pre-theoretical concepts) and theoretical objects is 
problematic for strong empiricism; Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel all turned to an instrumentalist stand due to 
the problems of the strictness of their previous demands of operationalisation and descriptivism (Raatikainen 
2004, 25-26). On debates on instrumentalism in IR see Chernoff (2007; 2009), and Wight (2007b).
24  To believe that most of the theoretical assumptions we base our understanding of the empirical world 
on, eventually turn out to be wrong (e.g., archaic), and that the theoretical objects theories deal with, are not 
assumed to be ‘real’, does not entail that there could not be such entities, or that theories could never “get it 
right” (Chernoff 2009, 386). Fallibilism is sceptical of the possibility of ultimate certainty, not of the possibil-
ity of knowledge or justified beliefs (Wittgenstein 1999b; Lammenranta 1993, 14). I consider fallibilism both 
compatible with instrumentalism and middle-ground between naive empiricism and radical relativism within 
the philosophy of science.
25  Bas Van Fraasen (1984, 256) would also ‘save the phenomena’ as fragments of larger unities.




from another in order to deal with it intellectually,” as Kenneth N. Waltz (1979, 8) puts 
is.27 According to this understanding, the theory of securitisation in this study is a tool to 
organise and understand the regularities of phenomena that happen ‘out there’ and, as 
such, it provides artificial examples of the category it claims to model.
As the term already suggests, an instrumentalist views science as a result of the inter-
action between humans and their environments. The purpose of science and scholarship 
from this view-point is to help solve problems (cf., Laudan 1977), be they about physical 
survival or increased consciousness.28 This also means that scholarship shares ‘family 
resemblances’ (Wittgenstein 1999a) with other human practices or language games (e.g., 
policy research, surveys and journalism in the case of IR), yet it has its own style and rules 
of argumentation, debate and rhetoric (Kaakkuri-Knuutila & Heinilahti 2006, 8).
Similarly, humans have developed various tools for various tasks and, consequently, 
not all tools can be used to perform all tasks. This is another point of disparity between 
an instrumentalist or conventionalist approach on science and a positivist one: instru-
mentalism is assumed in this study to entail that scientific theories are always developed 
for certain purposes and in certain political and social contexts (Cox 1986).29 These pur-
poses and contexts set limits for the application of theories, which should be taken into 
consideration in the practice of scholarship. Kuhn (2000, 92-93) has gone so far as to ar-
gue that fully fledged theories cannot communicate with each other as they form ‘differ-
ent languages’, which ‘cannot be translated’; in an earlier and even stronger formulation, 
paradigms were incommensurable,30 and could be without any common measure for 
27  Waltz’s (1979, 7, 11) structural theory was closer to an instrumentalist position: the task of theory was 
to make observations meaningful; theories bring otherwise disparate facts together in a manner that makes 
them interdependent. Theories are in another world in regard to the reality they are used to explain; theory 
is independent of practices, and theories cannot be equated with practices: “A theory is an instrument used to 
explain ‘the real world’ and perhaps to make some predictions about it” (Waltz 2004, 3). 
While Waltz himself warns against positivist and empiricist tendencies (e.g., Waltz 2008), many still construe 
him as a positivist, e.g., Onuf (2009, 188): “Waltz’s conviction that the world consists of observable phenomena 
and theoretical notions, neither reducing to the other, makes him a strong positivist.”
28  Reality and political speech are messier than the elegant models scholars create (cf., Wilkinson 2007), but 
elegant models allow us to focus on relevant aspects of infinitely complex phenomena. This understanding 
supports a creative, pragmatic, non-correspondence theory of truth: scholarly models are useful symbols to 
represent relationships in ways that may allow them to be solved (Stegeman 1969, 30).
29  How much the social and political context has an effect on the content of theories is a question for specific 
empirical studies; politics may or may not have a significant impact on scientific theories (e.g., consider Nazi 
Germany, or the PRC under Mao).
30  Ian Hacking (1983, 63-74) has divided incommensurability into three distinct types, namely topic-, dissocia-
tion, and meaning-incommensurability. A new theory should be able to cover the topics of the previous theory, 
but also be able to deal with new topics. Having different topics makes for incommensurability between them. 
Dissociation on the other hand makes for incommensurability through change in concepts. As the background 
information and assumptions of an old text fade away, it may become impossible for a later theory to under-
stand a previous conception. 
This may be why Derrida (1988) argued that literary studies cannot reach the ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ context of a 
text, and that new interpretations, meanings and contexts can always be grafted onto texts (see also Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001 on the surpluses of meaning). 
Incommensurability may also be the result of theoretical concepts having various meanings as parts of different 
theories. As concepts get their meaning from being a part of a theory, it may become impossible to derive a previ-
ous theory from a later one. (Hiski Haukkala 2008b, 39 emphasises this kind of conceptual path-dependence 
of various theories.)
Mika Kiikeri and Petri Ylikoski (2004, 66) add a fourth form of incommensurability, that of standard and aim, 
or methodological incommensurability. Representatives of various paradigms or theories may have varying 
understandings of the aims of scholarship, the relevance of research problems, and the standards of evaluating 
results. Their category of incommensurability could perhaps be broadened to include interests of knowledge: 
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Kuhn (1996). To pass from one theory and its language into another requires a Gestalt-
switch without any process of understanding.31
However, not all approaches to science are satisfied with such an instrumentalist 
stance in regard to scholarly activities and knowledge production. For example in the 
field of IR, some scholars use Roy Bhaskar’s (1978; 1986) critical realism as the basis 
on which they build their own theoretisations.32 Colin Wight (2006, 26) summarises the 
metaphysical commitments of critical realism as: 1) ontological realism (the existence 
of a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to know it), 2) episte-
mological relativism (that all beliefs are socially produced) and 3) judgemental rational-
ism (that it is, in principle, possible to choose among competing theories).33 For Wight 
(2007b), the social objects that science studies should be identified before philosophical 
positions can be taken on how knowledge claims about them can be made.34
Fred Chernoff (2009, 388) views scientific realism as leading to an ontology that con-
tains objects that almost certainly do not exist:35 “at its core scientific realism is a doc-
trine about the truth of scientific theories and the reality of the entities those theories 
postulate.”36 It is however not necessary to assume that theoretical objects postulated 
by philosophers or scientists are part of a ‘practical’, or ‘existing’, ontology that consists 
of pre-scientific objects like remote-controls or digital photographs of fathers, beyond 
starting our investigations ‘as if ’ the theoretical objects existed.37 This approach is in ac-
cordance with Duhem’s thesis that no theory can be the final or unrivalled truth given 
variance in the interests of knowledge of various theories may bring about yet another type of incommensu-
rability. Incommensurability is then a broader issue and question than debates on whether scholars inhabit a 
single or several worlds, whatever their Gestalt may be.
31  Kuhn’s (2000) later writings have indeed moderated his original formulation; complete incommensurability 
has become an issue of untranslatability. This alleviates many problems, as whilst all translation is ‘impossible’, 
we still manage to do it all of the time. If different theories are untranslatable, we may in a similar way in 
practice be able to make sense of them regardless. See Footnote 62 of the Introduction on issues of translation.
32  For recent debates and the position of critical realism in IR see Wendt (1999), Patomäki & Wight (2000), 
Wight (2006; 2007a; 2007b), Kurki (2006; 2007), Joseph (2007), and Käpylä & Mikkola (2009).
33  Wendt (1999, 51) summarises scientific realism as 1) the world is independent of the mind and language 
of individual observers, 2) mature scientific theories refer to this world, and 3) even when it is not directly 
observable.
34  While my own view of science, its functioning and role in knowledge production is close to the principles 
proclaimed by Wight, I do not see how science could go beyond an instrumentalist position, and that is where 
I part ways with Critical Realism.
The current ‘ontological debate’ within IR on whether ontological questions should come before epistemological 
questions seems to repeat the positions of Plato and Aristotle who first discussed what kinds of things exist and 
how they relate to each other before going into how people can gain knowledge of these things, and positions 
that have been more prominent since the 17th century (e.g., Descartes) where ontological questions could be put 
forward only after epistemological issues had been solved one way or another (cf., Heiskala 2000, 82).
35  Even Sokal’s (Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 58-59) ‘sensible’ approach to determining the truth would result in 
a lot of untrue entities being considered as true: criminal investigations “are rational and based on a detailed 
analysis of prior experience. In our view, the ‘scientific method’ is not radically different from this approach.” It 
is good to be reminded here that a lot of innocent people have indeed been convicted in the United States and 
elsewhere.
36  Chernoff (2009) seems to be suggesting that Bhaskar and scientific realists should be included into Mundle’s 
(1970, 274) list of ‘great metaphysicians’ the likes of Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Ayer who share a 
common trait: that of an irresistible tendency to believe that their categorical system is how the universe must 
be.
37  It is important to keep in mind that even pre-scientific ontological beliefs contain unobservables like money. 
Indeed, the assumption of unobservables is not limited to theories. Another difference between pre-theoretical 




any finite store of evidence.
The positivist understanding of science has taken science to be the provider of reli-
ability, measurability, objectivity and the predictability of regularity. Accordingly, schol-
arly flirtation with various strands of relativism has often been presented as endanger-
ing these important properties of science and scholarship.38 Constructionist theories 
of knowledge, for example, have been criticised for precisely this.39 Michael C. Williams 
(2005) argues that the so called neo-neo-synthesis of international relations theory 
(Wæver 1996; 1997b), for example, is wary of constructionist epistemology due to a be-
lief in cognitive liberalism.40 The leading idea of cognitive liberalism is the understand-
ing of objective empirical knowledge as the foundation and prerequisite for responsible 
action and practice; liberalism as a moral and political theory, defines how knowledge 
about morality and politics can be attained, as well as what can be done about morality 
and politics. Williams sees cognitive liberalism as an answer to Thomas Hobbes’ (1999) 
state of nature, which represents the limitability of human knowledge and authority. Ac-
cording to Hobbes, ‘man’ has no natural epistemic ability that would provide agreement 
on what the reality of the world is, in neither an empirical nor moral sense. Individuals 
can interpret good and evil in various ways. Williams sees this as the background for the 
methodological debate between rationalists and their critics in the field of International 
Relations (see e.g., Lapid 1989). Cognitive liberalists seem to fear a return to the state of 
nature as a result of empiricism and liberal-empirical objectivism, as transpiring to be 
untrue. Since would not ‘man’ return to a nihilistic state of nature, if the basis for objec-
tivist empiricism were lost?41 David Campbell (1996, 16-17) has identified this question 
as a fear of the loss of all options of articulating the state, or any other kind of political 
38  Sokal’s claim to fame is the result of just such an enterprise. For similar views within the field of IR see 
for example Mearsheimer (1994/1995) and Jarvis (2000). Others (e.g., Gilpin 1984) merely lament that they 
cannot understand what ‘post-modernists’ are trying to say. While for example Ashley’s (1984) barrage is quite 
easy to follow, the same cannot be said for the excerpts of Lacan (Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 18-37) and Kristeva 
(Sokal & Bricmont 1998, 38-49) Sokal and Bricmont (1998) have brandished.
39  See Keohane (1988) for an academic power-move trying to incorporate ‘critical approaches’ into the 
rationalist mainstream of IR. There were several proposals for label-candidates that could be used to manage 
the main fault lines of the field in the late 1980s. Keohane’s move was ‘reflectivism’ while Lapid (1989) used 
post-positivism. Around this time Onuf (1989; see also Kubálková et al. 1998) coined ‘constructivism’ as a third 
way, and eventual middle-ground in this ‘third debate’ within IR (Lapid 1989).
David A. Lake’s (2011) keynote address from 2010 shows how the divisions among the discipline have remained, 
and repeats Keohane’s (1988) move in another guise.
40  Williams (2007c, 18) identifies a similar fear prevalent in Security Studies: there is a desire to render the 
world knowable, calculable, and as a result, controllable, and constructivism is suspected of undermining these 
goals.
41  Even Feyerabend (1995) seems worried that political ideologies are once again taking the place of science, 
this time in the United States (witness also the shift of targets in Sokal 2008).
Such problems of ideology encroaching on scientific thinking and practice is not new. Indeed, Henrik von 
Wright (1987) argued that science as an independent form of producing knowledge first defeated alchemy, 
then totalitarian ideologies, and finally real socialism. It seems that it is the task of the current teams in the field 
of scholarship to defeat the challenge of real capitalism and New Public Management which are encroaching on 
the agendas and practices of science. The problem with ideologies penetrating scholarly practices is that the 
independently developed criteria and practices to evaluate what is claimed as ‘reliable scientific knowledge’ are 
replaced with criteria and perhaps practices developed for other purposes. 
Robert K. Merton (1973) argued for two criteria for the evaluation of scientific claims: logical consistency and 
compatibility with known facts. Hans J. Morgenthau (2006, 3) concurred with this understanding with his 
dual test of theories: theories should be consistent with the facts and within themselves. While the interests of 
scientific claims of knowledge vary, neither race, religion, class nor economic profitability should play into the 
criteria to evaluate claims about scientific knowledge.
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organisation to lead to a good life, if these critical arguments of rationalist international 
relations theory were taken to their conclusion. As cognitive liberalism connects univer-
sal empirical objectivism with responsible political practices, a relativist epistemology 
would lead to a political and moral relativism.42
It is important to note here, that even if knowledge claims can be argued to always 
be bound to a certain point of view, or a certain situation, this does not necessarily infer 
that all knowledge claims must be equally valid.43 Karl Mannheim (1997) had already 
separated this kind of a relationist understanding from a relativist one in his sociology 
of knowledge. A constructionist approach to scientific facts does not have to mean that 
a constructionist scholar could not believe in ‘external realism’, or in the existence of a 
human-independent reality, without its observation. Constructionist research of knowl-
edge is usually interested in how claims about knowledge or facts come about, not in the 
existence of the claimed facts or the accuracy of the knowledge claims as such.44  The 
sociological study of science and scholarship takes these human practices as an object of 
science and scholarship; the sociology of science does not give the practices of scholar-
ship any ‘special treatment’, beyond any other form of human practice. While the philoso-
phy of science is interested in the nature of reality (ontology)45 and the possibilities of 
acquiring knowledge (epistemology)46 as such, the sociology of science is interested in 
the construction of knowledge as an intersubjective activity (Berger & Luckmann 1994). 
Although, like Peter Winch (2008), close connections between the social sciences and 
philosophy can be identified, there are also differences in both the methodology and in-
terests of both the philosophy and the sociology of science.  
3.1.2. Problems of Observation and Falsification
The differences between scientific and philosophical investigations and proofs become 
apparent when G. E. Moore’s (1962) pen and his hands are examined (Moore 1993). 
Moore argued that his knowing that the pen he held in his hand existed, refuted Hume’s 
sceptical arguments. Further, by moving his hand, he reasoned that there must be material 
42  Which of course are logically separate.
43  Mouffe (2005, 14-15) states a similar position as regards value judgements: that one cannot provide an 
ultimate rational foundation for any given system of values does not imply that all views of values would have 
to be viewed as equal; as knowledge claims may be deemed to be satisfactory or wrong within systems of rules 
that guide such judgements, for Mouffe, the just and the unjust, or the legitimate and the illegitimate can be 
distinguished within given traditions with the help of standards this tradition provides, by playing the sets of 
language games that make up a given tradition.
44  To use Sokal & Bricmont’s (1998, 91) example of a man running out of a lecture hall screaming that there 
is a stampeding herd of elephants inside: a sociologist of knowledge would not be interested in whether or 
not there actually were elephants in the lecture hall; the sociologist of knowledge would be interested in why 
Sokal took either there being or there not being elephants stampeding in the lecture room to be knowledge, or 
a justified true belief; the sociologist’s own view of the truth or falsity of the screaming man’s assertion would 
not count into her investigation of Sokal’s knowledge claims. This approach is similar to that of conceptual 
history as practiced by Skinner (2002): of interest is not whether witches were real or not when Bodin wrote 
his treatises, but why such a learned individual seemed to strongly believe in the influence of witches on the 
politics of his time.
45  As a branch of philosophy, ontology investigates the nature of reality and what really exists in general 
(Raatikainen 2004, 11).
46  As a branch of philosophy, epistemology investigates what should be believed and what should not, how 
beliefs are justified, and what can be known (Lammenranta 1993, 13).
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objects in the world. Yet, as Wittgenstein (1999b) showed us, Moore confused philosophy 
with empirical science: whether or not Moore could know that the pen or the hand he 
perceived were real, is a question of epistemology, but the study of the features of his pen 
or his hands (e.g., whether or not they are material, or even ‘his’) is a matter for empirical 
science since philosophical and scientific ‘proofs’ are different.47 Indeed, as Peter Winch 
(2008, 39) has suggested, philosophy of science should elucidate the peculiarities of the 
form of life called science, while epistemology should elucidate forms of life in general. In 
this vein, the scholarly rules that this present research follows can generally be described 
as that the arguments presented here, should be allowed to undergo public scrutiny in 
the relevant scholarly community, without any outside interference. Only after this has 
been the case, can the arguments presented here be considered as conforming to schol-
arly practices, and thus constituting scholarly knowledge.
But how far do such scholarly practices or forms of life deem what is considered to be 
knowledge, and how can we assess how scientific knowledge progresses? 
The principle of induction could be described as the ‘common-sense’ view of how sci-
ence works and what science is: scientific knowledge has been proven to be correct, it is 
superior to other forms of knowledge, it is based on experimentation and/or observa-
tion, and it is objective and trustworthy. The idea is that all science begins with observa-
tions, which are then generalised into theory. Observing was for a long time considered 
to be trustworthy and not subject to problems, such as Russell’s (1912) discussion on 
‘sense-datum’ (cf., discussion of Moore’s hands above).48 After the ‘scientific revolution’, 
general laws and theories were induced from singular observations and these theories 
were then used to deduce forecasts and explanations for other phenomena. However, 
as Hume already showed us, induction is not logically valid. Observation cannot be fully 
trusted either, as all observation is theory-laden; for Norwood Russell Hanson (1958) 
there is no pure observation that would be interpreted, all observation is immediately 
interpreted, we see everything as something.49
The implications of the theory-ladenness of observation and perception were taken to 
their extreme by Paul Feyerabend (1975), for whom observation is subjective and what is 
perceived varies according to, for example, the culture or the scholarly tradition of the ob-
server. Without investigating Feyerabend’s claims too deeply, the subjectivity of all obser-
vation can be dealt with by emphasising the fact that intersubjectivity has the most im-
portant role in scholarly practices (cf., Figure 1). The observations of a single scholar will 
usually not be accepted as an indicator for the existence of a certain phenomenon. Such 
tests and observations should be repeated by various scholars and defended publicly.
47  Whilst the question ‘Do portable electronic devices that can be used to write academic theses exist?’ can 
be settled by producing the laptop on which I am currently writing this text for the one asking the question, 
answering such questions does not solve the question ‘Does reality exist?’ (cf., Winch 2008, 9-10). Whether or 
not reality exists is not something that the concept of ‘knowledge’ or ‘fact’ has been developed for; inquiring of 
others on whether reality exists, or not, does not make sense (Lammenranta 1993, 197-200).
48  David Hume had already proposed that only our sensory perceptions are real, and that supposing the exist-
ence of a material or spiritual reality beyond them means practicing useless metaphysics (Raatikainen 2004, 
19-20). This kind of extreme empiricism is not subscribed to here, even though empirical observation (and 
explication of intuition) is taken as an important aspect of convincing scholarly arguments.
49  Karl Popper (1963) noted that observation is always selective and requires an interest, point of view, or 




Both cultures and scholarly communities are comprised of groups of people, who have 
intersubjective beliefs and which, indeed, influence observation and perception, as also 
emphasised by Feyerabend. But the perception or observation of a phenomenon does 
not necessarily affect it in a severe way.  The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis falsification is a case 
in point: even though people in different cultures label and delineate phenomena in dif-
fering ways, that does not mean that their actual sensory perceptions would be that dif-
ferent, or at least different as a result of to the structures of their language.50 Indeed, the 
theory-ladenness of observation does not have to lead to any radical conclusions (Kiikeri 
& Ylikoski 2004, 31-33).51 
Even though we have to live with always being ’situated’ somewhere during observa-
tion, we do not have to succumb to nihilism. The perception of phenomena is influenced 
by the experiences of the researcher and it is not possible to study something from a com-
pletely extra-cultural point of view (Wierzbicka 1991, 9); scholars are inevitably guided 
by some principles, ideas, or concepts that we know are not necessarily shared by the 
entire human race. Nevertheless, it is a necessity to commence enquiries from some point 
i.e., some initial concepts or ideas.52 It must be accepted that all study is conducted from 
within one’s own culture. However, it may be possible to separate the idiosyncrasies of 
specific cultures from some near-universal aspects of human interaction.
In addition to issues of observation and perception, the question of how our assump-
tions can be deemed to be false has been considered a relevant problem for theory devel-
50  Linguistic relativists argue that the structure of our language in large measure affects the way we perceive 
the world. According to the Sapir-Whorf theorem, certain groups of Native Americans perceive colours in a 
different way to non-Native Americans because their concepts for colours are different. This hypothesis has 
been formed through the idea that since different languages have different structures for describing things 
(for example the Navaho have elaborate ways of ‘naming’ rock formations through geometrical shapes, which 
has led some to conclude that the Navaho perceived things geometrically) different cultures that use these 
languages (as a first language) also perceive things differently.
That different cultures divide the world up differently, is usually not questioned, but the claim presented by 
Whorf (1956) that cultures with different language structures perceive the world differently, is highly contro-
versial. The research of Berlin and Kay (1969) indeed supports arguments against linguistic relativism. The 
two anthropologists made a series of tests with people with different first languages that have different ways 
of describing the basic colours that are part of many languages (the amount of basic colour words can vary 
from two to fourteen). Different languages divide the scale of colours differently according to their basic colour 
terms. This has been considered a paradigm case of languages dividing up the world differently. Even though 
the boundaries of the colour terms of the participants were fuzzy, Berlin and Kay found that speakers of all the 
included languages displayed similar agreement on the central shades of all of their colour terms, which Berlin 
and Kay elected to call foci. Even though different languages have different numbers of colour terms, the foci 
were always the same. The locations of the foci on the colour spectrum also seemed to be universal. Colour 
terminology was thus shown to be governed by rigorous universal principles, and differences among languages 
are possible only within strict guidelines.
The study of Berlin and Kay (1969) refutes the Sapir-Whorf theorem: despite varying concepts, the people 
involved in their empirical test of the colour scale did not perceive the colours differently; they merely divided 
the colour scale into different sections. This result favours structuralism in a broad sense of at least some 
aspects of cognition having their own structure independent of societal conventions.
51  It is generally accepted in the mainstream of contemporary philosophy of science that theory-ladenness 
can affect observation in at least three ways: 1) pre-theories or pre-beliefs can affect what is observed, what is 
noticed, and what is considered as important, 2) previous beliefs may affect the estimation of the plausibility 
and reliability of an observation: an anomalous observation may be disregarded as erroneous for example, and 
3) observations have to be described in a language that is compatible with the theory, which can affect how the 
observation is given meaning (Raatikainen 2004, 34). As Abraham Maslow’s (2002, 15) law of the instrument 
states: “When the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.”
52  As Onuf (1989, 35-36) notes, one may begin with by taking facts, or ‘things’ as granted, or one may begin 
with words, ideas, or arguments as deeds done, as he does.
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opment. The refutation of hypotheses based on modus tollens53 has become problematic 
due to holism and the possibility of ‘Duhemian operations’.54 As Pierre Duhem (1954; 
1969) argued, no single empirical test or observation ever decides the fate of a single 
hypothesis: a hypothesis always encounters empirical observations together with sec-
ondary hypotheses. Thus, according to Duhem, which of the hypotheses is the faulty one, 
can never be known. There can be no crucial experiments that could decide the fate of a 
hypothesis, as the observation of empirical phenomena cannot articulate which hypoth-
eses are falsified.55 In principle then, should they desire the survival of their hypotheses, 
scholars can always engage in ‘Duhemian operations.’
When the Duhem theorem is translated into the theoretical and language philosophical 
stance applied in the present study, we can see that the explanatory power of theories is a 
pragmatic virtue, and that ‘truth’ is a feature outside of explanation (cf., Kiikeri & Ylikoski 
2004, 226-228). An explanation is independent of truth since theories are empirically 
underdeterminable. Empirical observation itself cannot articulate whether a theory is 
true or false. Those who would be convinced by a theory or observation may believe it to 
be true, but this is a pragmatic or a perlocutionary effect of the illocutionary force of the 
argument, presented in the form of a theory or hypothesis. Although now ‘visible’, thanks 
to 20th century language philosophy after Wittgenstein, our apparent consciousness re-
mains unable to communicate perceptions of reality, except through the ‘glass’ of social 
reality and language (cf., Agamben 2007).56 
That the ‘truth’ of theories is a virtue, separate from explanation, does not mean that 
solipsism must prevail nor the denial of an ‘external realism’; that one is an empirical 
constructionist, and argues for the empirical adequacy rather than ‘truth’ of theories (cf., 
Laudan 1977), does not mean that one could not be a realist when it comes to brute 
and social reality beyond one’s own perceptions and consciousness.57 What we know of 
either reality may not be ‘the truth’, but it may be enough for ‘all intents and purposes’ 
53  The logical validity of this principle is the basis for falsification.
54  I.e., that we can reject our observation in order to keep our favoured theory. As the discussion of Lakatosian 
research programmes below shows, it indeed does not make sense to deem a theory as refuted due to a single 
discrepancy (naïve falsification), even if it is reproducible. There however also are limits to how many Duhemian 
manoeuvres should be allowed before rejecting a theory altogether (cf., Lakatos’s positive and negative heuris-
tics of research programmes). These limits arise from the practices of scholarly communities.
55  Duhem’s thesis is more generally accepted than Willard Van Orman Quine’s (1997) stronger claim that 
a stubborn enough scholar can always find new ways to hold on to her hypothesis regardless of any logical 
or empirical proofs presented. While actual scholars often want to retain their theoretical constructions, we 
have to keep in mind that actual practice many times does not conform to philosophical possibilities. That 
you can be stubborn and reject both logic and evidence to save your theory or hypothesis does not mean that 
you have to do so; even scholars can be reasonable entities. Indeed, a sociological stance towards the study of 
science as knowledge production may save us from some of the problems the philosophical study of science 
has uncovered. The practices of scholars are from this point of view more relevant than the logical or other 
possibilities they may have.
56  As Agamben (2001, 47) notes, humans ‘see’ the world through language but they cannot see language itself. 
That Wittgenstein made language visible for us ‘equals a Copernican revolution’ (ibid., 54). But it is important 
to realise, as Agamben (1998, 50) notes, that this does not mean that the ‘nonlinguistic’ would be completely 
inaccessible for humans, but that human beings cannot reach it in a form that would be a ‘nonrelational and 
ineffable presupposition’, as the ‘nonlinguistic’ is only communicable by, and thereby within, language (cf., 
Wittgenstein 1999a; 1999b).
57  Indeed, many renowned scientists have held an instrumentalist stance on science; for many natural scien-
tists, the support of evidence, proper scientific practices, and choice of theories are the basis for accepting 
knowledge claims, not a belief in the knowledge claims being the ultimate truth.
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(for the interest of knowledge of that research) in that it may be enough to negotiate 
and execute one’s existence in relation to that ‘reality.’58 Thus, theories are fallibilistic 
suppositions that remain adequate until convincingly deemed otherwise. Theories and 
models make abstractions of reality, which can be empirically adequate, yet still turn out 
to be ‘untrue’, as has indeed occurred many times over in the evolution of the scientific 
understanding of the world.
3.1.3. Difficulties of Estimating the Progress of Knowledge
It is often suggested that science should be both successful and progressive. But how 
does one arrive at acceptable criteria for the success or progressiveness of theories? This 
is usually determined within the branch of science under discussion, or within competing 
approaches. Science is often thought to be progressing when it comes closer to ‘truths’, 
yet the practical effects of scientific theories may also be a criterion of progress.59 Indeed, 
although Duhem’s hypothesis, or empirical underdeterminacy, undermines simple falsi-
fication, real scholars are anyhow engaged in a much more varied endeavour in testing 
their theories. Indeed, simple empiricism is not enough to decide on the usefulness and 
applicability of a theory. More complex criteria have to be set to decide the fate of theo-
ries. These might include compatibility with other theories, simplicity, explanatory pow-
er and theoretical fruitfulness (Kiikeri & Ylikoski 2004, 36), or their capacities to deal 
with problems in ways that allow them to be solved (Stegeman 1969, 30; Laudan 1977), 
even elegance. When these types of questions are investigated, the assumed foundation 
of rationality for knowledge is of paramount importance.
Habermas’s (2007; see also 1977) concept of the ‘interests of knowledge’60 could be a 
basis here to evaluate the value of scholarly endeavours: as Laudan (1990, 18) also sug-
gests, there is a need to assess how well various approaches have reached the goals they 
have set for their endeavour. In view of the interests of knowledge, research which reach-
58  Engaging in a boxing match may be a hard means of dealing with the bruteness of reality, but it may enlighten 
us as a metaphor of the argument here. A boxer may have a theory of how to fight, but the reality of the other 
boxer (and the rules that constitute a boxing match) may ‘prove’ the theory to be wrong (no hits below the 
belt allowed here, and especially no kicking!), and defeat you. This however does not necessarily mean your 
theory of how to be a successful boxer was wrong: perhaps the other boxer was merely more capable, or the 
situation of the fight did not fit the theory. The discussion of ‘which martial art system is the best’ is something 
that many martial artists (or should they be better termed martial fan-boys?) spend their time arguing about. 
But also here, it can be argued that there is no best or ‘true’ system of martial arts, i.e., theory or concept, it is 
about the empirical adequacy of the ‘theory’ or style/system and its application in given situations ‘out there.’ 
Yet, we also have to note that as there are many ways of fighting, all of them with limitations, it is not true that 
all bodily movements are equally good for fighting. There is no single, all-applicable, ‘true’ method of boxing 
for example, but not all methods of boxing are equally good or reliable either. The same applies to scientific 
methods and theories.
59  Various research programmes could for example be ranked according to their timeliness, fruitfulness, or 
political effects (Heiskala 2000, 11). Finding one common measure for all research programmes in every field 
of science is however exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Larry Laudan (1977) suggests that how well a 
‘research tradition’ is able to solve empirical and conceptual problems could be the measure to assess the 
progress of ‘science’, or even that progress is a diachronic notion that requires empirical means to rank how 
far various efforts have realised some aim or aims they have set as their task (Laudan 1990, 18). From such 
a viewpoint, methodological rules are putative instruments for the realisation of cognitive or doxatic aims 
(Laudan 1984, 34).
60  See Nurmi (1971) and Berndtson (1971) for discussions on Habermas’s interests of knowledge from a 
political science perspective. Ashley (1981) views Political Realism through Habermas’s interests of knowledge 
while Vuori (2008a) does this for Political Realism and the study of security.
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es for a technical interest of knowledge, progresses when it allows enhanced control and 
guidance of processes in reality; that which aims for the practical interest of knowledge, 
will progress when people are able to understand both themselves and one another, and 
then to pass this understanding on by communication and the mediation of information; 
research that strives towards emancipation, progresses when intersubjective relations 
or positions of power considered as ‘natural’, can be deconstructed or ‘unmasked’, and 
people can be released from ‘false consciousness.’61
For Habermas, the three interests of knowledge are separate by definition, yet even in-
dividual studies may exhibit more than one interest of knowledge. It however seems that 
scholars tend to favour one of such interests, and accordingly, that interests of knowl-
edge form one more avenue for scholars to talk past one another in scholarly debates. 
It appears that some approaches to knowledge production and interests of knowledge 
go together better than others. Within the field of IR, it seems that, for example, realism, 
‘explaining’ and a technical interest would easily talk past a combination of idealism, ‘un-
derstanding’ and an emancipatory interest.
Actually, while Hollis & Smith (1991, 6-7) argue that the study of IR always has “two 
stories” to tell, viz. those of “explaining” and “understanding”, from the point of view of 
the interests of knowledge, IR may actually have three stories to tell (Vuori 2008a): the 
technical, the practical, and the emancipatory story. Indeed, securitisation theory can 
be used to conduct studies with any of the three interests in mind, although it may be 
more suited to serve certain interests better than others. But what are the three stories 
that securitisation theory, or Securitisation Studies, can tell us via the three interests of 
knowledge? 
In terms of control, or an instrumentalist interest i.e., the first story, the theory can be 
used to identify stages of conflict escalation. If the speech acts of various types of actors 
begin to display securitisation, this may be an indicator of the conflict becoming more 
acute. Identifying such situations may help arbitrators to, if not intervene, at least offer 
to participate in negotiations and thereby defuse a conflict before it becomes more dras-
tic. The strands of securitisation proposed in the present study can make such estimates 
more nuanced. From another point of view, the framework can be used to identify the 
types of actors that are most relevant in various societies, and thus to recognise when 
‘talk’ becomes serious.62 In these ways, the theory can be used as a tool in the early stages 
of crisis management and also for dealing with its problems on a practical level. 
In terms of the practical interest of knowledge i.e., the second story, the theory can be 
used to reveal and elucidate understandings of security.63 This may help decision-makers 
61  The combination of these three interests of knowledge together with Laudan’s (1977) division of empirical 
and conceptual problems provides us with a two by three typology for the assessment of aspects of the possible 
progress of theories.
62  It was for example interesting to note that both during the 2008 unrest in Tibet, and in the 2009 unrest in 
Xinjiang, provincial party leaders used the language of securitisation, while the central level used more moder-
ate language. This tactic signalled that the issues were severe, and the local securitisation allowed the use of 
security measures, but also that the measures could become more severe; the provincial securitisation of the 
issues functioned as a means of control and deterrence.
63  For example Ciuta (2009) argues that the theory could be a starting-point for hermeneutical studies of 
security where both analytical language and the language of the objects of study would be combined (Ciuta 
2009). Kurt W. Radtke (2008, 203) similarly argues that security studies ought to develop a metalanguage that 
could transcend the concepts of particular countries, cultures, and scholarly icons. As such, I reason that the 
theory of securitisation, when explicated with illocutionary logic, may provide some headway towards estab-
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and their critics and opponents, all to understand their own views, and possibly dissent-
ing views in their own society or in others too. Denaturalising security increases the need 
to take political responsibility and to help people evaluate arguments for legitimacy. A 
hermeneutical approach to security underlines the relational dimension of security (cf., 
Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998). Understanding the constitution of security and the proc-
esses of securitisation may similarly enlighten decision-makers, while understanding the 
negativity of security may help to keep more issues within the purview of non-emergency 
modes of administration.
Finally, with the third story, told from an emancipatory point of view, the theory can 
also allow security to be denaturalised and reveal its functions in the production and 
maintenance of power. By understanding the construction of social reality, by uncovering 
the contingency of social constructions and their political nature regarding issues of even 
security, opportunities for an ethical intervention may be opened, by either the scholar 
studying securitisation or the reader of the scholar’s work. The study of securitisation 
can, for example, be utilised for double readings (in the vein of Derrida), the dissolution 
of myths (in the vein of Barthes), or the dissection of doxa (in the vein of Bourdieu). Se-
curitisation scholars cannot say what ‘real’ security is, or what a ‘real’ threat is, without 
making an overt political argument or move. Yet this does not mean that a scholar could 
not make ethical interventions. Scholarly models can be used in the manner of artistic 
models to represent relationships, that is, they can be used to deal with actual problems 
(Stegeman 1969, 29). Displaying the elements of choice and contingency may lessen 
some of security’s functionality as a means of power. The theory can be used to unmask 
both the general functions of security, but also to analyse particular instances with this 
intent.
As we can see, these three aspects of the interests of knowledge securitisation theory 
can be applied to serve and complement one another, or they may be stages of a broader 
project. Securitisation theory can be used as a heuristic device, as a magnifier of contin-
gency for ethical intervention, or as an avenue to understand, even manage the relation-
ships of actors, objects, and meanings, to understand the functioning of power. These 
three types of stories may also work as a criterion to evaluate the practical progress of 
the research programme of Securitisation Studies.
Beyond the ‘stories’ or the value of studies of securitisation, the criterion for how scholar-
ly knowledge progresses that is applied in this study is based on a reappropriated interpre-
tation of the positive and negative heuristic principles promoted by Imre Lakatos (1970).64 
Indeed, a theory is viewed here as scientifically acceptable, if its capacity to explain, to 
make understandable, or to solve problems is better in comparison to an earlier theo-
ry that was constructed to investigate the same phenomenon.65 Such ‘progress’ can be 
lishing just such a metalanguage.
64  Kenneth N. Waltz (2008, 92-95) sees Lakatos’s value in his writings showing how a positivist stance to 
theory in political science does not work: no finite sample can ever disprove a universal probabilistic theory. 
Theories and facts are interdependent.
65  For Lakatos, such progress was exclusively empirical, and alteration was allowed only via new assump-
tions or the  semantic re-interpretation of terms of the original theory (Laudan 1977, 77). For Lakatos (1970, 
116), scientific theories are meant to ‘predict novel facts’. Such a predictive stance to science is problematic 
for securitisation theory, as it is for most of social science: much of collective human activity is too ‘chaotic’ 
as a phenomenon to be predicted. Indeed, as Laudan (1977, 16-17) notes, to merely concentrate on the 
explanation or prediction of (novel) facts would leave out much of the theoretical activities scholars engage in. 
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achieved both conceptually and empirically. Further, theories should not be rejected out 
of hand only because there is some evidence that is not in accordance with it:  it could be 
that the examples do not fit into the existing conceptual scheme, or an anomaly for that 
particular theory could also be an anomaly for all other theories.66
Lakatos viewed groups of theories as ‘research programmes’. A research programme 
is conceptually progressive if it produces new concepts with rich and simplifying struc-
tures. A programme will be empirically progressive if these concepts can contain previous 
understandings and at the same time expand the analytical power of the programme.67 If 
a programme lacks these virtues, degeneration is the result, and when confronted with 
problems, it merely produces new theories that skirt the issue by engaging in Duhemian 
manoeuvres.
Of course, Lakatos’s philosophy of science is not ‘correct’, and it is applied here in a 
reappropriated manner. The goal of many philosophers of science, such as Thomas Kuhn, 
Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, has been to explain the evolution and progress of sci-
ence in general. While their insights are important, such broad viewpoints may not be 
that helpful for particular theory developers in practice.68 Thereby, Lakatos’s similes of 
the positive and negative heuristics, and of the hard core and protective belt of research 
programmes are used here as a meta-method to model research programmes, and there-
by to help scholars engaged in the business of science to grasp their total endeavours 
from a wider and more abstract point of view.69
Lakatos sees series of theories to contain a leading idea, through which various theo-
ries in the programme join, and thereby form the ‘hard core’ of a research programme.70 
This hard core is ‘irrefutable’ and should not be targeted by the modus tollens, yet it 
should be ‘empirically falsifiable’. To be constructive, a research programme has to in-
clude a mechanism for theory development. In the model, the hard core of a theory is 
sheltered by a ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses, which can be adapted as more and 
more empirical anomalies appear. This positive heuristic is accompanied by a negative 
one: a researcher engaged in a research programme should not tamper with the irre-
futable hard core of the programme.71
Science then may not only be about empirical facts, but also conceptual problems. Thereby, although Lakatos’s 
similes of the core and the two heuristics is viewed here as useful, I do not subscribe to his strict notion of what 
‘scientific’ entails.
66  To continue with the boxing analogy: perhaps you were boxing with the heavyweight champion of the 
world!
67  In Laudan’s (1977, 18) terms, the transformation of anomalous and unsolved empirical problems into solved 
ones is the hallmark of scientific progress. Such a view emphasises that theories should not be rejected out 
of hand: presumed empirical anomalies may be transformed into confirming instances via theory develop-
ment (ibid., 30). Such development may occur through the shift of relevant variables in the theory, which may 
eliminate troublesome anomalies or resolve some conceptual problems (ibid., 68). For Laudan, theories are 
progressive if their problem solving capacity is increased.
68  Indeed, Lakatos emphasised the necessity to keep methodological assessments and heuristic advice 
separate.
69  Lakatos’s model is indeed viewed here as a general meta-method: actual research programmes should 
provide their own particular ‘clues’ for how to assess progress within their project (cf., Laudan 1977).
70  For Lakatos, this core can be the result of human creativity for example. Wæver (2005, 39; see also 2007a) 
seems to follow this vein of thinking as he also argues that instead of doing inductive generalisations from 
observations, scholarship begins with the creative moment of coming up with an abstract notion that is then 
tested via observations of reality or by deducing larger stories that ‘reconstruct complex realities’ in a convinc-
ing way.
71  Thierry Balzacq’s (2005, 176, 193) criticism of the speech act approach of Wæver, while raised in a construc-
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The meta-method of sophisticated falsification, with its positive and negative heuris-
tics, provides a meaningful framework for the development and adaptation of theory by 
retaining its core claims while adapting the research programme to accommodate for 
empirical anomalies. This methodology should be specified in each research programme 
as there is the danger that theories might become too ‘stretched’ (Sartori 1970). The hard 
core of the research programme of securitisation is viewed here to be formed by speech 
act theory and that securitisation is a speech act.72 These suppositions are irrefutable 
within the programme, but they are surrounded by auxiliary hypotheses that can be ‘falsi-
fied’ by either logic or spatiotemporal occurrences.73 Security means different things to 
different societies at different times, since the core fears of societies or social groups are 
unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences (Wæver 1989b, 301).74 We 
can formulate empirical hypotheses in accordance with our understanding of this socio-
historical process.75 At the same time, the meanings of security are constructed through 
speech acts: speech acts are seen as the mechanism to intersubjectively construct the 
core fears and historical experiences – the meaning of security – in different societies. 
The theory of securitisation thus does not claim any universal culture or meaning of secu-
rity, but still recognises the unity of the biological creatures that are the foundation for all 
cultures.76 This means that what, by whom, under which conditions and even how (on the 
level of convention) something is constructed as an issue of security, differs from society 
to society, but on the fundamental level of how this is accomplished, the linguistic mecha-
nism (speech acts) remains the same. Speech act theory thus forms the hard core of the 
tive manner, goes against the ‘negative heuristics’ of Lakatosian research programmes by actually questioning 
the leading idea of the theory. Balzacq questions the idea that security is based on speech acts, which in effect 
questions the hard core of the research programme of securitisation. In my view, he echoes Pierre Bourdieu’s 
(1991) criticism of some structural linguists who mistake considering linguistic rules as entirely determinant 
in speech acts. I do not see Wæver’s approach to securitisation repeating this error. Although Balzacq raises 
relevant issues, my argument here is that his criticism has not jeopardised the leading idea of securitisation. See 
Chapter 6.3.3. below for a detailed discussion.
72  See Chapter 6.3.1. below on why ‘security is a speech act’ is not considered to be the core of the programme 
here.
73  Scholarly communities may be convinced of the falsity of hypotheses even though empirical observation is 
indeterminate.
74  Bubandt’s (2005) ‘vernacular security’ is very close to this idea.
75  Indeed, Priyankar Upadhyaya (2006, 14) calls for conceptual and empirical studies that would explore the 
operation of securitisation/desecuritisation in diverse situations. Studies in non-European contexts are helpful 
here as they provide different political and social environments for the study of securitisation dynamics.
76  Ciuta (2009) has argued that the CopS does construct a permanent meaning of security that would not take 
the understandings of the ‘targets’ of analysis into account; he argues that the CopS rules out that meanings of 
security can vary contextually. I however argue that this is not the case (see e.g., Wæver 1989b). What the CopS 
presents as security (a situation where there are means to repel an existential threat) is the current dominant 
understanding in ‘international relations.’ As Wæver (2004b; 2008a) shows, the meaning of security in Europe 
has fluctuated greatly. This entails that this remains a possibility in the future; to Ciuta’s (2009, 303-304; see 
also Huysmans 1998a, 500-501 and Trombetta 2008, 600 for critiques of the CopS approach being unable to 
study shifts in the logic of security itself, or of imposing an essentialising fixity to it and the practices it is 
used to legitimate) question on whether security could become something other than the current ‘theoretical 
fiat’, I would answer an emphatic yes. The interesting question is what it is that we are actually discussing or 
analysing in ISS: the meaning and uses of ‘security’, or the politics of ‘survival’, something which is termed 
‘security’ in the contemporary era of international relations? Would it be more prudent and accurate to talk of 
‘survival policies’ and ‘survival studies’ instead of ‘security’? Survival would include both non-human threats 
(e.g., hurricanes) and demand more responsibility from politicians as ‘survival’ does not carry the same positive 
commonsense connotations as ‘security’ does. While ‘security’ may not always and everywhere have to mean 
‘survival’, ‘survival’ itself would.
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theory of securitisation while auxiliary hypotheses are used to understand the specific 
conventions of the social construction of security in different societies in different times, 
as well as the political functions and effects processes of securitisation have.77
As the above suggests, the hard core of the research programme of Securitization Stud-
ies is viewed here in a very minimalist way. Others might insert further features of the 
model, such as securitising actors, referent objects, existential threats, and extraordinary 
measures, into the core of the programme.78 I, however, contend that for the aims of the-
ory travel, it makes sense to keep the hard core as minimal as possible: the more specifi-
cally the features of the model are hypothesised within the core, the more it makes pre-
sumptions based on certain types of political orders and practices. The intention here is 
to make the model as general and abstract as possible in order to allow its operationalisa-
tion to the greatest number of political orders and practices – even theories of politics.
Such a minimalist and abstract view of the core of the research programme of Securi-
tisation Studies begs the question of whether the theory of securitization is compatible 
with Lakatos’s views of what a theory is. For him, theories had to be empirically falsifi-
able, and be able to ‘predict novel facts’ (Lakatos 1970, 116). What is the case for the 
theory of securitisation in general and the present study in particular: are they in tune 
with Lakatos’s view?
As with the core and the belt of the research programme itself, the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of this research and their methods of refutation must be separated. As 
it is viewed here, at the very core of the research programme is the theory of speech acts, 
which is based on intuition and should thus be approached through intuition. The theory 
of securitisation is based on the theory of speech acts, and in that sense, it should also 
be approached from the direction of linguistic intuition. The auxiliary hypotheses (the 
strands of securitisation) proposed for the theory of securitisation here are based on the 
illocutionary logic of speech acts, and thus also on intuition. Because rule-sentences that 
describe language cannot be falsified through spatiotemporal occurrences, they must 
instead be falsified through logic (cf., Itkonen 2003, 44-48).79 However, it must be kept 
uppermost in mind that even though intuition is the ‘act of knowledge’ (Popper 1963) 
used in this inquiry, intuition itself is not the object of study, but rather the norms of se-
curitisation, which can only be accessed through intuition (cf., Itkonen 2003). Thereby, 
although all the elements of the core and protective belt are ‘falsifiable’, not all of them are 
‘empirically falsifiable’, which means that the view taken on ‘scientificity’ here is broader 
than that of Lakatos.
Such a view is based on Karl Popper’s (1963) views on ontological levels and their 
77  We could for example form hypotheses on how security is understood and how it functions in Finland, and 
then study empirically whether our hypotheses derived from the theory make empirical sense or not. Although 
the hard core of the programme is viewed here to consist of the speech act aspect of the theory, the protective 
belt could include empirically falsifiable propositions such as ‘securitisation narrows down political debate’, ‘an 
affective relation between referent objects and audiences facilitates securitisation’, and ‘referent objects on a 
level above the individual and below the universal render themselves more easily to securitisation’.
78  One way to solve such different views of the contents of the core could be to divide the core into a hard core 
that consist of the leading idea of the speech act and a soft core that consist of further elements of the model.
79  A rule must be valid also independent of its particular use in discourse; a word can denote a segment of 
reality only insofar as it is meaningful in its own not-denoting. Language is pure potentiality. (Agamben 1998, 
20-21.) Similarly, there can be no concrete promises without the performative practice of promising, without 
rules of promising, which give the particular discourses of promising their force.
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correspondent ‘acts of knowledge’. For Popper (1963), ontology can be divided into 
three ‘worlds’ or layers (see Figure 1): 1) physical states/events, 2) psychological states/
events, and 3) social concepts and norms. Each of these layers requires its own ‘act of 
knowledge’, or epistemology: for the first it is observation, for the second introspection, 
and for the third intuition. All of these acts emanate from the second layer i.e., human psy-
chological states, since all are potentially conscious. Observation as an act of knowledge 
is directed at the first layer, while intuition is the correct approach for intersubjective or 
social norms and rules.80 Intersubjective norms thus differ from subjective experiences 
and connotations. Subjective experiences have to be grasped through introspection.
‘Empirical’ questions arise in the present study, when the social construction of se-
curity in China becomes the focus of consideration. China is an empirical entity, even 
though it is ontologically social.81 The analysis of how, what, by whom and under which 
conditions something has been constructed as an issue of security, has to be based on 
actually occurred speech and cannot be answered through linguistic intuition. The hy-
potheses and the theories discussed below are tools for this analysis and will assist in the 
formulation of empirical assumptions or claims. Even though the linguistic mechanism of 
securitisation and the general rules of securitisation are accessible through intuition, the 
referent objects, threats, audiences, securitising actors and facilitation/impediment fac-
tors, are empirical issues and require methods of empirical analysis beyond the analysis 
80  Sokal & Bricmont (1998, 143-144) argue that while intuition plays an important role in the creation or 
invention of theories, intuition should not play a role in the verification or falsification of theories, as these 
processes must remain independent of the subjectivity of individual scientists. Here, I would argue, Sokal & 
Bricmont succumb to at least two confusions. First, as Popper’s tripartite ontology reveals, all knowledge claims 
return to the second world of psychological events/states, and thereby all theories also ontologically depend on 
individual psychological events/states. While the above criticism may be borderline banality, Sokal & Bricmont 
conflate intuition and introspection; they have failed to see that intuition is the act of knowledge that should be 
used to verify, or falsify, intersubjective rules and norms. The checking of someone’s calculations is precisely 
based on intuition.
81  The PRC of course has a territory and a population, but these are not the PRC; the PRC is a social institution. 
This becomes explicit in the so called question of the two Chinas.
Figure 1: Popper’s tripartite ontology and acts of knowledge.
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of the logic of speech acts.
It is possible to propose empirical hypotheses with three possible observational re-
sults within the theory of securitisation. While the success and failure of securitisation 
is not a binary issue,82 it may be difficult to assess whether and when securitisation has 
been successful.83 Furthermore, the success of establishing a security status for an issue, 
and the success of the politics of establishing a security status for an issue, should be 
analytically kept separate. What are termed securitisation moves within the model, can 
manifest and be successful (value 1), they can also manifest and be unsuccessful (value 
-1), and they may not manifest at all (value 0).84 This means that our empirical assump-
tions can be ‘falsified’ by analysing relevant data.85
It is useful here to follow James Bogen & James Woodward’s (1988) conceptual dis-
tinction between data and phenomena (in terms of language philosophy this comes very 
close to Searle’s [1995] distinction between type and token). Data functions as evidence 
to the existence of a phenomenon; (some) theories seek to explain or understand phe-
nomena, not data. In this study, the phenomenon (or type) studied is ‘securitisation,’86 
while the analysis of the speeches that have actually occurred are the data (tokens) used 
to reason about the phenomenon or practices of securitisation.87 As noted by Bogen and 
Woodward (1988), this distinction between data and phenomena is important as data is 
the result of an immensely complex set of causal (and constitutive) factors. As also em-
phasised in Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003), 
this complexity has to be dealt with in some way, for scholars cannot take everything into 
account in their hypotheses and theories.88 This is a point that many critics (e.g., Bubandt 
2005; Kent 2006; Wilkinson 2007) of the approach, who emphasise the ‘messiness’ of 
‘local’ events and processes, do not take into account: a model is a model.89
As will be seen below, many critics of the CopS approach have identified empirical 
‘anomalies’ of one type or another (see for example Mak 2006; Wilkinson 2007; Barthw-
al-Datta 2009). I shall argue that the refined model presented in this study can deal with 
some of these ‘anomalies’ while retaining the insights of the previous version and that, as 
such, this study advances the research programme of Securitisation Studies.
82  This is also emphasised by Haacke & Williams (2008) and Buzan (2008). 
83  On the issue of when securitisation is ‘successful’, see Chapter 6.3. below.
84  See Chapter 6.3. below for a fuller discussion on this issue.
85  Although analysis and observation in themselves cannot tell us whether our assumptions are ‘true’ or ‘false’, 
presenting an assumption and an analysis of data that claims to refute or support the assumption may have 
the perlocutionary and pragmatic effect of convincing. On the relation of threat perception, securitisation, and 
security action, see Chapter 6.3. below.
86  ‘As if ’ it existed.
87  In sum, securitisation is the theoretical object/type/phenomenon whilst the occurred speeches are the 
pre-theoretical object/token/data.
88  “It’s only a model!” (Monty Python: the Holy Grail, directed by Terry Gilliam and Terry Jones 1975, Michael 
White Productions.) 
89  The juxtaposition of ‘messy reality’ and ‘elegant models’ is prevalent throughout academia. Indeed, what 
we are dealing with here are two types of beauty: the beauty of the material and the beauty of the formal 
(Berman 2007, 97). The beauty of the ‘empirical’ or the ‘real’ is material, even when it can be described in a 
‘formal’ way. Theoretisation ‘destroys’ this materiality, which may be why even ‘beautiful’ academic works are 
often described as ‘cold’ or ‘hollow’; the beauty of academic models is different from the beauty of the ‘wild.’ It 
is however advantageous to keep in mind that, as Wæver (2007a) also notes, abstractions are themselves an 
important part of reality, and it does not make sense to take all abstraction as an imposition on the inevitable 
messiness of the ‘wild.’
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3.2. Travelling Theories and the Dilemmas of Conceptual Stretching
Scholarly communities are generally not willing to accept the existence of phenomena 
based on just single sets of experiments or observations. Even the successful repetition 
of a test or observation will not always convince communities, as the test set-up may con-
tain the same yet unexplained factor or idiosyncrasy that resulted in the data observed. 
Only when a phenomenon is observed with a variety of (mutually independent) observa-
tions or arrangements will communities of scholars be convinced that the phenomenon 
indeed exists and is not merely the result of idiosyncrasies in the original set-up. Hence, 
scholars will seek to test and try out their hypotheses in various contexts, and endeavour 
to produce improved or at least alternative data on the same phenomenon.90 It is at this 
stage where, in social sciences, things get tricky in terms of what Giovanni Sartori (1970; 
1984) calls conceptual stretching.
Indeed, scholars will often seek to broaden their knowledge by application of their 
models and hypotheses to a wider range of cases, which often results in adaptation of cat-
egories to fit the new contexts. Sartori (1970; 1984) encourages this conceptual ‘travel-
ling’ (the application of concepts to new cases) but at the same time warns about concep-
tual ‘stretching’ (the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit the new cases). In 
order for scholars to be able to test the generality of their findings, they have to establish 
that their concept has a sufficiently similar meaning in the context of the new cases. The 
merit of Sartori’s approach is to encourage scholars to be attentive to context, but with-
out abandonment of broad comparisons.
Sartori (1970, 1041; 1984, 24) approached the problem of conceptual stretching 
through extension and intension. The extension of a category is the set of entities in the 
world to which it refers, while intension is the set of meanings, or attributes that define 
the category and determine membership within it. ‘Specific’ categories thus have less 
extension but more intension, while more general categories have more extension but 
less intension. Moving back and forth in the hierarchy of categories, thus changing the 
intension and extension of the concepts, is called moving on the ‘ladder of generality.’91 
Collier and Mahon (1993) have proposed that ‘radial’ categorisations may be more ef-
fective to facilitate conceptual travelling while at the same time avoiding the problems 
of conceptual stretching. In radial categorisations, in regard to intension and extension, 
the effect of moving between the principle and secondary categories has a reverse effect: 
by creating more elaborate categories the extension of a radial category may actually in-
crease. In classical categorisations the differentiating attributes of secondary categories 
occur in addition to those of the primary category; in radial categorisations the differen-
tiating attributes of the secondary categories are contained within the primary category. 
In radial categorisations, secondary categories thus serve to increase the extension of the 
categorisation, without any distortion.
Another scholar sensitive to the effects of changing contexts and uses of theories is Ed-
ward Said (1983; see also 1994), whose critique focused on the imperialistic tendencies 
90  Indeed, one criterion for a proper test for a hypothesis is that it must be done on different samples than 
those which were used to devise the hypothesis (Laudan 1990, 62).
91  Sartori himself used the term ‘ladder of abstraction’ but I find that the ‘ladder of generality’, coined by David 
Collier and James E. Mahon (1993), carries a more illuminating connotation.
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of universalising claims. Said was not against universal or global claims as such. The ques-
tion for him was how to understand the global in ways that remain sensitive to particular 
contexts and perspectives (Biswas 2007, 130). Paradoxically, Said was critical of human-
ism in the name of humanism, and simultaneously against universalising claims whilst 
claiming himself a humanist (Duvall 2007, 89). Aamir Mufti (2005, 122) reasons that 
Said was attempting to offer an alternative to Eurocentric thought by providing a general 
account of the role of the particular in universalising processes. Said’s answer was the 
‘contrapunal’ reading of simultaneous and mutually constitutive histories against linear 
and developmentalist narratives (Biswas 2007, 133).92 He believed in the possibility of 
actively different locales, sites and situations, without recourse to facile universalism or 
overgeneral totalising (Said 1994, 214).93
In this study, I apply securitisation theory to the analysis of the social construction of 
security in the People’s Republic of China. This means that one has to be sensitive to the 
categories and concepts utilised in the theory and avoid stretching them too far. Accord-
ingly, I propose further rungs to the ladder of generality of the theory of securitisation,94 
which will facilitate the applicability of the theory to China and makes conceptual trav-
elling, without stretching, possible. The study of the phenomenon of securitisation in 
various contexts and with various means, provides a more nuanced understanding of the 
phenomenon, and may eventually convince scholarly communities that it makes sense to 
conduct studies ‘as if ’ there indeed were such a phenomenon as ‘securitisation’, if this is 
not already the case. This is where this current research endeavours to provide its mod-
est contribution.
The explication of securitisation is based on illocutionary logic. However, this does 
not imply that the linguistic rules of speech acts are entirely deterministic, nor that the 
study of securitisation should only focus on linguistic analysis; both social and linguistic 
92  This is in essence Nils Bubandt’s (2005) argument for ’vernacular security.’ Also Claire Wilkinson (2007) 
criticises the CopS approach of assuming Euro-American models and practices in terms of human organisation 
which as a consequence turns complex issues into linear and simplified versions. However, from the point of 
view of theory development, Wilkinson’s critique can also be seen as a merit, if the problems of theory and 
conceptual travel are taken into account: the purpose of theory is not to make a 1:1 model, but to precisely 
provide distance through abstraction.
93  Donna Haraway (1988) similarly argues that the way towards objectivity is the confession of the situated-
ness and partial nature of all understandings, paradoxically also making an argument with universal scope. As 
was already presented above, the position I take in this study also emphasises the situatedness and relationality 
(yet not relativity) of knowledge claims: factual claims are partial, situated, and relational. Such a position does, 
however, not mean that I would subscribe to an cognitively relativist position: cultural or value relationalism 
does not entail nor equal cognitive or epistemological relativism. Thereby, if our theoretical notions are artifi-
cial enough, we can use them to study various socio-cultural situations and contexts without succumbing to 
‘cultural colonialism’. As Žižek (2002b, 66) also emphasises, scholars should not assume of impose universal 
ideologies or values, but that universality should be understood as a shared space of understanding among 
cultures that requires an infinite task of translation and reworking of one’s particular position. Such a notion 
of universality is compatible with a pragmatist viewpoint to scholarship (cf., Laudan 1990, 109-111): one may 
transcend one’s own culture in the evaluation of one’s own and other’s cultures, even when different cultures 
have different standards for the admissibility of ideas.
94  The strands of securitisation explicated below in Chapter 6.3.2. entail that they are securitisation. As the 
previous understanding of the function of securitisation, i.e., legitimating future acts of the securitising actor, 
is one of the strands of securitisation proposed here, this logically means that the extension of securitisation 
increases; securitisation has less semantic information than the strands of securitisation, which means that 
securitisation applies to a larger set of entities than a single strand of securitisation. See Figure 7 below in 




analysis are necessary to understand performative acts of securitisation. This means that 
the method of inquiry should be based on (cross-cultural) pragmatics (the study of the 
ways in which meaning is derived from the interaction of utterances within the contexts 
in which they are used) and not on purely semantics (the study of meaning) or universal 
linguistic rules. With departure from cross-cultural pragmatics, this study argues that a 
linguistic or a sociological approach to the study of actually occurred acts of securitisa-
tion cannot replace one or the other,95 but that they should be seen as complementary 
instead. But just as the sociological study of conversation should be built on a basis of 
illocutionary linguistics (Wierzbicka 1991, 254), the sociological study of securitisation 
should also have a linguistic foundation: the metalanguage of illocutionary logic provides 
the means for cross-cultural comparisons as it enables the identification of the families 
from the resemblances.96 Different social groups favour different styles of social interac-
tion, and these types of cultural differences may be reflected in illocutionary grammars 
too (Wierzbicka 1991, 276). Thus, illocutionary logic can provide the necessary rigour 
required to investigate these types of issues.
Moving from one social context to another or undertaking cross-cultural compari-
sons requires a culture-independent descriptive framework. In order to study different 
‘cultures’ in their culture-specific features we need both a universal perspective, and a 
culture-independent analytical framework.97 In order to avoid the distorting effect of the 
assumption that scholarly concepts are culture-free analytical tools, a near universal per-
spective from within our own culture must be sought with which to develop a framework 
of near universal human concepts that will be then accessible to most specific languag-
es.98 The cultural specificity of one’s current analytical concepts cannot be escaped, but a 
95  For securitisation studies that emphasise the sociological study of securitisation, see Balzacq (2005; 2010a; 
2010b; 2010c) and Stritzel (2007) for example.
96  Realities are disorganised and complex, which is why models and theories are needed: the complexity of 
reality has to be dealt with in some way in order to deal with it intelligibly (cf., Waltz 1979, 8). For example, 
language is pure potentiality (Agamben 1998, 20-21). No scholarly model could capture all of this potential. 
Scholarly models can none the less be used to make sense of the potentiality and the actuality of language – 
indeed to a far greater extent than some strands of post-structuralism which emphasise the perpetual openness 
of interpretation would seem to suggest. 
More often than not, people make sense of others; there are various ‘illocutionary devices’ (e.g., intonation) that 
guide interpretation in real speech situations (Wierzbicka 1991, 197-199); “the alleged enormous indetermi-
nacy of illocutionary forces is largely an illusion born out of an inadequate analytical model” (ibid., 252). Instead 
of trying to squeeze every utterance into a ‘pigeon-hole’ of illocutionary (English) verbs, the illocutionary force 
of utterances can be decomposed into individual components, thereby revealing that languages provide numer-
ous unmistakable illocutionary clues which enable the listener, as well as the analyst, to identify illocutionary 
forces to a considerable degree. Indeed, ‘orphan letters’ are not the norm in everyday communication, not even 
for texts that are under investigation by students of securitisation. You may fool some of the people some of the 
time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time (attributed to Abraham Lincoln). 
While ‘surplusses of meaning’ (Laclau & Mouffe 2001; Derrida 1988; Certeau 1988) remain, this does not mean 
that most utterances would be unintelligible in most utterance situations; the possibilities of reinterpretation, 
and ‘living within text’ have to be qualified. Like hearers, analysts of speech acts are permitted to make infer-
ences on the intentions of speakers as this is what, to a degree, pragmatically also happens. We should however 
keep in mind that to make such inferences does not mean that we would have access to the ‘sincerity’ of the 
speakers, nor to their ‘true intentions.’ Accordingly, the argument here is not that the intentions that can be 
inferred from speech acts would be the ‘real’ intentions of the speakers; what is argued here is that what most 
speakers can infer as the intention of a speaker, can also be inferred by an analyst.
97  As well as a semantic language that is in essence independent of any particular language or culture, and that 
is accessible and open to interpretation through any language (Wierzbicka 1991, 6-9).
98  Matt McDonald (2008a, 571) argues that to develop a universal framework to study the construction of 
security issues by analysing speech acts, would mean to downplay contextual factors. I however argue that 
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distant culture also cannot be understood ‘in its terms’ without at the same time under-
standing it ‘in our own.’ 
Illocutionary logic provides us with a metalanguage to do cross-cultural studies of 
securitisation for it can be used to decompose illocutionary forces and thus avoid the 
anglocentrism and its universalistic tendencies emerging from the use of the English lan-
guage. Acts of securitisation may not be achieved nor indeed be manifest in all societies 
or languages, but illocutionary logic can be used as a tool in the empirical study to assess 
whether illocutionary acts of securitisation do occur in specific situations, in any social 
context. Even though security means different things to different societies, since the core 
fears of a group or nation will be unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical expe-
riences (Wæver 1989b, 301), the social constitution of security with illocutionary logic 
can be studied as human utterances universally exhibit ‘force.’99 The linguistic compari-
son of acts of securitisation provides a basis for making cross-cultural comparisons of 
processes of securitisation; a broader categorisation of securitisation allows us to move 
beyond the European and liberal democratic political context.
Moving from one social and political context to another also means that scholars have 
to be sensitive to the variances in values and connotations in the various contexts. If the 
values that guide research are not reflected upon, they may distort it. There are, how-
ever, limits to how far this reflection of values should be taken. Indeed, Hayward Alker 
(2006) has correctly emphasised that comparative political analysis does not necessitate 
an explicit endorsement of a normative position on either the aims of the study or the 
worthiness of the empirical processes under scrutiny. While reflection has its merits, just 
as ‘justifications have to come to an end somewhere’ (Wittgenstein 1999a; 1999b; Winch 
2008, 36), there is also a limit for the extent to which a scholar has to contemplate and 
report on her preferences. 100
this is not the case. While a near universal metalanguage deals with the ‘grammar’ or ‘langue’ of securitisation, 
the analysis of real, or actually occurred speech requires dealing with the individual context of the utterances. 
Contextual factors cannot be defined in too much detail within the model, as these depend to a large extent on 
the political order, as well as other socio-political factors, of various societies.
99  See Chapter 1.2.: Which particular forces are universal, or near universal, is a question for empirical linguis-
tics, not securitisation studies.
100  The question becomes, how does a scholar know which things necessitate a reflection and report, and 
which do not? Would they include her preference regarding Loganberries? Trying to unravel the entirety of a 
scholar’s political views that constitute the path that led to the study would likely take longer than a life-time, 
and still probably leave out many unconscious constitutive elements. Arguing for a set of elements for reflection 
is bringing in a hegemonic practice, as is arguing for the “superior values of the community” (cf., Aradau 2004, 
403). It must be kept in mind that the constitutive role of language has largely become visible to us only in 
the 20th century; there are certainly many other such blind spots to be discovered – a task for philosophy and 
political theory, and perhaps not for empirical analysis of securitisation processes.
Morgenthau (2006) has argued that scholarly arguments have to be consistent within themselves and with the 
facts. This means that ‘I’ myself do not have to be consistent. For example, during the research process reported 
in this study, ‘I’ have indeed not been consistent: my body has gone through many changes (its weight has 
fluctuated and it has sustained injuries), as have my ideas, and even my identities (I have been engaged, single, 
and partnered). So has there been a consistent and constant ‘I’ driving these states, statuses, and acts, of this 
research endeavour (cf., Nietzsche 2003)? And how relevant is that? If such matters are not so relevant, how 
relevant then is the reflection of my values and preferences? Would it not be more important for the reader to 
engage in this kind of reflection and thus be the one to deem whether she wants to be part of the ‘conspiracy’, 
or the ‘(counter-)revolution’? See also Footnote 106 of Chapter 3. below.
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3.3. Culturalism and Evaluative Universalism
Some of the universalism–culturalism debate prevalent in China studies101 revolves 
around the dilemmas involved in the role of values and their evaluation across cultures 
and societies. Thus, is it justified to impose one’s values or normative goals onto another 
culture or society, or is one’s research distorted by one’s values?
Andrew Nathan (1997, 198) contends that values play a legitimate role in social sci-
ence inquiry. This position is shared by most critical security scholars, whose interest of 
knowledge (Habermas 2007) is usually slanted towards emancipatory ideals: many criti-
cal studies of security are normative, for they urge change in the social architecture of our 
world. Constructionists in general, and critical scholars of security in particular, are often 
explicit in terms of the normative goals of their research programmes. As a result, the is-
sue of a normative dilemma in research on security102 also becomes important. Wæver et 
al. (1993) lament that writing about security can never be ‘innocent’ and that widening 
the agenda of security studies can broaden the scope of security politics as well, which 
may then run counter to the normative aims of the research programme (see also Walker 
1997; Williams 1998; Wæver 2004a, 7-8). They have been explicit on this in coining the 
concept of societal security, and argue that a wider group can speak security in the case 
of societal identities than is the case when official representatives of the state speak se-
curity, on behalf of the state. Speaking about security may also reify the issues, referent 
objects and threats, when the normative aim is desecuritisation i.e., the dismantling of 
security issues.
Jef Huysmans (2002) concludes that this normative dilemma cannot be avoided or 
escaped, even if one moves away from the agenda of the study of shifts in ‘security fields’ 
to that of analysis of the ‘knowledge-power nexus’ of security where the specific security 
fields are embedded. Similarly, in the discussions on cultural relativism in China Studies, 
it has been emphasised that no interpretation can be value-free or completely neutral 
(Buck 1991, 32). And again, Alexandra Kent (2006, 344) has argued that all notions and 
practices of security are cultural and, as such, embedded in value systems, which often 
remain unquestioned; for her, any universal application of a particular definition of secu-
rity is already a form of ‘cultural colonialism.’103
But do these dilemmas mean that scholars should remain silent, so as not to reify 
the ‘evil of security’104 or ‘colonial orientalism,’105 thus in effect perhaps to perpetuate 
101  China studies is by no means unique in this regard: ’area studies’ in general and post-colonial studies in 
particular, have engaged in discussion on ’cultural imperialism’ and universalising ethnocentrism prevalent in 
European and American scholarship. For examples of linking this discussion to security studies, see for example 
Bubandt (2005), Kent (2006), and Wilkinson (2007), and to IR, see Tickner & Wæver (2009).
102  See Chapter 3.4. below for discussion.
103  Kent (2006) criticises the tendency of security studies to develop hegemonic definitions of security, and 
thereby to dismiss and silence local and culturally varying understandings. It however has to be noted that the 
CopS does not discuss what should be relevant referents of security: the approach is meant to analyse what 
securitising actors deem as referent objects. For the CopS, security is what security does, an approach which 
retains the openness of cultural and temporal variance.
104  Some discussants of the normative dilemma seem to know what effects an analysis of a securitisation 
process will have: the analysis will be taken as reifying security issues (cf., Butler 2006); for those who worry 
about securitisation analysis co-constituting political realities, even an explicit questioning of security does not 
have to be heard, as all that is heard is the reification of the security issue.
105  See Said (1979) for the initiating work on ‘orientalism.’
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the ‘white man’s burden’ or some other unwanted power-structure?106 For this study, 
I reason that the benefits of pointing out the ‘emperor without clothes’ i.e., unmasking 
security arguments, outweigh the drawbacks of possibly reifying unwanted discursive 
sedimentations or practices.107
Some of the discussion on relativism and culturalism in China Studies seems to be so 
focused on values that levels of abstraction and forms of social practices end up being 
confused in the debates. When China scholars equate transcendental truths and the un-
derlying physical reality independent of humans with universal values (Buck 1991, 30), 
they commit the fallacy of deriving universal values – which are human dependent – from 
external realism, which is human independent. Indeed, cultural or value relativism (e.g., 
Wittgenstein and Winch) does not equal epistemic or cognitive relativism (e.g., Feyer-
abend), and the reverse applies too: one can use the same epistemological methods to 
study different cultures without the necessity to claim universal values among them. To 
restate the point, to apply foreign analytical frameworks to the study of other cultures is 
not the same as to apply foreign value standards to other cultures (cf., Nathan 1997, 200). 
Indeed, the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ (Buzan & Little 2001) is still about the problem 
of the assumption of or preference for certain morals, values and world-views and not 
about the application of European analytical methods outside Europe as such. 
The realisation of the disparity between epistemic and cultural relativism does, how-
ever, not release the use of certain concepts from piggy backing values or biases: all 
scholarly work is political, but this is often distinct from the political.108 Scholars have 
to be sensitive to this, and thus reflect on the concepts used in their analyses. Describing 
one culture’s values in another’s language also leads to special problems involved in the 
translation and interpretation of concepts.109 This challenge, however, is one of transla-
tion in its broadest sense and not one of evaluation (Nathan 1997, 199).
Another difficulty in the debates on the issue of culturalism-universalism is that par-
ticipants in the debate often seem to approach both ‘China’ and the ‘West’ as some sort of 
106  Collingwood (1938, quoted in Winch 2008, 97) has stated that ‘scientific’ anthropologists often mask “a 
half-conscious  conspiracy to bring into ridicule and contempt civilizations different from our own”; cultural 
anthropology has critiqued the belief of 19th and early 20th century anthropologists that human cultures develop 
from primitive to civilized cultures, the highest form being Victorian Great Britain. This is in a way what theories 
of ‘colonial knowledge’ also criticise. The dilemma of colonial or orientalist knowledge is a dilemma that shares 
many similarities with the normative dilemma of writing security.
The question for a scholar writing of a society different to her own becomes: how to mitigate this ‘half-conscious 
conspiracy.’ If I write it out here, will I become part of this conspiracy? Or is the true insidiousness contained 
in the conspiracy’s half-consciousness; consciousness of the dilemma does not prevent participation in the 
conspiracy?
This avenue of thought seems to risk the portrayal of the societies under investigation as hapless victims and 
passive objects at the mercy of masterly scholarship. This is of course not the case: studying the CCP and the 
PRC does not deprive either of their agency or identity.
As always, whether the present study is part of a conspiracy of ridicule, a conspiracy to ‘topple CCP rule’, a 
conspiracy to ‘persecute the FLG’, or a conspiracy to ‘reify security’ whether as a category of human practice or 
in the specific cases studied here, is of course once again up to the reader to decide or interpret: ““I forgot my 
umbrella,”” (quote of Jacques Derrida [1988, 63] himself quoting an unpublished text by Friedrich Nietzsche).
107  Although, following Baudrillard (2010), it can be dangerous to unmask images, for it can be revealed that 
there is nothing behind them. According to the current (2011) state of particle physics, literally nothing.
108  Here, not in the sense of Schmitt’s (1996) political, but political as political in the commonly understood 
meaning of politicking.
109  See Footnote 62 of the Introduction on the problems of translation.
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monolithic totalities, which could be explained single-eyedly.110 However, as the norma-
tive dilemma of writing security illustrates, scholars face the same problems of value-
judgements and cultural relativity within the complexity of their own societies, not just in 
the ‘other’ of China (cf., Nathan 1997, 199): as the more general debates among philoso-
phers of science also show (e.g., Laudan 1990), the issue of epistemic and cultural relativ-
ism is by no means limited to ‘area’, or ‘post-colonial’ studies. Just as in any comparative 
piece of scholarship, also area and post-colonial studies need a shared framework of in-
vestigation to discover the points of divergence and convergence among human commu-
nities and their activities.
To suggest such a shared epistemic or methodological framework means that another 
confusion in the universalism-culturalism debate has to be addressed, namely that be-
tween regulative and constitutive rules. The discussion on evaluative universalism as-
sumes that there is a set of principles or rules, which should be applied across cultures 
(Buck 1991, 30). This assumption however does not make any distinction between regu-
lative and constitutive rules (Searle 1995), which are essential to make claims on univer-
salities among the human species. Regulative rules guide behaviour (e.g., traffic regula-
tions) while constitutive rules constitute activities (e.g., the rules of Chess). Regulative 
rules guide behaviour that would exist without the rules, while the activity constituted by 
constitutive rules would not be there without them. Certain human actions are logically 
dependent on the existence of ‘constitutive rules’, or perhaps more precisely, constitutive 
rules refer in English to the logical necessity of rules for certain practices e.g., the English 
language.111 Thereby, constitutive rules seem to be a shared, unconscious, necessity of all 
human languages, although the constitutive rules of particular languages are not alike, 
while if there were universal regulative rules, they would be intentional, and not a neces-
sity for human culture to evolve.
The approach taken here addresses the above issue of human collectives as sharing bi-
ological unity yet remaining culturally distinct. It is easier to accept the argument that the 
human species shares some universal traits e.g., the ability to form and learn languages, 
than it is to accept the universality of values without a universal culture. Seemingly uni-
versal concepts or values such as democracy and security are revealed in closer scrutiny 
to be essentially contested, and definitely not understood nor ranked in the same way in 
different (segments of) societies (Wæver 1989b; Nathan 1997, 203).
In this study, my approach is situated between the culturally relativist and ontological-
ly universalist stances. By using a theory that is based on a universalist premise i.e., that 
all human languages are conventional realisation of certain universal constitutive rules, 
this research takes a step towards universalism. Yet, the theoretical framework espoused 
here leaves a major role for the cultural conventions of securitisation as securitisation is 
not a purely linguistic phenomenon since it is dependent on conventional cultural prac-
tices.
That the analytical framework of securitisation is applicable to China does not mean 
110  Both ‘China’ and the ‘West’ are simulacra, or hyperreal, as Jean Baudrillard (2010) might have put it: it would 
seem that some China scholars are trying to reconstruct ‘China’, even though there is no original blueprint to 
begin with. Most scholarly work creates an image of something, which does not exist as such, without them 
reflecting or explicitly dealing with this issue.
111  John G. Ruggie (1998) has applied this distinction of rules in the study of international relations. See Onuf 
(1989) for a dissenting view on the division of constitutive and regulative rules.
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that scholars who apply it should not be sensitive and attentive of their own values and 
those inherent in the societies under study. How relevant this reflection of values is, de-
pends on the tasks and interests set for the scholarly endeavour that utilises the frame-
work.112 Different tasks and questions raise different dilemmas. One way out of the co-
nundrum would seem to be to relate one’s own perceptions and understandings of reality 
to those of others (Kent 2006, 347), and remain alert to seeking culturally sensitive un-
derstandings of security (ibid., 357), that is, not to assume any permanent and universal 
meaning of security, but to study who advocates what, when, how, and why as an issue of 
security.113
3.4. The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security for Emancipation
As shown earlier, many constructionist studies are normative114 in that they urge change 
112  If the intention is to unmask, it would be reasonable to argue that one’s own society should not be studied, 
as the risk of making naturalist assumptions may be greater because a scholar may take too many things for 
granted in studying her own ‘initial socialisation’, i.e., scholars may have a tendency to reify and retain doxa.
The solution, then, for studying foreign societies is not to transport one’s own reifications, doxa, or even language 
games, or at least, not to consider them to somehow be ‘superior’ to those of the society under study, unless 
that is what is specifically intended to be argued (cf., Heyes 2003b, 5). Indeed, as Brian Fay (1996) argues, it is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to be a part of a social group undergoing scrutiny in order to understand it.
Chomsky however argues that one should be critical of one’s own society; for Chomsky it is of little consequence 
when intellectuals expose the sins of states other than their own (Osborn 2009, 366). While I agree with this 
to a degree, I believe that this issue is connected to the discussion of the grade of constructionism, or on how 
intent one is on normative change. While Chomsky is at least rebellious vis-à-vis his society, the present study 
is limited to the grade of unmasking.
113  This precisely is the CopS approach, as understood in the present study. For a differing view, see Ciuta 
(2009).
114  This normativity has to be separated from that of language (Itkonen 2003) and normativity in the sense of 
following social rules, which can sometimes be confused and mixed. Francois Debrix (2002, 204) seems to make 
this error as he correctly attributes ‘constructivism’ as normative, but only attaches this to the reconstruction of 
how rules are produced and reproduced in social interaction, and does not discuss normativity in the sense of 
the desire for change in society, or in the sense of the normativity of language. This kind of imprecision contin-
ues as he (ibid.) claims that for Onuf (1989) “speech acts fall into three different categories of rules: assertives, 
directives, and commissives.” Onuf’s (ibid., 85-87, 183-184) argument however is that these three types of 
speech acts can be used to, or that they construct three types of social rules. Indeed, speech acts ‘fall into’ or 
conform to five types of conventional illocutionary forces (Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Chapter 6.4.1. below), 
as also noted by Onuf (1989, 86-92; in Onuf 1998, 64-69 he however has dropped out both expressives and 
declaratives from the possible uses of speech acts: “speech acts […] get things done for speakers and hearers 
together in three, and only three, ways”). Onuf however does not note (either in Onuf 1989 or Onuf 1998) that 
while certain speech acts can be used to construct social rules, speech acts themselves also conform to certain 
rules (Searle 1969; Searle & Vanderveken 1985), even though he recognises Searle (1969) as bringing speech 
acts to the door of social theory (Onuf 1989, 82; Searle has also developed his own social theory e.g., 1995; 
2000). While Onuf (1989, 84) argues that the normativity of speech acts is limited to the initiating interaction 
of speaker and hearer as well as subsequent interactions of the same category, Austin (1975) already argued 
that all illocutionary acts are conventional, they conform to constitutive rules; while Onuf (1989, 84-85) is 
correct in stating: “though all rules have an illocutionary component, it is not true that all sentences endowed 
with illocutionary force are rules,” it has to be noted that illocutionary forces are conventional and conform to 
‘rules.’ Onuf’s (e.g., 1998, 68) emphasis on rules being both constitutive and regulative can lead to confusion 
on this issue.
Debrix’s lack of precision regarding the aspects of normativity may indeed be due to Onuf (1989, 86; 1998, 
66-68) only discussing social rules. He (Onuf 1989, 50-51) sees the distinction between constitutive and regula-
tive rules as untenable. For Onuf (ibid., 91, 121, 183-184, 291) there are three kinds of social rules: instruction-
rules, directive-rules, and commitment-rules, each constructed by assertive, directive, and commissive speech 
acts respectively. Focusing on rules having both a constitutive and a regulative aspect (ibid., 52) (he however 
does not specifically define what he means by constitutive rules), he seems to miss the point that while all rules 
are social (in his terms, public [ibid., 47]), not all rules are social rules (on page 90 he also seems to be confusing 
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in the social architecture of our world.115 Often this change strives towards the reduction 
of the blocking and restrictive practices of most security measures. Indeed, desecuritisa-
tion, the return of security issues into regular political processes, is the ethical push be-
hind securitisation studies.116 But if writing about security can never be innocent, and the 
normative dilemma of the reification of security cannot be escaped, what can be achieved 
in terms of the emancipatory normative objectives in security studies? In effect, how can 
scholars deal with the risk of reproducing a particular securitisation move by just de-
scribing it (Huysmans 1995, 69)?
Huysmans (1995; 2002) highlights the dilemma of writing security even in critical 
discourses and analysis, as constructionist approaches reproduce the security agenda 
when they describe how the process of securitisation works. However, it is important to 
note that the performativity of language has a role here: security utterances have a per-
formative force that is different from other types of utterances. While the performativity 
of security utterances is precisely the phenomenon focused on in the present research, 
it has to be made clear that the theory of securitisation and acts of securitisation are dis-
tinct from each other.117 An example of a performative act does not have the performative 
force of the act it exemplifies (Agamben 1998, 20-22); writing the syntagm ‘I promise’ 
as an example of the performative speech act of a promise is not the same as making the 
promise.118 Illocutionary force is not equal to illocutionary verbs (Searle 1973; 1975).119 
Therefore, the analysis of acts of securitisation through the theory of securitisation is not 
a rule with stating a rule, thereby conflating all rules into assertives; cf., ‘all speech acts are assertives’ debate 
within speech act theory). Some rules indeed constitute an activity, which would not exist without the rules. 
Wittgenstein uses the example of Chess: while the rules of Chess are social, they are not social rules; the rules 
of Chess make Chess ‘Chess’, whereby they are more than the ‘regulation of agents’ conduct’ (contra Onuf 1998, 
68).
115  Whether security scholars are observers or advocates was one of the discussion points of the ‘Eriksson 
debate’ in Cooperation and Conflict, see Eriksson (1999a; 1999b; 2000), Goldman (1999), Wæver (1999), 
Williams (1999), and Behnke (2000); For the CopS stand that security analysts cannot say whether something 
is a ‘real’ security issue or not, see Buzan et al. (1998, 25-26). Another debate on the ethical and political role 
of scholarship was in the journal of International Relations and Development, see Aradau (2004), Taureck 
(2006a), Behnke (2006), Alker (2006), Aradau (2006), and Floyd (2007a). Similar issues are brought up by for 
example Wyn Jones (2005) and McDonald (2008b).
116  The preference of non-security can also be viewed from the point of view of the aporia (Burke 2002) 
security arguments create. As securitisation arguments contain a threat, security arguments in effect reproduce 
insecurities; security arguments promise more than they can deliver (Hietanen & Joenniemi 1982, 35-36).
117  It seems that some critics confuse the theory of securitisation and practices of securitisation, or are at least 
not very clear on the differences between the two (see e.g., Aradau 2004; 2006); Taureck (2006a) raises the 
same issue in her defence of Wæver.
For example Ciuta (2009, 322) notes that “to engage in the analysis of securitisation is inevitably to securitise, 
willingly or not.” It would, however, be peculiar to argue that one would be making a promise by engaging in 
the analysis of promising, willingly or not, or to argue that the analysis of Derrida’s (1988, 34) speech act “But 
let’s be serious” would entail being serious. Further, as Austin (1979, 234-235) notes that if someone says ‘I bet 
you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’, it makes more sense to consider this as a performance of betting, rather 
than a report on the performance of betting, I argue that the opposite also applies: analysing the performativity 
of the sentence ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow’ does not entail making a bet on tomorrow’s weather 
condition.
118  Using one of Tyler Burge’s Twin Earth arguments, Steven Davis (2002) shows how illocutionary tokens that 
have contents are indeed not identical to utterance act tokens.
119  For Searle (1975, 2), “illocutions are a part of language as opposed to particular languages. Illocutionary 
verbs are always part of a particular language.” Holdcroft (1978, 127) similarly separates the illocutionary 
force of an utterance from the illocutionary act performed. In terms of intension and extension, moving from 
illocutionary verbs via illocutionary acts to illocutionary force means moving up on the ladder of generality. 
Illocutionary force has a larger extension than illocutionary acts or verbs.
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the same as securitising the issues analysed; an act of securitisation and an analysis of 
securitisation have different illocutionary forces. The analysis of a speech act does not 
belong to the class of the speech act under analysis.120 An example, or the analysis of 
something, is excluded from the ‘normal’ class of such things, as it will exhibit its own 
belonging to precisely that class (Agamben 1998, 20-22). The analysis of securitisation 
may still reify the existence of something, but it certainly cannot function as an act of 
securitisation, unless such an act is brought about by explicitly arguing for the securiti-
sation of the issue being analysed e.g., by proposing that a matter should be securitised 
when it currently is not.121 While “a security problem results from successfully speaking 
or writing security” (Huysmans 2002, 45), a security problem which results from the 
analysis of successful, or unsuccessful, security speech or writing, can most certainly not 
be considered successful, or even a felicitously performed speech act with happy uptake. 
To avoid any kind of infelicity in one’s speech acts or their uptake would require muted 
silence which would not be very far removed from constituting a ‘Little Mermaid’s secu-
ritisation dilemma’ for critical security scholars (cf., Hansen 2000).
Radical constitutivists122 would probably be unwilling to accept the above argument 
of a securitising speech act and its analysis having different illocutionary forces, and that 
therefore the normative dilemma not becoming as dire as perhaps feared by some. As 
Wæver (1999, 336) notes, radical constitutivists would quite likely still object that even 
to critique a security issue is still part of its constitution in the world, as it enforces the 
tendency to think and speak in terms of security.123 Derrida (1988), however, has un-
derlined the openness of interpretation: you cannot know what kinds of effects a state-
ment will have in the hearer and/or reader.124 Indeed, as Murray Edelman (1972, 13) 
has noted, one man’s reassurance is another’s threat.125 The openness of interpretation 
leaves open the possibility of reinforcing a security argument, even though the intention 
and aim is completely opposite.
Radical constitutivists have their argument, but Judith Butler (2006) also has a point 
in her critique on Lawrence Summers’s126 view that all criticism of “any government 
120  This is definitely not a pipe! (cf., René Magritte’s 1928-1929 painting La Trahison des Images; Foucault 
1983.)
121  For examples of this kind of research, see Ramiah (2006).
122  Danger, Juha Vuori, danger! Beware the straw-person! (cf., Lost in Space, television series 1965-1968, 20th 
Century Fox Television.)
123  Don’t think of an elephant! But you did, did you not? This cognitive tendency emphasised by George Lakoff 
(2004) may perhaps be the reason why radical constitutivists are sceptical of even explicit critique; even 
critique will reinforce the mental frame or schema of the category or issue critiqued. 
124  See Fiske (1992) for an introduction to communication theory.
125  The pragmatic element of speech acts is illuminated by ‘I’ll come tonight’ as a promise from Romeo to Juliet 
but a threat from Count Dracula to Van Helsing. (I owe this modified analogy to Esa Itkonen.)
The study of how the abstract meanings of single speech acts become definite in specific cases requires knowl-
edge on specific situations and the ‘pre-contracts’ (Perelman 1996) of the discursive communities involved. 
Particular cases of language use separate pragmatics from semantics. For example, if it has been agreed in a 
certain community that birds that land on the totem pole should be killed, saying: ‘a bird is on the totem pole’, 
actually means for the members of the community: ‘kill the bird.’ This pragmatic meaning cannot be discerned 
through pure semantics. This is also the case with institutionalised security: for example the word ‘counter-
revolution’ has been institutionally securitised in the PRC: by using it as a label, its target is automatically 
considered a threat to national security; by saying ‘counter-revolutionaries have sneaked into the party’ means 
‘certain people should be eradicated from the party (and we are justified in doing so).’




of Israel” constitutes anti-Semitism. Butler critiques here the belief that audiences will 
only hear what they want to hear.127 For Summers, some utterances contain ‘effective 
anti-Semitism’ even though this is not the conscious intention of the one who makes 
the utterance;128 Butler (2006, 104-105)  raises the point that the explicit argument of 
a speech act does not have to be heard, since the hearer will only hear the hidden claim 
made beneath the explicit one. She (ibid., 108) also notes that Summers, in effect, argues 
that he knows the effects certain statements will have: they will be taken as anti-Semitic. 
The question then becomes: is the discussion of the normative dilemma a repeat of 
Summers’s argument? Are all utterances that pertain to security issues, doomed as ‘hate 
speech’ and doomed to reify the issues they are perhaps explicitly criticising? Perhaps 
things are not that deterministic? Indeed, Huysmans’s (2002) argument is that there will 
always be a potential of reification of the security issue; as Wæver (1999, 338) notes, we 
have to off-balance this risk with the possible benefits of the analysis.129
A way to approach this issue of the balance between the potential of reification with 
the normative goals of this present academic endeavour, is to emphasise the role of the 
audiences of security studies. Just as Huysmans (2002) notes, and as Weaver et al. (1993) 
have also argued, social institutions and the positions of securitising actors and audienc-
es within them, have relevance for the success of securitisation. Not everyone can speak 
security effectively. Indeed, Didier Bigo (1994) has noted that in the case of bureaucratic 
(or expert) securitisation, be it deliberate or not, success requires rational and technical 
language, which is often absent in constructionist scholarly parlance. The technical lan-
guage of security is often of a different genre of literature and scholarship altogether. In 
addition to having different illocutionary forces than actual securitisation moves, while 
still possibly reifying the issues, the likelihood that politicians or technocrats who utilise 
critical constructionist research as a basis for their agenda-formation of ‘real threats’, is 
rather remote.130
As also Huysmans (2002) has noted, the normative dilemma of constructing or reify-
ing security issues in ISS is, of course, a normative dilemma only for those who seek to re-
move issues from security agendas, or wish to eradicate or transform security altogether. 
This is a question of the degree of constructionism as discussed above; the degree of the 
normative dilemma may vary in accordance with whether one wishes to merely unmask, 
127  Indeed, you can keep arguing until you are blue-in-the-face that a man armed with a bunch of loganber-
ries is not a security threat, but the radical constitutivist will only hear that the fiend wielding the bunch of 
loganberries is a threat and drop the 16 ton weight on top of their head (“And Now for Something Completely 
Different”, directed by Ian MacNaughton 1971, Columbia Pictures Group).
128  Oh dear, yet another notch in my list of half-conscious conspiracy-memberships.
129  In a Nietzschean vein, Wæver (2007a) also argues that even scholars have to make choices, even with the 
risk of their choices going awry. For him, some forms of post-structuralism are too ‘security seeking’ in the 
sense of not being willing to have a stronger ‘will to power’, a stronger stomach for the responsibility of making 
a choice and leaving an impact. Yet he also warns of the dangers of allowing ‘anyone’ to speak security about 
‘anything’ (Wæver 2004a, 7-8).
130  ‘Public intellectuals’ (Said 2001) wanting to have a political effect have to be more proactive than publicis-
ing their views in academic journals. Indeed, as Morgenthau has emphasised, speaking truth to power may 
challenge the current state of affairs, but this may require that there are strong enough interests willing to 
support the ‘truth’ claims of scholars. Truth alone shall then not set us free for Morgenthau, but in connection 
to strong enough power resources this may indeed happen. This is an important point the ‘New Left’ of post-
structuralism seems to often ignore. Morgenthau (1972, 36) puts his position regarding science and action 
succinctly: “However deeply theoretical thought may penetrate the mysteries of the empirical world, it cannot 
do what even the most defective action achieves: change the world.”
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revise or revolutionise security. 131 However, this is not the only matter which affects the 
dilemma. If one is actually engaged in a programme aimed to create security issues, the 
dilemma becomes quite non-existent. For example, some scholars have actively raised 
environmental issues as security issues with the aim to raise awareness.132 Huysmans 
(2002) correctly problematises ‘positive security’, as the logic of security is conservative 
and guided by negative concerns (Wolfers 1952). Thus as security is about blocking and 
control, progressive and creative ‘Nietzschean’ agendas are not best served by its logic.
From a Machiavellian point of view, the normative dilemma could be even more dras-
tic: constructionist research on the ‘grammar of security’ could be utilised as a practical 
‘how-to-speak-security’ manual.133 This is highly unlikely, however, since politicians and 
bureaucrats have learned to speak security without the help of academics,134 and the re-
search conducted in constructionist projects is an abstraction of security practices – and 
should thus not be confused with what security-speak ‘out there’ is – and it is not meant 
to provide anyone with compelling security rhetoric.135 Just as ‘radioactivity’ caused blis-
131  Alker (2006) has correctly emphasised that comparative political analysis does not necessitate an explicit 
political stance in all research, although some clue of a political stance may be helpful to check for biases, for 
example. How important this kind of reflection is, depends on the tasks and aims of the scholarly endeavour.
132  Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006) argue that securitisation analysis should be used in a prescriptive 
way, and accordingly, Ilanevil Ramiah (2006) argues that AIDS should be securitised in Asia (Haacke & Williams 
[2008] however argue that while AIDS has been securitised in the African Union, policy implementation 
remains weak even there; the normative dilemma of unleashing the ‘Frankenstein’s monster’ [Grayson 2003; 
Collins 2005; However, the ‘Golem’ would be a more apt analogy for what is meant here than the ‘Frankenstein’s 
monster’, see Footnote 113 in Chapter 6 below] may then not be productive in Asia either; indeed, many scholars 
promoting securitisation do not reflect on the likely negative effects of actually employing ‘security measures’ 
to deal with this issue of concern. See Elbe [2006] on the ethical dilemmas of linking HIV and security, and 
Sjöstedt [2008] on the securitisation of HIV/AIDS in Russia). Nicole J. Jackson (2006, 313, 315) similarly argues 
that the securitisation framework should be developed into a tool to help the securitisation of individuals’ 
priorities and put new or ‘real’ security issues on the political agenda. Also others (e.g., Wang 2005) argue 
that securitisation theory’s usefulness comes from the ability to deem what should be on the security agenda. 
However, this tendency prevalent in security studies is one of the main reasons for Buzan et al. (1998, 25) to 
develop the constructionist securitisation approach to begin with: the security analyst cannot say what is a 
’real’ security issue nor what is not, as that would be a political move (see the ‘Eriksson debate’ and Buzan et al. 
[1998, 25] for the CopS’s views on the issue). 
Elliott (2007) however provides an interesting avenue to approach issues which could, but have not been, 
securitised. She asks why transnational environmental crimes have not been securitised when transnational 
crime in general has been securitised in Southeast Asia (Haacke & Williams [2008] disagree on this being the 
case). This approach allows the study of issues that have not been securitised within the broader securitisation 
studies framework, without having to make claims that something should be securitised. It could also be one 
way to deal with ‘silence’ (Hansen 2000) within the framework. Elliott (2007, 506) argues that we can use the 
metric of security voiced by decision-makers on similar issues, to assess whether the ‘silent’ issue conforms to 
this criteria. Similarly, for Mouffe (2005, 14-15), the just and the unjust, or the legitimate and the illegitimate 
can be distinguished within given traditions with the help of standards this tradition provides, by playing the 
sets of language games that make up a given tradition. This could allow assessment without saying what is ‘real’ 
security and what is not; this approach could allow observation and assessment, while leaving the choice of 
advocacy up to the analyst.
133  Hayward Alker (2006, 75) also points out the possibility to use scholarly analysis for political purposes 
by others. An American journalist at the War and Peace: the East Asian Context conference in Toronto 2003, 
humorously wondered whether George W. Bush had read my conference paper, as he seemed to be following 
the grammar of securitisation to the letter. While this observation may testify to the analytical power of the 
model, it is unlikely that the drafters of Bush’s speeches would be familiar with the theory of securitisation.
134  But perhaps with the help of military ‘professionals’, like Senator Edwin Johnson’s comment to Navy secre-
tary James Forrestall in 1945: ‘I like your words “national security”’ (Yergin 1977, 194).
135  It is useful to remember that the concept of securitisation is an analytical one, not one that is ’natural’ to 
politicians in either Europe or China, even if the practices and forms of interaction the concepts of securitisation 
are used to identify and analyse would be. ‘Securitisation’ then is not part of an English ‘folk-taxonomy’; it is an 
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ters before the conceptualisation of ‘radioactivity’ of which people accumulated deadly 
doses of, before it was realised the phenomenon was dangerous, politicians have talked 
about ‘security’ and legitimated drastic measures with survival long before the theory of 
securitisation arrived on the ‘scene.’
Then, from this discussion, it can be concluded that the normative dilemma of study-
ing security is perhaps not so drastic in the context of the present research. Indeed, ema-
nating as it does from Finland, it has practically no socio-political capital to securitise or 
desecuritise issues in China. Further, the degree of constructionism in the present study 
is limited to the level of unmasking. In this sense then, the value of the present research is 
in the general unmasking of security-speak and in the understanding of the social process 
of the construction of security issues in China – and through which, China being a token 
of a type, perhaps also elsewhere. Fortunately, the benefits of unmasking and increased 
consciousness outweigh the dangers of reification of security issues in the context of the 
present study. However, the dilemma retains its potential as a dilemma; the die has been 
cast, the political move has been made – and the loganberries are at hand.
artificial and abstract concept. This is evident in that it would be nonsensical to say ‘I securitise this as a matter 
of national security’; a politician would perhaps rather say ‘this is a matter of national security.’
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Threats, fears and their repulsion have probably been an integral part of politics as long 
as human beings have formed societies. Some have even considered the real possibility 
of ‘physical killing’ as the prerequisite for genuine life and politics (e.g., Schmitt 1996, 33; 
for a discussion see Huysmans 1998b; 2006a, 134-135; Ojakangas 2002).1 The preoc-
cupation with threats and their repulsion seems to be a constant concern for politicians 
and scholars engaged in the affairs of ‘good governance.’ In contemporary scholarly and 
political parlance, this complex of problems is labelled as ‘security’, be it of the national 
or international kind.2
The Copenhagen School groups ‘security’ together with notions like ‘democracy’ and 
‘peace’ as ‘contested concepts’ (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998).3 This means that even 
1  While Mouffe (e.g., 2005) promotes and argues for an unessentialist conception of the political and politics, 
by arguing that Schmitt is correct in identifying the possibility of a we/them relation in any field of life as having 
the potential to become an antagonistic enemy/friend distinction (e.g., ibid. 2-3, 50, 111, 114, 123, 127-128), 
she is herself making an essentialist argument. Like Schmitt, Mouffe seems to be stuck in the unavoidability of 
binary divisions as the political: the enemy/friend distinction is the essence of the political for her. It seems that 
this distinction is the ‘transcendental signified’ for Mouffe.
From a Wittgensteinian point of view, even Schmitt’s sovereign is a form of life made possible by the language 
game of dichotomising. Is it necessary to see it as having more essence than that, despite the possible conse-
quences such a form of life and the language games that form it make possible? Why is the ever-present possi-
bility of the enemy/friend distinction as the political, not as essentialist as claiming that the political is equal to 
class divisions (cf., Laclau & Mouffe 2001)? 
See Chapter 6.3.4 for how I argue that a Daoist theory of politics could perhaps avoid essentialising a binary 
exclusion as the essence of the political.
2  Before the Second World War, social sciences did not use the concept of security in the extensive way it is 
contemporarily being used, but discussed and applied those of defence, national survival, national interest, and 
sovereignty instead (Brauch 2008b, 77).
3  The term ’essentially contested concepts’ was coined by William B. Gallie (1962) who used concepts like 
’the champions’ and ’democracy’ as examples of this ’closed set’ of concepts, which differ from moral 
concepts like ‘good’ and ‘just’ that share an agreed-upon meaning (although people disagree on what could be 
considered a token of goodness). Gallie’s point was that concepts are contestable in discourse, and that 
there is practical value in understanding what concepts are and how they are used. William Connolly (1983) 
goes further in his defence of Gallie’s thesis by arguing that there are no sets of secure basic concepts to guide 
practical judgements, that any attempt to construct such sets depends on the exercise of political power, and 
that any claim of incontestability is itself contestable. If all concepts are contestable, what makes some more 
’essentially contestable’ than others? The simple answer would seem to be that some concepts have a more 
stable understanding of their ‘signifieds’ than others (due to the exercise of political or social power), while 
others are under constant struggle, or deliberately kept ’empty’ in order for them to work as vessels of the 
‘politics of concepts’.
4. What is Security?
We can regard ‘security’ as a speech act.
- Ole Wæver 
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though there have been a variety of attempts to define security,4 a common understand-
ing of it has remained, and would seem to remain, elusive.5 Håkan Wiberg (1987, 340) 
has noted, however, that most authors seem to be in agreement on security as being 
something good: the very term ’security’ is positively value-loaded. Wiberg views this as 
one of the main reasons why no clear meaning is attached to the word. Indeed, scholars 
interested in problematising the concept of security often focus on the tacit agreement 
on the positive connotations of security. Ole Wæver (2004b, 54; see also Baldwin 1997 
and Ciuta 2009) has noted that for the majority of scholars, security seems to be such a 
straightforward concept that most of the discussion claiming to be critical of the concept, 
focuses more on the referents6 of security, rather than the concept itself.7 Rather than 
See Baldwin (1997, 10-12) for a critical discussion on whether security really is as contested as Buzan (1991) 
suggests.
4  For example: 
Walter Lippman (1943, 51): “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to 
avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.”
Arnold Wolfers (1952, 485): “But while wealth measures the amount of a nation’s material possessions, and 
power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats 
to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”
Barry Buzan (1991, 18-19, 370): “In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from 
threat. When this discussion is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity 
and their functional integrity. […] Its bottom line is about survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial 
range of concerns about the conditions of existence. […] [security is] a powerful political tool in claiming atten-
tion for priority items in the competition for government attention.”
Ken Booth (1991, 319): “Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, 
is security.”
Ole Wæver (1995, 50): “The label ‘Security’ has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific 
field of practice. […] With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, 
security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. […] By utter-
ing, ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a 
special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” (Emphasis in original.)
Hans Günter Brauch (2008a, 28): “’Security in an objective sense’ refers to specific security dangers, i.e., to 
‘threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks’ to specific security dimensions (political, military, economic, 
societal, environmental) and  referent objectives (international, national, human) as well as sectors (social, 
energy, food, water), while ‘security in a subjective sense’ refers to security concerns that are expressed by 
government officials, media representatives, scientists or ‘the people’ in a speech act or in written statements 
(historical sources) by those who securitize ‘dangers’ as security ‘concerns’ being existential for the survival of 
the referent object and that require and legitimize extraordinary measures and means to face and cope with 
these concerns.” (Emphasis in original.)
Paul D. Williams (2008b, 5): “Security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished 
values; especially those which, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near 
future.”
5  See Brauch et al. (2008) for over seventy articles dealing with the re-conceptualisation of security in the 21st 
century.
6  For Buzan (1983; 1991) and Wæver (1995; Buzan et al. 1998) the referent of security does not mean the 
referent of the word security in the sense of the sense (sinn) and reference (bedeutung) of Gottlob Frege (1966), 
but the referent of the security argument i.e., what is secure or whose security is being discussed. Paul Chilton 
(1996, 22-23) argues that security is the preferred form of secure (verb) or secure (adjective) precisely because 
it leaves the question of the argument’s predication open i.e., it is not necessary to define whose security is 
under discussion. These unclear definitions provide more options for the political use of security arguments. 
For Edelman (1972, 71) only intangible threats allow polarising role-taking, which enables exaggeration of the 
threat and the justification of unwanted policy choices. Indeed, many threats claimed by state administrations 
are actually intangible in that the reality of the threat is itself unverifiable and the subject of dispute (ibid., 
69), and a particular instance of crisis or threat does not matter as much as the general creation of a threat 
perception (ibid., 13).
7  A similar conclusion is drawn by Graham Smith (2005). This is also what has happened in some discussions 
on the meaning of security in Asia (e.g., Bubandt 2005; Kent 2006; Muna 2006).
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focusing on what the concept of security means or does,8 the discussion has been more 
about whether national or individual security should be considered, for example. Main-
stream scholarship on security matters, especially in the United States (Wæver & Buzan 
2007; Williams 2008b), has seen no need to dissect the concept, as it has an everyday 
meaning which can merely be expanded to the international level.9 
Wæver (1995; 2004b; 2008a) departs from the understanding that security is about 
the same thing in everyday use as it is in international politics. He even disagrees on the 
tacit agreement of security being something positive. Drawing on Arnold Wolfers (1952), 
he (e.g., Wæver 1997a) argues that even though security does have a positive connotation 
in everyday use, for states, it is a negative concern. This approach to the value of security 
is similar to other ‘critically slanted’ scholars who also often see security as ‘anti-demo-
cratic’, and therefore as a negative (see for example Lipschutz 1995; Krause & Williams 
1997; Weldes et al. 1999; CASE 2006).
The problem of viewing security as something positive when the measures that it re-
quires often entail a negative form of politics is confounded by the image of effectiveness 
which security arguments often convey, or even effect. Indeed, securitisation moves sug-
gest that the proposed means will effect an increase of security, which makes it a very 
powerful means to galvanise an audience behind the measures the speaker proposes (cf., 
Buzan 1991; Balzacq 2005). However, as security speech identifies vulnerabilities, secu-
ritisation also gives the impression that to reject a proposed path of action would bring 
about a loss of security i.e., security is bound to insecurity. Accordingly, security speech 
and policies tend to promise more than they can deliver (Hietanen & Joenniemi 1982, 35-
36):10 the everyday understanding of security connotates a sense of certainty that cannot 
actually be achieved with any security measures; security discourses are designed to pro-
vide safety and the defeat of danger, something which can never be totally accomplished 
given the limits of human life. Security discourses conceal this unavoidable deferral of 
surety by producing the referents of security as stable, knowable, and in effect, securable 
(cf., Stern 2006, 193). As securitisation arguments contain a threat, security arguments 
in effect reproduce insecurities. Indeed, as Anthony Burke (2002, 20) notes, security can 
never escape insecurity as its own meaning depends on the production of ‘images’ of 
insecurity (cf., Figure 6 below).
Although concern over threats and their repelling is a perennial issue, security as a 
concept has not always been the prevalent avenue for discussing this complex of prob-
lems. The understanding of what security is and what security means has also undergone 
change throughout the ages. The conceptual history of ’security’ has been written many 
times, although not that often from an IR perspective.11 The word ’security’ in the English 
8  Smith (2005) however brings up a peculiar critique that most scholarship would focus on what security does 
rather than what security means.
9  For example Waltz (1979) sees no need to deal with the concept of security, which is peculiar, in that one of 
his main arguments is that states seek to maximise their security. Even more striking is that the ‘conventional 
constructivist’ magnum opus of Katzenstein (1996) does not deal with what ‘security’, as such, is, but seems to 
take the state as the referent of security, as well as military and external threats as the taken-for-granted object 
of studies of security – thereby provoking the ‘counter-opus’ of Weldes et al. (1999).
10  Further, Aki Hietanen and Pertti Joenniemi (1982 35-36; see also Hietanen 1981, 5) argue that security is 
not an analytical, but rather an ideological concept.
11  For examples of conceptual histories on security see Kaufman (1970), Conze (1984), Schrimm-Heins (1991), 
Markopolous (1995), Rothchild (1995), Osiander (1998), Wæver (2004b; 2008a), and Arends (2008). For an 
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language is derived from the Roman word ‘securus’, where ‘se’ means ‘without’ and ‘cura’ 
means ‘worry’, ‘care’, ‘concern’, or ‘anxiety’ (Markopolous 1995, 745; cf., Chilton 1996; 
Wæver 2004b; 2008a).12
Securitas is the Roman version of the Greek ataraksia (áταραξία; impassiveness, calm-
ness), which also begins with a negation; without its negation, tarasso (ταρáσσω) means 
‘to stir, trouble the mind, agitate, disturb’ (Markopolous 1995, 745; Arends 2008, 264). 
Arends (2008, 264-265) however argues that instead of ataraksia, the most important 
Greek root of security is asphaleia (áσφáλεια; steadfastness, stability, assurance from 
danger, personal safety) that was widely used both by Homer and Thucydides. There are 
two avenues to interpret securus (Mesjasz 2008, 46): in the first, the term is understood 
as a state of being secure or of being free from danger, while in the other, the term is un-
derstood as being without unease or without cares or worries. These two aspects have 
been emphasised differently in Europe, which is reflected in the objective and subjective 
aspects or understandings of security.
Indeed, during its conceptual development, security has shifted on the axis of objectiv-
ity and subjectivity several times.13 Cicero viewed security as an absence of distress upon 
which happy life depends (Cicero 1971, V. 14, 42, 466-7); for him, security was a negation, 
the absence of worry. From Cicero’s perspective, the contemporary concept of insecurity 
might seem a meaningless double negative (Wæver 2004b; 2008a), while both the politi-
example of a cognitive-semantic discussion of ‘security’ see Chilton (1996).
12  While there has not necessarily been an exact conceptual equivalent to securus or security in other ‘world 
cultures’, there however seem to be some similar aims and problems termed with different concepts. For example 
in Indian traditions, there is no equivalent to a modern concept of security (Brück 2008, 195). The notion of 
dharma (धम) or the dimensions of social experience of life and the individual’s framework for appropriate 
behaviour was what evoked trust in an unchanging universal order. What security could mean in this context 
would be a state of being in accordance with dharma in all respects, which would be good for individuals, 
society, and even the cosmic order. ‘Security’ would mean being without sorrow or anxiety and also confidence, 
freedom from danger, safety, stability (Dadhich 2008, 242). The citizens of a Hindu state were considered to be 
secure when the state functioned in accordance with the dharma; the state was considered to be secure when 
the king was safe. (ibid.) While for Hindus, dharma was about the upholding of the value of life, the togetherness 
and defence of inherited structures and the established system, i.e., about the conservation of the established 
order with the family and clan at the centre, for Buddhists, the dharma was open for anyone who shared its 
educational programme, thus, making the learned community and the future being of a new human being the 
referents of security (Brück 2008, 202).
While the term ‘security’ is a modern concept vis-à-vis Arabic/Islamic thinking, an equivalent can be found 
in the Koran as well (Hanafi 2008, 279-281): security is translated as amn («„«‰), with iman („«‰ ; faith) and 
aman (··«⁄ fi«œ ; to believe) as terms close to the same root. In its modern usage amn is connected to issues of 
defence of the nation against external threats in the present or in the future. In classical Arab/Islamic thinking 
amn meant quietude or peace of the soul. From its use in the Koran, amn has various meanings as security: the 
verbal form indicates that security is an act and a process, not a given situation; its use as a pronoun indicates 
that security is related to human and social relations, not to individual positions; security is similarly always a 
perception of the other, not of the self, and it may be an illusion and not a reality; thus security is a state of mind 
that those who commit unjust acts cannot achieve.
See Mabe (2008) for developments in African understandings of security, and Sánchez (2008) for a study of 
security in the Nahuan, Mayan, Quichean, and Incan traditions. See Chapter 7.1. on the Chinese and other Asian 
terms of ‘security.’  
13  Arends (2008, 263) sees the contemporary European concept of security as a chimera of Athenians’ inten-
tion of preventing the destruction of their empire, the religious connotations of the Romans’ ’securitas’, and 
Hobbes’s intention of preventing civil war.
Buzan & Hansen (2009, 32-35) argue that objective, subjective and discursive conceptions of security are 
the major epistemological distinctions among perspectives on ‘International Security Studies’, in addition to 
whether a scientific, or positivist approach to analyse security should be adopted, or whether analysis should 
be conducted along philosophical, sociological, or constitutive lines.
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cians and scholars of today are so concerned with it. Cicero would certainly disagree with 
the current dominant understanding of security as being something objective, of which 
one can have correct or illusory subjective perceptions (Jervis 1976). Indeed, the contem-
porary concept of security is viewed as a quality that we either have or do not have. Se-
curity is like a measurable mass, or a ‘container’ with an inside (which is safe, but where 
there has to be surveillance of the enemy within) and an outside (which is dangerous and 
has to be guarded against) (Chilton 1996; cf., Figure 6 in Chapter 6.3.1.).
Irrespective of its contemporary connotations, security has not always been viewed as 
something positive and sought-after. With the fall of Rome, the use of ‘security’ as a term 
diminished (Conze 1984, 834). For Medieval Christians, only God could provide certainty 
in matters of salvation, so the concept remained ambiguous, even hinting at mortal hu-
bris (Markopolous 1995, 746; Rothchild 1995, 61); securitas became the ‘mother of neg-
ligence’ in slackening the struggle against sin (Schrimm-Heins 1991, 147). The negative 
side of security was again emphasised with the protests of Luther and Calvin, when certi-
tudo, the certitude of faith, replaced the use of securitas in most contexts (Schrimm-Heins 
1991, 169). This usage was similarly evident in 16th century English, in which the words 
secure and security, could be used pejoratively in the sense of ‘careless’ or ‘carelessness’ 
(Chilton 1996, 77), as illustrated by Shakespeare’s (1993, 788) Macbeth, “you all know, 
security is mortals chiefest enemie.” As Der Derian (1995, 28) notes, these kinds of pejo-
rative connotations were still evident in mid 19th century Britain.
Some two centuries ago, security split into two separate concepts, namely safety and 
surety/security (Wæver 2004b, 55; 2008a).14 This split and later fusion of the concepts 
produced the ’objective’ understanding of security which eventually led to probabilism;15 
in the 1950s, for example, Wolfers (1952, 458) divided the concept of security into an ob-
jective and a subjective aspect: “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of 
threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will 
be attacked.” As Wæver (1995) has emphasised, probabilities and future-orientedness 
have been central to the concept in the 20th century.16 During the Cold War, and largely 
also after it, security was viewed more as an objective state, not of mind, but of being. Paul 
Chilton (1996, 86) already finds this kind of shift from the state of mind of security into 
an understanding of security as a ‘container’ or a ‘link’ in Hobbes’s (1999) Leviathan. The 
mental state of being without care is replaced in Hobbes’s treatise with an understanding 
of both physical protection and a psychological confidence in the future. 
Another relevant vantage point to security is the question of the level of analysis,17 
14  This would suggest that, unlike Ciuta (2009) argues, the meaning of security can undergo change even 
for the CopS: security as a situation where there are the means to repel an existential threat, is how the CopS 
interprets the current dominant understanding of the logic of ‘security’ in international politics.
In addition to shifts in the understanding of security as objective/subjective, as Conze (1984, 831-862) shows, 
since 1648, internal security was distinguished from external security. It seems that in contemporary times 
these two aspects of security are once again merging to a large extent (see e.g., Bigo 2000). See Trombetta 
(2008) on how the discourse of climate change may be altering the way security is understood as being about 
immediate threats to survival.
15  Security also has connotations relating to pledges of debts or obligations. These are common today in finan-
cial transactions: security works against financial risk.
16  For recent studies of risk within Security Studies, see for example Aradau & Van Munster (2007) and the 
special issue of Security Dialogue (2008).
17  The problem of levels of analysis was introduced to the field of IR by David Singer (1960; 1961). For discus-
sions and propositions for relevant levels of analysis in IR, see Waltz (1959; 1979), Wendt (1987), Hollis & 
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or ‘whose security’18 is under discussion (Wæver 2008a, 102).19 The introduction of the 
levels of analysis, in addition to the different sectors of security, has been one of the major 
contributions of the Copenhagen School.20 The state was for a long time, and still remains, 
the most central referent of security speech but this has not always been the case: for 
most classic philosophers of politics the state is a means to an end, that end being the 
survival and security of the individual21 (Rothchild 1995; Wæver 2008b). For Hobbes 
(1999), the Leviathan was the way to self-preservation. He emphasised that the right of 
self-preservation and defence was the only right that could not be given away. Friedrich 
Nietzsche (2003) dissented from this understanding, as he saw survival as merely being 
the most common result of the will to power. Critical scholars of security emphasise that 
the most ‘radical other’, death, cannot be escaped and that therefore, it makes no sense to 
recreate and reify fantasies of control and order. For them, creative ‘Nietzschean’ politics, 
without the fear of death, would be preferable to the conservative and repressive nature 
of security issues and policies.22
As already noted, security, as an organising principle of thought on international re-
lations, was not a key concept before the mid 20th century. One of the first major steps 
towards the centrality of the concept for both international politics and research came 
during the period between the two World Wars when the status quo powers of the coali-
tion that had won the first war used ’security’ as their ‘watchword’ (Carr 1946, 105). The 
concept was useful in dressing up power-politics; it was relatively new in the context of 
international relations and it blurred the distinction between the domestic and the inter-
national. Security proclaimed a shared interest in peace for the dominant powers, as well 
as for the whole world (ibid., 82). 
Smith (1991), and Buzan (1995).
In regard to concepts of security, for example Rothchild (1995) sees the concept of security being shifted or 
operated in four ways. The concept of security is being vertically extended in terms of whose security is in 
question both down and up from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals as well as to 
the security of the international system and the biosphere. The concept of security is being extended horizon-
tally to various sorts of security/insecurity (cf., sectors of security). The concept of security is finally being 
extended in terms of which kinds of actors are responsible for producing or guaranteeing security.
Buzan & Hansen (2009, 10-13, 21) similarly identify five points of contention that have defined the major 
academic debates within ‘International Security Studies’ as 1) whose security should be protected and studied, 
2) which sectors should the study of security focus on, 3) should the study of security focus on only external 
threats, 4) is the only form of security politics one of threats, dangers, and emergencies, and finally 5) which 
epistemologies and methodologies should be applied to the study of security.
18  This is a major emphasis of ’critical security studies’ (Lipschutz 1995; Krause & Williams 1997; Krause 1998), 
but also emphasised by Baldwin (1997, 13-16) as a relevant aspect of the conceptual analysis of ‘security.’
19  The ‘state’ or the ‘international’ level should not be assumed to be the dominant functioning levels. For 
example, while Muna (2006, 95) identifies IPOLEKSOSBUDHANKAMNAS (an Indonesian acronym for ideology, 
politics, social, cultural, defence, security, and national) as the ‘reference tool’ of the Indonesian state to find a 
‘security balance’, Bubandt (2005) shows how local understandings of the world, including security, may win 
over official policies.
20  The CopS approach (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003) includes three general ideas: 1) 
securitisation, 2) sectors, and 3) regional security complexes. The complexes are where the levels come in.
21  After the end of the Cold War discussion on individual security was revived once more. Individual security 
is contemporarily often termed as ‘human security’, as popularised by the UNDP in 1994. Human security as 
a political concept has won considerable approval in East- and Southeast Asia (Cheng 2006). See Burke & 
MacDonald (2007) for an example of how the individual or the human has been the referent of studies applying 
the Aberystwyth School’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region, and Floyd (2007b) for the differences between 
the notion and the CopS approach.
22  For Plato, the conquest of the fear of death would mean equality with Gods (Arends 2008, 269).
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Today, national security seems as natural a concept as any, yet it only came to its con-
temporary fruition in the United States of the 1940s, when it was used to explain Ameri-
ca’s relationship with the rest of the world (Yergin 1977, 193-194). Before the end of the 
Second World War, ‘defence’ was the preferred term used by the military.23 ‘Defence’ has a 
distinct opposite, which ‘security’ lacks, namely attack; security allowed the promotion of 
‘defence’ against intangible threats. However, the war effort required the combination of 
civilian and military activities which also led to a shift in terminology since security blur-
ring the distinction between military and civil issues, and also that between domestic and 
international, made the war effort more palatable (cf., Carr 1946).24 Defence was usually 
understood as following geopolitical lines, whilst security was freed from this constraint, 
as it could be defined according to the needs of ‘national interests.’25
‘National interests’, or ‘legitimate interests’, were a defining referent for security in the 
1940s (see e.g., Lippman 1943). By the 1950s, the emphasis shifted towards what has 
been termed ‘core values.’ It would seem that core values have been understood as major 
referents of security26 at least since Arnold Wolfers’s (1952, 484) off-cited27 misquote28 
of Walter Lippmann’s (1943) definition of national security. Wolfers’s misquote of Lipp-
mann emphasised the role of core values in national security: “a nation is secure to the 
extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values.”29
After the war, security was a useful tool to curtail the traditional mistrust of standing 
armies in the United States. First Secretary of Defence Forrestall used national security to 
legitimate a strong military establishment to fight a ‘future enemy’, which was reflected in 
the National Security Act of 1947 (Yergin 1977, 209-210, 339-340).30 The consequences 
of this new line of peacetime military development was quite apparent in Eisenhower’s 
(1961) farewell address, in which he lamented the necessity to build a massive standing 
23  ‘Defence’ has predominantly been used in military, sport, game and legal discourse, while ‘security’ had been 
used in financial and psychological domains before its adaptations to the affairs of states (Chilton 1996, 132).
24  Neocleous (2006, 367-369) emphasises the effect of President Roosevelt’s use of the concept of national 
social and economic security had on security becoming a widely used concept. This may have contributed to the 
popularity and usefulness of the concept of national security a few decades later. See also Yergin (1977).
25  The newness and apparent usefulness of the concept of national security was apparent in Senator Edwin 
Johnson’s comment to Navy secretary James Forrestall in 1945: ‘I like your words “national security”’ (Yergin 
1977, 194).
26  All types of political orders securitise their core values, the fundamental values on which they are based on. I 
argue that securitisation speech is a way to identify and define threats to these core values, and their protection 
can be considered a special type of politics, even in non-democratic political orders (Vuori 2004; 2007).
Graham Smith (2005) goes as far as to argue that all security is about the preservation of core values and the 
realisation of political orders, whether the political entity securing its values is an individual, a state, a nation, 
or a religious community. For him, this understanding makes the concept of security abstract enough to unravel 
the difficulties produced by trying to place the referent object of security somewhere on a spectrum between 
the individual and humanity as a whole: all of these entities can be the objects of security but security threats 
can also emerge at any point on this nexus. Although I disagree with some of Smith’s argument (especially with 
his interpretation of Buzan et al. 1998), his point on security measures arising when the core values of a politi-
cal order are judged to be in jeopardy by the members of the political order (cf., Smith 2005, 499), resonates 
with my argument  presented in Vuori (2007).
27  For examples of the ‘Chinese whispers’ see Buzan (1991, 16), Smith (2005, 489), and Albrecht & Brauch 
(2008, 509).
28  Lippman’s (1943, 51) actual definition was: “a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its 
legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.” (Emphasis added.)
29  Emphasis added.
30  A similar and equally important development was the incorporation of ‘international peace and security’ 
into the UN Charter in 1945 (see Bothe 2008).
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army, and warned against the likelihood of unwarranted decision-making power shifting 
to the ‘military-industrial complex.’ National security worked as a ‘package legitimiser’ in 
the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and the ‘Communist threat’ in general. 
It became one of the watchwords in the dominant macrosecuritisations of the era.31 It 
had been a means to deal with Pearl Harbour and latterly, nuclear weapons too: since no 
state could be invulnerable any longer, defence in the traditional sense could no longer 
exist.32 As such, national security thinking quickly spread around the globe and became a 
dominant logic in both research and politics for several decades. 
National security was a means to retain ’ragioni di stato’ policies33 in an era when 
democratic ethics seemed to be making such a way of thinking increasingly unacceptable. 
The national interest34 and now national security, were ways to address the ’democrat’s 
dilemma’ i.e., how to combine democratic values in domestic politics with an amoral and 
anarchic international system.35 As such, national security could justify drastic measures, 
such as intervention and war. By the late 1960s, then, it had achieved a status where it 
seemed as if it had always been part of the conceptual landscape of international politics, 
even though the concept was a recent intervention in this conceptual space (Neocleous 
2006, 364).
As a result of this development in the conceptual history of security, an almost com-
plete divorce of the everyday sense of the concept and its use in international-affairs has 
transpired. Ole Wæver (1995; Buzan et al. 1998) emphasises that security is what it does: 
someone with the right amount of ‘socio-political capital’ claims that something valuable 
is in peril, and this then justifies the use of ‘extraordinary measures’ and this moves the 
issue into an arena of ‘special politics.’
In this study, the understanding of ‘security’ is based on that of the Copenhagen School 
i.e., security is what security does. Here security has ‘slipped’ off the objective-subjec-
tive-axis; security is neither objective nor subjective, but in between actors. This means 
that ‘securities’ in various socio-political and historical contexts form social fields, where 
certain habitus and positions are favoured vis-à-vis others, and where certain types of 
symbolic capital are more effective and valued than others. Both these social fields and 
the speech acts produced in them are relevant aspects of the study of securitisation, the 
power politics of raising an issue into the social and political realm of security. Security, 
then, does not have a constant meaning. In its contemporary use in international politics, 
security is about survival, that is, the continued existence of valued referent objects. This 
kind of understanding of security focuses our attention to the ‘power politics’ of speaking 
security.
31  See Chapter 6.3.2.
32  See Tannenwald (2007) and Paul (2009) for how a tradition of non-use nuclear weapons has developed.
33  On the birth of ragioni di stato thinking, see Skinner (1998).
34  For a classical discussion, see Morgenthau (2006).
35  While various philosophers and state theorists (e.g., Montesquieu) had contemplated on the effects and 
consequences of an essentially anarchical international order, the concept of anarchy was incorporated into 20th 
century IR by G. Lowes Dickinson (1916; 1926).
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The problem of war and conflict has been at the core of International Relations as an aca-
demic field since its formal inception in 1919.1 However, what today is termed Security 
Studies has developed since the mid 1940s, largely influenced by the political popularity 
of the concept of ‘national security’ in post-WWII United States (see previous chapter). 
In the US, the field of study was largely labelled National Security Studies during the Cold 
War, while in the UK the label was Strategic Studies. Since the 1980s the label Security 
Studies has gained more ground as the field has been returning to its interdisciplinary 
roots beyond IR.2
Most reviews of the field (e.g., Walt 1991, 213-215; Baldwin 1995, 123-124; Wæver 
& Buzan  2007; Williams 2008b) characterise the period after the initiation of studies 
focusing on issues of security as a ‘golden age’ of security studies that lasted some ten 
years (1955-1965). During this time, such studies produced theories and methodologies 
that were incorporated into the broader field of IR (e.g., applications of game theory and 
theories of deterrence), and scholars in the US also had policy relevance. This theoreti-
cally innovative period was, however, followed by a reduction of multidisciplinarity in 
ISS, an increase in empirical and technically oriented studies, and the challenge of peace 
research, which together eventually amounted to stagnation and the end of the line for 
some of the theoretical assumptions of the ‘golden age’ (see e.g., Walt 1991, 215-216; 
Baldwin 1995, 124). The results of the reduction of multidisciplinarity in International 
Security Studies is evident in how Strategic Studies and Security Studies are often viewed 
as more confined areas of study within Political Science and IR (see for example Baylis & 
Wirtz 2007, 13; Figure 2). This has also been reflected in the majority of studies within 
1  The establishment of scientific institutes for the study of international relations in the US and the UK were 
given the task of focusing on the causes, conditions, and forms of war and peace, and on the approaches and 
results of international conflict resolution (Albrecht & Brauch 2008, 504).
2  As Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009) have recently ‘filled the lacuna’ on a lack of an intellectual and disci-
plinary history of ‘International Security Studies’, identified by Nye & Lynn-Jones (1988), and the ‘manifesto’ 
of the c.a.s.e. collective (2006) outlines the development of the Aberystwyth, Copenhagen, and Paris ‘schools’ 
of critical security studies in Europe (see also Wæver 2004a), further detailed review will be omitted here. See 
also Baylis et al. (2007), Collins (2007), Williams (2008a), and Buzan & Hansen (2009) for recent reviews of and 
introductions to contemporary approaches within the field.
5. International Security Studies, the Copenhagen School, 
and Critical Approaches to Security in Europe




the field of ISS, which were conducted in IR or Politics Departments at Universities.3
This period of stagnation lasted until the early 1980s ‘renaissance’ of security studies 
(Walt 1991). There was a revival of theoretical debates and increasing discussions on the 
concept of security (particularly in Europe), which coincided with the ‘critical’ versus 
‘rational’ debates that were underway in IR (e.g., Keohane 1988). Recognising the partial 
overlap of Strategic Studies and Peace Research, Barry Buzan (1983; 1991), for example, 
proposed that ‘security’ should be the thing to focus on in both strategic and peace re-
search. Some of the topics studied by both should be kept separate, yet chances for joint 
scholarly enterprises remain. 
In the era of détente between the superpowers, the research foci of die-hard ‘Real-
ists’ and ‘Idealists’ began to shift. The ‘second generation’ of peace researchers collided 
in the 1980s with many of the general trends in IR theorising. After the neo-neo-debate 
(Wæver 1996; 1997b), theoretical debates in IR opened up to include social theories and 
developments in the philosophy of knowledge. The 1980s saw an increase in discussion 
on ‘new security’, with the broadening of the research agenda beyond the military realm4 
that had been the focus of strategic studies for some time. Civil wars, ethnic conflict, ter-
rorism, and international crime, although all features of the Cold War era, now received 
new attention as the bipolar nature of the international system began to shift. The agenda 
of ISS became even broader, now encompassing questions from environmental problems 
3  It is good to keep in mind that not all academic communities of IR have evolved the same way around the 
world: IR or even political science do not have their own departments everywhere, and the ’great debates’ may 
not have been that influential in all scholarly traditions of the study of international politics. For how the study 
of IR has developed around the world, see Tickner & Wæver (2009).
4  Some examples of broadeners of the agenda include McSweeney (1999) with ‘identity’, Mathews (1989) on 
‘environmental security’, and Thomas & Wilkin (1999) on ‘human security’. See also Lipschutz (1995), Krause 
& Williams (1997), and Buzan et al. (1998). 
Figure 2: The relationship between Security Studies and other related fields of study for 
Baylis & Wirtz (2007, 13).
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through to gender issues.5 
At this junction, the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ emerged from within the auspices 
of the Copenhagen Centre for Peace and Conflict Research (also called Conflict and Peace 
Research Institute, COPRI) that had been established in 1985 (Huysmans 1998a, 479; 
Guzzini & Jung 2004b). The Copenhagen School began to work on the concept of security, 
which it saw as both contested and under-theorised. It challenged the mainstream of ISS, 
which, even though expanding its agenda, still hewed to an objectivist understanding of 
security. For the mainstream, security remained a matter of objective threats ‘out there’, 
only to be detected by the resultant enlarged agenda and group of experts, and responded 
to by politicians. The Copenhagen School broke with this understanding by building on 
Arnold Wolfers’s (1952) analysis of national security as an ‘ambiguous symbol.’ Security 
is seen neither as objective nor subjective, but rather as an intersubjective practice (cf., 
Wæver 1995, 51; Buzan et al. 1998, 31). The Copenhagen School argued that the pitfalls 
of previous understandings could be avoided by focusing not on what security means, but 
on what security does, or more exactly, on what is done by ‘speaking’ or ‘doing’ security.
The Copenhagen School’s approach can be viewed as an extension of ‘soft realism’ as 
exemplified by Wolfers (1952; see also 1962), Kissinger (1957), and Jervis (1978). Just as 
Jervis’s concept of non-offensive defence tried to overcome the ‘security dilemma’ (Herz 
1950; Booth & Wheeler 2008a; Brauch 2008c), for the CopS, the normative push of non-
security aims to reduce the vicious spirals that security action and policies can otherwise 
result in (Wæver 2000a). The CopS also has ties to neorealism (Buzan et al. 1993) as well 
as an interest in the ‘English School’ (Buzan 1993; 2001; 2004a; 2004b; Wæver 1992; 
1998; for a discussion, see Dunne 2005; Adler 2005; and Buzan 2005). Gender (Hansen 
2000) and post-structuralist discourse approaches have also been part of the approaches 
within the school or its next-door critics (Wæver 1989c; Hansen & Wæver 2002; Hansen 
2006). Later members of the institute – since 2003 merged into the Danish Institute of 
International Affairs – have introduced more sociological approaches (Guzzini 2000; 
Jung 2001; Leander 2000). These later additions also reflect some of the criticism raised 
against securitisation and the school in general (e.g., Bigo 1994; Bigo 2000; Bigo 2002; 
Huysmans 1998a; 1998b; Williams 2003; Hansen 2000; Balzacq 2005; see Chapter 6.).
All in all, as reviewers have also noted (e.g., Huysmans 1998a; Eriksson 2001a; Wil-
liams 2003), the field of ISS which was long considered reactive, actually influenced dis-
cussions within IR and infused them with new approaches and ideas in the 1990s. How-
ever, the development of the Copenhagen School was not the only theoretical approach 
that came to depict the European development of ISS in this period. What in the 2000s is 
called the Critical Approaches to Security in Europe collective has its foundations in the 
vibrant theoretisations of the 1990s. Exemplifying the newfound interdisciplinarity of 
ISS (see Figure 3), Didier Bigo (e.g., 2000), coming from the field of criminology, inspired 
Bourdieu-based studies of security. Drawing on the ‘Frankfurt School’, Ken Booth (1991) 
and Richard Wyn Jones (1999) were among those to call for more focus on the security 
of individuals. Another source of inspiration to discuss the study of security was political 
theory (e.g., Huysmans 1998b). When these are combined with feminist (e.g., Tickner 
1992) and post-colonial (e.g., Barkawi & Laffey 2006) approaches, and the increase of po-
5  See e.g., Brauch et al. (2008).
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litical interest in security in this decade,6 it may not be an exaggeration to call the 2000s 
a new ‘golden age’ of ISS (Wæver & Buzan 2007). The newfound interdisciplinarity of ISS 
is evident in the way Betts (1997) relates Security Studies to other close fields (Figure 3): 
while there is an overlap with Security Studies and IR for example, Security Studies also 
has dynamics and interests that go beyond international politics.7
The some six decades of ‘International Security Studies’ has resulted in a fairly com-
plex structure of intellectual influences and approaches to the study of problems and 
phenomena that are considered to be of interest.8 Buzan & Hansen (2009, 222) provide 
a figure (Figure 4) that displays this complexity, and also situates the CopS approach to 
other prevalent contemporary approaches to International Security Studies.
The formation of the c.a.s.e. collective is an indication of the establishment of a second 
generation of critical students of security, who are applying the theoretical approaches 
developed in the 1990s. The present thesis – located squarely between the sociological 
and linguistic boxes beneath Critical Constructivism in Figure 4 – is among those studies 
that aim to critically develop the theory of securitisation which has the greatest number 
of appliers of the various critical approaches.9
6  The ‘Global War on Terror’ has defined much of the security landscape of the first decade of the 21st century, 
but there have also been other new political discourses of security. The concept of ‘human security’ (i.e., 
‘freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity’) has increasingly gained ground since 
its inception in the 1990s (e.g., Thomas & Wilkin 1999). Various forms of ‘environmental security’ also shift the 
focus away from threats posed by states, to problems facing individuals and communities as opposed to states 
(see e.g., Brauch 2008a). See Brauch et al. (2008) for a comprehensive selection of various approaches to the 
expanded security studies agenda.
7  For example ‘Surveillance Studies’ (e.g., Lyon 2006) and some aspects of critical geography (e.g., Koskela 
2009) deal with issues of fear and unease, that are very close to the problems discussed within some areas of 
critical studies of security.
8  Buzan & Hansen (2009, 35-38) identify 11 approaches within ‘ISS:’ 1) Conventional Constructivism, 2) Criti-
cal Constructivism, 3) The Copenhagen School, 4) Critical Security Studies, 5) Feminist Security Studies, 6) 
Human Security, 7) Peace Research, 8) Post-Colonial Security Studies, 9) Poststructuralist Security Studies, 10) 
Strategic Studies, and 11) (Neo)Realism.
9  The ‘critical field’ of European security studies has also not remained in stasis. Wæver (2008a, 111) notes 
how the triangle of the three schools of critical approaches to security in Europe has shifted with Paris and 
Copenhagen becoming two poles with political theory of the ‘political’ becoming a new angle to approach issues 
of security (e.g., in the form of the work of Rob Walker and Jef Huysmans). The c.a.s.e. collective has sought 
to merge the schools but it remains to be seen whether this forms new research programmes. Other ‘second 
generation’ developments of the securitisation approach include Balzacq (2005; 2010a; 2010b), Stritzel (2007), 
Wilkinson (2007), and Salter (2008).
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Figure 3 The relationship of Security Studies to other related fields of study for Betts 
(1997).1
Figure 4: The present study within the intellectual evolution of International Security 
Studies as presented by Buzan & Hansen (2009, 222).
1  Adapted from a PowerPoint slide used by Ole Wæver at the PhD Course “Security Theory – Critical Innova-
tions”, November 27 to December 1 2006.
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The theory of securitisation was not the first to emphasise the political use of threat dis-
course. For example, Murray Edelman (1972, 13) noted that political scenes maintain an 
ever-present threatening trend, be it acute or merely a potentiality to brood about. The 
urgent and critical times we are always said to be living in is a tactic for politicians to 
justify unpleasant actions that otherwise might arouse resentment or even resistance; 
as the abstract notion of ‘national security’ means different things to different groups, to 
claim to protect ‘national security’ is efficacious for reassuring the anxious1 (ibid., 116). 
Further, a particular instance of crisis or threat does not matter as much as the general 
creation of a threat perception (ibid., 13), which is also one of the main positions of the 
CopS. The conviction that current times are indeed critical, is the factor that brings wide 
popular support for drastic measures such as peacetime drafts, the construction of fall-
out shelters or enacting restrictive legislation.2 
The theory of securitisation is perhaps the most systematic approach to study the use 
of security arguments. By drawing on constructionist language theory e.g., J.L. Austin 
(1975), Ole Wæver (Buzan et al. 1998, 32) views securitisation in terms of the power 
politics of a concept, that of security. According to his view, the construction of security is-
sues does not require objective threats. Under the right conditions, issues can be labelled 
with ‘security’ irrespective of whether or not there is a ‘real’ threat. The implications of 
this labelling are thought to provide legitimacy for the political actions of the securitising 
actor. The study of securitisation does not mean the assessment of some objective threats 
that ‘really’ endanger something; this would require an objective measure of security, 
which no security theory has been able to provide (ibid., 30). Instead, this theory is a 
1  Even anxious academics. The Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Turku presented 
a security argument as the rationale to combine the Department of Political Science with the Department of 
Contemporary History during his visit to the departments in September 2008. Whether aware of it or not, the 
Dean followed the grammar of securitisation to the letter: if the departments were not merged, the Faculty 
would cease to exist as its departments would be moved to other Faculties. The continued existence of the 
Faculty would legitimate the special procedure to merge departments. Interestingly some of the faculty of the 
department agreed with the threat, while others did not. The Dean’s securitisation was only partially success-
ful.
On January 1, 2010, the departments were merged.
2  Or combining university departments.
6. The Theory of Securitisation and its Critics
Its only a model.
Shut up!
- Monty Python and the Holy Grail
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means to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is 
to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat (ibid., 26). Security is a self-
referential practice; it is by labelling something as a security issue that it becomes one 
(ibid., 24).3 The exact definition and criteria of securitisation is the “intersubjective es-
tablishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political 
effects” (ibid., 25). Technically speaking, an act of securitisation is an illocutionary speech 
act where an existential threat is produced in relation to a referent object; an act of secu-
ritisation classifies an issue as an existential threat which requires drastic measures, and 
thereby brings about a status transformation for the issue in question.
In the CopS approach, the most important internal or constitutive rule of successful 
securitisation is the form of security, its grammar.4 By following the grammar of security 
a plot is constructed. This plot contains an existential threat, a point of no return and a 
possible way out (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998, 32-33). A successful or consummated 
(in Austin’s terms felicitous) performance of an illocutionary speech act brings in ‘conse-
quences’ or ‘effects’ in certain senses (Austin 1975, 113, 116-117). A successful speech 
act leads to a number of changes, which would not have otherwise happened in the regu-
lar flow of events.5 Securitisation moves, whether they succeed or fail, can change the so-
cial situation and can be the basis for acts that would not have been possible or legitimate 
without them. Thereby, securitisation can have inter-unit effects.
In addition to the constitutive rules - the ‘grammar’ of security - securitisation is de-
pendent on cultural factors (the conventions of illocutions), which may be unique to po-
litical systems and cultures. This requires that the method of inquiry should be based 
on (cross-cultural) pragmatics (the study of the ways in which meaning is derived from 
the interaction of utterances with the contexts in which they are used) and not purely on 
semantics (the study of meaning) or universal linguistic rules. All societies have ‘rules.’6 
These rules are products of historical and social contingencies, as are the referent ob-
jects and threats in security. When security logic and rhetoric is utilised to legitimate the 
breaking of these rules, a case of securitisation arises (Buzan et al. 1998, 25-26).
My main argument in this study is that to speak of something as an issue of security 
is a political choice, which may have several kinds of motives and political functions. The 
CopS has also noted the plurality of meanings of security: even though in everyday use se-
curity has positive connotations, for states, security is a negative concern (Wolfers 1952; 
Wæver 1997a, 15). Indeed, more often than not, security policy is guided by negative con-
cerns and its aim is to block negative developments. Perhaps due to the negative ‘nature’ 
of security policies, many see securitisation as a form of naturalisation, or depolitisation 
of political discourse (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Huysmans 1998a; 1998b; Holm 2004). By 
labelling an issue as one of survival, it becomes part of the language of nature, which is 
an effective tactic for dominant individuals to work against heretical discourse and the 
3  For Buzan et al. (1998, 31) the field of security is not equal in terms of positions of authority or the social 
capital various agents can wield.
4  “Among the internal conditions of a speech act, the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar 
of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 32).
5  The causes of saying something differ from causes in the physical sense: causality in saying has to operate 
through the conventions of language and it is a matter of influence exerted by one person on another (Austin 
1975, 113).
6  See Onuf (1989; 1998) on how certain speech acts construct social rules.
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symbolic revolution of the dominated (cf., Bourdieu 1991, 131). Securitisation imposes a 
feeling of obviousness and necessity; it moves the issue away from the non-determined 
discourse of politics that would otherwise allow multiple interpretations and outcomes. 
As such, security is an effective means to legitimate policies which might otherwise be 
considered excessive or immoral as it stages issues as matters of survival above ‘regular 
politics.’ Security is therefore also an effective means of control.
If securitisation is successful, legitimacy created through the widening social process, 
consisting of increasing cases of the act of securitisation, enables the speaker to break the 
rules that normally bind behaviour and policies, after which the question can be moved 
into an area of ‘special politics.’7 The perlocutionary effect of securitisation, as formulat-
ed by Wæver, is political legitimacy; securitisation legitimises action otherwise deemed 
non-legitimate.8 The theory of securitisation in a way describes the frame, script, plot or 
grammar of security – the way we have learned to understand what security is, what is 
security, and how something becomes security.9 Securitisation describes the process of 
creating the social fact of security, but the script or plot of security contains further ele-
7  Huysmans (2002, 45-46) has formulated securitisation as involving three elements from a generic perspec-
tive. The first element emphasises political contexts and practices of mobilisation. The contingent practices of 
enunciating security mobilise security knowledge in contingent political contexts. The second element focuses 
on the ‘security field’, which is distinct from other fields of practice. The successful performance of security 
practices integrates problem definitions, institutional processes, and expectations. Huysmans’s third element 
is the security formation in Foucault’s sense. While the security field is a concrete manifestation, the security 
formation provides the logic that binds disparate practices together into a field. The security formation makes 
the category of security practices possible, as it provides the rules and the grammars for security practices.
While not applied in this study, the concept of security fields enables a technocratic view of securitisation 
(Huysmans 2006a). Security experts, or professionals, engaged in this field, gain their capabilities of defining 
problems from trained skills and knowledge, and from utilising these in their work (Bigo 2000; 2002). Profes-
sionals gain their positions of power by making claims about the boundaries of categories and who fit into them, 
and who do not; “The power to classify is the purest of all deposits of professionalism” (Cohen 1985, 196). Role 
taking is action, which creates and maintains political symbols, and responses to mutual role taking maintain 
the rules that are actually played out in political practice. Once these patterns of role taking are established, they 
become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing. (Edelman 1972, 50-52.) For example, in the field of security, politi-
cians or administrators may start to think of their activities as a special kind of politics, that of national security. 
They start to interact with other domestic and international politicians and officials, regarding them not just as 
politicians, but agents of national security. As self-aware creatures, they may not only become politicians who 
deal with national security, but in their own self-consciousness, agents of national security. For an application 
of Bourdieu in security analysis see Williams (2007c).
8  I however reason that securitisation can also have other perlocutionary effects and aims beyond legitimacy. 
See Chapter 6.3.2. below.
9  Language and its grammar are pure potentiality (Agamben 1998, 23), but this potential can be used to do 
and achieve a variety of things. In this study, illocutionary logic provides the basis from which a grammar for 
securitisation is constructed, while the cultural practices and the social and political contexts of each empirical 
case provide the vocabulary in the phenomena studied as securitisation. Grammars of security are powerful 
as they can provide political legitimacy for immoral or extraordinary acts, and inform people how they should 
seek safety from harm (cf., Stern 2006, 188). See Pin-Fat (2000), Heyes (2003a) and Zerilli (2003) for studies 
on the grammar of politics from a Wittgensteinian perspective.
Maria Stern (2006, 193) has summarised a grammar of discursive moves in securing a ‘we’ as a referent object 
of security. The initial move is the imbuement of the object of security with an identity (cf., Weldes 1999) which 
is then presented as being stable and certain. The temporal grounding of this identity in the past, present and 
future is followed by the demarcation of a space where this subject of security resides. The fourth move is the 
naming of danger and identification of a threat. The special delineation works both towards defining the subject 
of security against the threatening Other and protecting the subject of security from this threat. The setting up 
of cognitive borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ work in defining dyads defining the two identities in many ways. 
The construction of a threatening situation is alleviated by the promise to provide security, order and safety. 
This promise is then said to be achieved through various security measures (Jackson 2005). Such a grammar of 
discursive moves is quite close to the more condensed grammar of securitisation proposed by Wæver.
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ments that entail priority and utmost importance.
Moving beyond the ‘grammar’ of securitisation, Wæver has argued that the require-
ments of securitisation include two ‘outside’ elements: the social status of the actor (the 
securitising actor has to be in a position of authority to the audience, which need not nec-
essarily be formal)10 and aspects related to the threat itself (issues are easier to produce 
as threats if similar issues are generally considered to be threats).11 These two elements 
are divided into further basic ‘variables’: referent objects, securitising actors, functional 
actors, securitising moves, existential threats, facilitating conditions, and audiences. (Bu-
zan et al. 1998; Wæver 2008b.)
Some of the original formulations of the above variables have become targets of 
debate, or have produced confusion for appliers. The definition of securitising actors: 
“actors who securitise issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially 
threatened” (Buzan et al. 1998, 36), is an example of how variation in definitions has 
problematic entailments. While Wæver often emphasises the openness of the acceptance 
of acts of securitisation by relevant audiences, declarations as speech acts do not neces-
sarily require this if the speaker making a declaration has the correct social position or 
capital. The formulation quoted above seems to suggest that securitising actors could 
‘decide’ on securitisation. Elsewhere, Wæver (2008b, 582) defines a securitising actor 
as: “the one who makes the claim – speech act – of pointing to an existential threat to this 
referent object and thereby legitimising extraordinary measures, often but not necessar-
ily to be carried out by the actor itself.” In terms of speech act theory, this formulation 
emphasises that securitisation cannot be decided, as it is a claim.12 This issue of whether 
securitisation can be decided or not is closely connected the issue of the ‘success’ of secu-
ritisation. The other two basic variables of securitisation theory that have raised the most 
controversy – facilitating conditions and audiences – are also connected to this issue.
Facilitating conditions are those under which the speech act of securitisation works, 
misfires, or is abused (cf., Austin 1975). There are two types of facilitating conditions 
external to the linguistic rules of the speech act of security. Firstly, the enunciator or secu-
ritising actor has to have a sufficient amount of socio-political capital or authority to per-
form securitisation acts.13 Beyond the capital and other resources of the actor, contexts 
10  “The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked” (Austin 1975, 34).
11  This for example seems to be the case with democracy and non-democracy in the US: the political order of 
India being democratic impeded the securitisation of India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998, whereas 
Iran’s non-democratic political order facilitates the securitisation of its claimed attempts to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Accordingly, India’s democracy was emphasised in speeches that justified the lack of a real response, 
while Iran’s non-democratic order is emphasised in speeches where Iran is presented as dangerous. For a 
comparison of US responses to these two states in regard to the nuclear issue via securitisation theory, see 
Hayes (2009).
12  In my view, this seeming imprecision can be dealt with by the strands of securitisation presented in the 
present study: some acts of securitisation are more formal and powerful than others, and some types of securi-
tisation acts require formal social authority while others do not. Most often, Wæver presents securitisation as 
the public legitimisation of extraordinary measures. The audience may also be restricted as “those who have 
to be convinced in order for the speech act to be successful in the sense of opening the door to extraordinary 
measures, otherwise not available” (Wæver 2008b, 582).
13  Rita Taureck (2006b) has argued that instead of understanding Wæver’s second facilitating condition as 
‘context’, it should be understood as capabilities in the Waltzian (1979) sense. Some securitisers have more 




and cultural experiences can impede or facilitate securitisation.14 Accordingly, a second 
category of facilitating conditions has to do with the threat. Buzan (1991, 133-134) notes 
how the nature of the threat and its intensity of operation have an effect on whether and 
when an issue becomes an issue of national security. It appears that the perceived inten-
sity of an issue can have an effect on whether it is securitised or not.15 Facilitation or im-
pediment effects may also depend on certain historical experiences and vulnerabilities, 
which may even take on the role of convention.16
However, the way in which the CopS presents their view of facilitating conditions is not 
entirely clear. Certain situations may actually impede securitisation, without being nec-
essary or sufficient conditions for achieving securitisation. As Stritzel (2007, 379) notes, 
the CopS seems to conflate, or confuse, felicity conditions with facilitating conditions, in 
their various formulations of facilitating/impeding conditions. For Austin (1975), felicity 
conditions were conventions that regulate the appropriate use of utterances and they 
were necessary conditions to achieve successful speech acts; felicity conditions were 
not entirely identical with (social) conditions of success, but dealt with issues of uptake, 
for example.17 For the CopS, however, these two aspects are not clearly separate: “On 
the basis of theories of speech acts, we can say that there are three ‘felicity conditions’ 
of a successful speech act” (Wæver 2000a, 252). Yet, while felicity conditions deal with 
the conditions of successful uptake, facilitating conditions should be seen as parts of the 
more general social context. Further, facilitating/impeding conditions should be viewed 
to facilitate or impede the politics of securitisation rather than to deal with the felicity of 
the various elementary speech acts that comprise the more complex speech acts of secu-
ritisation. Indeed, felicity conditions are those types of conditions that could be termed 
necessary or sufficient whereas facilitating/impeding conditions are conditions of the 
situation or context of the utterance. It may be more appropriate to term these two types 
of things as felicity conditions and facilitation/impediment factors.18
14  This is also evident from different sectors of security having different ‘dialects’ when it comes to threats and 
referent objects of security (Buzan et al. 1998, 27-28).
15  It seems that there can be degrees of urgency in respect to the general trend of existential threats. For 
example, during the Cold War, it was as though the whole of humanity was moving across a minefield where 
one misstep could have led to nuclear annihilation in a matter of hours, if not minutes. When the possibility of 
such rapid acceleration of destruction is compared to the slowness of the degradation brought about by global 
climate change, it seems that the threshold of ’doom’ and the pace at which it can approach have changed in 
respect to the most prominent of catastrophes that constitute contemporary (mainly Western) threat registers. 
See for example Trombetta (2008) on how the rapidness or slowness of the possible realisation of threats may 
be affecting contemporary notions of security. 
16  E.g., in the ‘West’ during the Cold War, tanks were certainly seen as more threatening than pamphlets, due 
to their historical record. In China however, pamphlets can be considered more dangerous than tanks, as on the 
one hand they ‘guide’ the tanks, while, on the other, resistance to the symbolic control of the party is threatening 
to the total control it otherwise proclaims to have.
17  Austin’s (1975, 14-15) felicity conditions included: A1) conventional procedures having conventional effects, 
A2) particular persons and circumstances that are appropriate for the conventional procedure and its effects, 
B1 & B2) the correct and complete execution of the procedure, and C1 & C2) the persons involved should have 
the correct thoughts and intentions, and should also consequently act them out.
Austin’s point was to emphasise the difference of felicity conditions with truth conditions of statements. Already 
Searle (1969) argued that Austin’s distinction between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts fails to distinguish 
between those speech acts which are successful but defective and those which are not even successful. Searle’s 
(Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 10) solution was to replace Austin’s division of felicity and infelicity, with the 
possibilities of speech acts being  unsuccessful, or successful but defective, or successful and nondefective.
18  For example, while an attack on skyscrapers is logically neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to 
achieve successful securitisation, this kind of an ‘event’ may be the kind of situation that facilitates the success 
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Moving on to the variable of audience, it is important to note that whilst securitising 
actors are necessary to label an issue with security, and that claimed threats, referent 
objects, as well as facilitation/impediment factors can influence the plausibility of such 
claims, the success of securitisation is up to the audience. The audiences of securitisa-
tion are those whom the securitising actor is attempting to convince in order to achieve 
success for the securitisation move. As can be seen from the original formulation of the 
audience in Buzan et al. (1998),19 it is not surprising that several scholars have raised 
critical points on this issue.20
Many of the criticisms of the CopS notion of audiences can be attributed to the im-
precise original formulation of ‘audience’. Another contributing factor has been the ‘as-
sumption’ of democracy as the form of politics that can be detected in descriptions of 
securitisation theory by many of its appliers. Although it indeed seems that the majority 
of literature on securitisation views the audience as referring to the citizens of a state 
(i.e., the electorate), and most functions of securitisation even in authoritarian contexts 
require publicity, the audience does not have to be the ‘general public’, as Wæver (2003) 
and Hansen (2000) have in fact noted. Furthermore, while Thierry Balzacq (2005) has 
emphasised the role of the audience as the primary aspect of securitisation processes, 
some critics emphasise that the role the ‘presumed’ general public as the audience of 
securitisation is not that prominent. 21 Alan Collins (2005) notes how authoritarian elites 
exert tight control on the dissemination of information. Similarly, Joseph Chinyong Liow 
(2006, 52, 57) argues that in authoritative political systems, authorities can “bull-doze” 
a securitisation discourse into the public domain without any open negotiation. Nicole J. 
Jackson’s (2006) observations from Central Asia concur with these views of audiences 
and securitisation in more authoritative systems.22
The problematic issue of assumed relevant audiences and political forums is also evi-
dent in Wilkinson’s (2007, 11-12) criticism that the CopS’s focus on identity privileges 
speech acts over other forms of communication. She argues that people may ‘securitise 
with their feet’ i.e., to migrate as a response to a perceived existential threat. Indeed, voic-
of securitisation acts.
It is also important to keep in mind that securitisation may be the means to achieve alternative agendas, that 
securitisation may itself be a facilitating condition for something else. It may be that audacious attacks on 
skyscrapers facilitate securitisation, and securitisation may facilitate something else. For example Huysmans 
(2006a, 128) argues that the politicisation of existential threats facilitates the introduction of laws that would 
otherwise be met with fierce resistance.
19  “Securitising move becomes securitisation only once an audience accepts it as such; securitisation can never 
be only imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25); “For individuals or groups to 
speak security does not guarantee success. Successful securitisation is not decided by the securitiser but by the 
audience of the security speech act. […] Thus, security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the 
objects nor with their subjects but among the subjects.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 31.)
20  The audience has been a difficult aspect for appliers doing case study research in Asia for example (Curley 
& Wong 2008b 8-9). Also Wæver (2003) has recognised the need for empirical studies on audiences in order to 
develop a more general and applicable formulation of audiences in the model.
21  The ‘democratic bias’ (see Chapter 6.3. below) of many applications and appliers of securitisation theory 
becomes very evident in criticisms of the theory that focus on the aspect of the audience (e.g., Balzacq 2005; 
Mak 2006;  Roe 2008). Balzacq (2010a, 67) goes so far as to suggest that a criterion for successful securitisation 
would be parliamentary action. This bias has resulted in several authors discussing the power of authorities in 
securitisation vis-à-vis ‘general publics’, as well as debate on whether or not publics have to be negotiated with 
by authorities or whether authorities can dominate public agendas and discursive spaces.
22  Hayes (2009, 982) also notes how the audiences that securitising actors face in autocracies are very different 
to democracies, and that this requires a very different language of securitisation.
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ing and disseminating security concerns may be very difficult for individuals or groups 
in non-democratic settings.23 However, this does not mean that a securitisation process 
could not take place also, for example, within a family. The question remains what is the 
relevant audience; not all securitisation discourses will be public on any level, ranging 
from the individual to at least the regional or even global level (it would, for example, not 
be hard to imagine the G8 or some other meeting of major powers containing macrose-
curitisation moves away from the limelight).24 For example, migration as an ‘emergency 
measure’ can be an indicator of a successful securitisation process on the level of, say, 
the family or clan. Civil strife may well contain a plethora of securitisation moves and 
successful acts. But since such local or private processes may never be publicised, we 
may never hear of these, and it is possible that no artefacts remain as evidence of their 
occurrence.
The general public is, then, not primarily important in terms of securitisation or secu-
rity action in any type of political order (cf., Emmers 2007). For example, Collins (2005) 
and Roe (2008) note how the UK parliament was more relevant than the general public in 
the case of the UK’s involvement in the Iraq war. Furthermore, some critics who have con-
sidered audiences in securitisation theory have emphasised that, even in single processes 
of securitisation, there can be various relevant audiences. J.L. Mak’s (2006) analysis of the 
‘partial success’ of securitising piracy in Malaysia and Singapore shows how the multiple 
relevant audiences he studied reacted in various ways to the securitisation moves of dif-
ferent actors.25 Mark. B. Salter (2008) also notes how securitisation speech can change 
in accordance with the audience, and with whether the discussion is happening at the 
‘front’ or ‘back stage’; a securitisation act may be deemed successful for a technocratic 
audience, yet fail for elite or popular audiences.26 Mak’s (2006), Salter’s (2008) and Roe’s 
(2008) analyses also reveal how a securitisation discourse can change shape, and how 
the practical policy applicability also fluctuates as the process develops.
The various strands of securitisation acts I formulate below may be used to compre-
hend the empirical observations on various audiences of even single securitising moves, 
as the strands can have various and parallel audiences. In my view, the strands provide a 
means to deal with the issue of multiple audiences within the abstract model of securi-
23  But as the fall of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deautschlands) in East Germany exemplifies, ‘people 
demanding the power back’ by claiming ‘we are the people’, demonstrates that the people do have the power to 
resist securitisation moves, even in non-democracies (cf., Wæver 1989b; 1995). Wilkinson (2007, 21) therefore 
misfires in arguing that this would or could not be considered through the CopS approach.
24   Buzan et al. (1998, 28): “Some security practices are not legitimised in public by security discourse because 
they are not out in the public at all (e.g., the ‘black programs’ in the United States, which are not presented in the 
budget), but this is actually a very clear case of security logic.”
25  Indeed, just as securitisation moves can have several audiences and several forms, an act of securitisation 
can also function on multiple levels either in terms of actors, referents, threats, or audiences. For example, the 
Singaporean terrorism discourse works on at least five levels of securitisation: the individual, institutional, 
state, the macro-, and the international level (Mak 2006, 88-90). Perhaps due to the complexity of the audiences 
and the threats, the securitisation was only partially successful and indirectly effective, as the target audiences 
did not take up the threat assessments and threat constructions of the securitising actors.
26  What is deemed acceptable, proper, or necessary may also change for even successful securitisation acts. 
The successful securitisation of the US war in Iraq may convince some to join the military, others to support 
the President, while for some it may merely mean acceptance of the war as legitimate. Still, it can also have the 
opposite effect in that some will oppose both the war and the securitisation of Iraq.
Salter (2008, 337) further points out how popular audiences of securitisation may not only accept securitisa-
tion, but also initiate the expansion of governmental power.
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tisation: the relevance of the different potential audiences of securitisation depends on 
the function(s) the securitisation act is intended to serve. Some acts of securitisation can 
serve as ‘system maintenance’ with a task to reproduce understandings of the self and 
other. Here the audience of securitisation would be quite general and encompassing. In 
other cases, for example in some tense crisis situations, the securitisation process may be 
restricted to inter-elite audiences and struggles.27 Just as with any rhetorical argument, 
the form that a security argument takes depends on which audience it is directed at (cf., 
Perelman 1996). Indeed, when we examine securitisation processes in various types of 
political orders, we soon realise that it is unhelpful to define the audience in the theory 
in a specific way, as audiences are dependent on the socio-historical situation. Who has 
to be convinced of the necessity of security action changes with the cultural and politi-
cal systems the securitisation occurs within: the audience could be the power elite, but 
it could also be a group of fundamentalists. What could be said within the model is that 
the audience has to be such that it has the ability to provide the securitising actor with 
whatever she is seeking to accomplish with the securitisation. In each empirical analysis, 
the specific audiences must be appropriately operationalised.
Furthermore, since the audience has a key role in the process of securitisation, my 
reasoning is that Balzacq’s (2005) criticism28 illustrates that there is a need to bring the 
audience into the theory in a more formal way. This can be achieved by expanding the 
categorisation of the felicity conditions of securitisation, to add a fourth condition viz. 4) 
conditions related to the audience of securitisation. In order to achieve successful securi-
tisation, the appropriate kind of audience has to be present i.e., different types of acts of 
securitisation will demand different types of audiences in order to be considered as ‘suc-
cessful’. Indeed, not all audiences will be amenable to achieve successful securitisation. 
Once such audiences have been identified, they could be further categorised according to 
how successful the securitisation has been: the audiences could, for instance, be divided 
into ‘believers’, ‘neutrals/indifferents’, and ‘non-believers’.29 Another dimension of suc-
27  For example Emmers (2003) argues that this has been the case in the securitisation of transnational crime 
in ASEAN. 
Haacke & Williams (2008) however contend that transnational crime beyond terrorism has in fact not been 
securitised in ASEAN.
28  Thierry Balzacq (2005; 2010a, 61) criticises Wæver’s approach of reducing securitisation to the acts of the 
speaker, to the illocutionary aspect of speech acts, and of not leaving any role for the audience of securitisation, 
for the perlocutionary effects of securitisation. Balzacq (2005, 172-173; 2010a, 63-65) subsequently argues 
that securitisation is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, 
a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience and 
the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction. According to him, the speech act approach 
overlooks the external context, the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience and neglects the differential 
power relations between the speaker and the audience. Furthermore, Balzacq views the speech act approach as 
too formalistic, as reducing security to a conventional procedure like marriage or betting. For him, the meaning 
of actions in world politics is not always determined by the conventional rules governing speech acts. Using 
Habermasian (1979) universal pragmatics, or universal rules underlying communicative action, is not enough 
for students of IR who should focus on discursive politics of security. Security should instead, in Balzacq’s view, 
be seen as a strategic purpose of the securitising actor to “swing” the audience’s support towards a policy or 
course of action, in a certain social context and field of power struggles.
Balzacq repeats the problem to only focus on securitisation as a means to legitimise future acts of the securitis-
ing actor, which has also been criticised by Wilkinson (2007), and already addressed in Vuori (2003) in addition 
to the approach presented here. Balzacq’s critique vis-à-vis the context of securitisation shall be returned to in 
Chapter 6.2.3.




cess here could be the depth of success. For example, is the acceptance of a securitising 
move superficial, or does it have a fundamental effect in terms of e.g., world views.
Partly due to the ‘success’ (Knudsen 2001) of the concept of securitisation, the approach 
has attracted a variety of criticisms. What has been especially worrisome for some critics 
has been the focus on the speech act of securitisation. Their concern is that a linguis-
tic emphasis excludes other relevant aspects of the ‘field of security’ from the analysis 
(e.g., ‘securitisation’ with feet [Wilkinson 2007]). Some propose that, for example, silence 
(Hansen 2000), contexts and audiences (Balzacq 2005), images and bodies (Hansen 
2000; Williams 2003; McDonald 2008a), and the practices of security professionals (Bigo 
2002) should be taken into account more elaborately by the framework.30 A focus on 
elites also concerns some (Huysmans 1998b; Williams 2003) as the focus on decisions to 
securitise can lead to Schmittian decisionism ‘at the limit’, with all the negative politics 
ascribed such an understanding of the ‘political.’
The wide remit of the concept of securitisation testifies to the utility of the approach, 
although it has been understood by both critics and appliers in a great number of differ-
ent ways. Wæver (2003, 16-17)  celebrates the variety in the ways actual studies have 
applied the concept, but some critics see the incoherence of the applications as a problem 
that effectively denies the comparison of accumulated results (see for example Stritzel 
2007). Indeed, it is precisely the wide variety of interpretations and applications of the 
concept of securitisation that has been one of the prime motivations behind the present 
study.
All in all, although the great variety of studies conducted within the Securitisation 
Studies research programme is to be celebrated, the differences between various ap-
proaches may disperse the programme too much, and may result in communication dif-
ficulties among scholars who disagree on concepts and methods.31 However, in my view, 
the explicated and subsequently more elaborate taxonomy of securitisation acts that I 
introduce below makes possible the incorporation of most of the ‘anomalies’ identified 
by various critics within the basic model of securitisation, by increasing its extension 
(see Figure 7 in Chapter 6.4.). All too often, approaches that are complementary to one 
another are seen as mutually exclusive.32 Various methods and methodologies may sup-
port each other to study empirical phenomena; but to make an argument for one set of 
methods is not to necessarily dismiss others which indicate different types of enquiries. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the theory of securitisation is not a theory of eve-
rything, not even everything pertaining to security and its academic study.33
30  This criticism echoes a similar discussion of ’bringing practice back in’ to general IR theorising (Bigo 2000; 
Neumann 2002); there are calls for a return to practices, that is, a return to traditional sociology from the 
linguistic turn.
31  This problem has been commented on as ‘overly enthusiastic yet unsystematic appliers’ of the framework 
creating more confusion. 
32  Michael C. Williams (1999, 343) has pointed out the tendency of creating clearly opposing analytical 
positions in security studies. He has similarly argued that the division between realist and constructivist 
approaches to international relations theory is artificial, as many of the approaches share common intellectual 
roots with ‘wilful realism’ (Williams 2005). This opposing positioning is misleading, and according to Williams 
based on the reification of social sciences and the forgetting of the historicity of the understandings of humanity 
that theories of rational choice are based on. One of the c.a.s.e. collective’s purposes has been to mitigate this 
tendency, and not divide critically slanted security studies into opposite camps.
33  Indeed, as Mundle (1970, 274) notes, a theory may be used to explain something without explaining every-
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6.1. Desecuritisation: Function and Tactics
Ironically, even though the normative goal of securitisation studies is the negative cor-
ollary of securitisation, namely desecuritisation, the majority of theoretical debate and 
empirical study has focused on securitisation.34 Indeed, desecuritisation has remained 
under-theorised (Aradau 2003). For the CopS, whilst securitisation raises issues into 
the realm of security policies and practices, desecuritisation lowers issues back into the 
realm of ‘regular politics’ or removes issues from the political agenda altogether. Desecu-
ritisation has largely been understood in terms of deconstructing collective identities in 
situations where relations between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ are constituted by existential 
threats (Roe 2004, 280); i.e., they are securitised. Such a position has been criticised to 
represent and reinforce a realist view of security (e.g., McDonald 2008a, 579–580). From 
this critical viewpoint, ‘security as emancipation’ (e.g., Booth 2005) would be preferable 
to the negativity of security bound to threats that Buzan et al. (1998) highlight. Indeed, 
for Wæver (1995), desecuritisation is a process by which security issues lose their ‘secu-
rityness’, and are no longer restrictive by nature. He has outlined three options for this: 
1) simply not to talk about issues in terms of security, 2) to keep responses to securitised 
issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and 3) to 
move security issues back into ‘normal politics’ (Wæver 2000a, 253).35
As already noted, an analyst of securitisation or security cannot make judgements on 
whether threats are ‘real’ as this would require an objective measure of security, which 
no security theory has been able to provide (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). The analyst of secu-
rity may however assess whether a security reality is more conducive to the solution of 
a political problem as compared to a situation with no security aspect. Wæver (1995) 
emphasises that often a non-security reality would be normatively preferable to a secu-
rity reality. ‘Asecurity’ or ‘non-security’ should however not be confused with insecurity: 
security is a situation where there is a threat with measures against it, whereas insecu-
rity is a situation where there is a threat and no certain measures to counteract it (see 
Figure 5 for the structural relations of difference of these concepts).36 What is desirable 
is desecuritisation, which leads back to asecurity or non-security, a situation where there 
is no threat, and thus no need for restrictive measures.
Claudia Aradau (2001) has noted that even desecuritisation is not without its own eth-
thing. Similarly, the point of theory is to deal with relevant empirical facts. Scientific theories do not make sense 
if they remain purely a priori.
34  This mirrors the pattern of peace and conflict studies, where the vast majority of studies are on conflicts and 
war, and not so much about peace.
35  These are in tune with Wæver’s (1999, 334; see also CASE 2006, 474) suggestions of what a scholar can 
actively do as regards the normative goals of the CopS: scholars can put ethical questions “at the feet of analysts, 
decision-makers and political activists alike: why do you call this a security issue? What are the implications 
of doing this – or not doing it?” Concerning desecuritisation, the analyst can 1) stop speaking about particular 
threats and hope that this contributes to a desecuritisation process by avoiding the adoption of the agenda of a 
securitising actor, 2) divert attention to other threats, and the analyst can 3) contribute to a different interpreta-
tion of the threat being securitised (Buzan et al. 1998, 34-35, 204-206). While an analyst cannot say whether 
something is ‘really’ a threat (in the sense of this claim being an ‘objective scientific result’; of course, like 
anyone else, analysts can make political/practical claims of the realness of threats), the analyst may comment 
on the desirability or possible effectiveness of dealing with a claimed threat with a security logic.
36  “’Security’ signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measures taken 
in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and  no response. […] When there is no security 
problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security.” (Wæver 1995, 56.)
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ical problems. The absence of securitisation processes is not straightforwardly positive, if 
threats are replaced by probabilistic risks. In her view, this could lead to the diminishing 
of individual freedom, as individuals would be categorised as risks, by merely exhibiting 
attributes that belong to authorities’ risk calculations. This argument can be expanded 
onto the international level. For example, US rhetoric on rogue states, or the Blair ad-
ministration’s emphasis on failed states, might be considered relevant in this context (cf., 
Abrahamsen 2005). However, while Aradau (2001; 2003; 2004) focuses on the norma-
tive and theory-of-politics aspect of desecuritisation, the discussion on desecuritisation 
here concentrates on the termination of institutional facts and on how desecuritisation 
can work as a political tactic in the political ‘games’ of securitisation. The construction 
of security issues is a very useful and powerful political tool for power-holders, yet even 
this political move can be contested and resisted: desecuritisation can be viewed as a 
counter-strategy or counter-move to securitisation.
6.1.1. Desecuritisation as a Termination of Social Facts
In contrast to the approach taken to desecuritisation here, Andreas Behnke (2006, 65) 
views desecuritisation as necessarily a ‘withering away’: explicit debate on whether 
something no longer is a security issue retains the logic and possibility of securitisation. 
For Behnke, desecuritisation cannot be a speech act which affirms a new status for an 
issue but it rather can only occur through lack of speech.37 However, a problem with tak-
ing silence as equating desecuritisation, is that silence does not necessarily entail that a 
matter has lost its aspect of securityness, or that there are no threats (see discussion on 
silence and the three ‘(t)ions’ in Chapter 6.2.). Indeed, not speaking about security may 
not be as unproblematic and positive as Wæver’s and Behnke’s positions suggest. On the 
one hand, silence may mean that there is no possibility to voice security arguments even 
though that might be prudent and legitimate. Lene Hansen (2000) has exemplified this 
through the example of ‘honour killings’ of Pakistani women remaining a silent secu-
rity issue. On the other hand, silence may also mean that security measures have been 
37  A problem with this understanding is that everything has a potential of being securitised, whether an issue’s 
desecuritisation is being debated or not (Buzan et al. 1998).
Figure 5: The Structural Relations of Difference of Insecurity, Security, and Non-security
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successful: there is no longer a need to maintain the security reality of an issue very 
‘loudly’, as the threat has been secured and is now silent; thus, silence may be the effect 
of successful securitisation e.g., the result of government suppression.38 Silence may also 
indicate that an issue is institutionally so thoroughly securitised that it no longer needs 
to be voiced in particular situations; security may have become the dominant logic in a 
field of practice.
Thus, whilst I shall reason below that security action cannot be a sufficient or a nec-
essary criterion for successful securitisation, here I contend that silence, or the lack of 
securitisation speech, cannot be a sufficient criterion for the success of desecuritisation: 
there can be security action with or without securitisation (and securitisation without 
security action) and there can be silence with or without desecuritisation. I also contend 
that explicit speech acts can function as desecuritisation moves: whether or not an issue 
is successfully desecuritised may perhaps depend on a ‘withering away’ of the securitised 
issue, but this withering away may begin with active moves.39 Here it is useful to refer to 
Jef Huysmans (1995, 65-67), who has proposed three approaches for desecuritisation 
strategies: 1) the objectivist strategy, 2) the constructivist strategy, and 3) the deconstruc-
tivist strategy.40 The objectivist strategy is premised on a traditional objective-subjective 
understanding of security: that is, security has an objective content, while subjective no-
tions of this are either real or illusory. A person intent on desecuritising a matter with an 
objectivist argument, would thus claim that the matter in question is not really a security 
problem. Just as with securitisation, this type of securitisation strategy can be considered 
a speech act, and it also has felicity conditions related to the socio-political capital of the 
enunciator of the argument, the threat and the audience.
Similarly to Huysmans (1995), Jaap de Wilde (2008, 597) sees various ways out of a 
securitised situation. For him, there can be desecuritising actors who evade, circumvent, 
or directly oppose securitising moves by, for example, emphasising competing threats. 
While de Wilde argues that security policies aim at desecuritisation (the solution to the 
threatening situation), for him, desecuritisation can also happen independently from the 
actions of securitising or desecuritising actors. Ways out of the securitised situation then 
include the solution to the problem, institutional adaptation in the form of new repro-
ductive structures, changes in discourse (e.g., loss of interest or audiences), and the loss 
of the referent object. For de Wilde (2008), securitised issues can either wither away, or 
they can be actively desecuritised.
38  See Roe (2004; 2006) and Jutila (2006) for a debate on whether the desecuritisation of minority rights is 
logically possible or not.
39  While not explicit on what would entail a desecuritisation move, Collins (2005, 582) identifies desecuritisa-
tion moves in the contested process of securitising Chinese education in Malaysia 2002. Unlike in 1987, in 2002 
the process remained within the limits of ’regular’ politics, i.e., the Internal Security Act or the Sedition Act were 
not applied to the situation.
40  The discussion here is closest to Huysmans’s objectivist strategy of desecuritisation. The other two strate-
gies may be more in tune with Behnke’s argument. Indeed, the aim of the constructivist strategy of desecuritisa-
tion is not to determine whether something is really a threat or not, the idea is rather to understand how the 
process of securitisation operates (Huysmans 1995, 66). Before the securitisation process can be handled, its 
causal processes have to be understood. The focus is on understanding how some issues end up within security 
discourses and policies. While the constructivist strategy examines the ‘security drama’ from without, the 
deconstructivist strategy looks out of the security drama from within. (Ibid., 67.) The deconstructive desecuri-
tiser tells a story of the ‘security problem’ in a way that does not recount the security drama. The threat or issue 
is presented as having identities beyond security threats.
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The question of whether desecuritisation is a matter of withering away and depends 
on silence, or whether it can, or even has to, be an active performative action is an issue, in 
Searle’s (1995, 106) terms, of the termination of institutional facts: here desecuritisation 
is seen as terminating the institutional fact of a securitised issue. In Searle’s view, when a 
conventional power is destroyed, the negation operates on the collective acceptance and 
not on the content of the acceptance. In terms of securitisation, this means that an ‘act of 
desecuritisation’ would translate as ‘we no longer accept (X is an existential threat to Y)’. 
Josef Moural (2002, 283-284) however argues that Searle’s formula would not allow the 
distinction between a formal termination of a social institution and a collapse of a social 
institution (e.g., as in the difference between a divorce and the collapse of marriage ac-
ceptance). ‘An act of desecuritisation’ would therefore perhaps be better phrased as ‘we 
accept (X is no longer an existential threat to Y)’.
A good practical example of these two different ways of understanding desecuritisa-
tion as a termination of institutional facts from an eroding totalitarian socialist setting, 
are the failed securitisation moves of the Socialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
(SED) in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989, also used as an example of 
desecuritisation by Wæver (1995).  As Steven Pfaff (1996) has shown, the revolution in 
the GDR was conducted under the slogan ‘We Are the People’ (Wir sind das Volk) which 
the protestors framed as their collective identity to thwart the prospect of a ‘Chinese so-
lution’ to the demonstrations (see Case III below). The ruling party, the SED, attempted 
to frame the demonstrators as counter-revolutionaries, but failed and finally had to cede 
power. Wæver (1989b; 1995) has emphasised that the fall of the SED was, inter alia, due 
to the failure of the ruling party’s securitisation moves.41
In a way, by stating ‘we are the people’ and resisting the securitisation of the ‘West’ 
by the authorities,42 the protestors made the statement ‘we no longer accept (X is an 
existential threat to Y)’ i.e., the protestors no longer accepted that the ‘West’ was an ex-
istential threat to the people of the GDR. As the authorities gave way, and conceded to 
the slogans on the streets, they, in a way, made the implicit statement ‘we accept (X is no 
longer an existential threat to Y)’ i.e., the SED authorities accepted that the ‘West’ was no 
longer an existential threat to the people of the GDR. The protestors made explicit moves 
towards dismantling the social institution of a securitised ‘West’, which the authorities 
eventually accepted. The authorities no longer maintained the securitisation of the ‘West’ 
and the threat label withered away i.e., it was desecuritised.
The question then is about whether security is an institutional fact that needs 
maintenance:43 so, extending the nuptial analogy, is securitisation like a wedding (once it 
is done you do not have to care about it) or is it like a marriage that needs maintenance?44 
41  The majority of the mobilised security units and the protestors being from Leipzig, and in some cases family 
members, quite likely affected the dynamic to not resort to the use of force. In China, the military units that were 
deployed to take over Tiananmen Square were from other military regions, as some commanding officers had 
refused to obey the orders to deploy to Beijing (see Case III below).
42  They were also resisting the securitisation of the protests. This is quite evident in the shouts of “wir sind 
keine Raudis” and “wir sind das Volk”, as well as the singing of the International by the protesters in Leipzig on 
the Ninth of October 1989.
43  Searle (1995, 43): as long as people continue to recognise the X as having the status function of Y, the insti-
tutional fact is maintained.
44  Securitisation for legitimating past acts (see Chapter 6.3.2.5.) indeed seems to be one means to maintain a 
security status for an issue.
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In the case of desecuritisation: is it a divorce, or is it a collapse of a marriage (a formal 
procedure, a shared disbelief in the continued existence of the marriage, or a lack of belief 
in a wedding having taken place)?45
6.1.2. Desecuritisation as a Political Tactic
Beyond the kind of philosophical or ontological issues discussed above, desecuritisation 
can be viewed as a ‘play’ in a politician’s or activist’s ‘playbook.’ Desecuritisation can be 
viewed as a political tactic that can be deployed before or after securitisation moves have 
been put into play. My argument here is that, especially in non-democratic settings such 
as the PRC, securitisation and desecuritisation provide a logic that legitimises suppres-
sion and resistance respectively, and that the vocabulary of both of these is drawn from 
the resonant values, myths, laws, and proclamations of the authorities. In such contexts, 
desecuritisation works towards contesting securitisation moves, or towards resisting se-
curitisation that has already occurred. These could be the tactics of the ‘targets’ or the 
‘threat’ identified in the securitisation discourse. In addition to securitising actors and 
the targets of securitisation articulating desecuritisation moves, desecuritisation could, 
however, also work as a political tactic for actors that are neither the original securitiser, 
nor the target being securitised.46 Overt desecuritisation moves may, for example, be pru-
dent political moves in situations where they are not a form of resistance, but attempts at 
‘riding the tide’ of public opinion. 
Indeed, overt desecuritisation moves may be necessary politically: ‘public opinion’ 
may be against some issue being dealt with under the label ‘security’, and in these types 
of situations successful politicians may want to ride this ‘tide’ and somehow acknowledge 
mistakes in previous assessments, go against the assessments of political opponents, or 
claim that the situation requiring securitisation has changed. While silence on the issue 
may be the final guarantor of desecuritisation, explicit desecuritisation moves may be 
politically prudent or even necessary.
In situations where desecuritisation works against constituted security issues, formal 
authority to dismantle such issues is of major importance. However, while the success 
of desecuritisation may depend on actors with sufficient formal or other socio-political 
capital to perform or promote desecuritisation, desecuritisation moves may also be ar-
ticulated by actors who do not have the sufficient socio-political capital to bring desecu-
ritisation about of their own means. This is often the case with social movements, which 
have to reappropriate concepts, principles and slogans in order to utilise the symbolic 
capital of authorities. The redeployment of the language of officials or ‘professionals’ is 
45  This analogy may enlighten what the Barack Obama administration has been debating regarding the question 
of whether ‘waterboarding’ and other ‘harsh’ interrogation methods were legal or illegal in 2009-2010. Inter-
rogators using these methods were under the belief that they had the right to use ‘extraordinary measures’, 
they believed that the securitisation of terrorism was in effect in legitimating these procedures. The Obama 
administration seems to be retracting the right to use torture as an ‘extraordinary measure’; in a way not 
recognising that these methods would be justified even when terrorism in general is securitised. For the Obama 
administration, it could be reasoned, the marriage did not actually take place even though everyone present at 
the reception thought it did. For how the breadth of practical applications of securitisations can fluctuate, see 
Bendrath et al. (2007) and Salter (2008).
46  Aradau (2003, 20) has a concern with the agents of desecuritisation being the same as the agents of securiti-
sation: the desecuritising agents should not only come from within the ‘self ’ that securitised the issue, but also 
from the previously silenced ‘other.’
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an important means of resistance for many social movements.
Indeed, the question of ‘who’ or ‘what’ can securitise issues is one of the key issues or 
questions that has driven Securitisation Studies. I however, wish to suggest that of equal 
interest should also be the question of ‘who’ or ‘what’ can contest or resist securitisation, 
and how this contestation or resistance can be manifested. I address such issues here in 
the context of the PRC, by consideration of the role of identity frames and imputations to 
legitimise both social mobilisation and its suppression. After this, I will also discuss the 
possibility of ‘pre-emptive desecuritisation’ as a political tactic.
6.1.2.1. Desecuritisation and the Justification of Resistance
Desecuritisation is viewed here as a means of contestation and resistance. Resistance47 
is seen here as emerging in the tension between contending projects/visions/practices, 
and thereby, taking on many forms. Accordingly, the focus here is on instances where se-
curitisation is contested by ‘public actors’, or actors with formal authority, and resisted by 
actors who do not have formal authority.48 Such contests of securitisation and desecuriti-
sation moves are viewed here as though moves in a game. This kind of an approach allows 
for the omission of questions of sincerity and intentionality, which chimes with Foucault’s 
critique of the modern subject49 (Mitchell 1990; CASE forthcoming): the moves manifest 
and can be detected regardless of whether the ‘subject’ exists within or without them, or 
whether the subject can ‘own’ the moves or not. 
As Scott (1987) emphasises, who resists, what, and how are important aspects of re-
sistance.50 All of these aspects are similar to the relevant aspects of securitisation, on 
the issue of who is speaking e.g., in the name of what or whom is security being spoken 
(Wæver et al. 1993). Securitising actors and contesters or resisters of securitisation can 
be on various social levels, and the power to securitise or contest securitisation may be 
47  Resistance studies have established a network of scholars working on similar themes. See http://resist-
ancestudies.org/
Concepts of resistance variously incorporate other notions, such as ‘disguised resistance’, ‘critical resistance’, 
‘off-kilter resistance’, and ‘civil resistance.’ Close fields such as social movement studies, terrorism studies, and 
subaltern studies have concepts with different but similar connotations e.g., ‘contention’, ‘protest’, ‘power strug-
gle’, ‘revolution’, and ‘mimicry.’
Scott (1987; 1990) are classic, formative studies of resistance. See also Veivo (2007) and CASE (forthcoming) 
for various notions of resistance.
48  Cf., de Wilde’s (2008, 596) distinction between private and public securitising/desecuritising actors.
49  If Foucault’s idea of the individual as a ‘relay’ of power is followed and power is viewed as productive, then 
the modern subject of power (or the subject of modern power) has historically been produced, which then also 
reproduces the fundamental mechanisms of power. The same form of power that exists at all levels, including 
“state to family, from prince to father, from the tribunal to the small change of everyday punishments from the 
agencies of social domination to the structures that constitute the subject himself” (Foucault 1979b, 84-85).
50  Scott’s (1987) typology leads to six types of resistance, viz.: Resistance exists in public as public declared 
resistance (e.g., open revolts, petitions, demonstrations, land invasions) against material domination, as asser-
tions of worth or desecration of status symbols against status domination, and as counter-ideologies against 
ideological domination; resistance exists in disguised forms (e.g., low profile, undisclosed, or ‘infra-politics’) 
as ‘everyday resistance’ (e.g., poaching, squatting, desertion, evasion, foot-dragging), or direct resistance 
by disguised resisters against material domination,  as hidden transcripts of anger or disguised discourses 
of dignity against status domination, and as  dissident subcultures (e.g., millennial religion, myths of social 
banditry, class heroes) against ideological domination.
See also Certeau (1988) on forms of ‘everyday resistance.’
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dispersed even on a single level.51 While securitisation and its contestation are viewed 
here as moves in a game, it is important to note that both securitisation and its contesta-
tion can be unintentional, and that both can have unintended consequences. Just as in the 
general ‘security dilemma’, securitising and desecuritising actors have to deal with the 
ambiguity of their speech acts and actions.
The plurality of power and resistance must be kept in mind when resistance and sup-
pression is considered: civil society is often understood as being a more authentic site of 
social organisation, and also as being an opposing force to the state i.e., an authentic site 
of resistance.52 But civil society can also be a site of conservatism, and civil society can 
be co-opted by the state, as is frequently the case in East Asia in general, and in China in 
particular (Callahan 2006, 99, 109).53  One should thus not see the relationship between 
the state and civil society as a binary position, for neither the state nor civil society is 
monolithic: scholars should not surrender to the ‘Westphalean straitjacket’ (Buzan & Lit-
tle 2001; Wilkinson 2007). In the context of East Asia it may actually be more helpful to 
consider New Social Movements (the emphasis being on the plural) rather than a singu-
lar civil society, as based on European assumptions of social organisation (Callahan 2006, 
117, 122).
European orientalised assumptions of Asia often envision collectivism of a monolithic 
character, especially in the Chinese case. But even the claimed essence of Chineseness 
of such visions i.e., Confucianism, can be used to highlight the plurality of forms of gov-
ernmentality, even in China. The Great Learning is explicit in the presentation of vari-
ous forms of governance and it transgresses the binary of the state and civil society thus 
making the individual, civil society and the state codeterminous and mutually entailing 
(Callahan 2006, 107). Governmentality54 joins the personal, the familial, communal, po-
litical, and cosmic in a Chinese articulation of pastoral politics, which diffuses power that 
emanates from many nodes.55 Confucianism resembles the pastoral power identified by 
Foucault (2007) in that it also repeats the diagrams of power on various levels.
The juridical power of the sovereign attempts to demarcate the power of the ‘prince’ 
and any other form of power. While disciplinary power also draws lines, or rather is a 
practice of limitation and exclusion, it goes beyond the power of the sovereign and mani-
fests itself in a variety of practices (Foucault 1979a; 2007). Just as different geometries or 
diagrams of power create different positions of dominance, they create different forms of 
resistance as well. Resistance is never in a position of complete exteriority in relation to 
51  Foucault (1979b, 85) puts power into perspective consisting of  (a) a commanding head or ruler, and (b) the 
obedient subject: “the formal homogeneity of power in these various instances corresponds to the general form 
of submission in the one who is constrained by it – whether the individual in question is the subject opposite 
the monarch, the citizen opposite the state, the child opposite the parent, or the disciple opposite the master. A 
legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other.” 
52  Cf., discussion of authenticity in respect of the state and its ‘creation’ in Chapter 6.2.4.
53  For example NGOs are more often than not government organised NGOs in China.
54  Governmentality in the form of biopolitics is also drastically apparent in China’s population policies. See 
Greenhalgh & Winckler (2005).
55  The Confucian dictum君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子 (jūn jūn, chén chén, fù fù, zǐ zǐ) is illustrative here: ‘A sovereign 
is a sovereign, an official is an official, a father is a father, and a son is a son’ presents the various positions of 
dominance, and while the dictum suggests that these are not the same things, and that they should not be 
changed (i.e., one should not think the one can be like the other, and one should take this as being a good thing) 
(Wierzbicka 1991, 426-427), the relationships also show how the diagram of power, in a Foucauldian sense, is 
reproduced on various levels.
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power. There is no single locus of ‘great refusal’, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, 
or pure law of the revolutionary. Just as there is a plurality of techniques of government, 
there is a plurality of resistances to them. As William A. Callahan (2006, 108) notes: “The 
relation between power and resistance is not clean or pure, but sticky.”
The possibilities and means of resistance, together with the use of identities in the 
mobilisation of protest has been extensively covered in some of the research on protest 
and social mobilisation on the Chinese mainland.  For example, in Gries & Rosen (1994) 
and Perry & Selden (2003a), various authors deal with the question of the legitimacy of 
the contemporary CCP and the legitimisation of protest against it. Vivienne Shue (1994) 
argues that the manner in which the Communist regime has legitimised itself offers a 
‘grammar of protest’ to activists who can similarly use it to legitimise their protest. Patri-
cia Thornton (1994) notes how the type of legitimisation speech that authorities direct 
at different social groups (such as workers, peasants and students) is important, as those 
groups are likely to seize these group-specific legitimisations and use them to their own 
benefit. Thornton (2002; 2003) also discusses the importance of the Internet as a space 
of resistance for ‘cyber-cults’56 like the FLG. Kevin J. O’Brien (1996; see also 1994) has 
developed the term ‘rightful resistance’ to describe the nature of typical low-key protest 
in contemporary China, whereby protestors usually draw on various existing sources of 
legitimisation for their protest, such as the legal code, CCP proclamations, social values 
and moral codes, that they hope will help to deflect repressive actions taken by the au-
thorities.57
The opportunities for contestation and resistance are influenced by the forms of sup-
pression authorities range against them. Comparative studies of social movements have 
demonstrated how various forms of policing influence protest behaviour (Porta 1996). 
The securitisation of social movements or activities is also a form of suppression: us-
ing soft forms of suppression e.g., labelling then increases the likelihood of subsequent 
hard repression, as it lowers its costs both by intimidation of protestors and justifica-
tion of violence, and may thus eventually ‘up the ante’ on both sides of the struggle.58 
56  FLG is not the only online ‘problem’ for Chinese authorities: Xinjiang and Tibet activists in addition to 
democracy dissidents also operate online in order to garner both domestic and international support and 
attention. However, the effect of this ‘online dissidence’ or ‘cyber-separatism’ is difficult to gauge. Wayne (2008, 
104) notes that for example in the case of exiled Xinjiang activists, exaggeration and inaccuracy is prevalent in 
foreign statements which has resulted in the creation of a wedge between local populations and outside dissi-
dents. Similarly, Millward (2004) and Bovigndon (2004), argue that while Uyghur organisations and groups 
outside China have provided international visibility, evidence of any actual influence on Xinjiang politics, seem 
scant notwithstanding some Uyghur leaders’ boasts and Chinese authorities’ claims. Regardless of its effective-
ness vis-à-vis its target audiences, this online activity thereby provides a degree of plausibility for the Chinese 
authorities claims of ‘anti-China forces operating both within and outside China.’
57  In autocratic settings of domination, resistance may also take forms beyond mass mobilisation; discursive 
or symbolic resistance may be more effective in these circumstances. For example, Thornton (2002) discusses 
metonymical resistance even in spaces like doorways and the body. In a more public setting, Elin Sæther (2008) 
has studied the conditional autonomy of critical journalism in China by examining the opportunities journalists 
may have to present ‘hidden transcripts’ or challenge the hegemonic discourses present in the media.
58  Repression is understood here as “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective 
action” (Tilly 1978, 100). These actions that raise the contender’s costs, can further be divided into hard and soft 
forms. Myra Marx Ferree (2005) argues that states engage in hard repression through use of force, and in soft 
repression when they try to limit and ‘exclude ideas and identities from the public forum’ in nonviolent ways. 
Such soft repression is specifically directed against movements’ collective identities and ideas that support 
‘cognitive liberation’ or ‘oppositional consciousnesses.’ In non-democratic systems like China, the use of soft 
repression (e.g., labelling) is an integral part of hard repression (e.g., sending dissidents to labour camps).  Both 
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Thereby, securitisation arguments can, for example, be used for deterrence: they can sug-
gest that acquiescence would be preferable to the continuation of the securitised activity. 
Once these types of securitisation moves appear in the media, for example, they often 
become the natural focus of refutation and thereby also to protest legitimisation. This 
forces those engaged in the securitised activities to discuss their own protest/movement 
and its objectives among themselves and vis-à-vis their audiences in terms that will, it 
is hoped, render the suppression ineffective, and mobilise popular support to give the 
protest a sense of common cause.  Indeed, it can be argued that in non-democratic states 
most of this type of ‘identity talk’59 by protest movements is produced under either soft 
or hard forms of repression. Which words and symbols are used to characterise an issue 
has great importance for how it is understood, regarded, and responded to. Meaning does 
not only imply what is at issue, but also what is to be done about the issue in question 
(Schön & Rein 1994, 29). 
As Williams (2007c, 69-70) notes, identity narratives are not private constructions but 
social and relational. Narrative resources available to an actor are historically and socially 
constructed and contained, and depend on recognition and acquiescence by others. Mere 
identity imputations or avowals are insufficient as they must also be acknowledged by 
others as legitimate. As such, the frames through which social movements are presented 
can have significant effects, and the frame of national security is a powerful one in China. 
To be labelled a revisionist, a running dog of capitalism, or a counter-revolutionary has 
had drastic consequences for the bearers of these labels (cf., Koselleck 2004b, 155-157). 
But if social activities are framed according to the set objectives of the authorities, the 
likelihood of their suppression will diminish. Even criticism against the authorities may 
be tolerable, if presented through the correct frame. For example, criticism of Chinese au-
thorities through a patriotic or nationalist frame is far more tolerated by state authorities 
than many other frames of critique.
It is indeed well established in studies on Chinese social mobilisation that the way 
the CCP legitimises its rule, is important for the ways in which the protestors in turn 
legitimise their collective actions in Mainland China. However, most studies of social mo-
bilisation and the securitisation of social movements have biases to them. Studies of se-
curitisation focus on legitimisation from the side of the authorities, while protest studies 
focus on legitimisation by the movements. Both literatures often overlook the interaction 
between the authorities and protestors on the level of both discourse and practice. 
The need to see protest legitimisation as a result of an interaction becomes apparent in 
recollection of the fact that in post-totalitarian60 states such as China, social movements 
and protracted protests generally operate under some degree of repression, which itself 
is often also the primary motive for the activists to produce protective identity framings. 
While different actors with different identities are unequally equipped to engage in strug-
are used in unison, with soft repression preceding hard repression.
59  ‘Identity talk’ refers to processes whereby social movements’ identities are constructed and expressed 
through communication among the movement’s participants and with non-participants. It occurs, for example, 
when the activists explain the movement to others, recruit new members, proselytize their message by making 
public pronouncements, and engage in disputes and debates. Identities are also expressed in cultural materials, 
viz. names, narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, clothing etc. See for example Snow & McAdam (2000) and 
Polletta & Jasper (2001, 285).
60  For post-totalitarianism, see Havel (1992). For applications to analysis of Chinese politics, see Lai (2006) 
and Paltemaa & Vuori (2009).
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gles over social knowledge (Williams 2007c, 70), the structures of non-democratic politi-
cal orders are more rigid and uncompromising than those of democratic orders where 
the freedom of self-expression and identity formation is often considered to be a core 
value. In non-democratic orders, in accordance with O’Brien’s (1996) concept of rightful 
resistance, protestors/activists are usually compelled to frame their identities and goals 
in accordance with the stated goals of the political order. Even in the initial stages of col-
lective action, the knowledge of past protests and their means of suppression can guide 
activists in framing their movement’s collective identities and objectives in a pre-emptive 
manner.
As such, there is nothing new in the notion that social movements and authorities 
interact with each other on the level of identities that play a key role in mobilisation and 
repression. Indeed, the idea that the success or failure of social movements is largely 
dependent on the interaction between activists and authorities (the state) was made 
clear in the ‘political opportunity structure’ approach to social movements of Charles 
Tilly (1978).61 As such, this interaction also holds true on the level of identities. The state 
always engages in a ‘struggle over meanings’ with the movements, and this struggle in-
cludes identity avowals and imputations on both sides (Tarrow 1998, 22; Hunt et al. 1994, 
185-186). Furthermore, it has been noted that frames are not built from scratch but they 
usually employ ‘resonant ideas’ or the vernacular of ‘cognitive maps’ of societies.62 Ac-
cording to Doug McAdam (1994, 37-38), the central task in framing is to advocate a view 
that both legitimises and motivates protest activity, and its success is partly determined 
by the ‘cultural resonance’ of the frames which the activists draw on. Therefore, the audi-
ence of protests is seldom offered new, and thereby perhaps alien, ideas.63 Instead, mobi-
lisation draws on existing ideas which are applied creatively to the situation, something 
which is called ‘frame alignment’ (Snow & Benford 1988, 204).64 Chaïm Perelman (1996) 
refers to this phenomenon with the terms of ‘precontracts’ or ‘premises’; they form the 
self-evident starting-point for the argument that a political speaker makes to their audi-
ence, wherein the speaker attempts to fuse the obviousness of the shared undercurrent 
with the argument being presented. Such precontracts have ‘cultural resonance’ and thus 
make the movement and its identities appear natural and its message familiar (Gamson 
1988, 227). They can also evoke emotions that are needed to activate collective action 
(Tarrow 1998, 111).65
61  That movements’ identity frames also depend on the way outsiders frame movements, is also noted in the 
new social movement research, for example, by Rachel L. Einwohner (2002) and that identities are constructed 
also with strategic goals in mind, is noted by David L. Westby (2002). 
62  In Indonesia, the ideological success of the New Order was largely based on the success of equating its notion 
of political order with the traditional cultural concern of being ‘secure’ (Bubandt 2005, 284). The state order 
resonated with stability, harmony and safety, which were significant cultural ideas in many parts of Indonesia 
(Mulder 1998). 
63  Holger Stritzel (2007, 369-370) separates the socio-linguistic reservoir of analogies and contracts from the 
socio-political context of more sedimented structures and positions of power. If securitising actors are able to 
frame their discourse compatibly with existing linguistic reservoirs, and they have positional power, they are 
more likely to succeed in getting their ‘texts’ to be the dominant narrative.
64  Frank Pieke (1994) refers to what is basically the same phenomenon, through the concept of ‘recontextu-
alisation.’ 
65  In China, this has been observed, for example, in the way the CCP mobilised its revolutionary movement 




Ideologies are an especially salient source of frames and resonant ideas in totalitarian 
settings, and therefore can guide both individual and collective identities and actions. Ide-
ologies also provide a ready value base upon which social movements and their activists 
can construct their identities and legitimisation (Rokeach 1979; Warren 1990). As David 
Apter notes, ideologies do indeed ‘dignify discontent’66 but they also dignify repression, 
as ideology is also a tool to legitimise the totalitarian system itself (Guo 2000; Elo 2005). 
Totalitarian ideologies define the actions and policies of power-holders as correct and 
legitimate, as they work in accordance with and toward attaining the only permitted 
world-view and set goals of a totalitarian system. Having only one accepted ideology also 
legitimises the use of force to protect it. Thus, it follows that should a movement want to 
avoid repression, it must align its identity framings with that of the official ideology.
The construction of security issues is a significant political tool for power-holders. As 
Williams (2007c, 68-69) notes, legitimate identities are inextricably tied to roles, and to 
structures of power: identities, roles and forms of action are fundamental components 
of structures of social power. Accordingly, the capacity to claim identities, or to grant or 
deny them to others, is a major source of social power. Securitisation is a major technique 
by which to achieve precisely this, to imbue or deny certain identities, roles and forms 
of action. While this is the case, the political move of securitisation can also be resisted. 
Desecuritisation can be viewed here as a counter-strategy or counter-move to securitisa-
tion.
Thereby, in non-democratic settings, such as the PRC, securitisation and desecuritisa-
tion provide a possible logic to legitimise repression and resistance respectively, while the 
vocabulary of both of these is drawn from the resonant values, myths, laws and proclama-
tions of the authorities.  As an attempt to raise the cost of resistance, authorities resort to 
framing activists with identities that render them as a threat to certain referent objects 
which are usually some valuable goals of the regime. In contrast then, activists attempt 
to desecuritise their movement by invoking identities that are aligned with these same 
values and so frame their activities as conducive and not as threats to them. Although the 
construction of identities for a movement serves other important functions too (such as 
the mobilisation of popular support and providing the participants with a sense of be-
longing, commitment and legitimacy of collective action) (Gecas 2000, 95-100; Polletta & 
Jasper 2001), these functions are not mutually exclusive. An effective frame will satisfy all 
of them. The necessity to respond to the issue of security is, however, forced on activists 
and becomes a prime constraint on their identity framings.
The question of social capital (Bourdieu 1991) is also related to identity framing. It 
would seem that social movements, almost by definition, lack the socio-political capi-
tal needed to achieve desecuritisation, capital which the authorities have stored in their 
formal positions. The desecuritisation of the movement is nevertheless something that 
movements must try to effect when confronted with soft repression (denial of their iden-
tity frames by the authorities for example) in the form of securitisation (imputations of 
negative identities thereto).67 This is made possible by direct appeals to various audiences 
66  Quoted in Tarrow (1998, 21).
67  As Butler (2006, xix) notes, to charge those who hold critical views with negative labels such as treason, 
or counter-revolution, does not necessarily aim to question the credibility of the views held, but rather the 
credibility of those voicing them. Dissent is, at times, quelled by the prospect of receiving such negative social 
stigmata. Dissent may risk becoming banned, becoming abandoned between life and law (cf., Agamben 1998, 
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through the use of resonant collective and activist identities that carry moral authority 
and therefore endow their carriers with socio-political capital, such as popular support 
and approval. Furthermore, movements can also engage in the persuasion of leading au-
thority figures in the authoritarian polity, with the intent to effect their own definition 
of the movement as acceptable. Through the use of resonant collective and individual 
identities, activists can also attempt to utilise possible fissures among the authorities and 
prompt those they deem responsive, to use their socio-political capital to desecuritise the 
movement and thereby grant its activists the right of social activism.68
Should this desecuritisation strategy fail to remedy the situation, and as the costs of 
resistance increase, activists may turn to tactics which can be termed reverse-securiti-
sation and counter-securitisation. In a reverse-securitisation discourse, activists reflect 
back the security arguments of the authorities in the same terms i.e., the adversaries’ 
identities are framed in exactly the same terms as the movement was framed. In a way, 
activists will endeavour to present themselves as a ‘matched pair’ with the authorities, a 
status which could increase their socio-political capital if their move were to succeed.69 
Activists can however discard the vocabulary of the authorities, and instead turn to coun-
ter-securitisation, where the authorities are still securitised, but the identity frames used 
are not the same as those that the authorities use. Activists can turn to other reservoirs of 
cultural resonance prevalent in the wider society or to their own inner discourses.70
While securitisation and desecuritisation are powerful ‘moves’, it is good to keep in 
mind that just as securitisation is a specific type of media-frame among others (Vultee 
2010), securitisation/desecuritisation moves constitute one set of tactics among many 
in a suppressor’s or resister’s ‘playbook’. It is possible to suppress and to resist without 
securitisation/desecuritisation, but this would entail different costs than action with suc-
cessful securitisation/desecuritisation. From this point of view, processes of securitisa-
tion are a much smaller group of phenomena than processes of social mobilisation and 
its suppression in general. Social mobilisation and its suppression can be based on and 
achieved by a variety of tactics, yet the logic of security is one of the strongest among 
these moves.
6.1.2.2. Desecuritisation as a Pre-Emptive Move
As was already noted, social movements can use the language of desecuritisation in order 
to deflect securitisation moves, already even before they occur, or to resist them once 
they appear. Indeed, antagonistic sides of a conflict usually blame one another, and depict 
themselves as not constituting a threat. Desecuritisation can, however, also be a tactic in a 
‘cold’ conflict, or even before any specific conflict situation arises; desecuritisation can be 
used pre-emptively. This becomes evident when the foreign policy maxims of the PRC in 
28-29).
68  As O’Brien (1994, 105-122) notes, attempting to find political leaders or organisations sympathetic to the 
protestors’ cause is typical of contemporary protest in China, where protestors know that they need official 
sanction to succeed in their endeavour, and that they can utilise the differences between the various levels and 
organisations within the state.
69  This kind of reverse-securitisation was apparent in both the Democracy Wall Movement and the 1989 
Student Democracy Movement in China, see Paltemaa & Vuori (2006) and Case III below.
70  This has been evident in the case of Li Hongzhi and the Falungong, see Case IV below.
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the reform period are examined. Here, instead of viewing Chinese foreign policy maxims 
as a feature of some ‘strategic culture,’71 or strategic culture affecting or facilitating poli-
cies, these maxims are viewed as a tactic to avoid conflict, that is, a tactic of avoiding the 
threshold of securitisation.
For example, the Chinese foreign policy slogan of a ‘peaceful rise’72 of the 2000s seems 
to be a ‘pre-emptive desecuritisation move.’73 This slogan explicitly runs counter to what 
many theories and beliefs of international relations suggest about eventual conflicts with 
71  Alastair Iain Johnston (1995a; 1995b; 1996b; 1998; 1999; see also Burles & Shulsky 2000) disagrees with 
the ‘pacifist bias’ prevalent in both Chinese political rhetoric and research on Chinese strategic culture. He 
claims that the Chinese strategic culture is comparable to the ‘para bellum’ nature of strategic culture dominant 
in the ‘West.’ The PRC leadership has a ‘Mencian’, Realist world-view, which can be compared to French Gaullists 
and American Republican isolationists. Johnston argues that strategic cultures are not limited to nations, but 
that there are strategic cultures that span eras and nations. American and Chinese idealists share more in 
common than American Realists and Idealists for example. Zhang Shu Guang (1999, 29, 44) shares a similar 
view in stressing that the PRC’s strategic culture is rooted in the history of Chinese warfare. Matti Nojonen 
(2008) makes a similar argument.
However, most Chinese analysts (see for example Zhang T. 2002) reject Johnston’s concept of ‘Cultural Realism’ 
and argue that traditional Chinese strategic culture has been thoroughly influenced by Confucian non-violence 
and would be better termed ‘Cultural Moralism’, which refers to a prolonged practice of moralising and a persist-
ent emphasis on morality. However, the current Chinese strategic culture stresses material strength more than 
cultural and ideational preferences. Therefore it is expressed in the form ‘Defensive Realism’, which is based on 
‘active defence’ rather than the ‘passive or static defence’ of the imperial eras (Zhang T. 2002, 73, 87).
While Johnston strives towards positivist-type explanations (cf., Johnston 1999), including statistical data from 
conflict behaviour (cf., Johnston 1998), Chinese mainstream analysts (cf., Zhang T. 2002) seem to be following 
the line presented in official Chinese security documents and repeat the ‘common knowledge’ of Chinese strate-
gic behaviour, listing a host of ancient Chinese mottoes about ‘harmony’, ‘peace’, ‘benevolence’, and ‘kingly ways’ 
(Yong 1998, 325). Most Chinese analysts fail to incorporate a truly historical perspective into their conceptuali-
sations. Feng Huiyun (e.g., 2005) however has combined operational code analysis (Leites 1951; George 1969; 
Holsti 1970) with temporal contexts in his studies of the world views of Chinese foreign policy leaders. Feng 
argues that which ‘culture’ a decision-maker seems to apply, depends on the international situation e.g., how 
real a threat of war appears.
These conflicting views on Chinese strategic culture as either Cultural Realism or Defensive Realism, reflect 
the disparity between stated Chinese diplomatic objectives and the apparent realpolitik calculations that have 
driven most of China’s significant foreign and security policy adjustments. Chinese culture contains elements of 
both moralism and realism (Nathan & Ross 1997, 21). Incidentally, both are also elements of the Chinese classic 
The Three Kingdoms (Luo 1999), in that, while realist stratagems win battles, they cannot unify the kingdom.
While it is difficult to assess whether Chinese culture is more violent than most others, it seems at least to be 
not less violent than many; similarly, Chinese states have seldom been reluctant to use force in their defence 
(Harrell 1990, 1, 7). Foreign military conflicts which China has participated in include the Korean war (1950-
53), border-clashes with India (1962) and the Soviet Union (1969), a ’punitive’ war with Vietnam (1979), and 
island conflicts over the Paracels (1974) and Sprattlys (1988). In 1954-55 and 1958, China bombarded islands 
in the Taiwan-strait, and in 1995-1996 conducted missile tests next to Taiwan. These uses of force would seem 
to be at odds with Chinese claims for benevolence and non-violence. However, all of the conflicts have been 
interpreted in China as ‘foreign aggression’, which has then compelled the Chinese government to take resolute 
action. China has also supported the weaker party in 56 percent of the inter-state wars listed by the Corre-
lates of War Project, in accordance with its self-portrayal of ‘anti-hegemonism’ (Singer & Small 1994; see also 
Johnston 1998; Whiting 2001; Wang 2003).
72  See The Information Office (2005) for the White Paper ‘China’s Peaceful Development Road.’
China has had also other foreign policy maxims that emphasise aspects of peacefulness e.g., the ‘five principles 
of peaceful co-existence’, and China has proclaimed itself to be working towards a ‘multipolar world’, towards 
China’s ‘peaceful rise’, and most recently towards a ‘harmonious world.’
73  The peaceful rise maxim could also be seen as a rebuttal of the US China threat discourse (see e.g., Bernstein 
& Munro 1997, Timperlake & Triplett 1999, and Mosher 2000), which China has countered with a desecuritisa-
tion discourse (see e.g., Yee & Zhu 2000). The official maxim can be read as a pre-emptive move to avoid the 




rising powers.74 It can be read as a tactic aiming to keep China off the acute security agen-
da of concerned states; the principle of ‘peaceful rise’ pre-emptively argues that China is 
not a threat to other states’ security, although China’s ‘comprehensive national strength’, 
consisting of economic, political and military elements, and China’s capabilities of pro-
jecting it even militarily, are increasing. Desecuritisation may then not only be about the 
termination of an institutional fact, but a move directed at the prevention of the construc-
tion, or solidification of an institutional fact.75
This dynamic also seems to be at work in China’s positions on the issues of Chinese 
migration to Russia’s Far East being securitised in Russia as part of the ‘China threat’76 
(see e.g., Lukin 2000 and Wishnick 2008) and the securitisation of human smuggling 
across the Taiwan Strait (Chin 2008).77 Whilst Russian politicians speak security at home 
and cooperation in China,78 Wishnick (2008, 84) identifies the Chinese position on the 
issue of Chinese migration to Russia as being consistently one of desecuritisation: for 
Chinese officials, the issue of migration is an economic and administrative issue, not an 
issue of security.79 She (ibid., 96) argues that this kind of asymmetric position may lead 
to increased tension: even while the Russian side has not implemented drastic measures, 
but merely incrementally made Chinese immigration more difficult, the Chinese desecu-
ritisation stance may signal a lack of concern or even the ‘masking’ of a deliberate pro-
gramme. A most fortuitous situation would emerge if both sides emphasised the position 
of desecuritisation, effectively rendering the issue one of non-security. Like securitisa-
tion, desecuritisation tactics can have unintended consequences.
6.2. Perception, Securitisation, and Action – When is Securitisation 
        Successful?
Desecuritisation, whether viewed as a termination of social facts or as a political tactic 
that works against securitisation, is closely connected to the issue of timing and success. 
For Wæver, successful securitisation is achieved when the relevant audience80 accepts 
74  For a critical review of the applicability of various models on power-transition and major war to the Chinese 
case, see Chan (2008).
75  For how these ‘tactics’ have played out vis-à-vis various social movements in the PRC, see Paltemaa & Vuori 
(2006) and cases III and IV in part two.
76  There are various ‘China threat’ discourses in the US as well as in states in Asia, see Yee (2000).
77  The issue of human smuggling from Mainland China to Taiwan was securitised by Taiwanese officials in 
the 2000s along three referent objects (Chin 2008, 106-107): societal security, economic security, and public 
hygiene. Chin (ibid., 111) argues that on the Mainland, Chinese officials securitise the issue of human smuggling 
within the state bureaucracy while they present a position of desecuritisation concerning the issue to officials 
on Taiwan. The PRC has had laws that forbid human smuggling since 1979, but the issue received more atten-
tion in the early 1990s with more specific legislation put into place. The desecuritisation of the issue regarding 
people emigrating or being smuggled to Taiwan is however problematic for Mainland officials due to the unique 
status Taiwan has: The issue is a thorny one for the Mainland, which has to use each opportunity to maintain the 
‘one China policy.’ Accordingly, Mainland officials use special terms for people who have illegally moved or been 
moved to Taiwan and to states the PRC recognises. Similarly, in negotiations between Mainland and Taiwanese 
officials, the issue is phrased with different terms on different sides of the negotiating table.
78  Good political speakers fuse underlying precontracts into their speeches (Perelman 1996), which means 
that the same issue can be voiced quite variably for different audiences.
79  Chinese scholars even contest the whole issue by arguing that the Chinese in most instances are not migrants 
but ‘overseas workers’ (Wishnick 2008, 93) who only want to make some quick money and return to China.
80  The relevant audiences vary from system to system, and from issue to issue. The relevant audience similarly 
depends on the functions of the security argument: functions of mobilisation, control, deterrence and legiti-
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the security argument to an extent that makes it possible to use extra-ordinary measures 
to counteract an alleged threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 25), which requires some basis of plau-
sibility (cf., Haacke & Williams 2008). The exact definition and criteria of securitisation 
presented by Buzan et al. (1998, 25) is the “intersubjective establishment of an existen-
tial threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”81 The important 
criterion here is the “securityness of security” (Wæver 1997a, 24).82
The successful achievement of securitisation speech acts requires both a correct ‘il-
locutionary grammar’ (Searle & Vanderveken 1985; see Chapter 6.2.1.2.) and a sufficient 
amount of ‘socio-political capital’ from the speaker:83 in order to invoke the ‘social magic’ 
of (national) security, the speaker has to be in the correct social position (e.g., chairman 
of the Central Military Commission) and use the correct form of speech (e.g., ‘We have to 
take these resolute measures in order to safeguard social stability and unity’).84 Aspects 
related to the threat itself also facilitate or impede securitisation (issues are easier to 
produce as threats if similar issues are generally considered to be threats) (Buzan et al. 
1998, 32-33). Neither the linguistic nor the social felicity conditions of securitisation are 
entirely determining or sufficient conditions for successful securitisation. No individual 
can be guaranteed successful securitisation, as this is up to the audience (Wæver 1997a; 
2000): Securitising moves fulfil the criterion of securitisation only after (the relevant) 
audience(s) accepts it as such; securitisation can never be only imposed, but there is 
some need to argue one’s case (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). Securitisation can therefore always 
fail (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998, 31; cf., Derrida 1988). In contrast to considering 
linguistic rules as determining, Wæver has argued that due to the social character of se-
curitisation, formal authority is not sufficient to achieve success: securitisation cannot be 
closed off by finite criteria for success (Wæver 2000a, 286; 2000b, 10).85
It is worth asking what the success of speech acts means, when the possibility of in-
felicity or the failure of the speech act is always present in speech acts situations (cf., 
Derrida 1988, 15). Here it is important to remember that the success or failure of speech 
acts is not a binary division. Already Searle (1969) argued that Austin’s distinction be-
macy, may ask for differing audiences. The audience of securitisation can then be key members of the political 
elite, voters, or a group of militant fundamentalists, for example. Also Mak (2006) and Salter (2008) emphasise 
that securitisation acts can have multiple and varying audiences.
81  Or in Buzan (2008, 553): “Securitization is when something is successfully constructed as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and that construction is then used to support exceptional measures in 
response”; or in Wæver (2008b, 582): “Securitization is the discursive and political process through which an 
intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the 
threat.”
82  The “securityness” refers here to the Sausserian division of signs into the signifier, the signified and the 
referent.
83  Taureck (2006b) argues that this aspect is actually from the Waltzian root of securitisation theory: the social 
capital and position of securitising actions should be taken in the model in the way capabilities are distributed 
in Waltz’s model.
84  As Williams (2007c, 67) notes, ‘security’ is not a property of either speech acts or discourse, or knowledge 
discourse, or of social organizations; ‘security’ is a function of all three.
85  In order to gain a better understanding of when securitisation is successful, when securitisation is not 
successful, or when it fails, should also be studied. It seems that more attention is being given to the aspect 
of failure in securitisation processes, as indicated by some of the examples used in the present study, and also 
by a group of papers at ISA 2009. See for example Mak (2006); Salter, Mark B. (2008; 2009; 2010); Stritzel 
(2009); Ruzicka (2009); Vuori (2005; 2010). It is however good to keep in mind that some of the initial texts on 
securitisation specifically emphasised how securitisation can fail (e.g., Wæver 1989b; Wæver 1995).
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tween felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, fails to distinguish between those speech 
acts which are successful, but defective, and those which are not even successful. Searle’s 
(Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 10) solution was to replace Austin’s division of felicity 
and infelicity, with the possibilities of speech acts being unsuccessful, successful but de-
fective, or successful and nondefective.86 In regard to acts of securitisation, the felicity of 
speech acts and the success of the political function of securitisation should be similarly 
separated: achieving a felicitous speech act does not yet necessarily mean that an issue 
has been successfully securitised, nor does it mean that the politics of securitising an is-
sue have been be ‘successful.’ Further, the success or failure of securitisation as a form of 
politics is not a binary division either: there can be a continuum of success and failure.87 
A security argument can be accepted wholeheartedly and embraced proactively to the 
extent of even enlisting in the military for example, while the same security argument 
may fail to obtain ‘genuine’ legitimacy in the privacy of other individual minds. The act 
may still achieve a degree of success, if the audience adheres to the ‘rituals’ the practice 
entails and subjugate themselves to its discipline (i.e., apathy equals legitimacy). Alterna-
tively, the utter failure of securitisation acts may lead to a system collapse (Wæver 1995). 
In all, the criteria of successful securitisation processes as politics depend on the function 
security arguments are intended to serve.88
86  See Chapter 6.2.1.2. for the conditions for a successful and nondefective performance of illocutionary acts 
defined by Searle & Vanderveken (1985).
87  Liow (2006) and Roe (2008) also suggest this. Various audiences can accept the security argument to various 
degrees, but even when the security nature of an issue has been accepted, there can still be disagreement on 
how threats should be responded to, or which kinds of real policies the security nature of an issue actually 
justifies (see also Bendtrath et al. 2007; Salter 2008).
Buzan (2008, 553) makes the CopS position somewhat clearer by noting that attempts at securitisation may 
have widespread success and be quite durable (e.g., the communist/Soviet threat in the US after 1947), or 
they may have limited success (e.g., US attempts to construe Iraq as a threat), or they may fail (e.g., the erosion 
of support for the war in Vietnam in the US). This succinct scale could be continued with the ‘epic failure’ of 
securitisation (e.g., fall of socialism in Europe in the late 1980s) (I owe the term ‘epic failure’ to Mika Harju-
Seppänen).
88  Buzan et al. (1998, 25-26) are unclear, or even self-contradictory, in their statements on the criteria of 
successful securitisation: “We do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to 
be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to 
be made from which it is possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps that would not have been 
possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity (ibid., 25). 
[…] Securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential 
threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules 
(ibid.). […] A successful securitisation thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency 
action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules (ibid., 26).” 
The confusion that can be attributed to these statements, seems to point to the last one. What Buzan et al. are 
taken to mean in the present study, is that successful securitisation has three components: 1) (the acceptance 
of) claimed existential threats and 2) a platform for emergency action, 3) which can affect interunit relations.
The kind of confusion discussed here is evident in, for example, how Emmers (2007, 112, 115, 123) deals with 
the issue of failed and successful securitisation. He identifies successful securitisation as a two-stage process in 
Buzan et al. (1998), with stage one being a securitising move, and stage two being the success of convincing a 
relevant audience of a referent object being existentially threatened. He then argues that “only then can extraor-
dinary measures be imposed” (Emmers 2007, 112). He further (ibid., 115; see also 2004) argues that successful 
securitising acts should entail both the convincing of an audience and the adoption of emergency measures. 
Confusion arises when Emmers (2007, 123) points to the failure of both the Bush and the Blair administration 
to convince the international community of the security nature of the invasion of Iraq: “even after the start of 
the hostilities, the US administration failed to convince the wider international community of the necessity and 
legitimacy of the conflict. […] The process of securitisation therefore failed to move beyond its first stage.” If 
an agent can take extraordinary measures only after the first two stages of securitisation have been success-
ful (cf., Barthwal-Datta 2009), how can the securitisation be a failure for Emmers when the measures (i.e., 
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Some of the critique of the CopS points to the imprecision of the theory on the issue 
of successful securitisation: questions arise in regard to audiences and the success of se-
curitisation (Balzacq 2005; 2010a; McDonald 2008a; Barthwal-Datta 2009; Ciuta 2009; 
Léonard & Kaunert 2010) as well as on the lack of more general criteria for successful se-
curitisation (Emmers 2003; Emmers 2004; Emmers 2007; Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006; 
Jackson 2006; Roe 2008).89 Some critics of the CopS approach argue that the focus on 
speech acts leaves out threats that cannot be voiced, so that the CopS approach is unable 
to deal with ‘silence’ i.e., that the theory is blind to situations where security arguments 
could or, as argued by some, should appear (Hansen 2000; repeated by many).90 For ex-
ample, Wilkinson (2007, 11-12) argues that the CopS’s focus on identity in its discussion 
of societal security privileges speech acts over other forms of communication e.g., dem-
onstrations.91 Others argue that threats which are real threats to some people, remain off 
the agenda of states (McDonald 2008a; Barthwal-Datta 2009).92 Some (McDonald 2008a; 
Trombetta 2008; Ciuta 2009) criticise the CopS’s approach to ‘security’, and the impreci-
sions or contradictions inherent within their writings.
As a significant amount of the types of critique above can be traced to the ambigui-
ties, or even contradictions, of definitions of security used by the CopS,93 and to how 
securitisation relates to security, it is worth outlining this study’s own reading of the re-
lation of securitisation and security. This reading can, I hope, solve some of the critical 
points raised, both in terms of the lack of criteria for successful securitisation, and the 
invasion) were implemented? For this reason, I argue that this underlines how the ‘three (t)ions’ are separate 
(see below), and how securitisation for the legitimisation of future or past acts, is a political choice independent 
of the use of security measures; in the example used by Emmers (2007) the attempt to legitimate forceful action 
failed, yet forceful action was still taken; force can be used without public legitimacy via securitisation, but this 
entails different costs than the use of force with public legitimacy via securitisation. This demonstrates how the 
estimation of success and failure often depends on the function securitisation is intended to serve: different 
strands of securitisation have different political functions, and thereby also different criteria for estimating 
success and failure.
89  McDonald (2008a, 575) argues that the CopS approach could not decide when securitisation took place in 
the UK decision to go to war in Iraq: was it the definition of the issue as an issue of security, when an audience 
backed this up, or when extraordinary measures were implemented. I would reason that securitisation is a 
process, often incremental, and that securitisation moves or acts can change shape as the process goes on, as 
was the case in the examples (securitisation of asylum-seekers in Australia is another) McDonald also uses (see 
for example the analyses in Part II). Salter 2008 also emphasises the processual nature of securitisation, and 
argues that the duration of the process is a relevant factor in terms of the success and failure of practical policies 
that are carried by or tied to the securitisation discourse. The various strands of securitisation can be used to 
analyse various types of speech acts in these kinds of processes.
90  As Butler (2006, xvii) notes, what cannot be said or shown in part constitutes the public sphere. What can 
be said/heard and what can be shown/seen sets limits for what can be considered as public, and thereby as 
viable political actors.
91  These types of criticisms seem to miss that while Austin focused on spoken language for the sake of simplic-
ity, other means of communication beyond speech were never excluded from even the initial formulations of 
speech act theory. Indeed, for Austin (1975), it was possible to perform illocutionary acts even non-verbally. 
Similarly, one can make a promise without using the verb ‘promise.’ As Buzan et al. (1998, 33) note, the same 
applies to securitisation: even though it can, the word ‘security’ does not have to be used in order for an issue 
to attain the status-function of security, or for the handling of the issue to begin following the logic or rationale 
of security (cf., Huysmans 2006a, 4). Ciuta (2009, 310) seems to miss this feature of speech acts in his criticism 
of Buzan et al. (1998).
92  The Critical Security Studies, or ‘Aberystwyth’ approach to security, contradicts the Copenhagen under-
standing of security as for them security means emancipation which should be striven for (Booth 2005). For 
CSS, students of security can deem what is ‘real’ security (meaning the security of the individual).
93  Ciuta’s (2009) critique precisely identifies this problem, even though he phrases it in a different manner.
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consequences of ‘silence’ in regard to securitisation.94 Threat perceptions, securitisation, 
and security action are logically, and at times even practically separate from each other, 
and this is why security action alone cannot be the criterion for successful securitisa-
tion. Further, in my view, the appearance of ‘silence’ in situations where there could be 
a securitisation discourse, which, for example, might appear in other societies, is good 
for the theory in terms of the possibility to form and ‘falsify’ empirical assumptions as 
drawn from the theory and empirical observations in other socio-political contexts. After 
presenting my reading of the relationship of securitisation and security, I shall illustrate 
how securitisation discourses may, or may not appear, by investigating whether or not 
the four contemporary macrosecuritisation discourses ‘postulated’ by Buzan & Wæver 
(2009) are part of prevalent security narratives in China. Here, I will also reflect on the 
debates that have revolved around the issue of structure and agency among appliers and 
developers of securitisation theory. This discussion entails examination of the event and 
context, as well as the possibilities of deciding in securitisation processes.
6.2.1. Securitisation, Not Security, is a Speech Act
A major criticism of the securitisation framework presented by those appliers who focus 
on politics outside Europe has been that the criteria or indicators for successful secu-
ritisation have been ill defined. Some empirical appliers would prefer a more ‘rational-
ist’ (e.g., Emmers 2004) or policy oriented approach to securitisation, which could then 
also have prescriptive applications (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006).95 In this vein, Jack-
son (2006, 312) considers the approach too ‘vague’, as it makes it difficult to identify the 
key indicators of the securitisation processes,96 resulting in difficulties for understanding 
how, why and when securitisation occurs.97 Like Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006), 
Jackson asks to which degree the language of security has to emerge, how much money 
needs to be allocated, or whether there have to be substantial administrative changes in 
order for an issue to be securitised.98 Emmers (2004, 15; see also Emmers et al. 2008, 
94  The ‘Aberystwyth School’ approach to and understanding of security is a fundamental issue and leads to a 
different kind of analytical and normative approach. See for example Buzan et al. (1998, 33-35), CASE (2006), 
and Floyd (2007a).
95  While some of the chapters of the edited volume in question include references that go beyond Buzan et 
al. (1998), the chapter that deals with the limits of securitisation theory (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers 2006) 
unfortunately does not engage with the various debates about securitisation theory.
96  Buzan et al. (1998, 25) however argue that the study of securitisation does not need indicators beyond the 
direct analysis of discourse and political constellations. While important parts of analysis, the central focus 
of securitisation analysis should not be on the actors (ibid., 32), or policy action, but instead the practice of 
securitisation, “the power politics of a concept” (ibid.), which can be studied directly.
97  Salter (2008, 325) proposes that scholars could measure various things in order to deem how well they 
are in accordance with the prescriptions of the securitisation speech act: 1) to which degree the issue is part 
of wider political debates, 2) is the description of the threat accepted or rejected, 3) is the solution accepted or 
rejected, and 4) are new emergency powers accorded to the securitising agent. In addition to the difficulties of 
setting thresholds and criteria to assess when a policy or an opinion is in accordance with the securitisation 
(e.g., when is something accepted or rejected; the basic epistemological problem is not solved by dividing the 
question into four categories; see the discussion below for why Salter’s fourth aspect cannot be sufficient crite-
ria for successful securitisation); as Edelman (1972) notes, threats in political speech are, most of the time, left 
on an intangible level. The specifics of security are often left for the technocrats who may, as Salter (2008) also 
notes, be more successful with some policy initiatives than with others, even though all of them would carry the 
banner of a relevant securitisation discourse.
98  For Wæver (Buzan et al. 1998, 25) these are not issues, as for him the criteria of successful securitisa-
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62), Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006), Jackson (2006, 313; 2008, 158), and Wish-
nick (2008, 96) all argue that securitisation theory should have criteria to define when 
securitisation had been practically achieved;99 they are not satisfied with ‘only rhetorical’ 
securitisation. For them, securitisation would only be achieved after the implementation 
of ‘extraordinary measures.’100
Roe (2008) argues for the inclusion of two aspects to estimate the success or failure 
of securitisation viz. identification and mobilisation.101 Through his analysis of the legiti-
misation of UK participation in the Iraq war, he argues that issues can have an intersub-
jective security status without actual mobilisation of security measures. The same has 
been noted by Emmers (2003; see also Caballero-Anthony & Emmers 2006) and Jackson 
(2006) who argue that securitisation should be deemed ‘successful’ only after policy im-
plementation.
Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006) identify further limitations, or shortcomings, of 
the CopS approach. They argue that securitisation theory should explain why decision 
makers choose to use either securitisation or desecuritisation. They are interested in the 
motivations and intentions of the securitising actors. They also take into account the rise 
or decline of levels of existential threats in respect of the outcomes or impacts of secu-
ritisation.102 Wæver (2007a), however, emphasises that it is not necessary to deal with 
what the motivations or intentions of policymakers are, as it is sufficient to consider what 
they have elected to say and do103 (with which I concur and thus omit those aspects of 
sincerity when explicating the concept of securitisation below in Chapter 6.3.2.). Indeed, 
an individual’s ‘real’ (as opposed to conveyed) intentions are not relevant here, but rather 
speech act analysis is used to model explicit and verifiable formulae for what people con-
tion are met when there is a basis for legitimacy: there do not have to be actual ‘emergency measures’ for an 
issue to be securitised. At the same time though, mere securitisation moves are not enough either: the relevant 
audience has to accept the securitisation argument for it to be successful (ibid.). The criteria for this, however, 
remain unspecified. As I argue here, security measures and their public securitisation are theoretically and at 
times even practically separate from each other, and thereby the application of security practices cannot be a 
sufficient criterion for the success of securitisation.
99  The emphasis of action beyond ‘talk’ is also evident in Iver Neumann’s (1998; 2001) further peg of ‘violitisa-
tion’ when the threshold of physical violence / killing is passed. For a study of Russian foreign policy in the 
1990s through this ‘revised’ framework of securitisation and violitisation, see Wagnsson (2000).
100  This demand is in part a result of securitisation moves in the ASEAN context which have not had policy 
implications (see e.g., Emmers 2003). Haacke & Williams (2008), however, argue both that transnational crime 
has not been securitised by ASEAN, except in the case of terrorism, and that it is not necessary to expect policy 
measures from ‘successful’ securitisation. For them, collective identification of a threat would be enough. 
Similarly to Abrahamsen (2005) and Emmers (2007), they further argue against a strict distinction of political 
and security issues: policy agendas are often crowded and security may provide urgency for a matter that is 
perceived as a problem, yet the language of security may not entail ‘emergency measures’ but rather incremen-
tal policies.
101  Alan Collins (2005, 570) identifies three stages: securitisation moves, acceptance of moves, and mobilisa-
tion, while for Emmers (2007) there are two stages, and for Haacke & Williams (2008) there are two steps. 
For Buzan et al. (1998, 26): ‘a successful securitisation has three components (or steps): existential threats, 
emergency action, and effects of interunit relations by breaking free of rules.’
102  Buzan (1991, 133-134) already notes how the nature of the threat and its intensity of operation have an 
effect on whether and when an issue becomes an issue of national security. While Buzan et al. (1998) are vaguer 
on this question, it seems that the intensity of an issue can have an effect on whether it is securitised or not for 
them as well.
103  Skinner (2002, 40-43) supports the same kind of approach in his method for studying the history of 
concepts: historians have to (most of the time) take the stated beliefs of people 1) as being conventionally 
truthful, 2) at face value, and 3) as a part of a broader network of other conventionally held beliefs.
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vey in their utterances and discourses by conventional (socio-)linguistic means.104 Simi-
larly, to assess differing levels of real existential threats would entail that securitisation 
analysts could then deem what is a real threat and what is not, contradicting one of the 
founding principles of the CopS i.e., that security analysts cannot say what is, and what is 
not, real security without a political move being made.105 Indeed, it seems that Caballero-
Anthony et al. (2006) promote normative securitisation studies in the guise of ‘normal’ 
security analysis.
It would seem that some of the criticisms presented above are consequences of con-
ceptual imprecision in the CopS’s various formulations of what security is. For example, in 
my view, to state “we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act” (Wæver 1995, 55; emphasis in 
original) is not entirely accurate and easily leads to confusion regarding the relationship 
of security, securitisation, and the role of speech acts (cf., Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; 
Ciuta 2009). For example, Felix Ciuta (2009, 312) identifies the problem of taking ‘securi-
ty’ both as a ‘speech act’ and as ‘survival’ (or more precisely as having the means to repel 
an existential threat).106 To avoid such confusion, I believe that it would be more precise 
104  For Skinner (2002, 82) speech act analysis is a way to gain a grasp of what people mean and do with what 
they say (the meaning of words may indeed differ from what people mean by using them). He (ibid., 91-93 ) 
argues that there are at least three kinds of meanings: 1) what do certain words mean in a certain context, 2) 
what does something mean to me (i.e., the reader), and 3) what does a writer mean by what is being said in a 
given text. Knowledge of the intentions and motives of a writer may guide us to understand the relationship 
of the writer to the text (ibid., 96-97), yet the recovery of intentions does not mean the recovery of ideas in 
‘other minds’, it means the recovery of the intersubjective meaning of utterances, be they in the form of hand or 
sound waves. For Skinner (ibid., 98, 100) what Austin (1975) calls successful uptake equals the understanding 
of the primary intentions of issuing an utterance (which does not necessarily convey the motivations of issuing 
the utterance); Wierzbicka (1991, 197-199) emphasises that there are numerous ‘illocutionary devices’ that 
guide listeners’ or readers’ interpretations of what an utterer is intending to convey. Skinner’s approach to the 
analysis of meaning in text, entails that the illocutionary intentions and perlocutionary intentions of issuing an 
utterance may vary and may be separate from each other, in addition to the varying and more unpredictable 
perlocutionary effects of illocutionary acts: what Skinner’s approach amounts to is that if the conventions of 
illocutionary acts in a certain socio-cultural situation are known, you can infer what an utterance is intended 
to do (its illocutionary force, if not the illocutionary act itself), and thereby to infer what the utterer means by 
doing what is being done. Yet the desired perlocutionary effect is not guaranteed: one’s reassurance can indeed 
be another’s threat (Edelman 1972, 13).
While the ‘death of the author’ announced by Barthes (1979, 73-78), Foucault (1979c, 141-160), and Derrida 
(1976, 6-100) is an important point regarding literary criticism, it is similarly important not to take this vein of 
thought too far: the virtual limitlessness of interpretation is more important in some situations than in others 
(cf., Skinner 2002, 121). While I can interpret a student raising her hand in my class in various ways, the conven-
tions of these kinds of social situations usually allow me to be confident that she is asking for permission to 
speak, and not confusing me for a Roman Caesar to be hailed. Some utterances are indeed devoid of the sorts of 
contextual or illocutionary indicators that would allow us to infer the intentions of issuing the utterance, e.g., 
Nietzsche’s note on forgetting his umbrella as used by Derrida (1979, 122, 123; Derrida 1988, 63). But these 
types of utterances are what Plato called orphan letters, and they are not the norm in communication. Derrida 
is correct in insisting that we cannot be sure of what Nietzsche meant, but absolute certainty is too tall an order 
for scholarship in general. Derrida’s points and approach largely remain philosophical.
105  Indeed, an analyst of securitisation should not take a stand on the existence of elephants, nor on the danger 
of their stampeding in lecture halls (cf., Footnote 44 of Chapter 3.), but to analyse how these kinds of claims 
become, or do not become, accepted as issues of security. This of course does not entail that the existence 
or non-existence of stampeding elephants in a lecture hall would not be a very important facilitating factor 
(i.e., type of situation) for some audiences’ acceptance or refusal of an argument to securitise a stampede of 
elephants.
106  Buzan et al. (1998, 21): “Security is about survival.” Wæver (1995, 56): “’Security’ signifies a situation 
marked by the presence of a security problem and some measures taken in response. Insecurity is a situation 
with a security problem and  no response. […] When there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our 
situation in terms of security.”
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to express the CopS understanding of security in terms of securitisation speech acts.107 Al-
though many threats, referent objects and means of threat repulsion are based on ‘brute 
reality’, security is a socially constructed, intersubjective and self-referential practice (cf., 
Buzan et al. 1998, 24, 31). Contrarywise to what Monika Barthwal-Datta (2009) argues, 
this would mean that there can be threatening things without them being securitised for 
even the CopS.108 For just as a matter can be securitised without being a ‘real’ threat, ‘real’ 
threats can remain without a security label.109 Of interest for the CopS approach are those 
instances where securitisation moves occur, even though it could be possible that there 
were no such moves. That there is ‘silence’ in situations where there could, and according 
to some, also should be securitisation, or security measures, is important for the theory 
of securitisation as a theory, and it also opens up interesting avenues for research.110 But 
before delving further into this issue, first an elaboration on why security is not a speech 
act, but securitisation is.
 
As already noted, the exact definition and criteria of securitisation presented by Buzan 
et al. (1998, 25) is the “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a sali-
ency sufficient to have substantial political effects.” At times, however, Wæver (1995, 55) 
states that “security can be considered as a speech act”, while at others, that security is a 
socially constructed, intersubjective and self-referential practice (Buzan et al. 1998, 24, 
31),111 where the important criterion is the “securityness of security” (Wæver 1997a, 24). 
On the other hand, for Wæver (1997a, 14), security signifies (X counts as Y in context C 
107  While the phrase ‘security is a speech act’ (Wæver 1989a; 1995) is the slogan used to distil the CopS 
approach to its core by both key members, appliers, and critics, on a close reading, some texts of the CopS 
suggest that my formulation may be what is actually meant: “the process of securitisation is what in language 
theory is called a speech act” (Buzan et al. 1998, 26); “the process of securitisation is a speech act” (Wæver 
2004a, 9). This seemingly slight alteration of the 1995 formulation would seem to support my argument that 
the underlying idea actually is that securitisation (and not security) is a speech act. While not putting attention 
on the difference to security being a speech act and securitisation being a speech act, some appliers ‘quote’ 
the CopS as presenting securitisation as a speech act: for example Mark Neocleous (2006, 366) notes that 
“’Security’ on this view, is the outcome of ‘securitising speech acts’,” while for Hans Günther Brauch: “security is 
the result of a speech act (securitization)” (Brauch 2008a, 28); “’securitization’ has been referred to as a ‘speech 
act’” (Brauch 2008b, 65).
108  “Securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential 
threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules” 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 25).
109  For example Roxanna Sjöstedt (2008, 8) points out how there has been a multitude of instances where 
decision makers have failed to recognise deadly developments as threats to ‘national security.’ Wæver (2008b, 
585) also argues that cultures and identities can disappear without this aspect being securitised.
110  If a securitisation discourse cannot be detected where it could be assumed to be prevalent, it could be 
asked, like Lorraine Elliott (2007), why a matter is ‘undersecuritised’. This would entail the use of different 
types of methods than securitisation analysis, as it is difficult to analyse something that is not there with tools 
that are meant to analyse something that is there. These types of questions would not entail deeming whether 
something is ‘really’ an issue of security, but to perhaps investigate why it is that politicians have elected not to 
use the language of securitisation in a certain issue. This avenue of investigation would be close to how Skinner 
(2002, 28-29) would investigate why some thinkers seem to believe in the existence of witches, while others 
do not.
111  Or: ”national security, that is, the security of the state, is the name of an ongoing debate, a tradition, an 
established set of practices and, as such, the concept has a rather formalized referent” (Wæver 1995, 48); “the 
label ‘security’ has become the indicator of a specific problematique, a specific field of practice” (ibid., 50). In 
this view, securitisation is an operation within the field of practice of security: “The specificity, in other words, 
is to be found in the field and in certain typical operations within the field (speech acts – ‘security’ – and modali-
ties – threat-defence sequences), not in a clearly definable objective (‘security’) or a specific state of affairs 
(‘security’)” (ibid., 51). (Emphasis in original.)
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[Searle 1969, 35]) the presence of an existential threat and adequate measures to deal 
with it, while insecurity signifies the presence of a security problem without the means 
to tackle it. This definition of security means that security is a state of affairs or a status. 
Further, taking security as a self-referential social practice means that security itself is 
not a speech act, but both a status-function and/or a practice. 
While these various formulations or aspects of ‘security’ can elicit confusion, the issue 
may be clarified by stating that securitisation is a complex speech act, which has a key 
role in the social construction of security, and thereby in the social practices of security, 
as well as the achievement of a security status for an issue; a security status is imbued 
by the perlocutionary effects of this constellation of elementary speech acts (see Chapter 
6.3.2. below). This understanding of securitisation and security entails that securitisation 
is neither necessary, nor sufficient, to achieve ‘security’ (as means to repel an existential 
threat): there can be activities that can bring about a security logic, or set of practices 
without explicit securitisation (Huysmans 2006a, 4), and a referent object may remain 
insecure even after its successful securitisation (if there are no actual means to repel 
the threat). Thus, the core of securitisation theory is the intersubjective establishment 
of a security status for an issue. This core is not concerned with threat perceptions, or 
whether something is really a threat, nor is it concerned with security measures.
This understanding of security and securitisation also entails that policy measures or 
security activities, are insufficient and unnecessary criteria for the success or failure of se-
curitisation (here as a means of public legitimisation).112 Securitisation and security policy 
action are logically separate, that is, threat perception, securitisation and security policy 
action are not codeterminant.113 Indeed, as Aristotle (2009, book IX, section 8) noted,114 
112  Contra Caballero-Anthony & Emmers (2006).
113  Collins (2005) identifies three stages of securitisation: securitisation moves, acceptance of these by the 
audience, and emergency measures. He notes how securitising actors in Malaysia have used the language of 
security without proposing the use of emergency measures or escalating to the third stage of securitisation. 
Like Kyle Grayson (2003), he argues that security language may become a ’Frankenstein’s monster’ in the sense 
that it may unleash unpredicted consequences if left unchecked (cf., the ‘security trap’ identified in CASE 2006; 
the ‘Golem’ would, however, be a more apt metaphor here, as the ‘monster’ of Frankenstein was an awry scien-
tific experiment, the product of which merely sought the approval and love of its creator, while the Golem was 
created for protection but turned out to be too unwieldy and disastrous for its creator. I was reminded of this 
by Paul Whybrow.). For Collins, desecuritisation does not necessarily entail that some issue is not an issue of 
security, it merely means the handling of the issue through ’regular politics’ and not by using the ’monster.’ For 
Grayson (2003) and Collins (2005), like for Wæver (1995), security practices may turn out to be counterpro-
ductive vis-à-vis the object of concern (the same argument is also made by Elliott 2007). 
Unlike Collins (2005), Haacke & Williams (2008) identify securitisation as a two stage process: similarly to the 
argument given here, for them, emergency measures are not necessary for securitisation to have taken place.
114  “Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite; for, while that which is not capable 
of being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. 
That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and 
of not being. And that which is capable of not being may possibly not be.” (Aristotle 2009, Book IX Section 8.)
It seems that a theory of action requires that an actor has a choice (Heiskala 2000, 16); if there is no choice, for 
Giddens (1984), we would be talking of an agent. This entails that in order for securitisation to be an action, 
there has to be a possibility to not make a securitisation move, as well as the possibility of making one. Securi-
tisation Studies embarks on its avenues of investigation precisely from the actualisation of this choice, from the 
“practice of securitisation,” from “the power politics of a concept” (Buzan et al. 1998, 32).
Whether or not to securitise is a two-level dilemma for decision makers, similar to the more general ‘security 
dilemma’ (Jervis 1976, 58-113; Booth & Wheeler 2008b, 137; see also Brauch 2008c): decision-makers have 
both a dilemma of interpretation and a dilemma of response in making the choice whether or not to securitise an 
issue. The possible benefits and costs of securitisation have to be weighed as in any political choice (cf., Wæver’s 
[1995, 80] analogy to raising a bet). Because securitisation is such a powerful political move, it may have major 
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one can have a skill but not use it.115 Referring to Karup Pedersen, Wæver (2007a) black-
boxes the intentions and thereby the perceptions of security policy decision-makers.116 
While logically there are eight possible situations vis-à-vis the three ‘(t)ions’ i.e., threat 
perceptions, securitisations (as legitimisation of future acts) and security actions, the 
CopS has been primarily interested in instances of securitisation. Further, normatively 
or morally, it might make sense to retain the aspect of threat perception (the assumption 
is that decision makers should be sincere in their legitimisation arguments), but for the 
sake of a securitisation analysis, it must be omitted. 
The eight logically possible combinations of the three binary variables117 are illus-
trated here by the Daoist symbol of the Taiji (太极, tàijí; the great or ultimate, the origin of 
the 阴, yīn and the 阳, yáng) and the eight trigrams (八卦, bāguà) that surround it118 (see 
Figure 6 and Table 1). The Taiji or Yin-Yang symbol in the centre represents or symbolises 
here the aporia of security (Burke 2002), the inseparability of processes of securitisation 
and insecuritisation (CASE 2006, 461), and the inside/outside of security/insecurity: 
freedom and security depend on each other (Huysmans 2006a, 88-89),119 and security 
promises more than it can deliver (Hietanen & Joenniemi 1982, 35-36); it is not possible 
inter-unit effects: if there is no securitisation of some issue, this may encourage others to keep moving towards 
a coercive solution, while securitisation perceived by others as ‘paranoid’ or over-excessive, for example, may 
lead to increased tension, even into a ‘security paradox.’ While the ‘securitisation dilemma’ and its material and 
psychological bases (the symbolical ambiguity of security means, and the problem of ‘other minds’) are not the 
main interests of the CopS, it could be possible to combine the study of securitisation with these more general 
approaches to security and international relations, as is strongly suggested by the variables considered relevant 
in analyses via the Regional Security Complex Theory. For a view of how securitisation as action and perception 
could fit into more elaborate models of system and complexity theory, see Mesjasz (2008, 48-52).
115  Holdcroft (1978, 75) notes how the question of whether someone in a position of authority intends to use 
their authority when making an utterance, is indeterminate: persons in positions of authority do not always 
choose to exercise their authority. In addition to not performing an utterance with formal authority when an 
opportunity for this arises, for example, a formal command may be given with the hope that it will be disobeyed. 
This entails that while an utterance may conform to the conventions of a certain illocution, its perlocutionary 
intentions may differ from the usual expectation of intention. The possibilities of such occurrences depend on 
the formality of the situation: a judge may personally not want to give a severe punishment, yet regardless of 
intentions, the performance of the utterance will have a ‘conventional outcome.’ Speech acts may indeed have 
unintended consequences.
Marina Sbisà (2001, 1809) also emphasises that in certain situations speech acts may be performed merely 
to ‘fulfill one’s role’, and that the intention or commitment to perlocutionary goals does not necessarily affect 
the conventional illocutionary effect. Yet, if the lack of such commitment is marked somehow, in less formal 
situations, this may result in an unhappy situation.
116  Human causation is often equated with psychological causation. Social determinants of behaviour are 
however often more interesting as well as accessible, as opposed to psychological ones. This is why Itkonen 
(1983, 13) argues that the question of how social determinants are internalised in the individual psyche may 
safely be ignored.
117  Just as the八卦(bāguà) can be increased, the logical possibilities of combinations may be increased, if 
instead of a binary division, multiple values for the variables were to be proposed (e.g., successful but defective, 
partially successful securitisation etc.).
118  The八卦(bāguà) are eight diagrams (☷☶☵☴☳☲☱☰)used in Daoist cosmology to represent a range 
of interrelated concepts. The eight symbols consist of three lines, each either ‘broken’ or ‘unbroken’, which 
represent a 阴-line (yīn) or a 阳-line (yáng) respectively. These symbols are often referred to as trigrams in 
English. In the Book of Changes (易经, Yì Jīng) the Taiji was surrounded by 64 pairs of trigrams (六十四卦, 
liùshísì guà), and was used in Daoist fortune telling and philosophy to explain how from 阴 and 阳 come the 八
卦, and from these the 六十四卦.
119  Whilst today, security is often depicted as limiting freedom, as security in a way blocks or ties down, for 
Montesquieu, for example, “political freedom consists in security, or at least in the opinion which one has of 
one’s security” (quoted in Rothschild 1995, 61).
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to have a completely secure inside or a completely insecure outside, security entails inse-
curity (Walker 1993; Bigo 2001; CASE 2006).120 The trigrams represent the binary pos-
sibilities vis-à-vis the three ‘(t)ions’, which are also presented in table-form (Table 1).121
What is important is that the various combinations of the three variables entail differ-
ent costs for decision makers or securitising actors: for example, security action without 
legitimisation in the form of securitisation may be costly in terms of trust or popular 
support.122 While logically there are eight combinations of these three variables, Secu-
ritisation Studies is most interested in situations where the ‘social magic’ of security is 
‘cast’ even when this is not logically a necessary condition (i.e., C, E, G, and H in Table 
1). Furthermore, Securitisation Studies is not concerned with what decision-makers or 
securitising actors ‘really’ think, or whether or not they are sincere (i.e., the inner ring 
of perception is removed). This means that the possibilities are reduced to four,123 and 
of original interest out of these combinations have been securitisation with no security 
action, and securitisation with security action. The eight logically possible combinations 
entail that the existence of actual policy consequences following securitisation moves, 
cannot be used either as a sufficient or a necessary criterion for the success of securi-
tisation: security action is possible with or without either successful or infelicitous se-
curitisation. In sum, security action or shifts in security policies may be an indicator of 
120  The symbol can also represent the relationship of potestas (the normative and juridical) and auctoritas 
(the anomic and the metajuridical) that Agamben (2005, 86) identifies as the antagonistic, yet functionally 
connected elements of ‘Western’ legal orders; the symbol could represent the ‘holding together and articulation 
of the two aspects of the juridico-political machine that institutes a threshold of undecidability between anomie 
and nomos, between life and law, between auctoritas and potestas.’ For Agamben (2005, 88), the symbol would 
be the political, the nexus between violence and law. Within IR, the symbol could also represent the relationship 
between political realism and idealism.
121  The perceptions of threats, means of securitisation, as well as the types of security action can vary greatly 
along with sectors and actors of security. Even the division of private and public securitising actors (Wilde 
2008) makes this evident. 
In the case of a family, for example, a perceived threat could be the rumoured execution of people with a certain 
ethnic background that the family also shares, occurring in a nearby location. This perception of threat could 
be securitised within the family by arguing that the family must leave their home before it is too late. Security 
action here could be the seeking of refuge, or the sending away of the family’s children, even through the means 
of ‘illegal emigration.’ Such processes could be difficult to trace with the conventional methods deployed by 
students of securitisation, but for example, interviews of refugees might be a way to discover whether or not 
such ‘private’ securitisation moves take place in real situations (Wilkinson’s [2010] method to study securitisa-
tion that draws on ethnography could be one avenue to approach these kinds of investigations).
Conversely, the study of processes of public securitisation is easier, as there are more traces of such processes. 
A government could, for example, perceive its own citizens of foreign descent as a threat in a crisis situation. 
This kind of perception could be securitised by, for example, arguing that such individuals’ loyalties may not lie 
with their new state, or that foreign agents may easily infiltrate such groups. Security action in such situations 
could, for example, be their internment.
These two examples illustrate how securitisation can be possible for both private and public actors, but which 
may entail different difficulties vis-à-vis the empirical study of such processes. They also show, however, that 
the three aspects are not deterministic, but that each is logically independent. A family could be mendacious 
as to the reason their children are being sent away, or a claim of an existential threat can be used to legitimate 
‘illegal immigration’ without there being a genuine threat perception for example. Likewise with public political 
machinations.
122  While all of the combinations are logically possible, it seems that certain combinations are more likely than 
others. For example, while ‘insincere securitisation’ may be an even likely tactic for a politician, ‘insecure securi-
tisation’ may be a risky proposition. Securitising threats which cannot be repelled may lower public morale and 
make the securitising actor seem weak. This may be one factor which has worked towards keeping difficult 
issues such as the abolishment of nuclear weapons and climate change off the top of states’ security agendas.
123  I.e., no securitisation with no security action, no securitisation with security action, securitisation with no 
security action, and securitisation with security action.
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Figure 6: The eight possible combinations vis-à-vis threat perception, securitisation (as 
legitimising future acts) and security action.
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successful securitisation of one or another strand, but such shifts cannot be either suf-
ficient or necessary conditions for success.
As the above discussion has shown, there have been many criticisms of the CopS ap-
proach which derive from empirical analysis that views securitisation as successful only 
after policy implementation. To define the success of securitisation on implementation of 
policies would, however, require a vast amount of criteria for success e.g., when a policy 
would have been implemented to a degree to satisfy the criteria for successful securiti-
sation. Indeed, instead of focusing on policy implementation, it is better to separate the 
felicity, uptake and other linguistic aspects of successful securitisation from the success 
of the whole securitisation process and the success of the politics of securitisation. This 
means that a speech act of securitisation can be successful, but that the process and the 
politics of securitisation may still fail. The assessment of these aspects of security policies 
has not been discussed within the original securitisation framework, and no readily avail-
able methods to tackle this exist. Perhaps due to the difficulty of defining these kinds of 
criteria, and the operationalisation of them being beyond most research projects, Wæver 
(e.g., 1995) has often emphasised that as an open social process, securitisation cannot be 
closed off by finite criteria i.e., no one can be guaranteed the success of securitisation.
In my view, the success in achieving a security status for an issue, and even the mobi-
lisation of concomitant security measures, should be separated from the assessment of 
the success or failure of the politics of securitisation, whether this is taken to entail the 
intersubjective establishment of a status function, or the mobilisation of policies. The 
success and failure of the politics of securitisation depends on factors beyond individual 
samples of discourse. This means that this kind of analysis requires methods beyond the 
textual analysis of security speech. The analysis of text through the securitisation frame-
work can be used to deem whether or not a securitisation discourse is manifest in it 
(value 1 or value 0). The success or failure of securitisation moves requires analysis of the 
political and social context beyond the specific text (e.g., how political constellations and 
interunit relations are affected) (value 1 or value -1) e.g., opinion polls, demonstrations 
and reactions of other units. Assessment of the success of the politics involved entails 
the deployment of even further methods of analysis. Indeed, the theory of securitisation 
is not a theory of everything; it is a constitutive theory of how issues receive the status-
function of security.124 
124  The theory of securitisation can be combined with other social theories in order to enhance our under-
standing of, for example, mobilisation, suppression and resistance. This is something that some critics of the 
approach seem to have overlooked; some seem to try to include all relevant aspects of politics into the theory 
of securitisation, when a better tactic would be to combine the theory of securitisation with other theories and 
thus discern what insights securitisation theory might provide rather than vice versa.
This is also suggested by Regional Security Complex Theory: whether or not a matter is securitised, is first used 
to deem whether a security complex exists, or not. After the identification of a complex, other means are used to 
assess it. If securitisation theory can be combined or connected to regional security complex theory in this way, 
I argue that securitisation theory can be combined to other political theories or analytical frameworks too.
See Paltemaa & Vuori (2006), Vultee (2010), and Chapter 6.1.2. on how frame theory can be combined with 
securitisation theory (Eriksson 2001a suggests a similar combination), and Limnéll (2009) and Léonard & 
Kaunert (2010) on how Kingdon’s (2003) agenda setting theory, can be combined with securitisation theory.
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6.2.2. The Appearance and Non-Appearance of Securitisation Discourses: 
            Macrosecuritisation with Chinese Characteristics
That the CopS is interested in cases where there is ‘security talk’ has raised criticism from 
scholars who argue that some unvoiced threats should be securitised; the CopS approach 
has been criticised as unable to deal with ‘silence’ i.e., that the theory is blind to situations 
where there could or, as argued by some, should appear the voicing of security arguments 
(Hansen 2000). Some critics (see for example Kent 2006; Jackson 2006; Wilkinson 2007; 
Barthwal-Datta 2009) of the CopS approach which focus on the lack of gender and the 
exclusion of ‘silence’ in the original formulation of securitisation theory, often refer to 
Lene Hansen’s (2000) article on the problem of Pakistani women being unable to voice 
their lack of security, due to the hegemonic discourses which silence them.125 Some of 
the critics who attack the CopS from this angle seem to be wishing to be able to articu-
late ‘real’ security threats. The problem this understanding brings with it is, firstly, the 
challenge to deem what is and what is not a real security threat, regardless of what the 
referent object of security would be (this lengthy debate need not be reiterated here).126 
Another problem is the paternalism of ‘speaking for the silenced.’ For example, some fem-
inist scholarship has been criticised for speaking for ‘Third World’ women, thereby also 
depriving them of their own voice and agency (see e.g., Butler 2006, 41, 47). Speaking 
security is never ‘innocent’, even when the intentions accord with so called ‘good’ mor-
als e.g., equality and non-violence. Indeed, “any attempt to define other people’s security 
for them necessarily excludes those people’s own constructions of meaning” (Kent 2006, 
347; cf., Hansen 2000; Ramiah 2006). Whether something should be securitised or not is 
a normative, ethical and political question. Scholars can also deal with these types of is-
sues and make interventions, but in these situations it has to be recognised that such are 
political moves, not ‘scientific’ results. Indeed, Ciuta (2009, 323) is correct in noting how 
prescriptive observations cannot be justified analytically, but only normatively.
Here though, I would like to argue that from a scholarly and theoretical point of view 
the existence of ‘silence’ on possible ‘security issues’ is positive for the theory: securitisa-
tion does not appear everywhere, not even everywhere where it could.127 We can expect 
a securitisation process to emerge – and this may prove to be a false hypothesis; such a 
possibility of ‘falsification’, in my view, increases the explanatory potential of the theory. 
 
125  While many scholars (e.g., McDonald 2008a) use Hansen’s argument to criticise the CopS approach for 
dismissing those without voice or power, Jackson (2006) points out how the CopS approach provides an 
accurate description of the realities of Central Asia: it is almost impossible for people to raise concerns in an 
authoritarian setting; the CopS framework enlightens us on why some issues receive less attention than others. 
That ‘the people’ may not have a voice in these issues is not the ‘fault’ of the CopS, but a feature of the political 
order.
Silence is also not as definitive on what it means or entails in regard to securitisation. Silence may, for example, 
indicate that security measures have been successful: there is no longer a need to maintain the security reality 
of an issue very ‘loudly’ as the threat has been secured and is now silenced; silence may be the effect of success-
ful securitisation, a result of government repression, for example. Silence may also indicate that an issue is 
so institutionally securitised that it no longer needs to be voiced in particular situations; security may have 
become the dominant logic in a field of practice.
126  See the ‘Eriksson Debate’ in Footnote 11 of the Introduction above.
127  In respect of theories of action, this means that securitisation is a choice, and thereby an action; securitisa-
tion is not deterministic, but a (political) choice (but not always a decision).
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I demonstrate this kind of ‘confirmation’ and ‘refutation’ of empirical hypotheses with a 
digression into Chinese macrosecuritisation discourses.
Buzan and Wæver (2009; see also Buzan 2006 and 2008) have argued that at certain times 
higher order securitisations embed themselves into most political discourses and prac-
tices in a way that incorporates, aligns and ranks more parochial securitisations beneath 
them. This was the case, for example, during the Cold War, when the struggle between 
the two ideological camps overrode many other security concerns and discourses.128 In-
deed, it seems that macrosecuritisations and their consequently ‘macro’ desecuritisation 
define, or at least provide, hegemonic labels for contemporary political eras, viz. the ‘Cold 
War’, ‘post-Cold War’, and the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT). Perhaps consequently, Bu-
zan and Wæver (2009) identify or ‘postulate’  four such higher order securitisation proc-
esses, namely ‘Cold War’, ‘Anti-Nuclear discourse’, ‘Global Climate Change’, and ‘Global 
War on Terror’.
While macrosecuritisations label and may dominate security discourse, these larger 
constructions may also be vulnerable.129 This is evident, for example, in the failure to 
transform the dominant security discourse in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto. During 
the Cold War, the macrosecuritisation of socialism in the ‘capitalist camp’ worked quite 
well in Indonesia, and the traditional ‘vernacular’ of security could be stretched to cover 
socialism as the representative of ‘bad elements’ working against the societal order there 
(Bubandt 2005). This has, however, not been the case with the ‘Global War on Terror’: 
the new US-led macrosecuritisation has not worked in the same way as the Cold War 
macrosecuritisation, even though they are still framed in accordance with local traditions 
and resonant values.130 As Bubandt (ibid.) notes in the case of Indonesia, higher level 
securitisations (e.g., GWoT) do not always triumph over lower level securitisations, be 
they national, international, or macro-level. Indeed, no one is guaranteed the success of 
securitisation (Wæver 1995; 1997a; 2000), not even global power macrosecuritisers.
While Buzan and Wæver (2009) discuss the global level, state level discourses can 
also have macrosecuritisations which bundle horizontal securitisations and provide 
them with a ‘higher’ status. In China, although Mao’s securitisation moves can be read as 
a part of the overriding macrosecuritisation of the era, and macrosecuritisation scripts 
128  Buzan & Wæver (2003) argue, for example, that the Asian security complexes were overlaid by the dominant 
bipolar struggle during the Cold War, and the results of this can still be seen in the contemporary security 
architecture of the region.
129  In addition to vulnerability, even the breadth of the legitimisation effects of even successful (macro)securi-
tisations may fluctuate. This is evident for example in the US securitisation of ‘cyberthreats’: here the threat of 
cyberattacks fluctuated from state attacks (pre-9/11) to terrorist attacks (just after 9/11), back to state attacks 
(quite soon after 9/11) (Bendrath et al. 2007). The GWoT temporarily subsumed the ‘cyberthreat’ securitisa-
tion, but it was deemed that a return to ‘regular’ state (i.e., ‘axis of evil’) threats, was more conducive for the 
securitisation of cyberthreats. Salter (2008) also emphasises variances in the effectiveness of accepted under-
standings of threats to specific policy initiatives. Stritzel (2009) deals with these types of issues as a translation 
of threat images. See also Nissenbaum & Hansen (2009) for discussions on ‘cyberthreats’ and securitisation 
theory in general. 
130  For example, Emmers (2003) notes that the GWoT has not succeeded beyond rhetorical commitment at the 
official level within ASEAN. The different level of success of the two macrosecuritisations becomes quite appar-
ent through an example of the politics of T-shirts. Timo Kivimäki (2007) has observed an Indonesian security 
officer putting on an Osama bin Laden T-shirt after work. While tacit support of bin Laden would seem tolerable 
in contemporary Indonesia even for security officers, donning a Che Guevara T-shirt under the Suharto regime 
would have quite likely had dire consequences for a similar officer.
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provided many moves and processes with vocabularies and categorisations, macrosecu-
ritisation as a phenomenon or category of practice alone does not explain these securiti-
sations. The question then becomes: how are macrosecuritisations, ‘watchwords’, and the 
institutionalisation of certain securitisations linked together? 
Buzan & Wæver (2009) argue that various ‘niche’ securitisations can be brought to-
gether into a macrosecuritisation framework. Didier Bigo’s concept of security continu-
ums131 also seems relevant here. Specific issues can be joined together both horizontally, 
and in the case of macrosecuritisations also vertically, by which parochial and local is-
sues can be provided with a macro or even global significance. The use of watchwords, 
or institutionalised securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998, 27-29), endows these continuums 
with ‘master signifiers’ (Buzan & Wæver 2009) which reduce the need for elaborate argu-
ments about the securityness of specific cases. Indeed, the continuous use of watchwords 
(like ‘counter-revolution’, ‘socialism’, or ‘terrorism’) can be seen as an indicator of a suc-
cessfully institutionalised securitisation.132
While the practice of ‘grafting’ new issues or tokens onto institutionalised security 
is quite evident as a practice, how do the four candidates, or hypotheses, for macrose-
curitisation status postulated by Buzan and Wæver fare in the case of China? Can the 
‘Cold War’, ‘Anti-Nuclear discourse’, ‘Global Climate Change’, and ‘Global War on Terror’ be 
deemed as overriding securitisation discourses or themes in China?133
When we examine the first of these discourses, we notice that, overall, the Cold War is the 
paragon of Buzan and Wæver’s concept of macrosecuritisation (cf., Buzan’s 2006 article: 
131  The concept of security continuums comes from Bigo’s (1994, 164; see also 2000; 2001; 2002) studies of 
the internal security field in Europe. In a security continuum, a general feeling of unease or insecurity is linked 
to a group of issues e.g., terrorism, organised crime and immigration, as they are often listed together in official 
European documents without any overarching justification for doing so. Thereby, as a field effect, the fear of 
terrorism is grafted on to issues of migration, for example. 
Security continuums can also be found in the Asian context, for example, in Singapore where piracy and terror-
ism have been conflated in public official statements (Young & Valencia 2003; Mak 2006) – a move which failed 
for the International Maritime Bureau in Malaysia but succeeded for the Mahathir administration which linked 
pirates, foreign terrorists, and illegal migrants (Mak 2006). Accordingly, Indonesian undocumented labourers 
have also been successfully linked with criminal activities and even terrorism as ‘existential threats’ in Malaysia 
(Liow 2006). Illegal migration has also been connected to terrorism in Australia (Emmers 2004; Huysmans 
2005; Emmers 2007; McDonald 2008b). In Indonesia, cross-border crimes such as terrorism, money launder-
ing, and drug trafficking have been linked, while illegal trade in small arms and weapons is securitised only in 
connection to national integration. ASEAN links other forms of transnational crime together with terrorism 
in its policy declarations (Haacke & Williams 2008). In China, the issue of North Korean immigration has also 
been framed in terms of security by the PLA (Curley 2004, 18), but the ‘Strike Hard’ and the campaign against 
the ‘three evils’, are the cases in point to discuss security continuums in contemporary China, which will be 
examined in more detail later below. 
The partial successes and failures of the instances of securitisation analysed by the authors referred to here 
seem to suggest that security continuums can be used to facilitate securitisation moves. Indeed, it is easier to 
securitise some types of issues than others. Linking some issue into a continuum of prevalent security issues 
provides a sense of plausibility for the claims of the securitisation actor who is intent on labelling a new issue or 
token as a security problem. The securityness of one issue can be ‘grafted’ onto another. For example the CCP’s 
‘war on drugs’ (see Dutton 2005, 155-161) used the category of counter-revolution to link drug use and trade 
to this institutionalised securitisation.
132  For Chinese watchwords and master signifiers indicating institutionalised securitisation, see Chapter 
7.1.1.
133  These candidates are used here to show how some hypothesised discourses may appear empirically (1), 
while others may not (0). An example of a securitisation discourse that appears, and has interunit effects, yet 
fails (-1) is discussed in Chapter 9.
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is the GWoT the new Cold War?). States indeed had to align themselves along or explicitly 
outside (i.e., the Non-Aligned Movement) the lines of the two inclusive universalist ide-
ologies formed around the camps of the ‘West’ and ‘East’ during the Cold War. Formative 
speeches and documents after the Second World War already showed the formation of 
this bipolar constellation. Harry S. Truman (1963 [1947]) distilled the emerging con-
stellation in his ‘Truman doctrine’: “at this moment in world history nearly every nation 
must choose between alternative ways of life.”134 This division was also evident in Mao’s 
(1949a) speech to the first Central Committee, in preparation for the declaration of the 
People’s Republic (see Chapter 7.1.2.): Mao clearly leaned to one side in the early constel-
lation of the Cold War.
Just as with the rest of Asia, Chinese security arguments and visions were largely over-
laid and aligned by those of the US and the Soviet Union. However, China in the Cold War 
demonstrates the vulnerability of macrosecuritisations. Buzan & Wæver (2009) utilise 
the Sino-Soviet split as an example of this when ‘parochial’ securitisations begin to be 
disaffected by the macrosecuritisation or withdraw from it.  In its early stages, the PRC 
leaned to one side and consequently received massive support from the Soviet Union. 
However, relations between Stalin and Mao were strained from the start and this ten-
sion, inflamed by further problems, led to the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s. During 
the ‘polemics’ (1965; Gittings 1968) between the two Communist Parties, it was quite 
evident that both Soviet and Chinese securitisations were pulling away from the two in-
clusive universalist macrosecuritisations of the Cold War (Chen 2001; Lüthi 2008).
While the socialist camp was being split, anti-American rhetoric retained its strength in 
China even during the heights of the Sino-Soviet split when the Soviet Union was formally 
declared as China’s greatest enemy (Barnouin & Yu 1998, 98). However, the potential for 
change in the macrosecuritisation constellation was already evident in the institution-
alisation of Khrushchev as a harbinger of security issues both in the US and the PRC of 
the 1960s. After an armed border conflict with the Soviet Union in 1969, Chinese assess-
ments considered the situation of ‘fighting with two fists’ as unfavourable for China.135 
This opened the way for closer Sino-US relations with the Nixon administration, negoti-
ated by Henry Kissinger.136 Here Carl Schmitt’s (1996) analysis of friends and enemies 
seems to hold water: Sino-US relations were at their best in the 1970s and 1980s when 
134  In his speech after the 2001 terror attacks, George W. Bush (CNN 6.11.2001) aimed for the same kind of 
universality in his macrosecuritisation move on terrorism: “You are either with us, or you are with the terror-
ists.”
135  This shift also had domestic dimensions. Lin Biao issued an emergency six-point directive ‘On Strengthen-
ing Defences and Guarding against an Enemy Surprise Attack’, which placed the armed forces on red alert, 
increased weapons production, and ordered commanders into combat positions. Lin’s apparently autonomous 
order angered Mao, and was countermanded. This episode that demonstrated how the military could be 
mobilised without Mao’s orders, perhaps put fuel on the fire of suspicions that would eventually lead to the fall 
of Lin Biao and to the ’Lin Biao Affair’, see Chapter 8. below.
While the fear of losing control of the military may be one explanation for why Mao did not support the large 
scale mobilisation of military units, MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 319) provide another: instead of costless 
political mobilisation, high profile military mobilisation could actualise the ‘spectre’ of Soviet attack. In terms 
of securitisation theory, when shifted to the level of practice, the securitisation of the Soviets could escalate 
further; the political functions of a domestic political mobilisation based on an external threat could spill over 
into inter-unit relations and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, with a ‘matched pair’, securitised interac-
tion can become unmanageable.
136  See Burr (1999) for the transcripts of the negotiations between the Chinese and Kissinger and Nixon.
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they shared a common adversary in the Soviet Union.137 China no longer fought with two 
fists, but now deemed Soviet Imperialism as worse than US imperialism.138
The difficulty in comprehending the Sino-Soviet split until its very visible practical im-
plications on the one hand, and the devastation of the ‘Nixon shock’ of 1971-1972 on the 
other, attest to the power of the Cold War macrosecuritisation. China’s ideological disa-
greements with the Soviet Union and realpolitical calculations with the US demonstrate 
that China was indeed engaged in Cold War macrosecuritisations and it was a major 
threat for both camps. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this constellation changed 
again and the 1990s became a period of, at times, very tense Sino-US relations.
In respect of the second macrosecuritisation discourse i.e., the anti-nuclear discourse, 
as Buzan & Wæver (2009) have noted, during the Cold War the anti-nuclear movement 
was not successful in achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons. While the level of the 
claimed threat was global and all-inclusive the relevant audiences in the leaderships of 
the nuclear states were not convinced to a sufficient degree to relinquish their nuclear 
weapons.139 Nuclear powers retained lower level securitisations at the top of their agen-
da, which has meant that the universal character of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisa-
tion suffers, in a way, from the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ According to Buzan and Wæver 
(2009), the ability to generate successful macrosecuritisations is not only dependent on 
power, but also on the construction of a higher level referent object capable of appealing 
to and also mobilising the identity politics of a range of actors. It seems that it is also more 
difficult to mobilise actors around a unity of positives than a unity of negatives e.g., the 
137  Mao’s appeasement with the US flew right in the face of the polemics (1965) he had been conducting with 
the Soviets; Mao himself contradicted one of the major stated reasons for launching the Cultural Revolution 
(see Chapter 8. below). It seems that beyond the veneer of ideological disagreements, the polemics and the 
Sino-Soviet split were about more than this (Lüthi 2008).
PLA marshals had already indicated the benefits of improved relations with the US in the latter half of the 1960s, 
but MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 320) argue that Lin Biao’s ‘first order’ was the trigger that launched Mao 
on the path to improve relations with the US; if the emergency situation with the Soviets had continued, this 
would have only increased the importance of the PLA in politics, which had already increased as a result of the 
Cultural Revolution, and thereby also increased the importance of Lin Biao. Retaining his unrivalled position 
required desecuritisation away from an emergency in the military field, so that the party could once again gain 
control of the gun rather than vice versa. Improved relations with the US would remove the acute threat from 
the south as well as providing support against the threat from the north.
138  Interestingly, China was also not in alignment in the macrosecuritisation constellation of its own Three 
Worlds theory: while proclaiming to be part of the Third World, Sino-Indian relations were strained at best after 
the late 1950s and the occupation of Tibet, actually boiling into an armed border conflict in 1962.
139  The Cold War also witnessed major successes in the limitation of nuclear arms, and especially in the preven-
tion of the spread of nuclear weapons. The successes include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test-Ban 
Treaty, and the various limitation treaties between the U.S and the Soviet Union. Further, the role of civil society 
and the anti-Nuclear peace movement cannot be discounted in the 1970s and 1980s discussion on the place-
ment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. 
The failure of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation is evident in that two decades after the end of the Cold 
War none of the five NPT-recognised nuclear powers has relinquished nuclear weapons (France and the UK 
for example legitimising their arsenal with terrorist threats, see e.g., Blair 2006), three states have conducted 
nuclear tests after the Cold War ended (India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and Israel 
is widely thought to possess nuclear weapons. The US unilaterally abolished the ABM-treaty and is building 
missile defences. The CTBT has not been ratified by either the US or China, and the NPT-renewal process has 
also run into difficulty. Similarly the Moscow Treaty did not actually reduce the number of nuclear arms, but 
only those on active duty.  However the Atomic Scientists reset their ‘Doomsday Clock’ one minute back to six 
minutes to midnight in January 2010 in the hope that the negotiations between the Obama and the Medvedev 
administrations effects a new treaty with actual reductions in the number of warheads and means of delivery.
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blame for the initiation of a nuclear holocaust is easier to pin on ‘them’ rather than ‘us.’140 
The absence of a ‘matched-pair’ in the anti-nuclear securitisation discourse has been an 
impeding factor in this process. 
What has been China’s policy alignment in terms of anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation, 
mainly operated by Western non-governmental organisations and the transnational net-
works they have been able to construct?141
The PRC acquired nuclear weapons in 1964 because its leadership believed that its 
alliance with the Soviet Union did not guarantee China’s security (Lewis & Xue 1988; 
Johnston 1996a; Freedman 2003). Due to the resource constraints the PRC faced, the 
leadership believed it necessary to also develop a self-reliant dissuasion strategy through 
nuclear deterrence. It seemed a more viable option than deterrence through either de-
fence or conventional forces.142 Yet more incentives were the implicit and explicit nuclear 
threats made by both the US and the Soviet Union.143
The role of nuclear weapons is not restricted to pure military calculations and deter-
rence however. Chinese statesmen are often quoted as affirming that nuclear weapons 
have always played a more political than military role for China.144 In the Chinese analy-
sis, the question has been of a power resource: Germany and Japan have gained in impor-
tance and influence through their economic power, while the UK and France are only able 
to cling to a major power status through their nuclear forces.145
The emphasis on nuclear weapons as political tools is also evident in China’s consist-
ent argument that it developed nuclear weapons to counter the hegemonic aspirations 
of the superpowers, and that it supports the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Thus, 
even here, an attitude that goes against the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation is present; 
140  The paranoid attitude of the Cold War is evident in McNamara’s anecdote from the era of negotiating the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty: US military representatives argued that the Soviets would cheat by testing on the dark 
side of the Moon (The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, directed by Errol Morris 
2003, Sony Pictures Classics). It seems that President Kennedy’s Secretary of State McNamara was eventually 
convinced of the anti-Nuclear macrosecuritisation together with an impressive cast of ‘cold warriors’ (see e.g., 
Schultz et al. 2008).
141  For studies and histories of non-governmental anti-nuclear movements, see for example Wittner (1984; 
1993; 1998; 2003) and McCrea and Markle (1989).
142  While the field of nuclear weapons was omitted from the various rectification campaigns of the Cultural 
Revolution, Mao’s emphasis on red being better than expert, had had negative effects on China’s engineering 
field (see Paltemaa & Vuori 2009). Deng Xiaoping taking charge in a pragmatic vein was quickly reflected in 
the field of nuclear and missile technologies as well. In 1975, China conducted a series of successful satel-
lite launches, which culminated in 1980 in the launch of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile, Dongfang 5 
(Lewis & Xue 1988, 213-214). While China achieved a credible second strike capability around this time (Sagan 
& Waltz 1995), official threat assessments were already reduced by 1975. Even though world war between the 
superpowers was still deemed inevitable, China being involved in a war within the next three to five years was 
considered as unlikely (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 388-389).
143  Displaying too much restraint from Mao’s point of view, the Russians hesitated in backing the Chinese with 
their nuclear umbrella when China was shelling Quemoy in 1958; Khrushchev made a nuclear threat against the 
US only after the crisis had, in effect, subsided (Christensen 1996; Freedman 2003, 264). This hesitation pushed 
the Chinese towards even more concentrated efforts to construct their own bomb, which exacerbated Russian 
perceptions of Chinese recklessness in the question of nuclear war. It even seems that the Soviets indicated to 
some of the European Socialist states in the 1960s the possibility of a ‘surgical strike’ on China (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 313), but the US responded that it would not tolerate a nuclear attack on the PRC. 
144  For example Mao’s comment “the atomic bomb is not so big, but if you do not have it, you are not counted. 
OK, let’s make some such bombs” (quoted in Liu 1999), illustrates the acknowledgement of the political power 
of nuclear weapons but is in stark contrast to the concerns of the anti-Nuclear macrosecuritisation.
145  For an example of this kind of argumentation see Liu (1999).
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the Chinese criticism of nuclear weapons has been more about nuclear weapons as tools 
of imperialism rather than as an existential threat to humanity. In the words of Mao (1969 
[1946]):146 “The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. 
It looks terrible, but in fact it is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, 
but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.” 
The line continued when China announced its first nuclear test (Xinhua 16.10.1964): “The 
atomic bomb is a paper tiger. This famous saying by Chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. 
This was our view in the past and is still our view. China is developing nuclear weapons not 
because it believes in their omnipotence nor because it plans to use them. On the contrary, 
in developing nuclear weapons, China’s aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nucle-
ar powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.” While the aim of abolishment is promoted 
here, it is not argued for with any threat to humanity or civilisation; the issue is closer to 
desecuritisation on the issue of such weapons as a threat to humanity as such.147 
After the Cuban missile crisis, while both the political leaderships of the US and the 
Soviet Union were acutely aware of the dangers of the nuclear Damocles sword that hung 
over their heads and thus in that sense were, at times, aligned with the anti-nuclear mac-
rosecuritisation, Mao remained adamant in his dismissal of nuclear war as a disaster for 
China. Mao’s belittlement of nuclear weapons was in accordance with the people’s war 
(人民战争, rénmín zhànzhēng) strategy which emphasised the value of China’s vast re-
sources of manpower instead (‘rifles plus millet’). As morale and political indoctrination 
were of utmost importance to this strategy, Mao had to ensure that the people would not 
succumb to fatalism which could be caused by an overemphasis on the destructive force of 
nuclear weapons. In fact, warnings of a nuclear world war that could annihilate the coun-
try were actually considered reactionary in 1960s China (Powell 1965, 61), which meant 
that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation itself was thereby institutionally securitised. 
Nuclear blackmail and threats were thus countered in this strategy by denial, since Chi-
na had no credible second strike capability for some considerable time (Lewis 2007).148 
146  Mao’s views on nuclear weapons accorded with his doctrine of people’s war. The principle of people’s 
war which was the mainstay of Mao’s military thinking, was developed during the Chinese civil war and the 
war against Japan, a time when there were no nuclear weapons, and even if there had been such weapons, 
Mao’s guerrillas would have had no access to them. The strategy was directed against the massive invasion of a 
superior force and it comprised three phases (retreat, stalemate, offence). The idea was to ‘lure the enemy deep’ 
or ‘exchange space for time’ so that the enemy would have to extend its forces too far so that the inferior forces 
of the Chinese could mount an offensive with locally superior forces. These elements were also present when 
Mao (1974b [1969]) was discussing war with the Soviet Union in 1969.
147  Mao’s speech at the 1957 Moscow Conference on a nuclear third world war which would lead to the victory 
of socialism (Mao 1986) was not received well by Khruschev, who deemed Mao’s views on nuclear weapons as 
both naïve and dangerous. Accordingly, Khrushchev reneged on the secret agreement to supply the Chinese with 
a nuclear bomb in 1959, when the world’s largest technology transfer programme ended with the withdrawal 
of 1400 soviet experts in 1960 (see Paltemaa & Vuori 2009).The difference of Mao’s view of nuclear weapons 
becomes clear when his position is compared to Soviet and US pronouncements around the same time: The 
Russians argued that in a nuclear war “the weak will be exhausted before the strong” (Freedman 2003, 265).
Mao’s comments on and attempts to gain the ‘bomb’ also worried Kennedy who made inroads into possible joint 
US-USSR action against the Chinese in the 1961 Vienna summit. China was also a galvanising factor in bringing 
about the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which enraged Mao. (Scott 2007, 47.) In 1963, president Kennedy 
similarly asked to insert nuclear weapons into the mix of planning action against Chinese nuclear plans, as 
Chinese development of nuclear weapons would be “potentially a more dangerous situation than any we have 
faced since the end of the Second World War, because the Russians pursued in most cases their ambitions with some 
caution” (MacFarquhar 1972, 200).
148  In 1961, Chinese military leaders maintained that China could not be defeated by long range nuclear 
weapons, even if combined with chemical and biological weapons (Powell 1965, 59). After the Gulf of Tonkin 
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    The evolution of the post-Mao nuclear weapons doctrine towards ‘limited deterrence’ 
(Johnston 1996a) seems to indicate that an anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation has not 
been a guiding principle in China’s nuclear policies.149 Even though China has seemed 
to be in line with the objective to abolish nuclear weapons, the legacy of Mao’s cavalier 
attitude towards nuclear weapons both as mere political paper tigers, and the survival of 
the Chinese nation in the event of a nuclear war, have gone starkly against the premises 
of anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation.
Paradoxically, while still officially in line with the anti-nuclear stance with its call for 
the abolition of nuclear weapons, China is yet to relinquish its own nuclear weapons ca-
pacity, and for a long time was prepared for what it believed would be an inevitable nucle-
ar war. Since the end of the Cold War, China has, in effect, increased its nuclear prowess, 
as it has modernised its own nuclear forces while both the US and Russia have reduced 
their own stockpiles of active nuclear warheads. In fact, the evolution of the Chinese mili-
tary doctrine towards the limited use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts takes China 
still further away from the premises of anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation.150 Indeed, anti-
nuclear macrosecuritisation has not appeared in China in the form of the Western, mainly 
non-governmental anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation; securitisations with respect to nu-
clear weapons have focused on national referent objects, rather than global civilisation.
As regards the third macrosecuritisation discourse, namely global climate change, during 
the past two decades, the threat of global nuclear conflagration has subsided from the 
most acute threat registers of societies and ‘global climate change’ seems to have usurped 
the top position among ‘doomsday scenarios.’151 Indeed, climate change has been advo-
cated as a global, or in some places national security issue by numerous non-governmen-
tal organisations,152 as well as by the 4th Assessment Report of the International Panel on 
Climate Change in 2007. It seems that the IPCC estimates of the likely effects of climate 
incident 1964, Mao divided China into three strategic areas, as a plan for withstanding a nuclear war: the 
remote and difficult terrain in inland China would be appropriate for a people’s war under nuclear conditions 
(Barnouin & Yu 1998, 93). However, this plan was not properly effected until 1969-1971 when Mao called on 
China to be “prepared for war” both physically and psychologically (Mao 1974b [1969], 285).
149  The role of nuclear weapons seemed to gain in importance, as deterrence through denial was altered to 
deterrence through retaliation after Mao’s death. Deng’s (Wu 1999, 207) comment makes a case in point: “While 
you have some deterrence force, we also have some; but we do not want much. It will do just to possess it. Things like 
strategic weapons and deterrence forces are there to scare others. They must not be used first. But our possession 
will have some effect. The limited possession of nuclear weapons itself exerts some pressure. It remains our position 
that we will develop a little [nuclear weapons]. But the development will be limited. We have said repeatedly that 
our small amount [of nuclear weapons] is nothing. It is only to show that we also have what you have. If you want 
to destroy us then you yourself will receive some retaliation.”
150  Interestingly, the US 2005 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations also indicated many signs of considering 
limited nuclear weapon use a relevant option (Joint Publication 3-12). Lewis (2007) does not agree with the 
view that China has shifted from minimum deterrence to minimal deterrence, but that China still seeks the 
‘minimum means of reprisal’.
151  This tendency becomes clear from two of the latest resets of the ‘Doomsday Clock’, which emphasised the 
role of “global climate change” in 2007 and 2010; see Vuori (2010a).
152  While the focus here is on whether the Global Climate Change macrosecuritisation is organising securitisa-
tions in China, some macrosecuritisation moves include China as a major threat in the discourse, as it is one 
of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, yet is not in a position to be able to tackle it as the vast majority 
of Chinese energy production comes from coal. While in 2008 China’s energy imports were still only a small 
fraction of its total energy consumption, China is likely to become one of the largest energy importers. As such, 
it would seem that the world’s largest coal producer will continue to use of its own coal.
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change have given impetus and plausibility for the discourse of climate change as a se-
curity issue,153 whereas previously the environment was mainly politicised rather than 
securitised (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003). Climate change has also been on 
the agenda of the UN Security Council (Bothe 2008) and it flashed in the 2008 US presi-
dential election, for example when Barack Obama, in his second debate with John McCain 
on October 7, stated that energy and climate change should be considered a national 
security issue.
Environmental issues have become some of the most discussed sectors of ‘broadened’ 
or ‘new’ concepts of security.154 In the post-Cold War period, also China has emphasised 
that it is working under a ‘new concept of security’. The new concept is a departure from 
previous notions in that what China now pursues is, to a large extent, the security of 
its ‘sustained development’, or its ‘comprehensive national power’ on a range of battle-
grounds (inter alia in military, political, economic and technological areas).155 Just as in 
the rest of East- and South-East Asia, the Chinese largely perceived security in military 
and geopolitical terms, until recent years (Cheng 2006, 90);156 comprehensive security 
has now, however, become the most widely used security concept in the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. Sustained development157 is seen as a guarantee, or even a necessity, for the other 
objectives of national security. Sustained development then becomes both a security ob-
jective and a means for security.
In contemporary Chinese thought, sustained development requires opening up and in-
teraction with the outside world, which has brought more attention to the interrelations 
between internal and external threats. This new security concept reflects an increased 
awareness of the risks of accommodation to international regimes, so that the increased 
interaction and dependence on foreign influence in Chinese society and the economy 
have blurred the boundaries of Chinese ‘interests.’ As a result, China has become more 
supportive of multilateral approaches in international security activities.158 Taking part 
in multilateral fora reduces the likelihood that these organisations could be used ‘against’ 
China. 159 
China has been one of the major producers of CO2 emissions in the world for some 
decades now. Although China participated in the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, it is deemed to be a developing nation and 
153  Public awareness in Europe and the US, which may also provide tangible support for securitisation moves, 
has been increased by the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize award to the IPCC and Al Gore. An Inconvenient Truth 
(directed by Davis Guggenheim 2006, Lawrence Bender Productions) has played a not insignificant role in 
raising awareness in the US and Europe.
154  See for example Deudney (1990) and Trombetta (2008) for discussions.
155  See Chapter 7.1. below for a discussion of Chinese notions of security.
156  Military considerations have not disappeared from Chinese security estimates (Ong 2007), and the procure-
ment of offensive weapons platforms still seems to be the norm in the rest of Pacific Asia as well (Hartfield & 
Job 2007). Indeed, old preoccupations with territory, sovereignty and core values have not disappeared from 
Chinese security thought, but merely been ‘secured’ to the extent that other preoccupations can take the main 
stage. 
157  Although Chinese leaders increasingly include the rhetoric of sustainable development in their rhetoric and 
policy planning, notably sustained development still takes priority over sustainable development. 
158  Beyond being one of the permanent five of the UN Security Council, the first Chinese headquarters of an 
international organisation is that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which is mainly focused precisely 
on security issues. China has also been active in the six-party talks on the North-Korean issue, and also taken 
part in the ASEAN Regional Forum.
159  See Johnston (2003).
150
Chapter 6
has therefore had no CO2 emission reduction obligations. In 2008, the year in which Chi-
nese officials also admitted that it was the largest producer of the so-called greenhouse 
gasses, the Chinese authorities issued their first White Paper on Chinese policies towards 
Climate Change (Information Office 2008).
An analysis of China’s policy positions in this White Paper (Information Office 2008) 
indicates that China is willing to align itself with the general trend on issues of climate 
change: while the issue is expressed as a major concern for humanity, the proposed means 
to tackle it are closer to ‘macropolitisation’ than macrosecuritisation. For example in the 
Foreword to the White Paper, the issue is presented as a global concern: “Global climate 
change and its adverse effects are a common concern of mankind.” However, the reason for 
this challenge to the survival and development of human society is placed on the activi-
ties of developed nations. China is depicted as a developing nation, which is thereby being 
adversely affected by Climate Change, which threatens its “natural ecosystems as well as 
the economic and social development.” While “[f]ully aware of the importance and urgency 
of addressing climate change”  as well as its likely negative impacts on Chinese society in 
the form of “augmented threats to the safety of life and property, and to the normal order 
and stability of social life,” the measures listed in the White Paper160 do not go past ‘regu-
lar’ policies and are in fact stated as being in line with the current political line of the Hu 
Jintao government: “the concept of harmonious development between man and Nature […
and…] the Scientific Outlook on Development, establishing a harmonious society and stick-
ing to the sustainable development road.” 
Thereby, the Chinese authorities do not advocate or strive to legitimise any ‘breaking 
of rules’ via the issue of global climate change. The paper does raise the issue as a major 
concern with adverse effects, yet it does not raise the issue as an issue of national or 
global security requiring drastic measures. ‘Actively participating in worldwide efforts to 
address climate change’ and ‘adapting’ to climate change, cannot be considered ‘special 
politics’ beyond the regular bargaining in international relations.161 As such, China still 
argues for the necessity to place its own economic development before the reduction of 
emissions.
The White Paper thus raises the urgency of the issue of Climate Change, which is re-
flected in the broad range of government measures, projects, tax-relief and legislation, as 
well as international cooperation and awareness raising. A final boost beyond being an 
urgent political issue to that of national, or in this case global or universal security, is not 
apparent in the document, or any other major policy outlines published by the Chinese 
authorities.162 Thus, while the official Chinese security concept has been broadened in 
160  “To address climate change, China adheres to the following guidelines: To give full effect to the Scientific Outlook 
on Development, adhere to the fundamental state policy of resources conservation and environmental protec-
tion, control greenhouse gas emissions and enhance the country’s capacity for sustainable development, center 
on securing economic development and accelerate the transformation of the pattern of economic development, 
focus on conserving energy, optimizing the energy structure and strengthening eco-preservation and construction, 
and rely on the advancement of science and technology, increase international cooperation, constantly enhance 
the capability in coping with climate change, and make new contribution in protecting the world environment.” 
(Information Office 2008.)
161  “The UNFCCC and the Tokyo Protocol are the main programs for addressing climate change. The two documents 
lay the legal foundation for international cooperation in dealing with climate change, and reflect the common 
understanding of the international community.” (Information Office 2008.)
162  See for example State Council: China National Plan for Coping with Climate Change; Outreach session of the 
G8 summit; APEC meeting; East-Asia Summit; Boao Forum for Asia; Chinese president and premier ‘energeti-
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the 1990s and 2000s, Climate Change is still not labelled as a major security concern, 
even though it is recognised as a major concern for the whole of humanity. According to 
the Chinese authorities, a solution to the issue requires international economic, techno-
logical and legal cooperation, rather than uni- or multilateral security measures. While 
China participates and engages in the ‘macropoliticisation’ of climate change, this, how-
ever, cannot be deemed successful macrosecuritisation in the Chinese case. This would 
support Buzan and Wæver’s (Buzan et al. 1998; 2003; 2009) observation that environ-
mental securitisation has mainly been successful in politicising issues rather than secu-
ritising them. 
As regards the final macrosecuritisation discourse of the GWoT, while the anti-nuclear 
and climate change discourses are either non-existent or remain within the realm of 
‘regular politics’ respectively, the discourse of the Global War on Terror seems to be on 
a different dimension in terms of its prevalence and effects. In the 2000s China has been 
actively engaged in this dominant macrosecuritisation of the era. The Chinese official 
response to the September 11 airline hijack attacks in the US already leaned towards 
the macro level, when Jiang Zemin described terrorism as a “common scourge” for the 
international community (People’s Daily Online September 12 2001). Similarly in a May 
2002 position paper (Foreign Ministry 2002), the Chinese authorities noted that “[t]he 
September 11th incident indicates that non-traditional security issues as represented by 
international terrorism are of graver concern. […] [R]recent years have seen a noticeable 
rise of international terrorist activities, which constitutes a real threat to regional and in-
ternational peace and is becoming an important factor of uncertainty affecting the security 
situation.” While supporting many US initiatives by, for example, backing U.N. Resolution 
1373 and ratifying China’s accession to the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Terrorist Bombings and also as a party to the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Financing Terrorism,163 China had even presaged the issues of terrorism 
and religious extremism in its own domestic security continuums in the 1990s.164 While 
China has engaged in the GWoT discourse, it has its own dynamic in and utility for it, for 
the GWoT discourse is not as overriding as for example it is in the US,165 yet it has been 
useful for China.166
cally promote global action to cope with climate change’ (Information Office 2008).
163  Chinese support has, however, not been unequivocal. China criticised the US invasion of Iraq as well as its 
permanent bases in Central Asia for example. While the early stages of the GWoT warmed Sino-US relations, US 
activities in Asia can still be read as a means of containing China.
164  Chinese security continuums containing separatism predate even the initiation of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation’s ‘threat package’ of the ‘three evils’ in the form of the strike hard campaign, which was 
launched in April 1996 as a nationwide crackdown on crime. While an influential report published in Renmin 
ribao (29.4.1996) focused on various criminal activities, as Dillon (2004, 84-85) reports, the focus of the 
campaign was directed at unofficial political organisations and separatist activities in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and 
Xinjiang. The initial criminal element was put into a continuum with “violent and terrorist cases organised and 
manipulated by national separatist forces” as well as “unlawful religious activities.” A securitisation discourse 
was quite evidently apparent already here. In this process, Islam was singled out as the greatest religious threat 
to national stability when compared to Christianity, Buddhism and Daoism (Dillon 2004, 90). Three years later, 
this was to be changed when Falungong received the status of the overriding threat (see Case IV below).
165  In his interview for 60 Minutes in 2008 (CBS 2009), president elect Barack Obama for example listed the 
capture or killing of Osama bin Laden as a top national security priority for the US. On May 2, 2011 Obama 
announced that Osama bin Laden had been killed in a US military operation in Pakistan.
166  In addition to warming Sino-US relations, Chinese authorities also have other uses for securitising separatist 
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If, for example, the Chinese campaign against the ‘three evils’ (i.e., ‘religious extrem-
ism, separatism, and terrorism’) is examined, it becomes quite clear how the GWoT mac-
rosecuritisation has been utilised to bring China’s domestic ‘problems’ (e.g., Taiwanese, 
Xinjiang and Tibetan separatists, and the Falungong) into the macro-process, and to link 
other issues within the same constellation (the ‘international struggle against cults’ is 
also utilised in this discourse for the same purpose).167 This also exhibits how macrose-
curitisations can be of political utility but without a ‘common concern.’168
Quite soon after the US had initiated its ‘War on Terror’ and thus defined the main 
global security discourse for the 2000s, on October 19-21 2001, Chinese representatives 
at the APEC summit in Shanghai identified ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorist forces’ as a part of 
the global terrorist movement that the US and its allies were fighting, and further specifi-
cally claimed that Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang had connections with Osama bin Laden 
and Al-Qaeda. Eventually China was also successful in getting the “East Turkistan Islamic 
Movement” (ETIM) on the US and UN terrorist organisation list.169 The ‘three evils’ is also 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s main ’threat package’ and has been used to se-
curitise human trafficking by linking it too with terrorism (Jackson 2006, 310).170
Thus, as global security discourse witnessed its most important shift since the desecu-
ritisation of the Cold War, the Chinese authorities linked the insurgency in Xinjiang171 to 
activities in its ‘periphery.’ The securitisation of Xinjiang insurgency as terrorism and separatism, in addition 
to the other two hotspots Taiwan and Tibet, works towards motivating the Chinese majority against these 
movements, and thus, according to Wayne (2008), increases the Chinese authorities’ legitimacy and possibili-
ties to deal with insurgency and separatism. The graver the securitisation, the graver the threat, and the more 
the authorities are endowed with legitimacy or approval for the actions they take to deal with the claimed 
threats.
167  The strike hard campaign in Xinjiang has contained many elements of threats, referents and benefits. 
Hostile forces both internationally and within, were portrayed as ‘colluding in jeopardising Chinese unity 
and social stability’, thereby endangering social development (cf., Wayne 2008, 23). The acts of the Chinese 
authorities were working toward repelling these threats and thereby ensuring the Chinese border (and sover-
eignty) and the continuation of economic development and social progress. While the continuum of ‘violent and 
terrorist cases organised and manipulated by national separatist forces’ as well as ‘unlawful religious activities’ 
portrayed an insecure situation vis-à-vis violent crime, separatism and illegal religion, there were also reports 
of the successes of the strike hard campaign. In accordance with ‘security grammars’ these reports portray the 
means of achieving security, the repulsion of the threat. The possibility of continued insecurity was however 
retained, even in celebratory reports on the progress of the ‘strike hard’ campaign.
Garner Bovigndon (2004, 4) also notes that the PRC’s other provincial-level autonomous regions i.e., Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Ningxia and even Tibet, have been far quieter in terms of unrest in the 1990s, which may 
explain the authorities emphasis on Xinjiang unrest as a threat. While Xinjiang has been the focus of Chinese 
authorities and the Western Press, other insurgencies, for example in Palestine, Chechnya, Aceh and Mindanao, 
have been far more violent and frequent in terms of incidents (see IISS database, http://www.iiss.org/publica-
tions/armed-conflict-database/).
168  It would appear that China or Indonesia, for example, do not use the GWoT macrosecuritisation out of a 
concern for the ‘West’ or the United States, but for their own concerns. Similarly, on the other side of the constel-
lation, while Al-Qaeda may want to subsume all Islamist movements to within their base-walls, most Southeast 
Asian movements have local or regional aspirations and do not share the goals of bin Laden, even though they 
may have contacts and cooperation with Al-Qaeda.
169  ETIM was listed as an international terrorist organisation by the US and the UN on August 26 2002. The US 
Department of State’s (2004) report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 has also had ETIM on its list of interna-
tional terrorist groups, while other groups listed by China were deemed as ineligible for the list.
170  The concern about these three issues lumped together was already present in the first statement of the 
meeting between the five participants (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan; Uzbekistan was 
admitted to the group in June 2001 when the SCO was formally promulgated), which has retroactively been 
nominated as the initial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation where the security continuum of 
‘splittism’, ethnic exclusion and religious extremism was clearly present.
171  On the level of practice, the Chinese response to the insurgency in Xinjiang since the ‘Baren uprising’ of 
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the international campaign against terrorism. In January 2002, the Information Office of 
the PRC State Council (2002) released a document which is still the most comprehensive 
account published openly of separatist resistance and organisation in Xinjiang by Chinese 
authorities (Millward 2004). This document, as well as the increased flow thereafter of 
official information on violent incidents in Xinjiang, previously termed as ‘splittism’, but 
after 2001 as ‘terrorism’, demonstrates the practical effects of the GWoT macrosecuriti-
sation in Chinese official policies.172 In accordance with the new global trend of security 
speech, ‘East Turkistan terrorists’ were now presented as a security threat to interna-
tional society, that is, the security and stability of related countries and regions, the sta-
bility of society, and the lives and property of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang (Information 
Office 2002). As Buzan & Wæver (2009) note, it indeed seems that the selection of which 
terms are elevated to top official status as security issues, is both an international as well 
as a domestic concern.173
As is evident from the above analysis of the four macrosecuritisation discourses with 
‘Chinese characteristics’, Chinese authorities have either formed their own dynamic in 
the securitisations (Cold War and GWoT discourses), or they have not actually securi-
tised the issue at all (anti-nuclear discourse), although perhaps tacitly acknowledging 
the existence of the discourse (global climate change discourse). While this supports the 
existence of macrosecuritisations as an organising force in global security discourse, it 
also seems to indicate that the discourses and their ‘high’ status are more likely to be uti-
lised on issues where parochial interests are of concern. The analysis also demonstrated 
how assumptions of the appearance of securitisation discourses can be ‘falsified’ through 
empirical investigation.
1990 has evolved into a ‘four-in-one approach’ consisting of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police, the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (兵团, bīngtuán), and the people (Xinhua 26.5.2003). Other clusters of 
instances of violence Chinese official sources consistently refer to, are a series of explosions and attempted 
bombings in 1992-1993 involving busses and stores as targets, and a wave of protests, explosions and assas-
sinations in 1996-1997, which coincided with the initial meetings of the ‘Shanghai Five’ and the initiation of 
the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign. (Dillon 2004, 62-65; Millward 2004.) Wayne (2008) describes how the Chinese 
anti-insurgent operation has evolved: the initial use of PLA-force has been replaced with an emphasis on the 
People’s Armed Police and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. (Wayne sees the success of the 
Chinese anti-insurgency activities as resulting from unique cultural, political and other situational factors, but 
also from the emphasis on bottom-up techniques.) The Chinese have used a mixed set of hard- and soft-power, 
ranging from eliminating insurgent leaders to co-opting groups and integrating ideas into the ‘core’ of Chinese 
society. 
172  Jackson (2008, 154-155) notes how the 9/11 US attacks effected a restructuring of priorities throughout 
Central Asia.
173  In his analysis of the Beijing Review and Government Work reports, Wang Hongying (2003) has found four 
persistent images of China presented in these official publications directed at foreign publics. These portray 
China as 1) a peace-loving nation, 2) a victim of foreign aggression, 3) an opponent of hegemony, and 4) a 
developing country. Andrew Scobell (2001) argues that Chinese elites hold three core beliefs: that the Chinese 
are a) a peace-loving people, b) not aggressive or expansionist, and c) only use force in defence. These images 
seem to be internalised and constitutive as they have moulded Chinese foreign policy in the long-term, while 
‘strategic images’ of China as a bastion of revolution have only had slight or short-term effects (Wang 2003; 
cf., Van Ness 1970). ‘Realist’ Chinese behaviour may then be interpreted and perceived in China through these 




6.2.3. Security, Event, Context – The Post-Structurality of Securitisation Theory
We have seen above that securitisation discourses may or may not appear in the ‘wild’. 
This raises the question of ‘what explains’ securitisation or ‘what makes it understand-
able.’ Here we are venturing into the debate on what kind of a theory the ‘theory’ of secu-
ritisation is, or should be.
As already noted, there have been a number of critics of the CopS approach who have 
had reservations with the emphasis placed on speech acts in the framework. These de-
bates have created multiple positions, but they seem to revolve around the same issue of 
contention between structure and agency.174 One such division has been formed around 
views on the ‘event’ or ‘performance’ of speech acts. Inspired by Jacques Derrida (1978; 
1988) and Judith Butler (e.g., 1999), Wæver’s early works on securitisation (e.g., Wæver 
1989a; 1995) emphasised the ‘internalist’ aspect of securitisation. This ‘postmodern’ or 
‘performative’ understanding has been criticised by scholars, who focus on the ‘external-
ist’ or ‘constructivist’ aspects of securitisation. They have emphasised the process of se-
curitisation, and especially the ‘field’ of security (Bigo 1994; Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007), 
drawing from the works of Pierre Bourdieu.175 Balzacq (2010c) posits this division as one 
between philosophical and sociological approaches; Wæver, on the other hand, sees this 
division as one between constitutive and causal theories.
As regards the issue of causality as opposed to constitutiveness, my reasoning is that 
causal theories of securitisation should be based on a theory of how security issues are 
constituted. While also examining actually occurred speech, the theoretical propositions 
regarding the illocutionary logic of speech acts of this present study, accordingly, operate 
within the dimension of constitutiveness. It must also be noted that even when dealing 
with empirical investigations, there will always be a causal jump between securitisation 
and actual ‘brute’ effects e.g., violent dispersion of protestors, or breakout of war.176 In a 
similar way, I contend that the sociological study of securitisation processes should be 
based on a linguistic foundation with respect to speech acts.177 In terms of the internal/
external division, I suggest that the rules of language, as well as conventions of securitisa-
tion, are intersubjective and thereby external. Yet, these rules and conventions can be ap-
plied creatively so that acts of securitisation can constitute something that was not there 
before; even if the conventions and social assets necessary to bring about something new 
174  In addition to the distinction of the internalist and externalist understandings of securitisation i.e., empha-
sis on the event or process nature of securitisation, there has also been a distinction between emphasising the 
spectacle of politics (on politics as a spectacle, see Edelman [1972], and Debord [1992]) or the technocratic 
nature of more mundane securitisation (e.g., Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006a). The spectacle of securitisation 
emphasises securitisation as ‘high politics’ e.g., major representatives of states are in the best position to voice 
security and therefore the study of securitisation should focus on these processes. The technocratic approach 
emphasises the ‘security professional’ who by her actions sets what is security, i.e., modulates insecurities.
175  Wæver’s theory actually contains elements of both the internalist and externalist understandings, which 
can be found in his three facilitating conditions, for example. Holger Stritzel (2007, 366) sees this as creating 
conceptual tension within Wæver’s theory.
176  Empirical appliers to Asian contexts have effectively made the same conclusion; see e.g., Curley & Wong 
(2008a).
177  The basis for this argument has been presented in Chapter 1.2. above. It is, of course, possible to develop 
means to study securitisation without examination of speech acts at all: even securitisation can be studied on 
several levels of analysis, and the focus can be on various aspects of securitisation processes, e.g., the resources 
available to actors and the nature of the relations (e.g., amity/enmity) of relevant actors.
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would be external, the act itself can create something new that is internal to the act. Simi-
larly, most social facts are ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective (i.e., 
intersubjective); social facts or status functions of security can be both self-referential 
and intersubjective.
The basis for my position may become clear through an analogy of the study of other 
speech acts. If the linguistic root of securitisation theory is taken seriously (as in this 
study), then the linguistic study of securitisation in IR should be equivalent to the lin-
guistic study of, say, promising in IR. Such a study of promising would not make much 
sense without including the relevant contexts of the empirical objects of study. Yet, these 
contexts would not close promising off. A ‘model’, a ‘grammar’, a ‘theory’, or a ‘langue’ of 
promising is required in order to study promising in specific empirical contexts.178 While 
equivalent in this way, the study of promising and securitisation in international politics 
would also differ in an important way. Promising is similar to pre-theoretical objects such 
as chairs and dogs, whereas securitisation is a theoretical object (cf., Chernoff 2009); 
‘promising’ is part of a folk-taxonomy (Wierzbicka 1991) whereas ‘securitisation’ is an 
artificial academic notion. While it can be fairly certain that promises exist, and existed 
before a linguistic theory of promising, this is not so certain in the case of securitisation. 
From an instrumentalist point of view, we do not have to assume that the theoretical ob-
ject of securitisation exists, yet we can begin our investigation ‘as if ’ it would.
Effectively, the argument posed here is that real processes of social construction are 
more complex than academic models of them. Accordingly, models are more formal, and 
based only on a certain aspect of such processes. Thereby, I contend that for the theory 
of securitisation, the focus on speech acts is the most productive foundation to build on. 
But this does not entail that processes of securitisation need only concern speech acts. In-
deed, Huysmans (2006a, 25) argues that the rationale of security should not be confused 
with the ‘physical utterance of security.’ The security rationale refers to constellations 
of meanings that allow for speech acts of securitisation to do their work; “security ra-
tionalities define the meaning of security” (ibid., 147). Huysmans emphasises that these 
constellations of meanings need not be understood as a set of rules that could easily be 
changed or manipulated, but that they can undergo change like a grammar or a language. 
Securitisation speech acts draw on historically constituted and socially institutionalised 
sets of meaning, which have to retain some continuity in order for the speech acts to have 
the capacity to generate meaningful speech.179 This constellation of meanings makes it 
possible for the performativity of securitisation speech to succeed: thus, how certain is-
sues are perceived and understood can change to be in accordance with this ‘rationale’ 
i.e., securitisation speech can be used to create a new situation.180
Issues of interpretation, perception, reception, and perlocutionary effects are even more 
prominent if we examine how images and symbols can be intertwined into securitisation 
178  Habermas (1984) makes a similar point in how ‘universal’ and ‘empirical’ pragmatics should work together, 
lest the study of language be ‘empty and blind.’
179  Huysmans’s (2006a, 147) intention is to shift emphasis from the language of security to the logics of its 
practice.
180  Even though securitisation also often draws on pre-existing images and understandings, and in this manner, 
some processes of securitisation can be viewed as a ‘translation of threat images’ (Stritzel 2009), even here, it 
should be borne in mind that a translation is also a creation of something new.
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discourse or rationality. Indeed, there have been numerous calls to include images and 
the media environment generally in the analysis of securitisation and the wider construc-
tion of security issues (e.g., Hansen 2000; 2011; Williams 2003; Möller 2007; McDonald 
2008a). For example Michael C. Williams asks not only how images affect securitisation 
acts, but also how the visual representation of various policy options influences security 
practices, and how images impact viewers in a way that is different from that of words on 
listeners, or text on readers.181
For Plato, speech was primary to text, as any text could become an ‘orphan letter’, 
while in a speech situation the sender and the receiver(s) were present and unambigu-
ous (Derrida 1978; Rancière 2008).182 While messages cannot be transmitted without 
interpretation even in situations of direct speech communication, with a written text ‘au-
thentic communication’ or ‘real meanings’ become even more complicated, as shown by 
Jacques Derrida. For Michel de Certeau (1988, xxi), even reading is not passive, for the 
reader enters the text, moves back and forth along it, and ‘lives’ within it. Indeed, reading 
a text creates an intertextual situation, where every instance of reading, even of the same 
text by the same person, has the potential to be unique, as the reader will connect the text 
being read with different connotations, texts and experiences.183
While written text is more open to interpretation than a situation of direct speech 
involving non-verbal communication, the interpretation of images is even more open. 
Images do not necessarily constitute a language, which makes the communication of spe-
cific meanings rather challenging. Most importantly, images can convey emotions with-
out recourse to language, which may be the aspect in which their relevance for acts of 
securitisation is the most significant. 
However, without a previous securitisation, or a security rationale that the image rep-
resents or connotates, it would be difficult to convey an act of securitisation with images 
alone. If an image is to have an influence on an act of securitisation, it must be ‘anchored’ 
to a meaning, that is, the ‘floating chain of signifieds’ has to be affixed to a preferred 
reading of the image (Barthes 1977, 38).184 Since images can convey emotion, affective 
images especially can have a facilitating effect in securitisation processes where, on the 
one hand, threats and fear, yet on the other, certainty and relief, play major roles. Just as 
with standard advertisement practice, when bound to securitisation processes, images 
can evoke emotions that thereby facilitate the ‘purchase’ of a securitisation argument, 
181  This approach to the inclusion of images in securitisation processes seems to suggest that the focus of study 
should be on how images operate to the facilitation or impediment of the legitimacy of certain policies being 
proposed or implemented by officials. It would, however, be interesting to also investigate how images impact 
political choices of decision-makers: for example, how do video-recordings of demonstrations by security 
‘professionals’ affect political decisions on how demonstrations in particular, or in general, should be handled? 
This is an especially pertinent question as video surveillance capabilities are being increased in many states 
and societies.
182  There are numerous ‘illocutionary devices’, e.g., intonation that guide listeners’ interpretations of the ‘force’ 
of real utterances (Wierzbicka 1991, 197-199). Also Sbisà (2001) emphasises the possibility to ‘qualify’ illocu-
tionary force in various ways.
183  See Der Derian & Shapiro (1989) for a selection of studies in the intertextual nature of international 
relations and their study.
184  Huysmans (2008, 177) notes how images of sewed-up eyelids and lips of individualised and ‘biologised’ 
refugees have no political significance without the mediation of public media, mobilisation, and contestation in 
courts. Similarly, while such images may be evocative emotionally or aesthetically, without their anchorage to 
issues of immigration and refugees, their political message is lost.
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in addition to providing either evidence or a degree of plausibility for the claims of the 
securitising actor. But as Frank Möller (2007) has argued, even textual interventions into 
images cannot guarantee that they will then be understood and perceived the way the 
intervention suggests. Instead, it is important what the perceiver, or consumer, of the 
images does with them (Certeau 1988). Images intended to facilitate an argument, may 
actually, contrarily, end up impeding it. The consumer or receiver of an image can also 
resist the general flow of signs (Tarasti 2005).
To examine such an aspect of securitisation requires entry into a less discussed view 
of securitisation processes, namely securitisation as symbolic action.185 As with most of 
‘high-politics’ and other formalised social processes, senders and receivers with the right 
kind of ‘socio-political capital’ have to be present in order to have ‘social magic’ success-
fully conjured (Bourdieu 1991). Edelman (1972, 95) has similarly argued that although 
all of an interlocutor’s acts take place in a setting, that is usually taken for granted whilst 
focus is on the actions of those involved instead. However, some formalistic acts greatly 
depend on their settings, which are not merely physical, but in their essence social and 
fundamental for symbol formation (Ibid. 103).186 Religious ceremonies often require a 
special setting, as do many official political events, such as sessions of parliament, where 
correct symbols have to be present, be they in the form of cloak or gavel. Settings may 
have conducive resonance for the political message delivered: think of for example the 
declaration “mission accomplished” behind George W. Bush on the deck of the aircraft 
carrier Abraham Lincoln during his speech on May 1 2003. The immediate setting of any 
political act can then be widely recognised as either appropriate or inappropriate for the 
kind of act committed.187 
Images may be strong facilitation or impediment factors in securitisation/desecuri-
tisation processes, yet, as their interpretation is up to their perceiver, they have to be 
anchored to certain meanings in order for them to operate as part of a securitisation/
desecuritisation process.188 Without ‘anchorage’ the images may remain too open in in-
185  Interestingly, while the relevance of ‘contexts’ for securitisation speech acts has been widely examined, the 
symbolic settings of securitisation speech acts have received relatively little attention. Mark B. Salter (2008) 
has studied the effects of settings on securitisation processes; whether a securitisation discourse is taking place 
in a popular, elite, technocratic, or scientific setting can affect how threats and remedies are articulated. While 
Buzan et al. (1998) deal partly with this issue in terms of the sectors of security having ‘dialects’, this could 
also be the case in terms of types of actors and audiences. Defining these types of factors too specifically would 
however risk biasing a certain type of political order. I argue that the features of settings identified by Salter 
should be part of the facilitating factors within the model; certain settings facilitate, or impede, certain types of 
securitisation arguments.
Here the settings of securitisation acts do not draw on dramaturgy and the stage and backstage of securitisation 
speech, but on the symbolic settings of securitisation: how do symbols present at security speech situations 
affect securitisation? Thus, which symbols facilitate, and which impede, securitisation acts?
186  The symbolic uses of politics are closely connected to political speech acts in formal settings. Edelman 
(1972, 98) has identified three functions for the settings of political acts: 1) to impress large audiences, 2) 
to legitimise a series of future acts and thus maximise acquiescence to and compliance with them, and 3) the 
establishment or reinforcement of a particular definition of the self as a public official.
187  This is where Michael Moore also derives his satire in Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004, directed by Michael Moore, 
Fellowship Adventure Group): it seems an inappropriate symbolic setting for President Bush to be securitising 
terrorists while he is playing golf.
188  For example the Doomsday Clock of the Atomic Scientists (Vuori 2010a) demonstrates how symbols can 
be intertwined with security discourse. The symbol of the Clock evokes and thereby facilitates all of the crucial 
ingredients involved in a securitisation grammar: the lateness of the hour (urgency), impending doom (existen-
tial threat), as well as the possibility to reverse course by moving the hands of time far away from midnight (way 
out). Thus, display of the Clock can be seen as a securitisation move, but the uptake of this move depends on the 
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terpretation to have any meaningful chance of securitisation, that is, they remain floating 
signifiers. The causal effects of symbols and images may be impossible to determine and 
quantify ‘in the wild.’
The above discussion of images in relation to securitisation processes reinforces the, al-
ready noted, prudence of separating the felicitous achievement of a securitisation act, 
and even the successful constitution of a security issue, from the success of the politics 
in construction of a security issue. The assessment of these types of issues requires tools 
beyond securitisation theory, which demonstrates how security issues are constituted 
through speech acts.189 A phenomenon (e.g., the social construction of security) can be 
modelled in various ways, allowing various interventions or understandings on it. The 
social construction of security can be studied through the theory of securitisation, but 
other options are available as well.190 
The quantification of causality in social relations is indeed difficult, and as regards 
linguistic causality, this functions in a different way than physical causality, as already 
noted by Austin: the causes of saying something, differ from the causes in the physical 
sense; causality in saying must operate through the conventions of language, and is a 
matter of influence exerted by one person on another (Austin 1975, 113). This illustrates 
the insight of Wæver in his formulation of securitisation theory as a constitutive theory: 
since it is virtually impossible to quantify the causal effectiveness of social constructions, 
it is prudent to understand the constitution of social reality. To reveal the contingency of 
these constructions, and their political nature vis-à-vis issues of even security, creates an 
opportunity for an ethical intervention, by either the scholar who studies securitisation 
or the reader of scholarly work.
Speech acts are not limited to speech: they can be accomplished through either the 
act of speaking, writing, hand signals, image creation or any other system of symbols 
and meaning representation.191 From the point of view of politics, these various means 
to achieve communicative interaction, inclusive of the use of images and the systems of 
meaning to which they can be attributed to, are embedded in fields of power and prac-
tices. Thereby it is important to keep in mind that what speech act theory, and thereby 
also securitisation theory is about, is not words (or verbs), but illocutionary force. Such 
forces may be brought about by words and utterances, but other forms of interaction 
(e.g., images) may at times also achieve perlocutionary effects.192
institutionalised status of the previous securitisation moves connected with it, that is, one has to be aware of 
the status of the Doomsday Clock in order for the securitisation move to be effective. Not all clock-faces entail 
a securitisation move.
189  For example McCrea and Markle (1989, 58) suggest resource mobilisation theories focusing on mobilisation, 
mass media manipulation, and coalition building to explain the ebb and flow of the nuclear peace movement. 
The question is how to combine norms, material constraints and social constructions into one study? How do 
securitisation arguments and moves weave into the more general practices of social mobilisation, its legitimisa-
tion and suppression?
190  See for example Weldes et al. (1999), CASE (2006), and Hansen (2006).
191  Indeed, Austin (1975, 119-120) emphasised that even in instances where an illocutionary act can be 
performed non-verbally, the means for achieving its ends non-verbally most of the time have to be conventional, 
even though you can use unconventional means of achieving uptake.
192  Enquiries into the means of illocutionary acts beyond utterances would demand that the theory of securiti-
sation develop its stance on theories of signs. Thus, this type of research now requires a semiology/semiotics/
semiosis of securitisation. I have made some suggestions on how to connect Peircean semiotics onto the protec-
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The realisation that speech acts are about more than ‘mere’ words may lessen some 
of the anxiety of critics who frown upon the study of such acts. Further, as already noted, 
for some, securitisation is about more than ‘speech acts’. For Huysmans (2006a, 153): 
“Securitisation is not a speech act but a multidimensional process in which skills, expert 
knowledge, institutional routines as well as discourses of danger modulate the relation 
between security and freedom.” His move to incorporate political theory and Foucauldian 
techniques of government into the study of the politics of insecurity, takes this approach 
beyond what the CopS has presented in their works. Huysmans recognises that what he 
is doing in the ‘wake’ of the linguistic turn of Security Studies and Foucault, is to focus 
on the technocratic analysis of techniques of government. This kind of move brings with 
it more levels of analysis than the CopS approach. My reasoning here is that a theory of 
communication or linguistic interaction should be the basis on which such broader ap-
proaches should be built on, and that the linguistic foundations of this kind of approach 
should be as explicit as possible. That speech acts of securitisation are rarely isolated 
incidents or one-off affairs does not mean that the logics and grammars of the linguis-
tic acts that form practices and processes of securitisation should not be explicated to a 
greater extent than they have been before.193 Making the roots of the framework of secu-
ritisation more defined also strengthens the branching out of the approach.
While Huysmans goes beyond the CopS approach by incorporating various other aspects 
to the study of securitisation, Thierry Balzacq (2005; 2010a) is the leading critic of the 
CopS’s ‘linguistic’ approach, which is why his argument is used as the counterpoint to 
the one outlined here. It seems that the difficulties in Balzacq’s critique may derive from 
two sources, namely Bourdieu (e.g., 1991) and Habermas (e.g., 1984). Balzacq (2005) 
emphasises the sociological aspect of securitisation processes, and argues that a focus 
on speech acts reduces the aspect of, for example, power to a linguistic convention like 
betting. While, in my view, the CopS approach does not do this, the problematic reading 
may be a result of Bourdieu’s critique of some structural linguists who take the rules of 
language as entirely determinant. However, Balzacq’s (2005; 2010a, 63-65) main argu-
ment is that securitisation should be taken as a ‘pragmatic act’, rather than a speech act. 
This position may derive from Habermas’s (1984) theory of communicative action, more 
specifically from his problematic position on illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in his 
division of communicative and strategic action. While Balzacq is correct to argue that se-
curitisation is often, at least partly, about the convincing of audiences, and that securitisa-
tion often has perlocutionary intentions, this does not mean that securitisation should be 
viewed as a perlocutionary (i.e., pragmatic) act; illocutionary acts can also have strategic 
objectives.194
tive belt of securitisation theory elsewhere (Vuori 2011).
193  The example of the Doomsday Clock also illustrates how a process of securitisation can last for several 
decades. Indeed, while securitisation theory is best understood as a constitutive theory, it does not mean (as 
some critics and commentators seem to suggest) that the analysis of securitisation would have to be limited 
to the ‘creation’ or the ‘constitutive moment’ of securitisation. ‘Real’ securitisation can be a lengthy process 
indeed, not purely a decision or a moment of creation. Since reality and political speech is fuzzier than the 
elegant models scholars create (cf., Wilkinson 2007), elegant models still allow a focus on relevant aspects of 
infinitely complex phenomena to be attempted.
194  Balzacq’s language of ‘security is a pragmatic act’ is not clear in this respect: as was noted before, security 
is not a speech act, and thus is unable to have perlocutionary effects in this sense (security may however, for 
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Launching his critique from an externalist and sociological angle, Balzacq suggests 
that Wæver has conflated the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of speech acts in 
his theory of securitisation; Balzacq (2005, 176-177) argues that Wæver’s approach re-
duces securitisation to the acts of the speaker, to the illocutionary aspect of speech acts, 
which leave no role for the audience of securitisation, that is, for the perlocutionary ef-
fects of securitisation.195 Balzacq seems to repeat Pierre Bourdieu’s (1991) criticism of 
formal and structural linguists. Bourdieu (ibid.; see also Thompson 1991, 2) argued that 
such approaches fail to grasp the social and political conditions of language formation, 
and especially language use. Wæver frequently (e.g., Buzan et al. 1998, 46-47; Wæver 
2000a, 286; Wæver 2003) notes that this was Bourdieu’s way to counter the tendency of 
some post-structuralists and philosophers of everyday language to consider the internal 
linguistic features of speech acts as entirely determinant. This was part of Bourdieu’s 
project to free sociology from all forms of domination by linguists and their conceptuali-
sations (Bourdieu 1991, 37).
Balzacq (2005, 185) presents securitisation as a strategy to swing audiences to favour 
the securitising actor. However, in my view, although a relevant aspect of securitisation, 
securitisation and security are not only about swinging audiences. As already noted, to 
speak of a matter as an issue of security is a political choice, which may have several 
kinds of motives behind it. Indeed, the perlocutionary effect of securitisation, as Wæver 
presents it, is legitimacy: securitisation justifies acts which would otherwise be consid-
ered unjustified i.e., it makes morally unacceptable policies196 become morally accept-
able, because they are seen to ensure the existence of something that should survive. 
However, legitimacy is not the only perlocutionary aim of securitisation. The process of 
securitisation may utilise securitisation moves with different aims as it goes on. Securi-
tisation may first be used as a warning or a deterrent, then as a basis to legitimise future 
drastic acts, and finally as a post-hoc justification, for example. In addition to legitimacy, 
controlled silence can also be the sign of a successful securitisation. The success of secu-
rity as silence may not be about swinging an audience in ones favour, but also to obtain 
desistance from some form of action e.g., popular resistance/uprising.
Another point of contention in these debates on securitisation is an echo of those on 
formality and openness within speech act theory’s applications in social theories. For ex-
ample, Balzacq (2005) criticises Wæver of reducing securitisation to conventional prac-
tices like marriage and betting. It should however be noted that while some speech acts 
have what Holdcroft (1978, 18-19) terms ‘conventional consequences’, not all do. Unlike 
standard perlocutionary effects, some speech acts (like a marriage declaration) do not 
have consequences that may or may not occur.197 In this sense securitisation is unlike bet-
example, have connotations or, through affects, some other effects). The speech act of securitisation however 
can have intended or unintentional perlocutionary effects. It might be clearer to posit that securitisation is a 
speech act, which when successful, brings about the status function of a security issue. 
195  For Wæver however, as we have already seen and will see below, the success or failure of securitisation has 
always been up to the audience, who the securitising actor tries to convince of the validity of her argument. 
Indeed, I reason that the perlocutionary effect is in fact the criterion for the success or failure of securitisation 
and a relevant aspect in the explication of the strands of securitisation speech acts.
196  Sometimes politicians too: securitisation has been utilised in interfactional struggle in the People’s Republic 
of China for example.
197  For Habermas (1984), some speech acts rely on social institutions, while others are more open, which for 
him allows ‘communicative action.’ While securitisation seems to conform to illocutionary conventions, most 
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ting: while betting has conventional consequences, securitisation may or may not have 
them, depending on the ‘strand’ of securitisation.198 Most securitisation moves are open 
in the sense that they are not declarations, in the sense that they have to be argued and 
their ‘success’ depends on effecting the desired perlocutionary effect.199
While illocutions may be performed with perlocutionary intentions (Searle & Vander-
veken 1985, 10; cf., Cohen 1973, 500; Holdcroft 1978, 21) and an illocutionary act may 
have a role to effectuate a matter, this does not necessarily mean that it has to be a per-
locutionary act (Holdcroft 1978, 22). This becomes evident when it is noted how non-
sensical it would be to say for example that ‘I convince you that you should do this’, or 
‘I persuade you that you are wrong’, or even that ‘I legitimise this as an issue of national 
security.’ Thereby, I believe that Habermas (1984) has a problem in categorising speech 
acts with perlocutionary intentions as ‘strategic’, while leaving illocutionary acts with-
out perlocutionary intentions as ‘communicative acts.’ Indeed, as he himself recognises, 
argumentation, which clearly should be the prime example of interaction that strives for 
understanding,200 can have “strategic [i.e., perlocutionary] aspects.” Indeed, while argu-
mentation seeks understanding, it also aims at convincing, which is a perlocutionary ef-
fect; thereby, I would argue that even understanding is a perlocutionary effect.
Another aspect of the internal/external debate on acts of securitisation is the issue of 
the ‘self-referentiality’ of security. Accordingly, Balzacq (2005, 171) also brings this point 
of contention up in his critique of the CopS approach. Like other criticisms of the ‘inter-
nal’ aspect of securitisation theory, he identifies a problem with the self-referentiality of 
security, with it being considered an intersubjective process: we either have to argue that 
security is a self-referential practice, thus forsaking perlocutionary effects, or we have to 
hold fast to the creed that using the concept of security also produces a perlocutionary 
effect, in which case we have to abandon self-referentiality.201
Thus the question arises: does the emphasis on audiences and perlocutionary effects, 
that is, the intersubjectivity of securitisation as discussed above, lead to security as not 
self-referential, as Balzacq argues? I contend that recognising the necessity of both illo-
cutionary and perlocutionary aspects does not mean security is not self-referential. John 
acts of securitisation do not seem to have conventional consequences.
198  And even in the case of strands which do have conventional consequences, even these are open and can 
fail, or be refused (even if only by violating the norm or convention); no act of securitisation is guaranteed or 
omnipotent in terms of it becoming a working social reality, no matter what kind of power of declaration some 
conventional and institutionalised social position may have.
Indeed, Wæver’s (1995, 80) footnote on securitisation being akin to raising a bet is an analogy rather than an 
equivalent.
199  Securitisation for deterrence differs in this sense, as its effects come into play only after a declaration 
has taken place. In the realm of security, declarations of war would be another example of a speech act with 
‘conventional consequences.’ A declaration of war is however quite different from most securitisation moves. 
See Chapter 6.3.2. below for the various strands of securitisation proposed in this present study.
200  Habermas’s (1984; see also 1979) communicative actions easily reads as extremely idealist. Even a precur-
sory reading of Schopenhauer (2005) shows how academic debates, which should be the form of life that most 
resembles Habermas’s communicative action, can be strategic indeed; Schopenhauer’s ‘eristic dialectics’ shows 
how academic discussions can be quite bereft of both truth and understanding.
201  Wæver’s internal aspects in his formulations of securitisation theory may be derived from his views on 
the possibilities allowed by discourse analysis of texts: discourse analysis should work within the text, and 
seek trancendental signifieds. This does not however mean other methods could not be deployed in order to 
examine variables beyond certain discourse samples. That the analysis of acts of securitisation works within 
discourse samples does not mean that these samples would be all there was or is as regards actually occurred 
social constructions of certain security issues.
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Searle (1996, 32-34) has noted that concepts that name social reality seem to have a 
peculiar kind of self-referentiality. Following Searle’s way to approach this issue, in order 
for something to be security it would have to be something considered to be security. If 
everybody ceases to believe this something to be security, then it ceases its function as 
security, and eventually ceases to be security.202 The very concept of security is self-refer-
ential, as in order for something to fall under the concept of security it must be believed 
to be satisfying the definition of security; part of being security is that it is believed to be 
just that, security. This is a feature of all social facts. 
Further, continuing along the externalist approach, Balzacq (2005, 181) argues that 
language does not construct reality; at best it shapes our perception of it. I concur with 
this position when it comes to issues such as, for example, the colour spectrum. However, 
social facts such as the status function of security are fundamentally different: they are 
political issues that exist only in a human-dependent form, even though some ‘threats’ 
have their basis in ‘brute reality.’ Yet, such brute facts have to be provided with a layer of 
social reality in order to have a status function for humans. Self-referentiality does not 
mean a divorce from the ‘real world’ or even ‘brute reality.’ Social facts are epistemologi-
cally objective, yet ontologically subjective. At the same time, the construction of social 
facts and institutions (like security) are both self-referential and intersubjective. A tank 
is only a ‘tank’ to humans who perceive the status function of a tank, even if a ‘tank’ can 
still cause their death without a status function of any kind. Similarly, that a status func-
tion for the human independent phenomenon of hurricanes is provided, clearly, will not 
affect what the physical effects of hurricanes are (unless this leads to, for example, human 
action in preparation for them). But hurricanes are also not spoken about as a security 
threat in the sense security in relation to international relations is (e.g., hurricanes can-
not jeopardise the sovereignty of states which are social institutions, unless the hurri-
cane happens to also eliminate humanity as such).203 Security in international affairs is 
relational, but one cannot be relational with hurricanes.204
But the question remains: why does security constituted by a belief to be security, not 
lead to infinite regress (cf., Searle 1996, 52-53)? I reason, along Searle’s lines, that the 
word ‘security’ marks a node in a complex network of intertwined practices inclusive of 
defence and surveillance;205 further, ‘security’ is a modality (Hansen 2000) or a rationale 
(Huysmans 2006a) that can operate in the absence of ‘security words.’ Although Balzacq 
(cf., 2005, 180) seems to view the term or concept of security as being a necessity to 
produce the speech act of securitisation, for Wæver (e.g., Buzan et al. 1998, 27), the word 
‘security’ is not required in order to have securitisation.206 The speech act of securitisa-
202  Wæver (2000a, 253) seems to implicitly follow this understanding when he speaks about the normative 
goal of securitisation studies; he has proposed that securitisation studies should aim at desecuritisation.
203  Catastrophic effects of hurricanes can, of course, facilitate threats that can bring the sovereignty of a state 
to an end, if another state sees its opportunity for an attack or a secessionist group decides to take action, for 
example.
204  We may be witnessing a shift in the predominant understanding of ‘security’ in international politics: slow 
physical processes in the global atmosphere seem to be attaining a sense of a threat to survival, which is of 
a different nature to those posed by humans via states and their weaponry. Whether such slowly progress-
ing threats will be incorporated into ‘security’, or whether they will be conceptualised in a different manner, 
remains to be seen. See Trombetta (2008) for a discussion of this issue.
205  See e.g., Lyon (2006; 2007).
206  Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 10) argue that speakers often perform illocutionary acts implicitly through 
the explicit performance of other illocutions by relying on background knowledge and the mental capacities 
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tion does not happen if, for example, an actor utters the word security, but through the 
production of an impression of a threat to something’s existence (e.g., by claiming and 
warning) through the suggestion that some emergency action will repel the threat. In-
deed, the word security may not have to be used at all, as security can manifest itself on 
a metaphorical level, implicitly or through institutional security (e.g., when some phrase 
automatically contains the element of security and priority) (ibid.).207 What is sufficient 
is that something is considered to have the role of security in a network of practices. 
Thereby infinite regress, as a result of the self-referentiality of social facts, is not appar-
ent. The word security functions as a linguistic placeholder for the practices that are a 
part of it, and what is termed security is itself a network of practices: the word security 
does not need to be used. The self-referentiality of ‘security’ then becomes intersubjec-
tive and thereby does not lead to infinite regress.
The above debate within Securitisation Studies has been about whether securitisation 
theory should emphasise the illocutionary or perlocutionary aspects of speech acts of 
securitisation. Due to this debate, it may be prudent to state my own view and reasoning 
on this contentious issue. The debate on the issue of illocutionary and perlocutionary as-
pects is closely connected to the various views on political theory and theories of politics 
that appliers of the approach have taken. Thereby it is also prudent to state my viewpoint 
on this issue here as well.
My aim for the present study is to explicate the speech act logic of acts of securitisation, 
and thereby to provide solutions for the empirical problems that have been identified by 
appliers of the securitisation framework. By provision of a typology of ‘strands’ of secu-
ritisation208 the semantic content of ‘securitisation’ lessens and ‘securitisation for some 
purpose’ increases, and thereby the extension of ‘securitisation’ is greater than before. 
While the emphasis here is on the explication of the variation in the political functions 
of securitisation, it is also important to note the shared semantic content of its various 
strands – after all – securitisation is ‘all about security’. To elucidate the shared illocution-
ary elements of the various types of securitisation acts may also clarify the view here on 
shared with the hearer, in order to achieve understanding (asking whether someone knows where something 
is, implies a request for directions for example). Securitisation speech acts can also be indirect, and rely on the 
relevant background. Similarly, certain illocutionary acts can imply perlocutionary intentions. For example, a 
promise could imply a threat. 
Ted Cohen (1973, 500) and David Holdcroft (1978, 21) argue in a similar vein that a perlocution can be the 
point of an illocution. They further argue that while an illocution may be performed in order to bring about a 
perlocutionary effect, the opposite is not possible. You may threaten in order to intimidate, but you cannot elect 
in order to vote.
Ciuta (2009, 316) argues that speech acts are by definition explicit, and that therefore the CopS could not 
analyse ‘implicit security’, or the logic of security, which it deems more important than the word security. There 
is however a huge discussion of ‘implicit speech acts’ beyond the points brought up here. It is prudent here to 
recall that speech acts do not always depend on certain ‘explicit’ verbs for example: a promise can be made 
without using the verb ‘promise.’
207  This institutional nature of securitisation is evident in the ‘macro-securitisations’ engaged in during the 
Cold War (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Edelman (1972, 14-15) has also noted that some threats come to be shared 
universally and thus are claimed to have the same consequences for everyone. The wide public processes that 
these types of threats are constructed by make it very difficult to react to them in any other way than as threats; 
threats will be the focus of attention whether the media is controlled by private interests or propaganda minis-
tries. Communism, counter-revolution, or terrorism will entail a security element and logic, depending on the 
context where they are used (Buzan & Wæver 2009; cf., Edelman 1972, 15).
208  See chapter 6.3.2. below.
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what exactly happens in illocutionary acts of securitisation.
When we compare the elementary speech act sequences of the five strands of securi-
tisation posited below (see Table 2), it becomes apparent that they all share the speech 
acts of a claim and a warning. The combination of these acts commits the securitising 
actor to the view that there is an existential threat to a valued referent object, and that its 
continued existence requires or has required drastic measures (to paraphrase the main 
point: ‘this issue has/had to be dealt with before it is/was too late’). This then forms the 
shared elementary stem for the strands of securitisation: the securitising actor commits 
to the view that to repel a threat to a referent object’s existence requires drastic meas-
ures. It also displays how the word ‘security’ does not need to be used in order to ‘do 
security’: what is required is the social institution/rationality/modality of security, and 
precisely this is evoked by the shared illocutionary stem of securitisation.
Although the various strands of securitisation display how ‘security’ can be used for 
various functions or purposes in terms of perlocutionary goals, the securitising actor al-
ready does something beyond communication in the illocutionary utterance of securi-
tisation, namely commits to the goal of a ‘status transformation’ or maintenance on the 
issue in question into that of ‘security’ or threat repellence. This commitment takes place 
irrespective of whether the utterance act is felicitously performed or not. Thereby, al-
ready the illocutionary act may change or alter the social situation, as it brings the social 
institution/rationality/modality of security to bear on it. The success or felicity of the 
illocutionary act beyond uptake is a perlocutionary matter (is the hearer convinced, for 
example), but as the two level securitisation dilemma also shows, the illocutionary act 
on its own already evokes the possibility of the status transformation, even if it ‘fails’.209 
What the transformation that happens in the illocutionary act is, depends greatly on the 
socio-political context.210  But it is important to note that for the various perlocutionary 
intentions to succeed, the constitutive change that takes place in the illocutionary act of 
securitisation also has to be successful.
As was already stated, the debate on the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of 
securitisation speech acts is closely connected to different views on theories of politics. 
This connection has recently become a new explicit point of contention within the litera-
209  This viewpoint can perhaps be elucidated with an analogy of punching: whether or not there are effects 
caused by a punch, the status of the social situation may already be transformed in the act of punching  (‘You 
tried to hit me?!’), which may depend greatly on the social context of the punch (e.g., whether it takes place in 
a contest, in jest, illegally, or in self defence). Thereby, irrespective of whether the punch lands on its target, 
misses it, or either is dodged or parried, the act of punching is done in the punch and the puncher commits 
(irrespective of intention or sincerity) the status transformation it entails. Furthermore, just as speech acts can 
have both intended and unintended consequences, so can a punch.
210  As Marina Sbisà (2001, 1797, 1801) notes, some illocutionary acts can have ‘conventional effects’, which 
may depend on the ‘power’ of the utterer (e.g., authority, influence, legitimation, capacity, or competence) and 
the uptake of the hearer. As was already noted above, a similar notion has been put forward by Holdcroft (1978, 
18-19), who posits that some speech acts can have ‘conventional consequences’. Which illocutionary acts have 
conventional constitutive entailments is an empirical matter to be investigated. 
In the case of acts of securitisation, as was noted above, to commit to an illocutionary act of securitisation, 
in some social situations, may have consequences, some of which may be conventional. For example, with a 
declarative illocutionary force, the success of the strand of securitisation for deterrence depends on its conven-
tional ‘effects’ or ‘consequences’, as the deterrent effect is based on the possibility of realisation of the proposed 
measures. Declarations of states of emergency or war are other examples of instances where there are conven-
tional effects when the correct speakers, hearers, and other social conventions are present. Often, these effects 
have even been codified into laws.
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ture on securitisation theory.211 Different participants in the debates on securitisation 
theory hold different views on what politics is, and this is often reflected in the way they 
approach securitisation theory as well. Many critics have also noted that the theory of 
politics which can be deduced from securitisation theory is inconsistent or self-contra-
dictory.
Indeed, politics may be approached from a variety of angles. It can be viewed as a 
productive activity (e.g., postmodern approaches that draw on Foucault), reproductive 
activity (e.g., approaches that draw on Bourdieu), or an allocatory activity (e.g., approach-
es that draw on Easton). Furthermore, politics can be viewed both as an arena and an 
activity (e.g., approaches that draw on Palonen). It could be possible to limit the theory 
of securitisation to one theory of politics, and inject that into the theory, and it could be 
argued that the theory of securitisation needs to contain a theory of politics – or even 
that the theory of securitisation is itself a theory of politics. My viewpoint is, however, 
different. In accordance with the minimalist view on the core of the theory, and the goal 
of theory travel, my contention is that securitisation theory can be used to elucidate phe-
nomena and practices in accordance with all of the above approaches to politics. This is 
made possible by a minimal core, and the adaptation of the protective belt in accordance 
with the theory of politics applied in each study. An empirical applier of the theory of 
securitisation could connect some theory of politics onto the protective belt of the frame-
work, while another applier could attach a different theory to it. Thereby, the speech 
act approach to securitisation can be used to investigate how identities are produced in 
processes of securitisation, yet it can also be used to investigate how securitisation oper-
ates in bureaucratic battles of resource allocation. When the core of the theory is kept 
minimal, such variation in the types of problems investigated with the approach does not 
have to be a question of either or. It may be necessary to have some theory of politics in 
order to apply securitisation theory, but it may not be necessary that the combination of 
securitisation theory and a theory of politics would always stay the same. 
To sum up the above discussions, we know that IR has witnessed a series of metatheoreti-
cal debates on structure and agency.212 Thus, it is no surprise that the issue has flared up 
within the debates on securitisation theory, too. In this view, the debates on the internal 
and external aspects of acts of securitisation seem to revolve around the same issues 
that Chomsky and Foucault (2006) discussed in their famous debate on human nature. 
Proponents of the internal aspect emphasise the creativity of acts of securitisation, in 
that performative acts of securitisation bring something new into situations that was not 
there before. Conversely, proponents of the external aspect emphasise that acts of secu-
ritisation depend on various structures that emanate from the situation itself, for it is not 
possible to do certain things, if certain other things are not first in place. I believe that a 
middle-position should be adopted on this issue, just as Chomsky and Foucault did in the 
end: not everything is possible, even performatively, if certain ‘structures’ are not in play, 
while such ‘structures’ can be applied or manipulated creatively. While many processes 
211  A forthcoming issue of Security Dialogue based on the 20th anniversary of securitisation theory conference 
held in Copenhagen in September 2010 engages this debate explicitly.
212  For debates and discussion of the agent-structure problem in IR, see Wendt (1987; 1999), Hollis & Smith 
(1991), Carlsnaes (1992), Buzan (1995), and Wight (2006).
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of securitisation depend and build on existing norms, threat images and even previous 
processes of securitisation, bringing these to bear on some particular issue is concomi-
tantly a way to create something new.
The capabilities (e.g., habitus and socio-political capital) of actors and how these are 
distributed in a particular social field, enable and constrain the creative use of perfor-
matives. The field and the capabilities are, however, not the same as the context of the 
utterance or performance of speech acts: for Searle & Vanderveken (1985, 27-28), the 
context of an utterance consists not only of speaker, hearer, time, place but of also related 
other features of the speaker, hearer, time and place that are relevant to the performance 
of the speech acts. Securitising actors can choose to perform securitising moves, but they 
cannot decide on the perlocutionary effects these will elicit i.e., securitising actors cannot 
decide on the success or failure of their illocutionary acts.213 Thereby, securitisation is an 
open social process which can always fail, and which can be refused (Wæver  2000b, 10): 
“it is necessary always to keep open the possibility of failure of an act that previously suc-
ceeded and where the formal resources and position are in place (the breakdown of com-
munist regimes in Eastern Europe) and conversely that new actors can perform a speech 
act they previously were not expected to (the environmental movement). […] Therefore, 
the issue of ‘who can do security?’ and ‘was this a case of securitisation?’ can ultimately 
only be judged in hindsight. […] It can not be closed off by finite criteria for success.” For 
Derrida (1988, 15), the possibility of infelicity or the failure of the speech act is always 
present in speech act situations. Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985, 10) solution to the is-
sue of success and failure, or the felicity and infelicity of speech acts was to broaden the 
possible ‘results’ of speech acts, to those of speech acts being unsuccessful, successful but 
defective, or successful and nondefective. Beyond issues of success and failure of speech 
acts in terms of criteria such as uptake, Habermas (1984) raises the point of the ever 
present possibility of refusal: hearers can challenge the social convention a speech act is 
based on. While such refusals may be a taboo or have severe consequences, e.g., a court 
martial for refusal to follow orders, the logical and practical possibility of such remains. 
Structures and agents are both required to achieve securitisation, and both should be 
taken into account in its empirical investigation.
6.2.4. Carl Schmitt in Copenhagen and Beijing – the Concept of the Political and 
Securitisation Theory
As the previous sub-chapter demonstrated, the issue of structures and agents in bringing 
about securitisation has been a multifaceted debate. ‘Who’ can ‘speak security’ is a rele-
vant question here, but even more pertinent is whether those who that have the ability to 
speak security can decide on the success of such speech, or on whether or not a security 
policy is implemented. Wæver’s emphasis of the internal aspect of acts of securitisation 
has worried many because of its similarity with ‘decisionism’. However, while processes of 
securitisation can be viewed as a form of politics that defines limits between the normal 
and the ‘special’ or the ‘exceptional’, as the above discussion already indicated, speakers 




cannot always decide on the success of securitisation.214 This is one of the fundamental 
differences between the theory of securitisation and readings of Carl Schmitt’s notion of 
the political within Security Studies. 
Schmitt (e.g., 1996; 2005) discussed the state of exception in the context of constitu-
tional legal systems. For him, the essence of the political is the moment when normative 
procedural constraints on political power have to give way to the necessity to recognise 
the enemy,215 thus revealing the primacy of the exception over the norm.216 The power to 
decide on such an exception to regular procedures and limits defines a sovereign,217 and 
the authentically political moment of creation.218 Even though Schmitt has never disap-
peared from the ‘scene’ in Europe (Koivusalo & Ojakangas 1997, 35), since the end of the 
1990s his thoughts have gained intensive attention in European security studies.219 The 
opening salvos for this new barrage of debate came from Jef Huysmans’s (1998b) and 
Michael Williams’s (2003) articles. The newfound interest in Schmitt has been fuelled by 
Giorgio Agamben’s (2005; see also 2001) discussion on the state of exception and ‘bare 
life’ (Agamben 1998), journals such as Telos have constantly discussed Schmitt, and such 
illuminaries as Chantal Mouffe (2005; see also 1999) and Jacques Derrida (2005) have 
found it necessary to engage with Schmitt to develop their own conceptualisation of poli-
tics. Schmitt has even been relevant in China studies, as exemplified by Michael Dutton’s 
(2005) study of policing in China, which I will discuss below. As Markku Koivusalo and 
Mika Ojakangas (1997, 36-37) note, Schmitt has been either an inspiration or a target 
for criticism and debate for a broad spectrum of positions ranging from the neo-right to 
Maoism and even the Green movement.
As was just noted, many commentators on securitisation studies (e.g., Huysmans 
1998b; 2006a; Williams 2003; Alker 2006) have found similarities between securitisa-
tion and Schmitt’s decisionism.220 Wæver (2007a) too, recognises these similarities, but 
denies that Schmitt would have influenced him before the development of his own un-
derstanding of securitisation.221 As will be seen, although the two approaches do share 
214  A securitising actor can choose to make a securitising move, but thereafter the actor cannot decide whether 
the move succeeds or fails. Some acts of securitisation have conventional perlocutionary outcomes whilst 
others do not.
215  Schmitt (1996, 26): “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced 
is that between friend and enemy.”
216  Schmitt (2005, 5): “This definition of sovereignty must therefore be associated with a borderline case and 
not with routine.”
217  “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” (Schmitt 2005, 5). The sentence in the original German 
is “Soverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet”, which implies the possibility of the sovereign in 
plural. Thereby, the sovereign is not necessarily an individual person, but the position from which a new order 
is established, and exceptions from it determined.
218  For Agamben, the political is the nexus between violence and law (Agamben 2005, 88), and “in modern 
biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as such” (Agamben 1998, 142).
219  The same trend has happened within IR. See for example Odysseos & Pepito (2007), and the exchange 
between Chandler (2008a; 2008b) and Odysseos & Pepito (2008).
220  For example Huysmans (2006a, 135) identifies the Schmittian understanding of the political as a move from 
normal to exceptional politics, as the political problematic of securitisation. While securitisation is different 
from Schmitt’s position, Huysmans argues that taking securitisation as the legitimisation of the ‘exceptional’ is a 
particular way to view the political. Neal (2006) similarly posits securitisation as among the various approaches 
to ‘exceptionalism’ he discusses and critiques.
221  Andreas Behnke (2000, 91-92) argues, similarly to Huysmans (1998b), that the separation of politicisa-
tion and securitisation reifies and depoliticises the constitution of political communities through sovereign 
decisions. Behnke argues that Wæver rejects securitisation because it disturbs the silence of the sovereign 
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similarities, there are also clear differences, which have also been noted (Williams 2003; 
Neal 2006). A discussion of Schmitt’s and Agamben’s approaches to ‘states of exception’, 
with a Daoist digression, will elucidate these differences.
We can begin by noting that, for Schmitt, the authentically political moment of creation 
boils down to a struggle between (Christian) good and evil; for Schmitt (2005, 36): “all 
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological con-
cepts”; “every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the ‘nature’ of man 
and presupposes that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil’” (ibid., 56).222 Yet 
what is deemed to be good or evil is in itself a political and moral question. Leo Strauss 
(1996, 95, 99, 101) already noted this problem with Schmitt’s ‘affirmation of the politi-
cal’, which Strauss demonstrated was merely an ‘affirmation of the moral’: 
“the opposition between the negation and the position of the political can be traced 
back to a quarrel over human nature. […] The opposition between evil and good los-
es its keen edge, it loses its very meaning, as soon as evil is understood as innocent 
‘evil’ and thereby goodness is understood as an aspect of evil itself. Schmitt [has to 
nullify] the view of human evil as animal and thus innocent evil, and to return to 
the view of human evil as moral baseness. […] [H]e affirms the political because he 
sees in the threatened status of the political a threat to the seriousness of human 
life. The affirmation of the political is ultimately nothing other than the affirmation 
of the moral.” 
Indeed, instead of going ‘beyond good and evil’, Schmitt is basically bound to Christianity, 
and thereby to a Manichean understanding of the world and how it is ultimately consti-
tuted. This is evident in his assumption of the existence of basic dyadic relations (Schmitt 
1996, 26): ”Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between 
good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable.” 
In the realm of politics, then, the basic dyad is famously that of friend and enemy. How-
ever, a Daoist double reading of dyads through the Yin-Yang principle, and of sovereignty 
through the ‘sage-ruler’ (圣人, shèngrén), show how a morality beyond basic dyads and 
‘deciding’ could be possible.
While for Schmitt (2005) it is the sovereign that decides,223 for Laozi (2004) it is the 
sage that cannot decide. For Schmitt (1996) it is not important how, or on which grounds, 
a judgement or decision is made, but that it is made in the first place, so that, in each situ-
ation a judgement on what is right and wrong, what is good and evil, or what is beautiful 
and ugly, comes about. Conversely for Laozi (2004), the ability to lack such judgements is 
decisions that precede the ‘liberal democracy’ that is already included in the theory of securitisation. In a way, 
Behnke fleshes out the ‘democratic bias’ of the paradigmatic form of securitisation theory, see Chapter 6.3.
222  Ojakangas (2002, 35) presents one possibility for why Schmitt was ‘stuck’ to a dichotomous morality: 
Schmitt was a ‘true believer’ who saw Christianity as essentially anti-Jewish and exclusionary of Judaism.
223  As Huysmans (2006a, 137) puts it: “The Schmittian sovereign does not move value questions to the private 
realm but publicly decides what counts as right and wrong” (cf., Schmitt 1996, 53-68). The Daoist sage is 
precisely the opposite of this understanding of the sovereign; a Daoist sage-ruler is against vitalism, against 
creative acts of will. “The wise ruler is a non-judgemental, self-effacing mother” (Roberts 2004, 131). Instead 
of an über-mensch, the sage-ruler is an unter-mensch (Moeller 2006, 135); while Schmitt aims at being ‘beyond 
good and evil’, the Laozi (2004) achieves precisely this: the Laozi is non-humanist philosophy.
169
Chapter 6
precisely what makes the sage a sage: all other people know that good is good and bad is 
bad, except the sage-ruler (Moeller 2006, 103-104, 106; Laozi 2004, §2, §49).224 
As Ojakangas (2002, 119) notes, the Reich or Polis, that is, the state, is by no means rare 
in the world, but rather, what would be rare, for him, would be the non-creation of the 
Reich, the suspension of power and rulership. It would also seem that Daoist states have 
been rare, if not non-existent. A Daoist state would practice inaction or non-interference 
(为无为, wéiwúwéi): the sage would be a leader who would neither decide (contra Sch-
mitt) nor judge (contra Arendt).225 This kind of state would be essentially different from 
those formed in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the types of judicial orders discussed 
by Schmitt, since they would not be based on absolute dichotomies, but rather on the Yin-
Yang principle. Yet even here there would be ‘limits’: only the sage would know that she 
actually does not know (what is good and what is bad).226
With his vitalist philosophy, Schmitt sought the authentic political condition or experi-
ence, which was the definition of the enemy and the decision on the state of exception, the 
real possibility of ‘physical killing’ (Schmitt 1996, 33; Huysmans 2006a, 135-138).227 As 
Strauss (1996, 107) suggested, Schmitt sought ‘pure and whole knowledge’, which could 
only be gained by the means of return to the origin, to ‘undamaged, non-corrupt nature.’ 
The leading philosopher of contemporary ‘exceptionality’, Giorgio Agamben seems to re-
sist this position, or at least its desirability. For Agamben (2005, 88), “purity never lies at 
the origin”: the ‘disenchantement of fictions’ (like the unity of life and law) merely allows 
the possibility of the origin’s new conditions. As Koivusalo (2001, 100) notes, Agamben 
has dealt with the issue of ‘authenticity’ or ‘origin’ in most of his works, by returning to 
the issue of the limits and power of language, always in a slightly different manner. In a 
way, this could be seen to conform to the circular principles of Daoism: “Reversal is the 
movement of the Dao” (Moeller 2006, 102), “the things of the world are generated from 
presence; presence is created from non-presence (ibid., 39).”228 Agamben’s objective to 
seek to end that which has been, and move towards that what is, but has never before 
already been, equals the truest form of infantia (Koivusalo 2001, 107-108). In Daoism, 
the origin is similarly always present; it is neither more authentic nor purer than the 
224  The sage-ruler has two key characteristics: inaction and being without personal qualities (Moeller 2006, 
59; Laozi 2004, §48). The sage-ruler will not be opposed, as there is nothing to oppose; the sage-ruler must 
make sure that there is no distinguishable person or ‘interest’ at the centre of power (Moeller 2006, 62-65).
225  One could think that perhaps the Laozi (2004) is not about politics or a social theory, but as Moeller (2006, 
57) notes, the Laozi is a text of human leadership, and like many other philosophical texts of its time, it was a 
guidebook for political leaders.
226  Daoist thinking could also make possible the essentialist-resistant politics Mouffe (2005, 7) seeks: just as 
“neither the totality nor the fragments possess any kind of fixed identity, prior to contingent and pragmatic 
forms of their articulation,” Daoist principles deal with emptiness and form (form is emptiness, emptiness is 
form). Moeller (2006, 20) suggests that the Dao describes the structural interplay of emptiness and fullness, 
or non-presence and presence. The Laozi does not seek ‘external sources of energy’, it does not look for acts 
of creation; genuineness is not to be found in the origin, as the origin is always present (Laozi 2004, §14). As 
Roberts (2004, 21) notes, history in Daoism becomes a nonchronical and everpresent antiquity; virtue does not 
emanate from some paternal history, but is accessible in the authenticity of the present.
227  Schmitt (1996, 29): “The political is the most intense end extreme antagonism.” For Laozi (2004), a moral 
aspect is absent even in issues of war: instead of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or enemy and friend, the Laozi conceptualises 
military confrontations in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Moeller 2006, 84). The function of military forces is to 
act as deterrents (Laozi 2004, §80). The Daoist approach to military engagements is in tune with Sunzi (2005): 
the aim is to make the opponent expend energy while the defendant remains inactive.
228  In Laozi (2004, 112) the Stanza 40 is translated as: “The Way moves on by contra-motion; Yielding is the 
application. Becoming begets all beings below; Becoming begotten of negation.”
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present.229 Thus, in a way, the objective of the sage is to be in-between the social and 
the corporeal, to be in a state of infancy. The sage-ruler is non-present, a human desert, 
‘an infant that does not yet smile’ (Moeller 2006, 67). Unlike the superior individual, the 
‘gentleman’ (君子, jūnzǐ) emphasised by Confucianism, in Laozi, the sage is childlike and 
never a commanding father; the sage has no ruler-vassal relationship (臣君, jūn-chén) 
nor father-son relationship (父子, fù-zǐ) that are among the cardinal relationships of Con-
fucianism (Roberts 2004, 18).230 The Laozi envisages a system of rule that is not based on 
paternalism, nor vitalist moments of creation or decision.
Beyond the notions of infantia and the lack of purity in origins, Agamben (1998; 2005) 
departs from Schmitt in that when for Schmitt the state of exception is truly exceptional, 
for Agamben the state of exception has become the rule.231 This state of affairs came about 
229  ‘Out of one comes two, out of two comes three, out of three comes a multitude of things.’ In Laozi (2004, 
116) Stanza 42 is translated as “The number one of the Way was born. A duad from this monad formed. The 
duad next a triad made; The triad bred the myriad, Each holding Yang And held by Yin, Whose powers’ balanced 
interaction Brings all ten thousand to fruition.”
As Moeller (2006, 51-52) notes, the Dao is not an origin or an ultimate beginning: “neither the cosmos nor 
society has been ‘created’ or ‘planned.’ Neither of them is grounded in some initial ‘action’ or ‘agency.’” Unlike 
Christianity, there is no creator in Daoism. Accordingly, the Daoist state is not based on vitalist philosophy à la 
Schmitt. The Laozi is non-teleological, and avoids concepts of some original acts of creation, or of entities that 
would precede their own existence; the Laozi does not seek external sources of energy (Moeller 2006, 52-53).
A ‘secularised’ Daoism would then lead to a different understanding of sovereignty than the ‘secular’ theology 
of the political Schmitt examines.
230  The Daoist critique of the definition of the enemy as the founding moment of political orders, and the basis 
of the political presented here, should not be taken as an argument for how things metaphysically ‘really’ are: 
I use the Daosit critique as a double reading of the necessity of the enemy/friend dyad. I argue that there is no 
need for a doxa, or even an orthodoxa concerning the political. If a Daoist sage is a sovereign who cannot decide, 
then perhaps sovereignty can be something beyond deciding on the exception.
Another possible reading of how a state can be founded without defining an enemy also comes from Chinese 
state-philosophy. Without going deeply into the traditions, it can be noted that in imperial China, the basis for 
legitimate rule of the emperor was the mandate of heaven (天命, tiānmìng). This mandate was however not 
permanent. Should there be a succession of bad harvests or natural disasters, this could be interpreted as the 
heaven announcing that the mandate was revoked. This legitimated rising up against the emperor, and setting 
up a new cosmological order with a new emperor. 
Although culturally and temporally anachronistic, these kinds of situations could be interpreted as states of 
exception, moments of overturning the reigning political order and replacing it with another. This however did 
not necessitate the definition of an enemy.
See Perry (2001) on how the idea of challenging the mandate of heaven has influenced popular protest in 
China.
231  Huysmans (2008, 166-167) also emphasises the difference between Schmitt’s and Agamben’s ‘state 
of exception’: Schmitt grounds the political in a conception of the exception, while Agamben grounds it in a 
conception of the exception-as-the-rule.
Agamben draws inspiration for this from Walter Benjamin’s (1999b, 248) sentence: “The tradition of the 
oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.” 
There indeed are examples of ‘emergency powers’ as the rule for decades. This was for example the case in 
Malaysia where states of emergencies were in place for several decades, and in the US which has, for the most 
part, been in a state of emergency since President Roosevelt declared one during the ‘great depression’ (the 
four states of emergencies declared after 1933 were terminated in 1978, only to have a new national emergency 
declared in 1979, which has been followed by 30 others in a fewer number of years [Neocleous 2007, 10]). 
Agamben however does not continue Benjamin’s (1999b, 248-249) point: Benjamin called for a ‘real state of 
emergency’ which would improve the positions of struggle against fascism. Indeed, it is important to realise 
that what Balakrishnan (1999, 264) notes on Schmitt, applies to Benjamin as well: the political context of 
both Schmitt and Benjamin is ‘nearly the exact opposite’ to Agamben’s, despite the camps in Guantánamo or 
Woomera.
Agamben (2005, 2) argues that the state of exception has become a global technique of government, and thus 
it blurs the distinctions between constitutional forms. Before (1998, 115) he argued that “if today there is 
no longer any clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri.” But if 
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in Nazi-Germany when the state of exception ceased “to be referred to as an external and 
provisional state of factual danger” and came “to be confused with juridicial rule itself” 
(Agamben 1998, 168). Agamben (1998; 2001) uses the political theoretical analysis of 
‘camps’ as his example of how the exception is incorporated into the normal, of how a 
state of exception is willed into being.232 The ‘camp’ is a space that opens up and is given 
permanence when the state of exception is left to remain in normalcy, yet is excluded 
from it (Agamben 1998, 169-170, 175; 2001, 36). The ‘Jew’ could be put into camps only 
after she had been stripped of all aspects of citizenship, after she had been ‘denational-
ised’ (Agamben 1998, 132) and had become ‘bare life’, life that could be killed by anyone 
without consequence (Agamben, 2001, 25).233 Agamben (2001, 13) argues that the state 
of exception has become the sole form for legitimising power, and that power constantly 
aims to produce a state of exception. Via biopolitics, the pre-eminence of the bios over the 
zoe, bare life has become the only value of modern politics for Agamben, and this is where 
modern democracies and totalitarian orders are in solidarity (Agamben 1998, 10, 122; 
cf., Koivusalo 2001, 114-116).234 
However, it would appear that Agamben conflates a state of emergency and a state of 
exception,235 which Schmitt (2005, 5) clearly keeps separate; for Agamben (2005, 4), the 
state of exception (Ausnahmezustand) contains the ‘state of necessity’ (Notstand), ‘emer-
gency decrees’ and ‘states of siege’ (état de siège), as well as ‘martial law’ and ‘emergency 
powers.’ As was already noted, for Schmitt (2005, 5), the state of exception is more excep-
tional: the exception is not merely a construct applied to any emergency degree or state 
of siege.236 Rather, the exception is a borderline concept, which should not be considered 
this would be the case, how would the people in the ‘camps’ be any different from citizens who have rights 
and entitlements, any different from those who would not be banned ‘outside the city’? If all are banned, does 
that not mean that all are inside or outside? This shows how practices of securitisation may be viewed as 
more specific techniques of abandonment or banning. On the level of technocratic practice, this may entail the 
banning of a trench-coated man in a subway, for example.
At times Agamben also seems to paint with too broad strokes, for example, in terms of what is global and what 
is the West: in Agamben (1998, 176), “the camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the 
new biopolitical nomos of the planet,” actually turns out, a few pages later (ibid., 181), to be “the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West.”
232  Jurists came up with the concept of a ‘state of willed exception’ (einen gewollten Ausnahmezustand) in order 
to establish the National Socialist state (Agamben 1998, 168).
233  Agamben (1998, 8): homo sacer (the sacred man) “may be killed and yet not sacrificed,” as the homo sacer 
is already in the possession of the ‘gods of the underworld’ (ibid., 73).
234  Mika Ojakangas (2002, 112-116) argues that Agamben’s interpretation of biopower is different to Foucault’s 
biopower: for Foucault, the sovereign can only deal with ‘bare life’, but biopower goes beyond the power to 
decide on death, as it aims to exclude death itself; Foucault’s biopower precisely deals with life in all of its forms, 
not just bare life as Agamben suggests. Biopower cannot rule through merely the threat of death as sovereign 
power, biopower requires a plurality of techniques of power (cf., Foucault 2007). Further, while Agamben 
(1998) portrays for example the extermination of the ‘Jew’ as ‘lice’ as being a paragon of the biopolitics of bare 
life, Foucault might have seen this as a form of thanatopolitics instead, i.e., the politics of death (cf., Agamben 
1998, 122).
235  In Agamben (2001, 9), for example, he defines a state of exception as a temporary suspension of the legal 
order, something similar to a state of emergency, which is often part of a legal order.
236  Schmitt (2005, 5): “the exception  is to be understood to refer to a general concept of the theory of the state, 
and not merely to a construct applied to any emergency decree or state of siege.”
Agamben (2005, 4-5; see also Agamben 1998, 166-169) recalls the historical introduction of the Napoleonic 
decree of a state of siege, and when the possibility to suspend the constitution was introduced into law. That 
such possibilities are inscribed into a legal order precisely shows that they are not what Schmitt’s state of 
exception was about. When Schmitt (1996, 46-47) for example discusses the hostis declaration of the Romans, 
he uses this as an example of how internal enemies are decided on by the sovereign. Deciding on the exception 
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routine. The exception, thus, cannot be factually circumscribed or codified in law: indeed, 
the exception can, at best, only be characterised as extreme peril or a danger to the ex-
istence of the state (ibid., 6); “what characterizes an exception is principally unlimited 
authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing legal order” (ibid. 12). For 
Agamben (2005, 23) by contrast, the state of exception can be the total, or partial, sus-
pension of the legal order and the state of exception is neither internal nor external to 
the juridical order but in a ‘zone of indifference’ where inside and outside blur into one 
another. The legal order is permanently suspended in the ‘camp’, and thereby the camp 
remains outside the legal order (Agamben 2001, 37). It seems then that, for Agamben, 
the camp represents a specific or limited suspension of the legal order and is thereby 
different from what Schmitt describes as a state of exception; the camp is a permanent 
special order that houses ‘bare life’, which no longer can be written into the order beyond 
it (ibid., 40).237
As can be seen from the above reasoning, for Schmitt, the sovereign decides on the state 
of exception and also defines the enemy. This forms the metaphysical basis of the po-
litical and the political involves the definition of mortal enemies. This decision, however, 
remains solely with the sovereign. This then crystallises the first difference between de-
cisionism and securitisation. 
Wæver has argued that due to the social character of securitisation, formal authority 
is not sufficient to achieve success. Securitisation can always fail and no one person can 
conclusively hold the power of securitisation (Buzan et al. 1998, 31). Securitisation can-
not be closed off by finite criteria for success (Wæver 2000a, 286; 2000b, 10). Therefore 
no single individual can be guaranteed that her decisions will be accepted; securitisation 
is an intersubjective, social process. Huysmans illustrates how Schmitt’s understanding of 
the political renders politics as a politics of fear; to base a political order on the fear of the 
enemy is a dictatorial principle of governance that enforces executive authority and de-
nies the possibility and capability of others to interpret and act in the world in a different 
way (Huysmans 2008, 170). Therefore, Schmitt’s understanding of politics would seem to 
be contrary to what communication studies have otherwise demonstrated on the open-
and deciding on the enemy are two different things for Schmitt, when for Agamben they seem to be conflated. 
Thus, for Schmitt, what Agamben conceptualises as the ‘ban’ or ‘abandonment’ is not about the exception, but 
about the enemy.
237  Butler (2006, 57) identifies the Guantánamo Camp Delta as just such a space. The Bush administration’s 
legal arrangement for this camp does indeed seem to have parallels with what Himmler did with the initial 
camps for political prisoners in 1933 (Agamben 1998, 169); similar to the camps in Hitler’s Germany which 
were placed under the authority of the SS, and thereby outside the German legal order, the Bush administration 
has placed ‘enemy combatants’ captured outside the US legal order.
While the case of Guantánamo has been a popular example of how the state of exception has become the rule 
(for a critique, see Neal 2006), it seems that this specific camp may not be that permanent after all, at least in 
this specific geographic location. Whether or not indefinite detention (cf., Butler 2006, 63) remains an indefinite 
practice for the Obama administration remains to be seen.
Another problem with Agamben’s conception of camps when actual practices are investigated, is that he does 
not give a voice for Homo Sacer: Agamben presents the people interned in camps as hapless victims who have 
no agency. Yet, when for example the Woomera camp in Australia is examined, those interned in the camp had 
agency even though they did not have a voice (see for example Huysmans 2005 on the Woomera detention 
centre and the protests there). Constructions of worthless and powerless others may be dangerous, as that 
other may prove to have agency and  voice after all (e.g., North Vietnam vis-à-vis France and the US) (I owe this 
insight to Tarak Barkawi).
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ness of all interpretation; there is always a surplus of meaning in a text (Derrida 1988; 
Laclau & Mouffe 2001; Fiske 1992).238 Habermas (1984) also emphasises the possibility 
of refusal, even in highly formal and institutionalised social situations.
Another difference between the state of exception and securitisation is that while the 
state of exception is general and all-encompassing, the nullification of the legal order and 
the setting up of a new ‘Ordnung’, securitisation is specific and limited.239 It would seem 
that a considerable amount of the recent literature on the state of exception, especially 
in terms of the war on terror, is confused as regards Schmitt’s concept of the state of ex-
ception.240 Schmitt clearly states that the state of exception is not about a siege on a town, 
but that it is about the nullification of law to instigate a new order and sovereign i.e., it is 
about revolution.241 Camps do not nullify an entire legal order, but are exceptions within 
the judicial order (Agamben 1998; 2001). This is a significant phenomenon and should 
be further analysed, but even so, this state of exception may still not be the correct con-
cept and understanding to assess this inclusion of the exclusion.
A third difference between decisionism and securitisation is that the number of ac-
tors who can speak security is greater than those who can decide in the vein of Schmitt. 
While Schmitt’s metaphysics is based on a judge’s prerogative of decision, which is used 
to return to the origin of a legal order, it may be possible to conjure up images of situa-
238  While interpretations retain the possibility of openness, it is also frequently the case that people will 
interpret matters in a similar way. There are also consistencies in cultures and societies in terms of the under-
standing of concepts. The roles people assume may also influence interpretations: people who share the same 
role learn to respond in similar fashion to particular signs. Specific types of political speech to specific types 
of audiences, may specify a certain response with a high confidence; in a way, Graham Allison is speaking of 
this when he states that ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ (Allison & Zelikow 1999). Meanings and 
ways of responding to them are not the same for everyone, but perceptions of group interests and mutual 
role-taking may bear a significant influence on them. (cf., Edelman 1972, 115.) For Wæver (2007a) however, 
the possibility of re-articulation, the surplus of meaning, is a condition for the possibility of politics. Like him, 
it may be advantageous to take a middle-ground position on the issues of Derrida-style (over?)emphasis of 
freeflowing reinterpretation and the Foucauldian emphasis of dominant discourses and structures. Structures 
may dominate, but they can also be used creatively to undermine them, as a form of resistance.
239  Insight as provided to me by Ole Wæver during the Q&A session to his keynote lecture at the Culture and the 
Configuring of Security Conference in Höör, 7.11.2007. See also Wæver (2008a, 109).
240  As Neocleous (2007, 14) notes: “governments much prefer to work under the cloak of legality […] far from 
suspending the law, violent actions conducted in ‘emergency conditions’ have been legitimated through the 
law on the grounds of necessity and in the name of security.” This demonstrates how most ‘emergency condi-
tions’ differ from what Schmitt describes as a ‘state of exception’, and how securitisation similarly differs from 
Schmitt’s approach.
241  The discussion on the state of exception can be seen as continuing an even older discussion on ragione 
di stato and coup d’état. Michel Foucault’s (2007, 261-266) discussion of coup d’état’s also comes very close 
to securitisation. For Foucault a coup is a suspension, or a temporary departure, from laws and legality; it 
is an extraordinary action against ordinary law, while ragione di stato demands that it must command laws 
themselves. While ragione di stato is always exceptional in relation to public, particular and fundamental laws, 
most of the time it still respects the law it has stipulated down. But in the name of the salvation of the state, 
ragione di stato can free itself from the binds of law. A coup d’état is a self-manifestation of the state: “necessity, 
urgency, the need to save the state itself will exclude the game of these natural laws and produce something 
that in a way will only be the establishment of a direct relationship of the state with itself when the keynote is 
necessity and safety” (ibid., 262). While prepared in secrecy or behind the scenes, coups, are for Foucault, like 
security arguments, by their nature theatrical or public because they need support: “to win support, and so that 
the suspension of laws with which it is necessarily linked do not count against it, the coup d’état must break out 
in broad daylight and in so doing reveal on the very stage where it takes place the raison d’état that brings it 
about. No doubt the coup d’état must hide its preparatory processes and moves, but it must appear solemnly in 
its effects and in the reasons that defend it” (ibid. 264-265).
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tions where also non-sovereigns can create mortal enemies.242 The Atomic Scientists re-
sponsible for the creation of nuclear weapons concomitantly also created a global threat 
i.e., the possibility of thermonuclear annihilation. Securitisation moves that have posited 
human civilisation as jeopardised by such a possibility, are one of the macrosecuritisa-
tion discourses postulated by Buzan and Wæver (2009). I have elsewhere (Vuori 2010a) 
analysed the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation moves of the Atomic Scientists, by which 
I demonstrated how the theory of securitisation differs from Schmitt’s political: not all 
securitising actors can ‘decide’.243 Some actors have to convince others of the necessity of 
their suggested remedies to deal with existential threats. Furthermore, the anti-nuclear 
macrosecuritisation discourse demonstrates that securitisation moves do not always 
have to entail the creation of an existential enemy. To reason via enmity, and to be able to 
refer to a ‘matched pair’, seems to make securitisation arguments more convincing, but 
this does not make the construction of an enemy a logical necessity for securitisation.244 
While the securitisation moves of the Atomic Scientists argue for the initiation of a new 
international Ordnung (cf., Schmitt 2003), and thus come close to what the political en-
tails for Schmitt, they are not sovereign. 
Furthermore, the securitisation moves of the Scientists work via a different route than 
that on which securitisation is generally assumed to operate. Instead of sovereign deci-
sions, or legitimisation of the exceptionality of state action, their securitisation moves 
have strived for increased awareness of the threat of nuclear weapons and, thereby, for 
the inclusion of this issue on the agenda of decision makers via the pressure of public 
opinion. Indeed, it seems that the way in which the Atomic Scientists perceive security, 
exceptionality and desecuritisation differs from the way they are generally approached. 
While nuclear weapons are often viewed as means to achieve the security of states and 
their sovereignty, the security that the Scientists seek is security from such weapons. 
Final desecuritisation could be achieved only once the possibility of waging war with 
these weapons was eliminated – that is, when the world would be ‘emancipated’ from 
nuclear weapons. 245 The ‘exceptional’ the Atomic Scientists are proposing, then, is not 
242  Incidentally, from this point of view, Alan Moore’s (1995) graphic novel character of Ozymandias is interest-
ing: While not a sovereign in Schmitt’s sense and thereby unable to decide on the enemy, Ozymandias quite 
concretely creates an impression of an enemy, and thereby constitutes a more encompassing ‘us’ via a global 
threat.
243  I use the initial securitisation move of the Atomic Scientist as an example of a securitisation move to raise 
an issue on the agenda below in Chapter 6.3.2.1. This strand of securitisation also shows how securitisation 
moves by non-state actors, who may not have recourse to ‘extraordinary measures’, can still nonetheless ‘speak 
security’, and thereby exemplifies how ‘securitisation without the state’ (Bartwal-Datta 2009) can be studied 
within the framework of securitisation.
244  Collins (2005, 571) for example argues that the consequence of securitisation is the generation of a threat-
ening other, the creation of friends (us) and enemies (them). As the example of the securitisation moves of the 
Atomic Scientists and Moore’s (1995) Watchmen show, a matched pair of friends and enemies may facilitate 
a securitisation, but it is not a necessary condition, nor a result of securitisation. Trombetta (2008, 598) also 
suggests something similar in the case of the securitisation of the climate, which has “avoided the identification 
of enemies and has involved actors other than states.”
245  ‘Ways out’ of threatening situations when expressed as parts of securitisation processes are generally 
thought to entail exceptional, immoral or illegitimate measures. Here it seems that the actions of the Atomic 
Scientists differ from more ‘conventional’ securitisation measures: their call for exception is from sovereignty 
rather than in support of it.
In respect of such views of ‘exceptionality’ as an integral part of securitisation and when the anti-nuclear stance 
is being discussed, it is prudent to remind of the ethical push that guides this study, and that is viewed here 
as the push of the CopS as well. Just as Wæver (1999) has argued that scholars studying securitisation should 
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more powers or measures for the state, but a new international order, where state sov-
ereignty would be reduced. That they nonetheless make arguments that conform to the 
grammar of securitisation, is further demonstration that securitisation is not equivalent 
to Schmitt’s political.
Now that the differences between Schmitt’s concept of the political and securitisation 
theory have been established, I will present my argument for why securitisation theory 
is a more appropriate and powerful analytical approach to the study of Chinese politics 
than a Schmittian framework. This will lead us into a discussion of the nature of the Chi-
nese political order and the role of defining enemies and opponents in it.
Michael Dutton (2005) has studied Chinese policing by using Schmitt’s concept of the 
political.246 He demonstrates how campaigns against various enemies were frequent in 
Mao’s China, which might even be understood as the formation of a rule as Agamben 
(1998; 2005) suggests. Dutton (2005, 18-21), however, argues that this type of politics 
ended with Mao’s death: his successor Deng Xiaoping’s politics were no longer concerned 
with the definition of the enemy. During the ‘reform period’, incidents of ‘enemy defini-
tion’ are, for Dutton, separate instances which no longer form the definitive element of 
Chinese politics of policing; for Dutton, ‘the political’ in China ended with Mao’s rule when 
policing and the political were decoupled. Indeed, many scholars (e.g., Baum 1996) have 
described Deng’s China through various fang/shou (放/收, fàng/ shōu; let go/tighten) cy-
cles and not Schmitt’s political. However, does the definition of enemies becoming more 
‘exceptional’, suggest that the ‘political’, as Schmitt saw it, has ended? I would suggest that 
another division that stems from Schmittian metaphysics provides a more illuminating 
answer: rather than the end of the political, the qualitative change is a result of a change 
from constitutive to constituted power.
A cardinal element of Maoist politics was the almost continuous campaigning against 
various types of enemies. This is already evident in the opening sentence of the Selected 
Works of Mao Zedong (Mao 1926): “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This 
is a question of the first importance for the revolution.”247 Dutton (2005, 3) uses this as 
not be either fatalist or defeatist when it comes to the role of the analyst and the security policies of states, 
Hannes Alfvén (1981, 4-5) has argued that proponents of the elimination of nuclear war i.e., proponents of 
the macrosecuritisation of nuclear war, should not be fatalists either, saying that the catastrophe is coming no 
matter what, or defeatists, saying that nuclear omnicide would be equivalent to an inevitable natural disaster. 
The ethic of the anti-Nuclear Movement then seems to be close to the ethic of a critical scholar studying security, 
also exemplified by the Bulletin’s editors’ call at the end of the Cold War: “’National security’ should no longer 
justify bankrupt policies and conceal misdeeds. […] People must work more vigorously to demilitarise their socie-
ties” (Editors 1990, 3). It is important to emphasise here that, in my view, this has also been the ethical push of 
securitisation studies. For contrasting views of this issue, see for example Wyn Jones (2005).
246  Dutton (2005, 304) emphasises the class issue in the definition of enemies: “Maoist China lived life politi-
cally and, in the process, transformed everything into a binary political question framed in the language of class.” 
Thereby, the definition and search for enemies would seem to concur with Schmitt’s friend/enemy dyad. Yet, 
as MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 201) also note, it may actually be that the influence for the centrality of 
the friend/enemy distinction for the CCP actually emanates from Lenin; or, more specifically, from his Kossack 
dictum of Kto, Kogo (кто кого?), or ‘Who, whom?’ (i.e., ‘who will prevail over whom’). Lenin’s dictum was in use 
in China, for example, by Liu Shaoqi in his discussions with Mikojan in the 1940s (Heinzig 2004, 149), and was 
also in use in the Polemics (1965, 471-472): “[A] very long period of time is needed to decide ‘who will win’ in 
the struggle between socialism and capitalism.”
See Palmujoki (1995, 39-40) for how the dictum was adopted and operated via Stalin in North Vietnam’s politi-




the platform from which to launch his analysis of the tradition of policing in China. Using 
Schmitt’s principle of defining the enemy as the essence of the political, Dutton argues 
that this was indeed the essence of policing in China before the establishment of the PRC 
and during Mao’s rule. However, the problem with this argument is that Dutton takes only 
this one aspect of Schmitt’s metaphysics into account:248 he fails to deal with the issue 
of exceptionalism and the issue of constitutive and constituted power. Mao had defined 
enemies even before the declaration of the People’s Republic, and he would continue to 
do so after it up to his death, in 1976. It should be considered then whether the Maoist 
‘political’ was about defining the enemy, and about making the ‘state of exception’ the 
rule, and whether this changed in post-Mao China.
To begin this examination, it must be enquired as to what exceptionality means in po-
litical orders that are not liberal democratic, or more precisely, what an exception means 
in a non-democracy where the legal order is not settled but in continual flux or a fluid 
state.249 Why do non-democratic orders for example declare martial law when they could 
use their prerogative power regardless? Mark Neocleous (2007, 14) may have one an 
answer here: governments seem to prefer to operate under the cloak of legality, so that 
in lieu of suspension of law, violent actions of state apparatuses conducted under ‘emer-
gency conditions’ have been legitimised through the law, on grounds of necessity and in 
the name of security.250 Indeed, it would seem that even in political orders in which the 
state is ideologically legitimised as an exception, adherence to laws, decrees, and other 
principles remain necessary to legitimise forceful actions, once the initial stage of the 
revolution has been accomplished. After this point, the use of force may in fact well be 
read as a sign of weakness. The post-totalitarian order where freedom is a technique of 
government seems more effective in the longer term.
The issue of constitutive and constituted power seems more pertinent to comprehend 
the differences between the type of political rule in the Mao and post-Mao orders, rather 
than to take the differences as an end to the use of the enemy/friend dyad in Chinese 
politics. Agamben (1998, 12) views the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state of ex-
ception, which is the transitional phase leading to a stateless society. If we agree with this 
viewpoint, then the PRC has been – and remains – a state of exception itself. But can this 
248  Dutton (2005, 304): “I have no interest in Hitler’s so-called crown jurist beyond this.”
Dutton’s application of Schmitt has also further problems. For Schmitt, defining the dyad is a decision, yet 
Dutton (e.g., 2005, 77-78) describes the dyad as a discourse which shifts, without indication as to how this 
occurs. For example during the anti-Japanese war, there was a shift in the basis for defining the enemy from 
class to the nation (Dutton 2005, 77-78). It seems that even for Dutton (ibid., 80), the political is not a decision, 
but a “dyadic process of framing politics.” For Dutton (ibid., 308): “Be it in the singular or in the collective, then, 
the enemy defines us.” But why then is there a need to change who the enemy is? The enemy/friend distinction 
is not enough of an explanation for the totality of Chinese politics during Mao’s lifetime. The defining of enemies 
is better viewed as a technique, a mechanism, or a logic, which may also have unintended consequences. The 
theory of securitisation provides much greater nuance for studying such techniques than Schmitt’s metaphys-
ics. For Dutton, the dyad takes centre stage and seems to explain everything in Chinese policing. I, however, 
contend that while the construction of impressions of threats and the legitimising effect of claiming to repel 
them is an important political technique, the effects of these kinds of tactics and strategies are qualified i.e., they 
are not the only matter that affects politics or politicking. As also Dutton (2005) admits, this kind of politics did 
not end with Mao. My reasoning is that it is important to study both Mao-era and post-Mao era politics through 
the same analytical framework, and just as important to be able to study Chinese politics through the same 
framework as other political systems.
249  Žižek (2002a) has noted that totalitarianism is mired in a liberal-democratic notion of normalcy.
250   An example is how for the Mahathir administration in Malaysia the use of emergency measures without 
legitimisation risked being perceived as an abuse of power (Collins 2005, 578-579).
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understanding enlighten us? In the case of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
exception is not from a legal order, but the moment of crafting a classless and, as a result, 
stateless society. In the CCP’s contemporary official doctrine of a ‘harmonious society’, 
this end goal still remains.
Lenin (2004 [1917], 13-18) famously argued for the withering away of the state in 
three stages:251 “The first stage—the bourgeois state: in capitalist society, it is the bourgeoi-
sie that needs the state. The second stage—the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat: 
during the period of transition from capitalism to communism, it is the proletariat that 
needs the state. The third stage—the communist society: the state is not necessary, it withers 
away.” This doctrine entails that the state is a state of exception; thereby the state of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is the state of exception that is used to effect the stateless 
state of existence. For Agamben (2005: 2), modern totalitarianism is a form of legal civil 
war that allows for the elimination of not only political adversaries but whole categories 
of people; what for Marx was a class struggle, turns in modern totalitarian regimes into 
a constant war which can only end when the ‘People’ and the people are merged into a 
classless society or a messianic state (Agamben 2001, 31).252 The state of exception is the 
means to accomplish this. In these terms, the Chinese case presents the state operating in 
a state of exception: the state is the means to eliminate the state through the elimination 
of classes and thus achieve the ‘withering away’ of the state itself, as classes and the civil 
war between them would cease to exist. Yet, as regards Dutton’s (2005) argument to the 
end of the political in China, classes, clearly, still remain in the People’s Republic.253 This 
might mean that the PRC remains, too, a state of exception, as it has classes and it is for-
mally a state. For Schmitt (1996), the political would only end when there came to be only 
one state, and the ‘possibility of real physical killing’ was no longer possible: for Schmitt, 
the mere possibility of antagonistic contradiction entails the political. Along this line of 
thought, the political should remain in China, regardless of the frequency of external or 
internal enemy definition.
Moving beyond the definition of enemies, in Schmitt’s terms, Mao appears to have 
sought the continual renewal of the nomos i.e., the pure immediacy of rule unmediated by 
law.254 The transition from Maoist politics to post-Mao politics is then, perhaps, a transi-
tion from the constant renewal of the nomos, in terms of exceptional politics, to settling 
the state down and ruling it through law. It is also a transition from constituting power to 
251  The original idea of the state withering away is from Engels, but it seems that Lenin’s explanation of what 
this means vis-à-vis the state and the revolution has been more influential, for example, in the Polemics (1965, 
448).
252  Agamben (2005, 2) also notes how the state of exception is closely connected to civil war, insurrection 
and resistance. While various sovereigns have the possibility to limit the rights of citizens during ‘states of 
siege’ or ‘emergency’, the counterpoint for such rights is the right of citizens to resist the sovereign (Agamben 
2005, 10-11; cf., Ojakangas 2002). For example, the constitution of the German Federal Republic institutionally 
securitises the democratic constitution, as its Article 20 states that “against anyone who aims to abolish that 
order, all Germans have a right of resistance, if no other remedies are possible” (quoted in Agamben 2005, 11). 
253  Deng’s post-Mao analysis of the Chinese society and state, suggests that China operates in a ‘normative 
interregnum’ (cf., Huysmans 2006b, 14) where the pre-PRC order is no longer valid, yet the communist order is 
not yet born; for Deng, the Chinese state cannot wither away until China has moved on from the ‘primary stage 
of socialism’, which will take ‘a hundred years’, or ‘a very long time.’
254  Totalitarian rule seems to favour, if not even necessitate, state structures that are in flux (for example, Adolf 
Hitler ruled under a state of exception, or Ausnahmezustand, until the very end in 1945).
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constituted power i.e., a transition from revolution to state (cf., Agamben 1998, 41-42).255 
While the PRC continues to become more and more constituted e.g., in the form of its 
legal system becoming more extensive and predictable, the party still retains its potential 
of prerogative. Similarly to what Agamben (ibid.) suggests in both the cases of Nazi Ger-
many and the Soviet Union, the party-state structure of the Chinese political order can be 
viewed as a means to retain constitutive power within a constituted power.256
Thus the CCP in the PRC seems to concur with the paradox of sovereignty that Sch-
mitt (2005, 7) identified, since the sovereign is both outside and inside the legal order; 
it is in the remit of the sovereign to decide if the constitution is to be suspended in toto. 
Furthermore, there remain classes in the PRC, so that the state as exception would still 
needed in respect of Lenin’s (2004 [1917]) theory of the withering away of the state; 
ergo, the potential for the political in Schmitt’s sense, and the possibility to define inner 
hostis, remain in China. Yet Dutton’s observation on the reduction of the all-pervasiveness 
of seeking internal enemies still holds true in post-Mao China too. Dutton (2005, 19-20) 
himself recognises that there are still instances of internal enemy definition in China, 
but defining them is no longer the ‘rule’, but now the exception. In sum, this means that 
another explanation is needed rather than the ‘end of the political.’257 As such, perhaps it 
is not necessary to essentialise the dyad, but to examine the use of asymmetric political 
concepts through other means.
6.3. Applying the Theory of Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic
        Political Orders
In contrast to the empirical cases studied here, the vast majority of literature on the prac-
tice of securitisation has focused on political systems that can be considered more or less 
democratic. This is probably due to a large extent to the ‘Europeanness’ of the approach 
(Huysmans 1998a, 499-502), as it was after all induced from European politics.258 While 
this European aspect is manifest in both the theoretical formulations and empirical ap-
plications of the CopS approach, it has to be noted that the originators of the theory did 
not intend for it to be only applicable to Europe or democratic systems: national security 
is an immensely convenient tool to justify actions and policies – in all types of states 
(Buzan 1991, 11; see also Buzan et al. 1998). Indeed, Huysmans (1998a) argues that se-
255  In the case of the Cultural Revolution as a dissolution of the rules set up to rule the CCP, the question 
remains: was Mao afraid of losing the constitutive power of the revolution, or of losing his own position of 
authority and influence. Interesting as this question is, it is beyond the remit of this present study.
256  The Chinese system of ‘invisible ministries’ or xitongs (系统, xìtǒng), that informally connect legally separate 
segments of the state bureaucracy (Lieberthal 2004) appears to have a similar function. In this kind of a system, 
neither the sovereignty nor its constituting power can be located wholly within or without the juridico-legal 
state system of the PRC.
257  Questions arise, such as: Why was martial law declared in 1989 for parts of Beijing, when the Chinese state 
is supposed to be a state of exception, and the CCP retains a prerogative position? Was a decade of post-Mao 
politics enough to reify the Chinese state beyond an exception, or was the declaration of martial law more about 
gaining legitimacy for actions that broke the moral rules of leadership? Would the overt use of exceptional 
power in the form of force been too costly for the leadership that could no longer rely on the charisma and 
popularity Mao commanded two decades before? And here it is notable that even Mao used the language of 
threats during the Cultural Revolution to legitimise the dissolution of rules (see Case I).
258  Wæver (2004a, 2) also identifies the context-boundedness of the development of the CopS approach, in 
addition to the development of the other ‘European’ critical schools of security studies (see also CASE 2006).
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curitisation theory is a framework that can, and should, be put to the test outside Europe. 
The applicability of the approach beyond Europe has also been noted by Hayward Alker 
(2006, 73) who maintains that it allows and encourages comparative historical/empirical 
investigation into securitisation/desecuritisation practices, in democratic, authoritarian 
and totalitarian societies and politics.259 
While the application of the approach to all types of political systems has been promot-
ed, the normative push of the research program has been towards democracy; although 
securitisation theorists have been reluctant to be normative in the manner that Critical 
Security Studies proposes, the built-in ethics of the approach is clearly a democratic im-
pulse.260 Indeed, although the originators of the theory of securitisation intended it to be 
applicable to non-democracies, a certain preference, or even ‘bias’261 towards democratic 
decision-making can be detected in the ‘paradigmatic understanding’262 of the theory: 
the practice of securitisation has been understood as a means of naturalising politics, a 
means to avert certain issues beyond the democratic process of government. In this un-
derstanding, security issues represent a type of special politics, which legitimises the use 
259  Some appliers of securitisation theory beyond Europe have criticised the ‘Eurocentricism’ of the CopS (e.g., 
Caballero-Anthony & Emmers 2006, 5-6). Nils Bubandt (2005) has similarly criticised the universal premise 
of concepts like ‘human security.’ Just as sociologists of modernity seem to make an argument for a ‘genuine’ 
modernity, Bubandt sees global security discourses as producing a hegemonic understanding of security. He 
argues for ‘vernacular security’ or multiple securities: understandings of security vary on the local, national 
and global level and these understandings intersect but are not always compatible (see Muna 2006 for a similar 
argument).
Bubandt (2005) is indeed correct to emphasise the social constructedness of securities and insecurities. Most of 
his arguments are, however, already present in the CopS approach when combined with the sectors and levels 
of security complex theory. Felix Ciuta’s (2009) argument that the CopS does not ‘listen’ to what the objects of 
study have to say about the meaning of security does not seem to hit its target squarely, as Wæver (1989b, 301) 
has for instance argued that security means different things to different societies at different times, because 
the core fears of societies, or social groups, are unique and relate to vulnerabilities and historical experiences. 
Similarly, Buzan et al. (1998, 27) state that their “claim is that it is possible to dig into the practice connected to 
this concept of security in international relations (which is distinct from other concepts of security) and find a 
characteristic pattern with an inner logic.” As security is what security does, it is possible to use the approach 
to study securitisation in various contexts and various levels. Indeed, it seems that many critics of the theory of 
securitisation do not take the sectors and levels of Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 
1998; Buzan & Wæver 2003; Buzan & Wæver 2009) into account when they criticise the CopS. 
Using an anthropological approach, Kent (2006, 346) agrees with Bubandt and criticises most security theories 
as inherently ethnocentric. Claire Wilkinson (2007) uses the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’, coined by Buzan and Little 
(2001), as the gist of her critique of the CopS approach when applied outside Europe. Like Bubandt, she argues 
that the Euro-American understanding of the state and society is taken as unproblematic or even normative in 
the study of ‘states’ and ‘societies’ elsewhere, and if empirical results conflict with IR theories, similarities with 
‘Westphalia’ are emphasised. Alexandra Kent (2006) shares this concern of assuming European understandings 
of security in studies of Cambodia, but while Curley (2004) criticises the CopS approach of Eurocentricism, 
she finds that it resonates with the discussion of illegal immigration as an issue of non-traditional security 
in Northeast Asia, in her survey on theoretical approaches to analyse the securitisation of migration. See also 
Curley & Wong (2008a).
The CopS is not alone with its European emphasis, which is present even more significantly in the Critical 
Approaches to Security in Europe Networked Manifesto (CASE 2006). Consequently, it too has provoked similar 
criticism (e.g., Walker 2007; Behnke 2007; Salter 2007).
260  See the ‘Eriksson debate’ (Eriksson, 1999 onwards), Huysmans (2002) and Wæver (2003); on the distinc-
tion between the normativity of Critical Security Studies and securitisation analysis, see Taureck (2006a), CASE 
(2006), and Floyd (2007a).
261  See for example Laustsen & Wæver (2000), Taureck (2006a), and CASE (2006); even critiques of securitisa-
tion theory display the same tendency, see Huysmans (1998b), Aradau (2004), Balzacq (2005), Muna (2006); 
still some criticise the Copenhagen School of dismissing democracy (Bigo 2002).
262  In the sense Phillip Huang (1991, 308) uses it.
180
Chapter 6
of ‘special procedures’ through necessities of survival (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). 
This built-in ethical push towards democracy – hence desecuritisation – should not, 
however, limit the study of securitisation to democratic political systems. If Securitisa-
tion Studies is to be an encompassing research programme, it should take into account 
security speech and politics in all types of political systems. As such, the main theorists 
of the theory have understood all types of political systems as applicable for analysis 
within the framework, as evidenced in their analysis of security complexes around the 
globe (cf., Buzan & Wæver 2003), but they have not spelled out how this might be accom-
plished beyond its abstract idea. Unfortunately, the majority of both critics and appliers 
of the theory seem to assume that the theory is only applicable in democratic societies. 
The argument goes263 that totalitarian or other non-democratic political systems do not 
need political legitimacy in the same way as democracies do. The leaders of totalitarian 
systems can rule by force, without special justification. There is no need to move security 
issues away from the democratic process into ‘special politics’, as there is no democratic 
process to begin with.
However, when non-democratic political systems are examined, it is noticeable that the 
above assumption is not always the case (cf., Arendt 1976; Jahn et al. 1987; Wæver 1989b). 
Indeed, a more obtainable reasoning is that all governments must exercise a minimum of 
both persuasion and control, and that security arguments are used to achieve both.264 As 
Christian Davenport (2005, xv) points out, authoritarian regimes usually frame repres-
sion as a necessity arising from some political threat, not something that is done because 
it can be done. Legitimacy is perhaps the most significant element in the survival of any 
social institution and all governments must exercise a minimum of both persuasion and 
coercion in order to survive (Wiberg 1988, 120). All societies require some form of ritual, 
as without such devices no polity can survive and retain the acquiescence of its members 
(Edelman 1972, 3). This is applicable to both democratic and non-democratic systems; 
even the most despotic states are headed by individuals who depend on the favourable 
beliefs of some key figures in the polity. Even tyrants need people to do their bidding, and 
loyal actors and subjects are important in totalitarian systems (Elo 2005, 128-131). In 
the long term, purely coercive rule is impossible and even brutal oppression can turn into 
a disadvantage for the oppressor. Authoritarian regimes too have to legitimise their use 
of extraordinary measures (Holm 2004, 219), and security is a strong legitimator even in 
non-democratic political systems. 
But does security have a similar function in non-democratic political systems, as it 
does in democratic ones? Why would it seem that the current form of securitisation the-
ory does not function in the analysis of these systems? What is ‘special politics’ when no 
democratic process exists from which to move security issues away from? What is the 
political function of security in non-democratic systems? Can we still utilise the concept 
of securitisation in analysing the security politics of non-democracies? Yes we can, but 
further categories of securitisation acts have to be introduced. As Caballero-Anthony & 
Emmers (2006) and Wilkinson (2007, 13) also emphasise, an examination of the impact 
263  This argument has been presented to the present author at conferences and in referee comments.
264  Collins (2005, 578-579) for example notes how the Mahathir administration of Malaysia needed public 
legitimisation with its use of the Internal Security Act to detain university personnel in 1987, as the use of 
emergency measures alone risked being perceived as an abuse of power.
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of operationalising European concepts as deduced from politics in a liberal-democratic 
order in specific non-European and non-democratic contexts must be made. 
Based on illocutionary logic (Searle and Vanderveken 1985), I propose here that the 
complex act of securitisation can contain several kinds of perlocutionary intentions and 
effects, and thus, that securitisation can be utilised for a range of political purposes. The 
explication of the concept of securitisation and its more complex categorisation allows 
the precision and usefulness in the liberal democratic context to be retained, whilst hon-
ing the theory conceptually in order to utilise it to analyse security issues and politics 
in non-democratic contexts. To move from one social and political context to another, 
an explication that is based on illocutionary logic is required so as to be able to move 
up and down on the ‘ladder of generality.’ Security serves various political functions in 
various contexts. If the purpose of Securitisation Studies is to gain an increasingly precise 
understanding of who can securitise (actors), which issues (threats), for whom (referent 
objects), why, with what kinds of effects, and under which conditions (i.e., what explains 
when securitisation has been successful) (Buzan et al. 1998, 32; Buzan & Wæver 2003), 
it becomes useful to investigate security speech in as many contexts as possible. Moving 
from context to context, however, means that we have to be careful not to distort our 
concepts.
One possible candidate for such distortion is the notion of ‘special politics’, largely 
left undefined by Buzan et al. (1998, 36). This notion seems to be closely related to the 
tripartite classification of: 1) non-political issues – which are outside of the purview of 
the state, 2) political issues – which are on the agenda of ‘regular politics’ and 3) security 
issues – which is the arena of ‘special politics’ i.e., non-democratic decision making due to 
necessities of survival (cf., Buzan et al. 1998, 29).265 Due to the Euro-emphasis of empiri-
cal securitisation studies conducted to date, this understanding easily premises democ-
racy as the norm of politics,266 as securitisation is often seen as a means to move issues 
beyond the democratic process of government. Yet also states which have no democracy, 
have security issues.267 Thereby, how are we to deal with the social construction of secu-
rity issues in these states, and what is ‘special politics’ in non-democratic systems?268
265  Mouffe (2005, 2-3) has criticised the kind of thinking that separates the political into a sphere or sector of 
activity in the way the CopS does. Instead, she suggests that the political is a dimension that is inherent in the 
ontology of human beings. See also Jutila (2006, 171-174) on the problems of the understanding of politics of 
the CopS. He suggests that Kari Palonen’s distinction of politics as a sphere, and politics as activity, should be 
the method to conceptualise politics. In my view, as I have already reasoned above, the securitisation theory 
framework can be used together with a variety of approaches to or theories of politics.
266  Balzacq (2010a, 67) goes even so far as to suggest that securitised issues have to be parliamentary issues, a 
move that would remove securitisation from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the PRC.
267  This is already most clear from Buzan & Wæver (2003) who use securitisation theory to discuss all the 
regional security complexes around the globe, as studies which utilise securitisation theory in Asia highlight. 
See for example Emmers (2003; 2004; 2007), Curley (2004), Collins (2005), Caballero-Anthony et al. (2006), 
Paltemaa & Vuori (2006), Jackson (2006), Wilkinson (2007), Elliott (2007), Haacke & Williams (2008), Curley 
& Wong (2008a), and Barthwal-Datta (2009). Critical studies of security in Asia that utilise the other European 
critical ‘schools’ of security studies seem to be much fewer in number. An exception here is Burke & McDonald 
(2007). See Alagappa (1998), Pettiford & Curley (1999), Bubandt (2005), and Kent (2006) for critical views that 
do not apply any of the CASE approaches.
268  This is often understood as breaking the rules of liberal democratic decision-making. The model of securiti-
sation does not, however, necessitate this kind of thinking. As Collins (2005, 571) also notes, special procedures 
or emergency measures may take various forms according to the socio-political system. He argues that an 
extraordinary or emergency measure is an action that goes beyond the remit of the usual measures used by the 
securitising actor. Such measures could include, for example, the imposition of martial law or special legislation 
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It is important to repeat here that in order to avoid premising any form of politics as 
the norm within the theory of securitisation,269 ‘special politics’ cannot be defined very 
specifically; yet, it can be postulated that all societies have ‘rules.’ These ‘rules’ are prod-
ucts of historical and social contingencies, as are the referent objects and threats in secu-
rity. When security logic and rhetoric is utilised to legitimate the breaking of these rules, 
we have a case of securitisation. (Buzan et al. 1998, 24.) If security can be used in democ-
racies to relieve decision makers from the democratic process, in some other political 
systems, decision makers can also then be relieved of some other constraints they would 
usually have to take into account, for instance, morality or the infallibility of leadership.
However, I propose here that security is not always about ‘special politics’ in the sense 
of breaking rules. In totalitarian socialist systems, struggle and antagonistic contradic-
tions among enemies can sometimes be considered ‘normal politics’, or even politics 
which follows the ‘rules.’270 In these situations, security speech can be utilised for other 
purposes than to legitimise the breaking of rules. Security can, for example, be used to 
reproduce the political order and to control society.
Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish between ‘normal’ and ‘special’ politics 
in authoritarian states, in which most opposition has been suppressed and where the 
army, which often holds the real power, remains highly secretive (cf., Emmers 2007).271 
Accordingly, the study of Chinese politics undertaken in this present study is also prob-
lematic, as the party there remains secretive of its political processes, and ‘emergencies’ 
have been dominant in many political campaigns or even leadership eras (see Part II). 
Similarly, the official and formal description of power relations in the Chinese constitu-
tion does not have real relevance to the de facto analysis of Chinese politics, which can be 
well described as ‘informal’ (Baum 1995; Lieberthal 2004).
Studies in other non-democratic political orders have revealed similar problems. From 
her analysis of Algerian politics, Ulla Holm (2004, 219) concludes that in these types of 
systems it is not easy to analyse who is securitising what, and how successful this secu-
ritisation is. For Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Nicole J. Jackson (2006, 312) identifies 
the same problem: decision-making structures are closed and the authoritarian political 
leaders are able to make rapid decisions in constant ‘emergency mode.’ Tajikistan poses a 
further problem due to its ‘fluctuating’ political system. Jackson (2006) contends that this 
makes the application of securitisation theory difficult or impossible in analysing states 
with little or no contested politics.272 For Malaysia, Joseph Chinyong Liow (2006, 52, 57) 
(e.g., the Internal Security Act in Malaysia or the Patriot Act in the USA).
Curley (2008, 30-31) also discusses the issue of what it means to move from ‘normal’ to ‘special’ politics in 
authoritarian or quasi-democratic political orders. See also Liow (2006, 61-62) and Curley & Wong (2008c, 
180-181).
269  The intention here is to keep the hard core of securitisation theory abstract enough that it can be adjusted 
via its protective belt to work together with various approaches to politics (e.g., productive, reproductive, and 
allocatory views), and perhaps even within various research traditions of IR (e.g., realism, constructivism, and 
postmodernism).
270  Dutton (2005) in a way argues for this in his analysis of Mao-era policing in China.
271  While public legitimacy is one of the keys to success in democratic political orders, it is good to keep in mind 
that not all issues of security are made public even in liberal democracies: “Some security practices are not 
legitimised in public by security discourse because they are not out in the public at all (e.g., the ‘black programs’ 
in the United States, which are not presented in the budget), but this is actually a very clear case of security logic 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 28).”
272  It has to be remembered that regardless of how uncontested or strong some authoritarian leadership is 
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argues that politics and security cannot be clearly distinguished, as the government is 
firmly in control of the parameters of socio-political discursive spaces of the public do-
main. He argues that in these types of authoritarian or pseudo-democratic political land-
scapes, securitisation does not have to be negotiated in a public political space; since 
in these types of systems the ‘state’ can deem what is kept in or out of the public do-
main.273
Holm (2004, 220) agrees that even though it is nearly impossible to identify who is 
the real actor behind securitisation processes in authoritarian systems, it is possible to 
analyse how the logic of legitimisation through securitisation functions through analy-
sis of official programmes, laws and statements. Indeed, according to Jadwiga Staniszkis 
(1992, 84), legitimisation arguments determine the philosophy of rule in real political 
orders. Such arguments determine, to a significant degree, the nature of institutional 
structures in the political sphere and inform the language which authorities use to for-
mulate problems and suggest solutions. Most security arguments fall under this category 
of requests for legitimacy (Wæver 1997a). Although in prerogative states,274 legitimisa-
tion arguments do not always actually serve legitimisation functions (but, for example, 
the functions of autocommunication or control), as they may not have been accepted by 
society. They can nonetheless have important consequences for the political process, and 
they may even result in the ensnaring of authoritarian leaderships.275 Because security 
arguments are so powerful, it is not in their nature to remain hidden (Wæver 1995) even 
though secrecy is a major feature of actual security policies.276 The authoritative con-
struction of security is needed in authoritarian or totalitarian systems to create a security 
reality. In most cases, this construction has to be public in order to have the legitimising, 
reifying, disciplining, or other function desired. 
In Algeria, for example, one difficulty of measuring the support for the securitisation 
of the survival of the state/regime is that elections have very rarely been fair (Holm 2004, 
219). But as Holm also notes, even authoritarian regimes have to legitimise their use of 
or seems to be, securitisation can always fail as an open social process without any finite criteria of success. 
Further, to raise an issue on the agenda is only one of the functions of securitisation. See Chapter 6.3.2. below.
273  I argue that the strand of securitisation for control (see Chapter 6.3.2.4. below) provides an answer for 
Liow’s (2006) criticism of the CopS’s apparent assumption of an open political space where securitisation would 
have to be negotiated. While even ‘bull-dozing’ acts of securitisation may be used as a form of legitimisation, the 
function of control may be more prominent here. The argument I present here is supported by Sayed Fauzan 
Riyadi’s (unpublished) application of the five strands of securitisation (Vuori 2008b) to study the functions of 
securitisation in Malaysia. It should also be noted that the ‘general public’ may not be the only relevant audience 
for securitisation; there may be political audiences in Malaysia that have to be convinced of the security nature 
of an issue in order to provide legitimacy for certain policies, even if this is not actually the ‘general public’ but 
the President himself instead.
274  Although the prerogative state relieves itself of the obligation to adhere to any legal formulas, and the 
authorities themselves (still intersubjectively) decide when a crisis prevails (Stanizskis 1992, 12-13, 79-82), 
the prerogative state is not omnipotent, as it also needs some degree of legitimacy and legitimisation, including 
self-legitimisation by the authorities (cf., Wæver 1989b; Wæver 1995; Holm 2004; Elo 2005).
275  A good example of this from an eroding post-totalitarian socialist setting was the social movement that 
facilitated the collapse of East Germany in 1989. The ruling party SED tried to frame the demonstrators as 
counter-revolutionaries, but failed and finally had to cede power. Wæver (1989b; 1995) has emphasised that 
the fall of the SED was, inter alia, due to the failure of the securitisation moves of the ruling party. Some have 
also attributed the fall of the Indonesian New Order to the undermining of popular belief in the legitimacy of 
the state and its security project (Bubandt 2005, 287). Even the Kyrgyzstan government failed in its counter-
securitisation moves preceding its overthrow in 2005 (Wilkinson 2007, 18).
276  Cf., Foucault’s (2007, 261-266) discussion of coup d’états. 
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‘extraordinary’ measures. A failure in this legitimisation can be detected in demonstra-
tions and riots, intra-elite revolts, palace coups, or active non-participation (cf., Wæver 
1989b; Wæver 1995; Staniszkis 1992). This kind of active passivity and resistance is 
frequent in China, albeit on an uncoordinated level.277 Although apathy translates into 
legitimacy (Wiberg 1988), active passivity is a sign of something else e.g., a form of resist-
ance.
Of course, ‘security threats’ could be eliminated without public securitisation, but this 
would entail different costs in terms of legitimacy for example. Indeed, the use of force 
signals weakness in politics (Edelman 1972, 114).278 Securitisation theory focuses its at-
tention precisely on those cases where actors deem it prudent to have a public securiti-
sation discourse, but the theory does not claim that there would necessarily have to be 
securitisation acts in order to have deeds that go beyond ‘special politics’, a point which 
some critics would seem to have missed (e.g., Wilkinson 2007, 21; Emmers 2007, 112; 
Barthwal-Datta 2009). Security arguments need not be used merely to achieve immedi-
ate results, but to gain the acquiescence of those whose lasting support or compliance is 
needed.
6.3.1. Varieties of Speech Act Theory
As the above has already shown us, there has been a wide variety of criticisms of the CopS 
approach, much of which has arisen from empirical application to contexts that have gone 
beyond the original European one. Hence I argue here that the explication of the logic of 
securitisation acts shows how the original formulation of the theory represents only one 
type of securitisation, and that the increase in extension of the concept allows the incor-
poration of most of the ‘anomalies’ identified by critics into the theory whilst retaining 
the insights of the original formulation. 
Accordingly, I will explicate the concept of securitisation through the illocutionary 
logic of John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken (1985). I reason that this meta-language 
is sufficiently ‘near-universal’ (cf., Wierzbicka 1991) to make cross-cultural analysis of 
securitisation speech acts possible. The explication of the concept and opening up of the 
complexity of securitisation speech acts provide a more exact bearing of the various func-
tions of securitisation as a form of politics. The various ‘strands’ of securitisation form a 
‘grammar’ for it and are about the ‘langue’ of securitisation (the ‘vocabulary’ or the ‘pa-
role’ of securitisation is specific for actually occurring ‘speech’ and securitisation moves). 
The new categorisation of securitisation speech acts raises the concept of securitisation 
to a higher level of generality, which entails an increased extension for the concept. In 
order to provide the foundation for my argument, some basics of speech act theory as 
such has to be discussed.
277  See O’Brien (1994; 1996) on how Chinese peasants use ‘rightful resistance’ as a form of protest, Tanner 
(2004) on how prevalent ‘mass incidents’ are in contemporary China. 
278  As Wæver (1995, 80) notes: “the other side of the [securitisation] move will, in most cases, be at least the 
price of some loss of prestige as a result of needing to use this special resort (‘national security was threatened’) 
or, in the case of failure, the act backfires and raises questions about the viability and reputation of the regime.” 




The point of departure for this present study is the premise that speech acts are the basic 
form of human communicative interaction. The concept and theory of speech acts is fairly 
recent, yet the idea that people do things by talking, that they perform different kinds of 
acts by speaking has a much longer intellectual history; this avenue of thought stretches 
back at least to the stoics (Wierzbicka 1991, 197). Ideas similar to that of speech acts were 
also put forward by scholars like Josef Schächter (1973), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1999a), 
and Mikhail Bakhtin (1986). However, it was John L. Austin (1975) who presented the 
conception in the most systematic form and transferred it into the field of linguistics.279
Speech act theory contains three types of speech acts: locutionary (an act of say-
ing something),280 illocutionary (an act in saying something), and perlocutionary 
(an act by saying something) (Austin 1975). John R. Searle (e.g., 1969) is the lead-
ing developer of Austin’s theory or language philosophy, but social theorists such 
as Jürgen Habermas (1979; 1984),281 Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., 1991)282 and Judith 
279  Wittgenstein and Austin have perhaps been two of the most important sources of inspiration for 20th 
century linguistic philosophy, which has been divided into two trends: the logical trend of Frege and Russell 
which studies how words relate to things, while the trend of ordinary language analysis studies how and for 
which purposes words are used in discourse (Vanderveken & Kubo 2002, 3). Speech act theory has also had an 
impact on various social theories, as noted by Onuf (1989, 82) for example. Skinner (2002) is an example of how 
speech act theory has influenced the study of the history of political ideas and concepts.
280  For Austin (1975, 94-95), locutionary acts consisted of phonetic acts, phatic acts, and rhetic acts. For him, 
locutions also had both a sense and a reference. Searle (1973, 141-145) departs from Austin’s separation of 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, by using his own distinction between illocutionary and propositional acts. 
This difference is more than a taxonomical preference and involves important philosophical issues. Searle (ibid., 
147-148) notes how Austin (1975, 95) had inadvertently characterised rhetic acts as illocutionary acts. Searle 
continues to argue that no sentence can be force-neutral; every sentence has some illocutionary force-potential 
built into its meaning. According to Searle, there is no way to abstract (Austin had noted that locutionary and 
illocutionary acts are abstractions of the whole speech act) a rhetic act in the utterance of a complete sentence, 
which does not abstract an illocutionary act as well, since a rhetic act is always an illocutionary act of one kind 
or another. Searle (ibid., 153) lists three locutionary-illocutionary distinctions: 1) The distinction between a 
certain aspect of trying and succeeding in performing an illocutionary act (securing uptake etc. from Austin), 2) 
The distinction between the literal meaning of the sentence and what the speaker means (by way of illocution-
ary force) when uttered, and 3) The distinction between propositional acts and illocutionary acts (there is 
also a fourth distinction between the illocutionary act performed and what was implied by its performance). 
Forguson (1973, 160) disagrees with the destructive aspects of Searle’s (1973) critique of Austin’s (1975) 
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary speech acts. In the present study, the locutionary aspects of 
speech acts as well as their possible ‘sense and reference’ (Frege 1966) can be omitted from the discussion, as 
the illocutionary, and to an extent the perlocutionary aspects are more relevant. 
281  Habermas’s interest in speech acts is connected to his theory of communicative action. He divides speech 
acts into perlocutionary and illocutionary acts, where perlocutions are forms of strategic action and illocutions 
communicative action. The problem with his distinction is that he does not seem to take into account that even 
the most communicative forms of illocutions e.g., argumentation, can have perlocutionary intentions, and aims 
e.g., convincingness.
282  For Pierre Bourdieu (1991, 72-75), performative utterances are effects of symbolic domination. The power 
of different speakers depends on their symbolic capital i.e., the recognition they receive from a group. This 
symbolic capital, be it institutionalised or informal, can only function if there is a convergence of social condi-
tions distinct from the linguistic logic of discourse. Appropriate senders and receivers have to be present in the 
social situation. Speech acts are acts of institution, and they are inseparable from the existence of an institution 
defining the conditions, which have to be fulfilled for the ‘magic’ of the words to operate. For Bourdieu then, the 
conditions of felicity are social conditions; the real source of the ‘magic’ of performative utterances lies in the 
‘mystery of ministry’, where the representative gives a biological body for the constituted body of the aggregate 
of individuals.
According to Bourdieu, the power of speech lies in social institutions rather than in words themselves, as his 
point was to counter some structural linguists’ overemphasis of the determinacy of linguistic rules. Countering 
one overemphasis, however, can lead to an excess of another kind: Bourdieu’s approach can be criticised as 
being too formal in terms of social institutions. Indeed, Butler has emphasises the indeterminacy of identities, 
and thereby of social institutions, which can be contested and refused. 
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Butler (e.g., 1997)283 have also provided their own view on speech acts.284 The approach 
to speech acts applied in the present study follows that of Searle and Vanderveken (1985), 
with some insights taken from Bourdieu (1991).285
John Austin (1975) and John Searle (1969) have argued that speaking a language is 
rule-governed behaviour286 and that all human languages share a set of constitutive rules 
that lie underneath the conventional semantic structures of different languages.287 Lan-
guage (as the ability) thus logically precedes different languages and cultures. Human 
languages, to the extent they are inter-translatable, can be regarded as different conven-
tional realisations of the same underlying rules (Searle 1969, 36-37). Thus, illocutionary 
speech acts, such as securitisation, are an example of practices that derive from these 
universal rules. This then, is the premise that makes it possible to apply the theory of 
securitisation to the study of Chinese politics: if security issues are constituted through a 
process of speech acts, then they should also be constituted through the same mechanism 
in all societies, even though not all societies or languages share the same particular types 
of speech acts. Austin (1975) argues that illocutions, unlike perlocutions, are contingent: 
they are done conforming to conventions. These conventions are historicised and de-
pendent on social and cultural factors. However, even though security means different 
things to different societies, as the core fears of a group or nation are unique and relate 
to vulnerabilities and historical experiences (Wæver 1989b, 301), the constitution and 
perlocutionary effects of security are based on the universality of speech acts.288
283  Judith Butler’s (1999) Foucault-inspired concept of performativity, proposes that core discourses are 
learned and then repetitively repeated, and that this imbues people with identities within systems of difference, 
rather than that they would have some essential identity beyond the performance of one. Butler (1993, 95) 
argues that it is not the ‘subject’ that iterates, but that it is the repetition that “enables a subject and constitutes 
the temporal condition for the subject. This iterability implies that ‘performance’ is not a singular ‘act’ or event, 
but a ritualized production.” The possibility of iterability shows that the subject is underdetermined, and that 
thereby it can be contested and remain incoherent. She (Butler 1997) uses speech act theory to underline the 
indeterminacy of meaning in pragmatic speech situations. Butler (2006) further, argues that the performative 
meaning of words cannot be concluded in the abstract, but that their performativity is context-bound.
Butler emphasises the iterability of performatives, and presents identities as underdetermined in systems of 
difference. However, she remains vague on the difference between performativity and performance. 
284  There is a large literature on speech acts in philosophy and linguistics. See for example Strawson (1964), 
Bach & Harnish (1979), Derrida (1988), Wierzbicka (1991), and Sbisà (2001; 2002) for varying views on 
speech acts.
Speech act theory has also been applied to the study of conceptual history (e.g., Skinner 2002), production of 
social norms (e.g., Onuf 1989), Chinese politics (e.g., Schoenhals 1992), and of course, the social construction 
of security (e.g., Wæver 1995).
The CopS seems to draw on Austin and Derrida’s (1988) interpretation of Austin (and criticism of Searle) with 
a twist of Bourdieu, while maintaining a distance from Habermas. The most explicit critical treatment (i.e., 
Balzacq 2005; 2010a) seems to be inclined towards Bourdieu and Habermas. The understanding of speech 
acts here follows the line of Searle and Daniel Vanderveken (Searle & Vanderveken 1985) with some influences 
from Bourdieu.
285  It is good to note again that the intention here is not to resolve debates on speech act theory, but to apply 
them it in order to enhance securitisation theory.
286  This is also emphasised by Peter Winch (2008, xiii).
287  This premise is contested; see for example Kemmerling (2002).
288  Concomitantly with the philosophy of science applied here: the study is conducted ‘as if ’ there were such 
things as ‘speech acts’, and ‘as if ’ they share some ‘near universal’ features.
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6.3.1.1.  Speech Acts, Semantics, and Pragmatics
Austin’s work was an inspiration for the now mostly defunct ‘generative semantics’ (Wi-
erzbicka 1991, 18) which proposed that all sentences contain clauses that identify the 
nature of the speech act performed through the means of the sentence (see e.g., Katz 
1977; Holdcroft 1978). Similar to the deeper lines of thought reminiscent of the idea of 
performatives, this type of analysis of sentences had already been proposed by Roger 
Bacon in the thirteenth century, and Paul of Venice in the Fourteenth (Nuchelmans 1973; 
Wierzbicka 1991). While the generative analysis of illocutionary verbs has lost most of 
its adherents (see e.g., Searle 1973), the idea that illocutionary force is a part of an ut-
terance’s semantic structure has prevailed in linguistics. Many have attacked this under-
standing by emphasising the indeterminacy of utterances with the argument that ana-
lysts cannot reconstruct performatives (cf., Derrida 1988). However, Wierzbicka (1991, 
199) disagrees with this view, which would result in illocutionary force being outside 
linguistics in the domain of ‘fuzzy’ pragmatics instead.289 She argues that most of the 
time people know what other people are saying to them, and that there are, to a large ex-
tent, unmistakable linguistic clues as to what kind of an act a speaker is committing with 
their utterance. For example, in addition to intonation there are innumerable linguistic 
indicators of illocutionary force, beyond illocutionary verbs. What is ineffective is not 
the identification of illocutionary force, but the models in terms of which linguists have 
tried to analyse illocutionary forces. What is needed is a framework that operates with 
sufficiently elaborate components. I contend that the illocutionary logic of Searle and 
Vanderveken (1985) is just such a framework.290 Indeed, the decomposition of illocution-
ary forces into more specific components solves the ‘insuperable syntactic and semantic 
difficulties’ that the ‘performative hypothesis’ of ‘generative semantics’ was confronted 
with (Wierzbicka 1991, 202, 252-253).
The difference between semantics and pragmatics can be seen in at least three ways 
(Leech 1983, 6). ‘Complementarism’ divides the study of signs into syntax, semantics, and 
pragmatics. The problem with this view is that syntactic and morphological devices carry 
meanings in natural languages (Wierzbicka 1991, 16) i.e., natural languages do not sepa-
rate denotational and pragmatic meanings. Wittgenstein’s (1999a) language philosophy 
launched ‘pragmaticism’ by not asking for the meaning, but asking for the use instead. 
Wittgenstein however did not provide any kind of rigorous framework to describe and 
compare languages across ‘language games’; in fact, his approach lacked an analytical 
metalanguage. Generative semantics was in vogue in the 1970s when it tried to demon-
strate that illocutionary force is an aspect of the semantic structure of utterances (e.g., 
Katz 1977)291 – a point of view sometimes called ‘semanticism.’ This approach also lacked 
a methodology that would have delineated the field of semantics and provided coherence 
to it, thereby the approach eventually led to a ‘self-admitted defeat’ (Wierzbicka 1991, 
18).
As these three views of pragmatics and semantics have all displayed severe difficulties, 
289  See Footnote 96 of Chapter 3 on Derrida’s point of the perpetual openness of interpretation and how this 
is related to in the present study. 
290  For an earlier but less elaborate and partial classification of illocutionary forces, see Schiffer (1972).
291  This is noticeable in Quentin Skinner’s essays on speech acts written in the 1970s (see Skinner 2002).
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Wierzbicka (1991, 18) suggests that we should divide pragmatics into two types. On the 
one hand there is linguistic pragmatics, which deals with the coherent and integrated 
description of linguistic competence. On the other hand, there is another form of prag-
matics that deals with social and psychological domains. These two aspects of pragmatics 
are relevant for this present study as well. Illocutionary logic is a form of linguistic prag-
matics. This can be used to model the illocutionary grammar of the various strands of 
securitisation speech acts. The sociological aspect of pragmatism comes into play when 
the grammatical models are used to analyse actually occurred speech. The analysis of 
securitisation processes requires means and methods that go beyond linguistic analysis; 
structured social fields of practice are a relevant aspect to achieve real or pragmatic se-
curitisation.
6.3.1.2. The Illocutionary Logic of Speech Acts
In an autobiographical introduction, Searle (2002b, 4) states that the objective of his 
early work on speech acts was to develop a general theory of the philosophy of language. 
His theory stated that speaking in a language was a matter of performing illocutionary 
speech acts with certain intentions, according to constitutive rules. These constitutive 
rules have the form “X counts as Y in context C” (Searle 1969, 35).
In developing his theory, Searle (1979; 1983) moved on to argue that there are only 
five elementary types of speech acts, or in his technical terminology, five basic illocu-
tionary points. 292 These are: 1) assertives (e.g., statements, explanations and assertions) 
in which the speaker commits herself to, in varying degrees, the truth of the expressed 
proposition; the speaker thus presents a proposition as representing an actual state of 
affairs in the world of the utterance (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 37-38); 2) Directives 
(e.g., orders, requests and commands) in which the speaker tries to get the hearer to do 
something; in directives the speaker attempts to get the hearer to carry out the course 
of action represented by the propositional content (Ibid.);  3) Commissives (e.g., prom-
ises, threats, and guarantees) where the speaker is committed to doing something, com-
mitted to some future course of action (Ibid.); 4) Expressives (e.g., apologies, thanks and 
congratulations) in which the speaker expresses her feelings and attitudes about some 
state of affairs specified by the propositional content (Ibid.); and 5) Declarations (e.g., 
declaring war, pronouncing wedlock and adjourning a meeting) where the declaration of 
the speaker brings about changes in the world through her utterances so that the world 
changes to match the propositional content, solely by virtue of the successful perform-
ance of the utterance (Ibid.).
Searle and Vanderveken (1985; see also Vanderveken 2002a; 2002b) make arguments 
towards the universality of their illocutionary logic. However, Anna Wierzbicka (1991) 
has criticised Searle (1975) of anglocentricism.293 According to her, Searle departs from 
292  Searle thus makes a strong argument about the basic illocutionary uses of language, i.e., that language can 
only be used in five ways (in the illocutionary sense). Searle (1983) justified this strong claim about the nature 
of human language in his work on the analysis of meaning. This argument was then developed further together 
with Daniel Vanderveken (Searle & Vanderveken 1985) when they established the foundations of illocutionary 
logic.
293  The same tendency is evident in many other treatises in the field of language philosophy, even linguistics; 
see e.g., Grice (1975), Holdcroft (1978), and Leech (1983).
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the English language and makes assumptions and claims of universality across languages 
and cultures without proper empirical study, which amounts to Anglo-Saxon ethnocen-
tricism.294 Indeed, ‘requests’ are only possible in the English language, as ‘translation is 
impossible’;295 languages are self-contained systems (unlike texts, which are intertex-
tual) and no words or constructions can have absolute equivalents in the structures of 
difference of various languages. But as soon as the notion of absolute equivalents and 
universals is abandoned, partial equivalents and ‘partial universals’ become more appar-
ent. Even though two languages do not have identical networks of relationships of signs, 
some correspondences between the networks of relationships of two different languages 
can be expected to be discovered. (Wierzbicka 1991, 10.) Thus, commonplace illocution-
ary verbs of the English language may not appear at all in other languages.296 While the 
same illocutionary verbs do not feature in all languages, we should not confuse illocution-
ary forces with illocutionary verbs; verbs are language specific, but illocutionary forces 
may have broader universality across languages than certain verbs.297 Wierzbicka (1991) 
also argues that the way out of the dilemma of ethnocentricism is to develop a technical, 
artificial and (natural) language independent of semantic metalanguage, and to decom-
pose the elements of illocutionary force. Searle and Vanderveken’s illocutionary logic is 
viewed here to achieve such a metalanguage to a sufficient degree to be utilised in this 
present study as the metalanguage that allows conceptual travel without stretching.
It is good to keep in mind here that all grammars are incomplete. Indeed, the five el-
ementary types of speech acts proposed by John Searle (1979) and Daniel Vanderveken 
(2002a; 2002b) cannot cover all of the complex acts that are constantly committed in 
actual speech. 298 However, the categorisation of elementary speech acts can be utilised 
294  Itkonen (1983) similarly argues that instead of the kind of transcendental deduction Vanderveken (2002a, 
63) calls for, pragmatic linguistics should be based on the study of actually occurred speech. However, it is 
important to remember that Searle is not a linguist, but a philosopher of language and it is not the task of 
philosophers to compare different languages, or to be aware of differences and similarities between them.
295  See Footnote 62 of the Introduction.
296  Not all languages allow thanking, for example (Wierzbicka 1991, 160), while some languages deal with the 
colour spectrum with two words (Berlin & Kay 1969; Heiskala 2000, 148).
297  Searle (1973) already criticised Austin (1975) for confusing the two, when Searle developed his own 
taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Austin (1975, 148-164) classified illocutionary forces into four categories: 1) 
the verdictive is an exercise of judgement, 2) the exercitive is an assertion of influence or exercising power, 3) 
the commissive is an assuming of an obligation or declaring of an intention, 4) the behabitive is the adopting of 
an attitude, and 5) the expositive is the clarifying of reasons, arguments, and communications.
298  For criticisms of the taxonomy of Searle and Vanderveken, see e.g., Kannetzky (2002) and Siebel (2002).
Searle and Vandeveken (1985) argue that the five illocutionary points they postulate are the only illocutionary 
points possible. While this may be the case today, new illocutionary points may evolve or be developed in the 
future. De Sousa Melo (2002, 117) argues that Searle has adopted an evolutionist approach to the mind, and 
that for Searle, intentionality is a natural pre-linguistic property that develops as the organism evolves. If this 
is the case, then it may be too strong to argue, along with Searle and Vanderveken, that the illocutionary points 
they have postulated are the only possible ones, as it may be possible that humans develop new ways to use 
language, in ways not conceived of at present; that more illocutionary points cannot be posited than Searle and 
Vanderveken does not need entail that this would forever be so. This point was also alluded to by Wittgenstein 
(1999a): old meanings and uses can disappear as they become obsolete and forgotten, or new ones appear; if 
it is impossible to construct a theory of all possible language games (Vanderveken & Kubo 2002, 19), it may 
equally be impossible to construct a theory of illocutionary acts that would ‘last for ever.’ Indeed, even Austin 
(1975) referred to more primitive forms of language with their prior limitations. If humanity as a species has 
evolved, our capacity for language may also evolve and thus bring in new illocutionary points. Language and 
evolution should be considered open ended, and theoretisations of language are only tools with which to under-




to analyse complex speech acts. Stephen C. Levinson (1980, 20) notes, that on the one 
hand, several sentences together can actually constitute one single speech act, while on 
the other, a single utterance may contain several speech acts.299 Furthermore, speech acts 
can form sequences, where complex acts can have elementary acts as their components 
(Wunderlich 1980, 293-296), and where the perlocutionary object of one illocution can 
be the sequel of another. Dieter Wunderlich (1980, 293-296) argues that speech acts are 
organised within certain variable discourse patterns: thus, a complex speech unit con-
sists of several acts with several stages performed in sequence. Speech acts within these 
sequences may also possibly utilise parts of the propositional contents provided by the 
preceding utterances in the sequence. The structure of complex speech units is due to 
their complex functions and aims. Typical complex speech units include, for instance, 
narration, argumentation and description. Wierzbicka (1991, 149) argues that complex 
‘speech events’ should be treated in the same manner as simple speech acts. Despite vari-
ances in length, function, and structure, many such events and acts share similar linguis-
tic natures, and their analysis requires a unified descriptive framework. In my view, il-
locutionary logic provides us with just that.
Searle and Vanderveken (1985) term the logical theory they have developed for the anal-
ysis of illocutionary acts, illocutionary logic. They set as its objective the formalisation of 
the logical properties of illocutionary forces. For them, the task of illocutionary logic is to 
study the entire range of possible illocutionary forces, in whatever manner they may be 
realised in particular natural languages and utterances of them. It is thus interested in all 
possible illocutionary forces, and not just in the actual realisations of these possibilities 
in actual speech and in actual languages.300
For Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 1; see also Vanderveken & Kubo 2002) illocution-
ary acts are the minimal unit of human communication. Whenever a speaker utters a 
sentence in an appropriate context with certain intentions, she performs one or more 
illocutionary acts. An illocutionary act consists of an illocutionary force F, and proposi-
tional content P, which means that sentences can have the same propositional content 
but different illocutionary forces (e.g., an order and a prediction), and that two sentences 
can have the same illocutionary force, but different propositional contents. Some lin-
guists have seen this as leading in an irresolvable problem of indeterminacy regarding 
the illocutionary force of utterances.301 Wierzbicka (1991) however, argues that there are 
various semantic markers for illocutionary forces, and that these can be interpreted by 
linguistic analysts. Indeed, most of the time, people seem to make sense of what others 
are doing when they commit illocutionary acts.
Language is often viewed as a tool for human communication. However, language 
has many uses beyond communication: it is a tool for human interaction (Wittgenstein 
299  Vanderveken and Kubo (2002, 7) term these, illocutionary conjunctions. Also Skinner (2002, 134) identifies 
this phenomenon without using technical language.
300  This reminds once again of the different tasks behind philosophy and science in general and language 
philosophy and linguistics in particular. While illocutionary logic is utilised in the present study, the objective 
and task here is not only to explicate the logic of securitisation speech acts, but also to study actually occurred 
speech. Thus, the theoretical part of this present study engages in the theoretical and intuitive discussion of 
illocutionary logic, while its empirical part investigates actually occurred speech that has realised illocutionary 
forces i.e., how securitisation speech acts have been achieved in the PRC.
301  Derrida (1988) plays with this vis-à-vis Searle’s philosophy on speech acts.
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1999a; Wierzbicka 1991, 453).302 Speech act theory argues that people interact with lan-
guage by infusion of the language they use with illocutionary forces, which are used to 
produce effects in other people. For example, Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 11-12) ar-
gue that a successful illocutionary speech act will always produce, at minimum, the effect 
of understanding the utterance in the hearer. Utterances often produce – and indeed most 
of the time are meant to produce – other effects in addition to the effect of understanding. 
These effects can affect the feelings, attitudes and subsequent behaviour of the hearer(s). 
Such effects are called perlocutionary effects (Austin 1975), and the act of their produc-
tion is called the perlocutionary act. For example, by making a statement (illocutionary 
aspect), a speaker may convince or persuade (perlocutionary aspect) her audience, or by 
making a promise (illocutionary aspect) she may reassure or create expectations (perlo-
cutionary aspect) in her audience. Perlocutionary effects may be achieved intentionally 
or unintentionally. It is possible to achieve perlocutionary effects without speaking at 
all i.e., they are not essentially linguistic; unlike illocutions, perlocutions do not follow 
conventions (Austin 1975). Because perlocutionary acts are bound to ‘other minds’ and 
subsequent effects, they cannot be conventional i.e., there cannot be a convention that 
such and such a sign counts as convincing.303
The success or failure of speech acts is not a binary division. Searle (1969) argues that 
Austin’s distinction between felicitous and infelicitous speech acts fails to distinguish be-
tween those speech acts which are successful but defective and those which are not even 
successful. In place of felicity and infelicity he proposes that a speech act may be unsuc-
cessful, successful but defective or successful and nondefective (Searle and Vanderveken 
1985, 10). The conditions for a successful and nondefective performance of an illocution 
contain seven categories; for Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 20-21; originally Vander-
veken 1980), illocutionary forces are uniquely determined once each of the following are 
specified:304
I) Illocutionary point (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 13-15): Each type of illocution has a 
point or purpose internal to it being an act of that type. If the act is successful, this point 
is achieved. The illocutionary point is achieved on the propositional content, as the illocu-
tionary point can only be achieved as part of a complete speech act of the form F(P).
According to Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 37-38; Searle 1979), just as there are 
only five elementary types of speech acts, accordingly, there are only five illocutionary 
points:305 1) the assertive point, to say how things are: thus the speaker presents a propo-
sition as representing an actual state of affairs in the world of the utterance; 2) the com-
302  Even C. W. K. Mundle (1970, 78, 262) recognises the assimilation of words and tools as the most fertile of 
Wittgenstein’s similes, in his criticism on linguistic philosophy. The simile of language as a tool-box is important 
here as it was an inspiration and an influence for Austin as well.
303  For the various perlocutionary intentions of securitisation acts, see Chapter 6.3.2. below. How the lack of 
conventionality in perlocutionary acts is a problem for Balzacq’s (2005; 2010a) understanding of securitisation 
as a ‘pragmatic act’ was demonstrated in Chapter 6.2.3.
304  For how these aspects of illocutionary force can be utilised to define various strands of securitisation 
speech acts, see Chapter 6.3.2. As the present study is interested in the intersubjective construction of security, 
sincerity conditions (features 6 and 7) can be omitted, as the intersubjective dimension of human interaction is 
of interest here, although Searle has been interested in the individual’s point of view.
305  I.e., the force of assertion, the force of commitment to future action, the force of a linguistic attempt to get 




missive point, to commit the speaker to doing something: thus the speaker commits to 
carrying out the course of action represented by the propositional content; 3) the direc-
tive point, to try to get other people to do things: in utterances with the directive point the 
speaker attempts to get the hearer to carry out the course of action represented by the 
propositional content; 4) the declarative point, to change the world by saying so: thus the 
speaker brings about the state of affairs represented by the propositional content solely 
by virtue of her successful performance of the speech act; and 5) the expressive point, to 
express feelings and attitudes: thus the speaker expresses some psychological attitude on 
the state of affairs represented by the propositional content.
II) Degree of strength of the illocutionary point (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 15): Dif-
ferent illocutionary acts often achieve the same illocutionary point but with different de-
grees of strength (e.g., request and insist). Some illocutionary forces require that their 
point is expressed by a certain degree of force, their characteristic degree of strength.
III) Mode of achievement (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 15-16): Some illocutionary acts re-
quire special procedures or conditions for their illocutionary points to be achieved (e.g., a 
position of authority and command [invoking authority in the act]). These are called the 
modes of achievement of an illocutionary point. When force F requires a mode of achieve-
ment it is called the characteristic mode of achievement.
IV) Propositional content conditions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 16): Conditions im-
posed on the propositional content of illocutionary acts by the illocutionary force of the 
act are called propositional content conditions (e.g., a past promise cannot be made).
V) Preparatory conditions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 16-18): Most illocutionary acts 
can be successful and nondefective only if certain conditions apply. Such conditions nec-
essary for the successful and nondefective performance of an illocutionary act are called 
preparatory conditions. In the performance of a speech act the speaker presupposes the 
satisfaction of these preparatory conditions. These conditions are not psychological, but 
certain sorts of states of affairs. Speakers and hearers internalise the rules that determine 
the preparatory conditions, but the conditions must not be psychological themselves. 
Many preparatory conditions are determined by illocutionary points.  For example: all 
acts whose point is to get someone to do something (orders, requests, commands etc.) 
have a preparatory condition that the hearer is able to do the directed act.
VI) Sincerity conditions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 18-19): When one performs an il-
locutionary act with a propositional content, one also expresses a certain psychological 
state with the same content. Since it is always possible to express a psychological state 
that one does not have, sincerity and insincerity in speech acts can be distinguished. An 
insincere speech act is defective but not necessarily unsuccessful. 
VII) Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 19-20): 
Analogous to the illocutionary point being achieved with different degrees of strength, 
the same psychological state can be expressed with different degrees of strength.  
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The force of an utterance is a matter of the illocutionary intentions of the speaker, but wheth-
er or not an illocutionary act with the intended force is successfully and nondefectively 
performed involves a great deal more than just intentions (Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 
21-23).306 Illocutionary logic defines a further set of conditions that have to be satisfied in 
order to achieve successful illocutionary speech acts. Austin (1975) calls the most promi-
nent of these conditions illocutionary uptake, which includes conditions for correctly un-
derstanding the utterance (e.g., attention and language ability). The seven features of il-
locutionary force are here reduced to four types of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the successful and nondefective performance of an elementary illocution; assuming that 
all the conditions necessary and sufficient for hearer understanding are satisfied when 
the utterance is made, an illocutionary act of the type F(P) is successfully and nondefec-
tively performed in a context of utterance if, and only if (Searle and Vanderveken 1985):
The speaker succeeds in achieving in that context, the illocutionary point of F on the 
proposition P, with the required characteristic mode of achievement and degree of 
strength of illocutionary point of F.
She expresses the proposition P, and that proposition satisfies the propositional 
content conditions imposed by F.
The preparatory conditions of the illocution and the propositional presuppositions 
obtain in the world of the utterance, and the speaker presupposes that they ob-
tain.
She expresses and possesses the psychological state determined by F, with the char-
acteristic degree of strength of the sincerity conditions of F.307
For Bourdieu (1991, 72-75) the conditions of felicity are primarily social conditions and 
performative utterances are effects of symbolic domination. He emphasised that linguis-
tic exchanges are situated encounters between agents endowed with socially constructed 
resources and competencies.308 Speech act situations are situated in ’fields’, where the 
’social magic’ of speech acts is a derivative, not of their internal rules or their content, 
but of the extra linguistic social structures and social, or symbolic ‘capital’ of the agents 
involved in the activity.309 The efficacy of performative utterances is inseparable from the 
306  Holdcroft (1978, 4) similarly emphasises the relevance of the context of utterances in determining which 
illocutionary act is being performed; for him, this depends largely on certain features of the context of the 
utterance. For example, while someone may mean something by uttering a sentence, this someone may fail to 
perform some illocutionary act should the requisite authority to perform that utterance be missing (ibid., 51). 
Thereby, the author of a text may at times matter after all (cf., Barthes 1979, 73-78; Foucault 1979c, 141-160; 
Derrida 1976, 6-100).
307  For the present study, this aspect can be omitted from the analysis for the aforementioned reasons.
308  Sbisà (2001) similarly emphasises the role of ‘power’, inclusive of competence, in how illocutionary force 
operates in degrees.
309  It is interesting to compare this with Carl Schmitt’s (2005, 31-32) argument that constitutive decisions 
emanate from nothingness. For Schmitt, the legal force of a decision is different from the result of substantia-
tion. Legal prescriptions only describe how formal decisions should be made, not who should make them; the 
question of competence cannot be answered by the legal quality of a maxim. Indeed, “to answer questions of 
competence by referring to the material is to assume that one’s audience is a fool” (ibid., 32-33). Alongside the 
194
Chapter 6
institutions which define the conditions (e.g., place, time, agent) that have to be fulfilled 
in order for the utterance to be effective. (cf., Bourdieu 1991, 72-75.) While striving for 
transcendental deduction (Vanderveken 2002a), in Searle and Vanderveken’s (1985) il-
locutionary logic, the context of utterances is one of the determinants of the illocutionary 
acts being performed; illocutionary acts are performed at the moment of utterance by 
uttering an appropriate utterance (i.e., producing an appropriate sign) in an adequate 
context of utterance (Vanderveken & Kubo 2002, 4). For Searle & Vanderveken (1985, 27-
28), a context of an utterance consists of five elements and sets of elements viz. 1) speak-
er, 2) hearer, 3) time, 4) place, and 5) those various other features of the speaker, hearer, 
time and place that are relevant to the performance of the speech acts. Particularly im-
portant are the psychological states – e.g., intentions, desires, beliefs – of the speaker and 
hearer. These other features form the world of the utterance. Here the notion of physical 
possibility is also relevant, as the abilities of the speaker and the hearer often enter in the 
preparatory conditions of the illocutionary act (ibid. 30).
While socio-political aspects are quintessential aspects of real speech in real situa-
tions, I contend that the socio-political study of language use should also have an illocu-
tionary foundation. Such a foundation will make the kind of analysis of speech possible, 
which is sufficiently culture-independent to allow cross-cultural comparisons, but with-
out conceptual stretching.
6.3.2. Strands of Securitisation – Explicating the Concept of Securitisation 
           for Conceptual Travel
As securitisation is a complex illocutionary speech act, its illocutionary force is uniquely 
defined (Vanderveken 1980) through the specification of its: 1) illocutionary point, 2) 
preparatory conditions, 3) the mode of achievement of its illocutionary point, 4) the de-
gree of strength of its illocutionary point, 5) its propositional content conditions, 6) its 
sincerity conditions, and 7) the degree of strength of its sincerity conditions (see previ-
ous chapter). Since we are interested in securitisation from an intersubjective point of 
view, sincerity conditions can be left out of our analysis (features 6 and 7).310 This con-
curs with Kannetzsky’s (2002) and Kemmerling’s (2002) criticism of Searle.311 Searle is 
mainly interested in speech acts from an individual’s point of view, which makes sincerity 
conditions relevant to his analysis, but less so for other points of view. The criteria for the 
successful and nondefective performance of securitisation speech acts then depend on 
the first five of the seven features of illocutionary force. A difference in illocutionary force 
i.e., in the features of the illocutionary force of speech acts, will mean a different speech 
question of substantive correctness stands the question of competence (ibid., 34-35). This is what Austin (1975, 
34) means with the statement: “The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate 
for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.” Just as with legal decisions, felicitous speech acts require 
both correct grammar and appropriate social capital/competence to achieve the desired force of the utterance. 
It is however important to keep in mind that not all speech acts are ritualistic: while some perlocutionary acts 
have a conventional outcome, not all do.
310  This is implicit in the original formulations of securitisation theory, but some critics (e.g., Balzacq 2005) 
seem to have overlooked this. As influenced by Karup Pedersen and Jacques Derrida, Wæver (1989c; 2004a; 
2005; 2007a) has emphasised the impossibility of studying what politicians really think through discourse 
analysis.
311  Already Holdcroft (1978, 42) noted that an insincere statement is still a statement.
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act. This implies that if there are differences in illocutionary force, there are different 
strands of securitisation. 
As was already noted above, the force of an utterance is a matter of the illocutionary 
intentions of the speaker, but whether or not an illocutionary act with the intended force 
is successfully and nondefectively performed involves far more than just intentions. It 
must be kept in mind that to achieve a security status for an issue requires more than the 
linguistically felicitous performance of the securitisation speech act. Nevertheless, nei-
ther the linguistic nor the social felicity conditions of securitisation are entirely determi-
nant: no individual can be guaranteed the success of securitisation, as this is in the remit 
of the audience (Buzan et al. 1998, 31; cf., Wæver 1997a; 2000).312 Both the linguistic and 
social felicity conditions are necessary, but neither is a sufficient condition for successful 
securitisation. However, this does not make it any less prudent to formulate the linguistic 
rules of securitisation as explicitly as possible.
Based on the illocutionary logic briefly presented above it can be seen that the type 
of securitisation Wæver has argued for is only one strand of securitisation; as security 
speech is analysed, it can be seen that there are differences in the illocutionary force of 
the speech acts utilised in constructing security realities. The type of securitisation pre-
sented by Wæver aims to legitimise future acts. Wæver’s securitisation can be considered 
to be a complex speech act like argumentation, and it can be divided into three sequential 
elementary speech acts: 1) claim, 2) warning, and 3) request. In total, there are at least five 
strands of securitisation viz. securitisation 1) for raising an issue onto the agenda, 2) for 
legitimating future acts, 3) for deterrence, 4) for control, and 5) for legitimating past acts, 
312  Wæver has emphasised the ‘openness’ and equal status of the success and failure of securitisation, which 
some critics and appliers have overlooked. For Wæver, in an Arendtian way, the nature of politics seems to be 
based on a general openness. (cf., Derrida 1988; Arendt 1976.)
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Table 2: The Five Strands of Securitisation.
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or for reproducing the security status of an issue (i.e., post hoc securitisation) (Table 2). 
    Security can be utilised to achieve several political aims. Each strand of securitising 
speech acts, or securitisation moves, consists of a sequence of separate elementary 
speech acts (e.g., claim – warn – request). As the preparatory and other conditions differ 
in the variants, they are thereby different, yet closely related illocutionary speech acts 
(as are promising and pledging for example). The strands of securitisation share ‘family 
resemblances’ (Wittgenstein 1999a). In my view, the semantic metalanguage provided by 
illocutionary logic allows this family to be seen from the resemblances.313
6.3.2.1. Securitisation for Raising an Issue onto the Agenda
Securitising actors are often presumed to be political decision makers with formal posi-
tions of authority, and thereby to have the possibility to put their proposed measures into 
effect to counter the threat they claim exists.314 Furthermore, securitisation acts are often 
understood as a means to legitimise policies that either go beyond ‘normal’, or somehow 
‘break the rules’ of the regular ebb and flow of political debate and practice; as such, secu-
ritisation is understood to create space for ‘special procedures’ by state authorities. But 
just as there can be a variety of securitisation speech acts, there can also be a variety of 
securitising actors: not all securitising speech is uttered by the powers that be, who also 
do not always have to be state powers. Those outside official authority can utilise securi-
tisation speech to achieve certain aims, provided they have sufficient socio-political capi-
tal. One such aim can be to raise an issue onto the agenda of decision makers.315 In this 
strand of securitisation, securitising actors should be in a position to raise such issues; 
they could be e.g., scholars, politicians, bureaucrats or journalists,316 while the audiences 
313  Indeed, all of the strands of securitisation are illocutionary acts of securitisation. The emphasis here is on 
how – via illocutionary logic – we can discern how various types of acts within this family can be deployed for 
various purposes. It is, however, good to keep in mind that they all draw on the social institution/modality/
rationality of security, irrespective of variation in their illocutionary points, perlocutionary aims, temporalities, 
and degrees of illocutionary force.
314  Barthwal-Datta (2009) criticises the CopS approach for doing this: she argues that the CopS does not take 
into account securitising actors beyond the state. This strand of securitisation however answers her criticism 
as it shows how actors without formal authority to enact security can also utilise security speech. Haacke & 
Williams (2008, 780) also point out that while the CopS suggests that security fields are in favour of state actors, 
the theory allows for non-state actors to assume the role of a securitising actor (cf., Buzan & Wæver 2003, 
44-45). Salter (2008, 337) points out how popular audiences of securitisation may not only accept securitisa-
tion but even initiate the expansion of governmental power.
315  De Wilde (2008, 596) makes a distinction between private (e.g., parties, NGOs, social movements) and 
public (e.g., governments, IGOs, local governments) securitising actors. Private securitising actors often attempt 
to attract public attention to the issue they present, while public securitising actors usually aim to legitimise 
extraordinary actions, or to set priorities among competing issues on the agenda. Public securitising actors 
usually have more resources than private securitising actors, and public actors often merely reproduce institu-
tionalised security discourses.
316  Melissa G. Curley (2004, 18) argues, for example, that in the early 2000s, representatives of the People’s 
Liberation Army were making moves towards securitising the North Korean migration issue via border security 
with national integrity and sovereignty as the referent objects.
Barthwal-Datta (2009, 296), who has studied the role of newspapers in Bangladesh, uses language very similar 
to that used here to describe some securitisation moves’ function as raising an issue onto the agenda: “it is 
unlikely that The Daily Star, New Age, or The Bangladesh Daily would be identified as securitising actors, and 
their attempts to raise the issue of misgovernance as a threat to the security of Bangladeshi society would not 
appear in the security analysis it [the CopS approach] produces.” Her analysis of the securitisation moves of 
these papers supports the argument here, and the present strand shows how it is possible to incorporate the 
type of analysis she does into the general framework of securitisation theory. This also reveals how the refined 
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of securitisation could include decision makers or constituencies, for example. 
The perlocutionary effect intended by the strand, is to convince decision makers of the 
urgency of a threat, so that they will agree to raise the issue onto their agenda and effect 
the suggested measures. The illocutionary point of this type of securitisation is directive, 
as the point is to try to get other people to do things, to get the hearer to carry out the 
course of action as represented by the propositional content e.g., to do X in order to repel 
threat Y. This complex speech act consists of a sequence of three elementary speech acts 
viz. claim, warn, and urge, illustrated here in a similar format as John Searle (1969, 66-
67) did in his classic study on speech acts.317
The first elementary act of such complex sequences is claiming, formally illustrated 
in Box 1: something is an existential threat for a referent object that should continue 
to exist. The illocutionary point318 of claiming is assertive. Claiming concerns taking a 
stand on something; in the case of securitisation, on something which is represented as 
an existential threat for a referent object. Most illocutionary acts can be successful and 
nondefective, only if certain conditions apply. These conditions are called preparatory 
conditions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 16-18), which are certain sorts of states of af-
fairs. In claiming, the speaker has to present, or have proof for the truth of her claim and it 
should not be obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer knows the truth 




content Any claim (C).
Preparatory
1) Speaker (S) has proof (reasons etc.) for the truth of C.
2) It is not obvious to both S and hearer (H) that H knows 
(e.g., needs no reminder etc.) that C.
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that C represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 1: Claim speech act in securitisation (cf., Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 183).
The second speech act in a sequence of a securitisation move, illustrated in Box 2, is warn-
ing: the threat is realised, if something is not done. A warning can either be a directive or 
an assertive about the state of affairs (which is presupposed not to be in the interest of the 
hearer) represented in the propositional content of the utterance. One can warn that such 
and such is the case or warn someone to do, or not to do something. In securitisation, the 
securitising actor warns with a view to get action in regard to a threat. The securitising 
actor asserts (warns) of a certain state of affairs that requires action. The preparatory 
conditions for a warning include the possibility that the state or event warned of, could 
happen, that it is not in the hearer’s interest, and that it is not obvious to both the speaker 
framework is able to capture securitisation moves, and thereby also securitising actors, within a wider scope 
than the original formulation of the theory.
317  The explication of the elementary speech acts in the ‘boxes’ below are from Searle (1969) or derivations 
from it or from Searle & Vanderveken (1985).
318  Each type of illocution has a point or purpose internal to it being an act of that type. If the act is successful, 
this point is achieved.
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and hearer that the event or state warned of will occur in any case.
The third speech act of this strand of securitisation can vary, depending on the mode 
of achievement of its illocutionary point, the degree of strength of its illocutionary point, 
and its propositional content conditions. A securitising actor could, for example, recom-
mend, suggest, request, deplore or insist that decision makers take action. The point of 
this third, directive elementary speech act is to get someone to do something, to get the 
issue onto the agenda and the proposed measures into effect (to paraphrase the essence 
of the argument: ‘deal with this problem [with these measures] before it is too late and 
we will not be around to correct our mistake’). The preparatory conditions and modes of 
achievement depend on which directive is used. All of the possible directives share the 
preparatory conditions of the hearer as able to do the directed act, and that it must not be 
obvious that the hearer would do the directed act on her own accord. Box 3 illustrates the 
speech act of urging in securitisation for raising an issue onto the agenda. 
Warn
Types of rule
Propositional content Future event, state etc. (E).
Preparatory
1) H has reason to believe that E will occur and 
that it is not in H’s interest.
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that E will oc-
cur in any case.
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not in H’s best interest.
Box 2: Warn speech act in securitisation (cf., Searle 1969, 67).
Urge
Types of rule
Propositional content Future act (A) of H.
Preparatory
1) S believes H is able to do A.
2) S has a reason (R) for H to do A.
3) It is not obvious to both S and H, that H would 
do A in the normal course of events.
Essential Counts as an attempt to get H to do A by virtue of R.
Box 3: Urge speech act in securitisation for raising an issue onto the agenda (cf., Searle & 
Vanderveken 1985, 200).
As has already been noted, empirical instances of actually occurred ‘speech’ cannot ‘close’ 
grammars off or ‘refute’ them. However, empirical illustrations may elucidate the ab-
stract grammars of securitising moves presented here. It may therefore be appropriate to 
illustrate securitisation moves for raising an issue onto the agenda here with the “state-
ment” of the “Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists”, led by Albert Einstein,319 which 
319  Other trustees of the Committee included Harold C. Urey, Hans A. Bethe, Thorfin R. Hogness, Philip M. 
Morse, Linus Paulig, Leo Zilard, and Victor F. Weisskopf.
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appeared in the sixth issue of the third volume of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 
1947. This statement was bound to the ‘unveiling’ of the Doomsday Clock, which has ar-
guably become a widely recognised symbol of the total anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation 
process.320
As a symbol, the Clock evokes and thereby facilitates all of the crucial ingredients in-
volved in a securitisation ‘plot’: the lateness of the hour (urgency) and impending doom 
(existential threat), as well as the possibility to reverse course by moving the hands of 
time far away from midnight (way out). This evocative image was anchored and interwo-
ven into the textual securitisation move of the Atomic Scientists. The statement consisted 
of a three part claim (Box 4), a two part warning (Box 5), and an urge (Box 6): the state-
ment claimed that “1) Atomic bombs can now be made cheaply and in large numbers. They 
will become more destructive. 2) There is no military defence against atomic bombs, and 
none is to be expected. 3) Other nations can rediscover our secret processes by themselves”; 
the statement warned that “4) Preparedness against atomic war is futile and, if attempted, 
will ruin the structure of our social order. 5) If war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used, 
and they will surely destroy our civilization”; and the statement urged that “6) There is no 
solution to this problem except international control of atomic energy, and ultimately, the 
elimination of war.” The claimed threat in this initial securitisation move was the use of 
atomic weapons, which jeopardised the referent objects of “our social order” and “our 
civilization.” A way out of this urgent and dangerous situation was also presented in the 
form of international control of atomic energy, and the eventual abolition of war. The 
structure of the statement follows the grammar of a securitisation move for raising an 
issue onto the agenda, as detailed above. 
The structure of the statement is supported by its stated intentions, and the authority 
in whose name the statement was made. The securitising actor of this initial move321 was 
the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists. The symbolic capital of this particular 
group of scientists322 was enhanced in the statement by the claim that ‘all scientists ac-
cept the facts’ listed in the statement. As the word emergency in the name of the Com-
mittee suggests, this move was presented as urgent indeed. The evident audience of the 
securitisation was “the public,” but in a democracy, public opinion is understood to in-
fluence public policy, thus, while “the Committee does not propose to make government 
policy, either on the national or international level,” the intention was rather to influence 
public policy, as the Committee’s stated “purpose is to make available an understanding of 
the atomic era on which such policy must depend.”
The editorial of the same Bulletin (Rabinowitch 1947, 137-138) elaborated on the 
statement of the Committee. The “intrusion” of scientists into national and international 
affairs was inspired and justified by the “necessity for a factual, realistic attitude as a basis 
320  See Vuori (2010a) for a history and analysis of resets of the Doomsday Clock.
321  The idea of resetting the Clock in accordance with trends in world events was only initiated in 1949, when 
the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear tests, and the Clock has been reset in accordance with the Bulletin’s 
perceptions of the world for over 60 years. That the securitisation moves have spanned seven decades reveals 
that their politics of securitisation have not been that successful vis-à-vis their object of concern, namely the 
abolition or strict international control of nuclear weapons.
322  Einstein’s symbolic capital had had a major influence in the initiation of work towards building an atomic 
weapon. Einstein lamented that the biggest mistake of his life was to sign the letter written by Leo Szilard which 
requested funding from President Roosevelt to initiate research towards sustaining a nuclear chain reaction.
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of political decisions of our statesmen and political thinking of our citizens.”323 The pro-
posed remedy of the Committee was ‘special’, or ‘broke the rules’, as it would entail “the 
sacrifice of American sovereignty” in the form of the submission of US atomic research and 
industry to be under international authority, as well as the renunciation of a veto right.324 
This proposition went against the two other paths that were debated at the time, namely 
‘keeping the secret of the atomic bomb’, and ‘let’s destroy the bombs.’ “To achieve security 
and survival of America” the US would have to sacrifice its belief in the supreme virtue of 
private enterprise and national sovereignty, while the Soviet Union would have to sacri-
fice its belief in the supreme virtue of socialistic isolationism in the capitalist world. “Both 
sides must take risks – the alternative being an almost complete certainty of a catastrophe 
for both of them.”
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
Atomic bombs can now be made cheaply and in large numbers, 
they will become more destructive, there is no military defence 
against atomic bombs (none is to be expected), and other na-
tions can rediscover the secret processes of constructing atom-
ic bombs by themselves.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The status of the scientists as the developers of the atomic 
weapons functions as proof of their claims. 
2) It is not obvious that the public knows that there is no de-
fence against atomic bombs, or that other states would be able 
to produce them in large numbers.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that other nations be-
yond the United States will be able to produce large numbers 
of very destructive atomic bombs for which there is no defence 
represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 4: The claim speech act in the Statement of the Emergency Committee of Atomic 
Scientists.
The example of the Atomic Scientists reveals that not all securitising acts need to be about 
legitimising future acts, and that not all securitising moves need to be committed by speak-
ers with the authority to effect their suggested ‘remedies.’ The Atomic Scientists literally 
created a global threat, that of the possibility of thermonuclear annihilation. But the sci-
entists lacked the authority of ‘deciding’ on the ‘exception’; instead, they had to convince 
others of the necessity of their suggested remedies for dealing with existential threats. 
323  The discussion of the role of scientists, or ‘whether scientist should be on top or on tap’ (Simpson 1960) in 
political decision making has also been a major feature of the Bulletin through the decades of its publication.
324  The ‘radicality’ of the proposed remedies of the Atomic Scientists is also apparent in a later text connected 
to the 1969 reset of the Doomsday Clock. Eugene Rabinowitch (1969, 2, 16) was calling for the breaking of the 
rules of national sovereignty, calling for a new international political Ordnung: “What is needed is no less than 
[...] an international revolution against the worldwide establishment of sovereign nations”. In addition to this 
ultimate goal, the reset editorials have also proposed more limited and practical suggestions for going forward, 
like arms reductions and other means of increasing confidence between the nuclear powers.
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II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Preparedness against atomic war is futile and, if attempted, 
will ruin the structure of the United States’ social order; If war 
breaks out, atomic bombs will be used, and they will surely 
destroy the civilization of the United States.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The public has a reason to believe atomic bombs would be 
used in a future war on the United States (the United States 
had used atomic bombs itself) and that this would not be in 
their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that preparedness against atomic war 
would be futile.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that atomic war or 
preparation for waging atomic war is not in the best interest 
of the United States’ general public.
Box 5: The warn speech act in the Statement of the Emergency Committee of Atomic 
Scientists.
III speech act: urge
Propositional content There is no solution to this problem except international con-trol of atomic energy, and ultimately, the elimination of war.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The United States could achieve international control of 
atomic energy.
2) The Atomic Scientists have a reason for the United States to 
achieve international control of atomic energy (this would pre-
vent the use of atomic weapons against the US and the ruin of 
its social order).
3) It is not obvious that the United States would try to achieve 
international control of atomic energy of its own accord.
Essential content
Counts as an attempt to get the United States to achieve inter-
national control of atomic energy by virtue of preventing the 
ruin of the US social order.
Box 6: The urge speech act in the Statement of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Sci-
entists.
6.3.2.2. Securitisation for Legitimating Future Acts 
The type of securitisation introduced by Wæver can be called securitisation for legitimat-
ing future acts. This strand aims at the perlocutionary effect of legitimating future acts 
of the securitising actor. The audience in this case are the evaluators of the political le-
gitimacy of the actions of the actor e.g., voters, journalists, competing factions etc., while 
securitising actors are politically responsible325 decision makers or a person who acts 
325  Counter to what Balzacq (2010a, 67) suggests, this responsibility however need not have to be to a parliament. 
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on behalf of decision makers. The aim of this strand is to justify actions that would oth-
erwise be judged illegitimate by the evaluators of legitimacy. The illocutionary point of 
this securitisation act is directive e.g., accept that X is done in order to repel threat Y. The 
speech act leaves room for disagreement i.e., the audience has the opportunity to reject 
the legitimacy of the future acts of the speaker. 
This strand of securitisation also consists of three sequential, elementary speech acts. 
The first two are the same as in securitisation for raising an issue onto the agenda i.e., 
claim (Box 1) and warn (Box 2). The third act, illustrated here in Box 7, is a request: ac-
cept that something is done so the threat will not come to pass. The request in securitisa-
tion is that for the acceptance of a future act to ward off the threat i.e., the future act of the 
hearer, requested by the speaker, is the acceptance of a future act to ward off the threat. 
A request is a directive illocution that allows for the possibility of refusal. As acceptance 
cannot be forced (as the success i.e., perlocutionary effect of securitisation is in the remit 
of the hearer), it has to be argued in a certain sense.326 The preparatory conditions of a 
request include that the hearer is able to do the act requested, and that it is not obvious 
that the hearer would do the act on her own accord without the request.
Request
Types of rule
Propositional content Future A of H.
Preparatory
1) H is able to do A and S believes H is able to 
do A.
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that H would 
do A in the normal course of events of her own 
accord.
Essential Counts as an attempt to get H to do A.
Box 7: Request speech act in securitisation for legitimating future action (cf., Searle 1969, 
66).
The strand of securitisation for legitimating future acts can be illustrated here by George 
W. Bush’s (PBS 2001) televised speech after a cabinet meeting on September 12 2001. 
The speech followed the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington which pro-
vided a sense of imminent danger and crisis. President Bush claimed (Box 8) that “The 
deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday against our country, were 
more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.” This claim alone would raise the issue 
under discussion to a top priority. Bush underlined the gravity of the events by warning 
(Box 9) that “Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know 
we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced.” This warning entails that if the 
‘American people’ do not act, freedom and democracy – the oft repeated core values of 
326  It is logically possible that the same security means could be carried out without securitisation, but this 
would be a different scenario, with different costs in terms of legitimacy. In a case of securitisation, the securitis-
ing actor wants to handle the claimed challenge by gaining acceptance through the specific securitisation opera-
tions, which entail threats, survival, ‘necessity’, and countermeasures. This will only make sense in a situation 
where acceptance of the securitisation (but not of the measure as such, if implemented in a non-securitised 
manner) cannot be forced, but depends on some kind of acceptance.
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the United States that it is willing to proselytise even abroad – would be in jeopardy: “This 
enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.” 
To deal with such threats demands extraordinary efforts: “This will require our country to 
unite in steadfast determination and resolve.” 
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The September 11 attacks were more than act of terror, they were acts of war.
Preparatory condition
content
1) Proof of the attacks was evident from the continuous news 
coverage on the attacks. 
2) It is not obvious that the attacks were more than acts of ter-
ror.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the attacks in New 
York and Washington being acts of war represents an actual 
state of affairs.
Box 8: The claim speech act in President Bush’s September 12 speech (PBS 2001).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Freedom and democracy are under attack, and the American 




1) The American people have a reason to believe freedom and 
democracy could be under attack (the United States had never 
been attacked like this before) and that this would not be in 
their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the attacks in New York and Washington 
were an attack on freedom and democracy.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that freedom and democ-
racy being under attack is not in the best interest of the Ameri-
can people.
Box 9: The warn speech act in President Bush’s September 12 speech (PBS 2001).
The final segment of the President’s speech describes how the United States is mobilising 
its resources to combat the threat. Accordingly, the speech counts as an attempt to gain 
legitimacy for the future acts that are not ‘business as usual’ but go beyond it (Box 10): 
“The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy.” The ele-
ment of the future was pre-eminently present: “This battle will take time and resolve, but 
make no mistake about it, we will win.” The sense of emergency was also emphasised: “The 
federal government and all our agencies are conducting business, but it is not business as 
usual. We are operating on heightened security alert. America is going forward, and as we 
do so, we must remain keenly aware of the threats to our country.” These elements of the 
speech set the founding for the legitimacy of future acts: “This morning, I am sending to 
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Congress a request for emergency funding authority so that we are prepared to spend what-
ever it takes to rescue victims, to help the citizens of New York City and Washington, D. C., 
respond to this tragedy, and to protect our national security.” The prevailing self-image of 
the US facilitated the request for legitimacy: “This will be a monumental struggle of good 
versus evil, but good will prevail.”
President Bush’s speeches on September 11 and 12 defined the mood of world politics 
for the first decade of the 21st century. The claimed threat and the warning were used to 
legitimise extraordinary measures in the United States (e.g., the Patriot Act) and the use 
of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the rendition of suspects and the detention 
of ‘enemy combatants’ at Camp Delta in the Guantanámo naval base, in violation of the 
Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war.327 The claims and warnings of 
these initial speech acts and their numerous maintenances were expanded into the mac-
rosecuritisation discourse of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (Buzan & Wæver 2009). These 
speech acts formed the basis for the legitimisation of various extraordinary measures, 
and similarly had major inter-unit effects both domestically and internationally. 
III speech act: request
Propositional content
The country should unite in steadfast determination and re-
solve: all resources should be used, the government and its 
agencies should operate on heightened security alert, everyone 
should be keenly aware of threats, and Congress should author-
ise the use of emergency funding in order to respond to the 
tragedy and to protect national security.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The American people, the federal government and Congress 
are able to do what the President requests.
2) It is not obvious that the American people, federal agencies 
and Congress would do what the President requests on their 
own accord.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the hearers consid-
er the country uniting, using all its resources, operating under 
heightened alert, and Congress authorising emergency funding 
as legitimate.
Box 10: The request speech act in President Bush’s September 12 speech (PBS 2001).
6.3.2.3. Securitisation for Deterrence
Some security discourse is not aimed at legitimisation or to effecting certain action to 
repel the claimed threat, but rather the repulsion of threats through the deterrent effect 
of securitisation acts. The intimidation effect of the special status of security issues may 
deter the threat without further resort to special procedures, so that the mere possibil-
ity of future special procedures may be sufficient.328 This type of securitisation can be 
327  The US policies on enemy combatants and their imprisonment in Guantanámo has been a common example 
of ‘exceptionality’ in 21st century world politics (see e.g., Butler 2006; Neal 2006).
328  Indeed, as Russett et al. (2006, 107, 129) note, threats may not have to be carried out if the actor has a 
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termed securitisation for deterrence.  
The perlocutionary intention of this strand is intimidation and deterrence; here se-
curitisation functions as a warning about possible future acts.329 Securitising actors who 
use this strand have to have an official position, or de facto control of subordinates e.g., 
leader of a state or a movement, so their authority can be invoked in the speech act. In 
this strand, the securitisation is actually aimed at the threat itself; the audience of secu-
ritisation is the threat e.g., another state, secessionist group, or protesters who may not 
recognise the authority of the securitising actor.330 The illocutionary point of this strand 
of securitisation is declarative. The point of a declarative is to change the world by saying 
so: in utterances with the declarative point the speaker effects the state of affairs repre-
sented by the propositional content solely in virtue of her successful performance of the 
speech act (Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 37-38) e.g., Y is a threat to Z. This requires that 
the speaker is in a position, where she is able to invoke the kind of authority that achieves 
this effect.
This strand of securitisation also begins with a claim (Box 1) and a warning (Box 2), 
but they are followed by a declaration, which brings about the state of affairs of the claim. 
By declaring that something is a threat to a referent object i.e., an issue of security, the 
securitising actor gains special powers, which in turn are intended to deter the threats 
targeted in the securitisation. The aim is to repel the threat through the deterrent effect 
of possible future action (‘this is a problem that has to be dealt with before it is too late 
and we will not be around to correct our mistake’). As is also apparent from its illustra-
tion in Box 11, the preparatory conditions of a declaration include that the speaker is 
in a position where she can issue effective declarations and that the consequence of the 
declaration is not already in effect.
The strand of securitisation for deterrence that contains a declaration speech act 
can be illustrated here with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377 (S/
RES/1377 [2001]) that dealt with ‘threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts.’331 The resolution refers to three previous resolutions (S/RES/1269 [1999]; 
S/RES/1368 [2001]; S/RES/1373 [2001]) that also deal with the issue of terrorism. The 
resolution analysed here is the third resolution that followed the September 11 attacks 
on the United States. Those attacks were deemed as acts of international terrorism in the 
previous resolutions, which claim is recalled in the resolution 1377. With condemnation 
reputation or a track record of using force. The mere hint of punishment may be enough to bring about the 
desired action, namely compulsion or deterrence.
329  The deterrent effect is based on issues being labelled with ‘security’ having subsequent consequences on 
how issues are dealt with: “when states or nations securitise an issue – ‘correctly’ or not – it is a political fact 
that has consequences, because this securitisation will cause the actor to operate in a different mode than he 
or she would have otherwise” (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). The reasonability, or even plausibility, of one actor’s 
securitisation may have an effect on how other actors respond to it, yet an authoritative securitisation does 
change the mode in which the issue is responded to and perhaps even dealt with.
330  This is one of the features of this strand of securitisation that distinguishes it from the strand of securitisa-
tion for control: securitisation for control can compel while securitisation for deterrence cannot, as the ‘target’ 
of the securitisation may not necessarily be under the authority of the securitising actor. Authoritatively chang-
ing the social world, or the ‘conjuring of authoritative social magic’, may affect social or political actors beyond 
the authority of the securitising actor by changing the ‘situation.’
331  See Bothe (2008) and Wæver (2008a, 104-105) on how ‘international peace and security’ have been used in 
the UN Security Council to transform issues into issues of security. The power of this ‘social magic’ is endowed 
to the Security Council in Articles 24 and 39, whereby it is obligated to “determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”
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of the attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, resolution 1368 at the same time 
made the claim (Box 12) that those attacks were acts of terrorism, which were a threat to 
international peace and security: “The Security Council […] unequivocally condemns in the 
strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in 
New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of interna-
tional terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security” (S/RES/1368). 
Declare
Types of rule
Propositional content Any proposition (P).
Preparatory
1) S is in a position where she has the power to 
declare that P.
2) P is not already in effect.
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that P be-comes the state of affairs.
Box 11: Declare speech act in securitisation for deterrence (cf., Searle & Vanderveken 
1985, 205-206).
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The September 11 attacks were an act of international terror-ism, which are threats to international peace and security.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Proof of the attacks was evident from the continuous news 
coverage on the attacks. 
2) It is not obvious that the attacks were threats to internation-
al peace and security.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the attacks being 
acts of international terrorism, and thereby threats to interna-
tional peace and security represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 12: The claim speech act in the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001).
Resolution 1377 (2001) reaffirmed this claim, and warned (Box 13) of the dangers of 
international terrorism to individuals, states and to global stability and prosperity: “The 
Security Council […] [u]nderlines that acts of terrorism endanger innocent lives and the 
dignity and security of human beings everywhere, threaten the social and economic de-
velopment of all States and undermine global stability and prosperity.”  The claim already 
made in previous resolutions and the warning reiterated here, are the justification for the 
declarations (Box 14) that form the crux of the resolution: “The Security Council […] [d]
eclares that acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to in-
ternational peace and security in the twenty-first century, [and] [f]urther declares that acts 
of international terrorism constitute a challenge to all States and to all of humanity.” 332
332  The empirical illustration of resolution 1377 shows how the models developed in the present study are 
artificial models: even though it is argued here that the resolution follows the ‘grammar’ of securitisation, the 
elementary speech acts that constitute an act of securitisation do not follow each other in the order presented 
in the model. That the declarations of the resolution precede the warning does not matter: all of the elements 
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II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Acts of terrorism endanger innocent lives and the dignity and 
security of human beings everywhere, threaten the social and 




1) The members of the United Nations have a reason to believe 
acts of terrorism could endanger lives and stability (there had 
been such resolutions before) and that this would not be in 
their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the attacks of September 11 2001 en-
dangered global stability and prosperity.
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that acts of terrorism are not in the best interest of the members of the UN.
Box 13: The warn speech act in the UN Security Council Resolution 1377 (2001).
III speech act: declare
Propositional content
Acts of international terrorism constitute one of the most se-
rious threats to international peace and security in the 21st 
century and acts of international terrorism constitute a chal-
lenge to all States and to all of humanity.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The UN Security Council is in a position where it has the 
possibility to declare something as a threat to international 
peace and security and as a challenge to all states and all of 
humanity. 
2) Acts of terrorism were not already considered to be the 
most serious threat to international peace and security in the 
21st century or a challenge to all states and to all of humanity.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the attacks receiv-
ing the status of a serious threat to international peace and 
security, and a challenge to all States and to all of humanity 
becomes the state of affairs.
Box 14: The declare speech act in the UN Security Council Resolution 1377 (2001).
While calling and inviting states and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to do things, the 
declarative nature of this securitisation act also serves the function of deterrence: by de-
claring acts of terrorism to constitute one the most serious threats to international peace 
and security, and by imbuing the attacks of September 11 2001 with this political status, 
the Security Council indicates its willingness to act and thus makes it a “political fact that 
of securitisation are present in the resolution and the context it refers to (e.g., previous resolutions). That the 
models of the strands of securitisation attempt to be parsimonious does not suggest that actually occurring 
speech that is inferred to entail securitisation acts would be as neat, tidy, or even logical (cf., Wilkinson 2007); 
securitisation is an artificial analytical concept, and not part of a ‘folk-taxonomy.’
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has consequences, because this securitisation will cause the actor to operate in a differ-
ent mode than he or she would have otherwise” (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). While authoris-
ing states to do things, it is also a signal to both state and non-state actors to desist from 
further such acts or ‘face the consequences.’ These resolutions were part of the basis for 
the invasion of Afghanistan, and an important aspect of the ‘Global War on Terror’ mac-
rosecuritisation discourse.
6.3.2.4. Securitisation for Control
Security is an effective means of control, as survival is primary and justifies drastic meas-
ures and strict discipline.333 This strand of securitisation for control, aims at the perlo-
cutionary effect of obedience to the directives of the securitising actor. The audience of 
securitisation here are those under the authority of the securitising actor e.g., members 
of a party or citizens of a state, while the securitising actor is someone in a formal posi-
tion to authorise compelling directives.334 The aim is to get the audience to do the acts 
required by the actor or to forbid them from doing certain acts. The illocutionary point of 
this strand of securitisation speech act is directive e.g., it is required that you do X and/or 
cease doing Q, in order to repel threat Y. This speech act requires that X be done and/or Q 
not be done any longer; requiring does not leave room for disagreement. This is why the 
securitising actor has to have both formal authority and a reason (a threat in relation to a 
legitimate referent object) for her directive.
Initially, securitisation for control begins with the elementary speech acts of claiming 
(Box 1) and warning (Box 2), by which the issue is constructed as one of security. These 
two acts are followed by the speech act of requiring, as illustrated in Box 15. Requiring is 
a directive which gives no option for refusal, and thus, it has a greater degree of strength 
than requesting or even telling. Requiring also has the extra preparatory condition of the 
need for something to be done, a specific reason for requiring the act (Searle & Vander-
veken 1985, 201). The reason for requiring acts (or desisting acts) in securitisation is the 
security threat as warned of in the previous speech act, combined with the authority of 
the speaker or some other formal authority (the law or the UN security council, for exam-
ple). The aim is to legitimise and to provide a reason for the actions required, within the 
securitisation speech act (‘these measures are required to deal with the problem before 
it is too late and we will not be around to correct our mistake’).
The strand of securitisation for control is illustrated here with the press releases and 
statements of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general Lord Rob-
ertson that invoked article five of the Washington Treaty335 for the first time in the his-
tory of NATO in response to the attacks of September 11 2001.336 The initial statement of 
333  While distancing herself from the idea that securitisation would be limited to being an instrument of state 
elites, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1999, 73) also suggests that securitisation “is an instrument that power holders can 
use to gain control over an issue.” While she does not go into detail on the perlocutionary implications of this 
take on securitisation, her succinct discussion of securitisation implicitly supports the argument made here 
that securitisation can have various political functions.
334  This separates this strand from that of securitisation for deterrence, as in that strand, the target (e.g., 
another state) of the act is not under the authority of the speaker.
335  Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one, or several members, shall 
be considered as an attack against all.
336  It would be interesting to analyse the discussions that went on in the various classified meetings at NATO 
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the secretary general (NATO PR/CP[2001]121) on September 11 2001 contained a claim 
(Box 16) that the attacks were directed against democracy, and that the international 
community and the members of NATO need to unite their forces to fight terrorism: “These 
barbaric acts constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and underline the need 
for the international community and the members of the Alliance to unite their forces in 
fighting the scourge of terrorism.” In another press release (NATO PR/CP[2001]122) on 
September 11 the secretary general stated that “If it is determined that this attack was 
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”
Require
Types of rule
Propositional content Future A of H.
Preparatory
1) H is able to do A.
2) It is not obvious to both S and H that H would 
do A in the normal course of events on her own 
accord.
3) There is R for H to do A.
Essential Counts as an undertaking to get H to do A by vir-tue of R.
Box 15: Require speech act in securitisation for control (cf., Searle & Vanderveken 1985, 
201).
In a press release (NATO PR/CP[2001]124) on September 12, the North Atlantic Council 
referred to the initial establishment of NATO: “The commitment to collective self-defence 
embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different 
from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world 
subject to the scourge of international terrorism.” Previous statements of the Heads of 
State and Government of NATO were also presented as important: “When the Heads of 
State and Government of NATO met in Washington in 1999, they paid tribute to the success 
of the Alliance in ensuring the freedom of its members during the Cold War and in making 
possible a Europe that was whole and free.” There has, however, been a qualitative change: 
“But they also recognised the existence of a wide variety of risks to security, some of them 
quite unlike those that had called NATO into existence. More specifically, they condemned 
terrorism as a serious threat to peace and stability and reaffirmed their determination to 
combat it in accordance with their commitments to one another, their international com-
mitments and national legislation.” The press release relied on the above institutionalised 
securitisation of the need for NATO as a form of collective defence, even in the post-Cold 
War era. This institutionalised basis was the foundation for the warning (Box 17) con-
tained in the press release: “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was 
directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by 
 
to see whether and how the possible securitisation arguments evolved in these meetings, and who raised them. 
The press releases and statements however provide us with the final result of the meetings, and as such, they 
can function as an illustration of an act of securitisation that does not allow refusal.
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Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more 
of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
The September 11 attacks constitute an intolerable aggres-
sion against democracy; the international community and the 




1) Proof of the attacks was evident from the continuous news 
coverage on the attacks. 
2) It is not obvious that the attacks were directed at democ-
racy, nor that the international community or the members of 
NATO should unite their forces to fight terrorism.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the September 11 
attacks being attacks on democracy represents an actual state 
of affairs.
Box 16: The claim speech act in the NATO Secretary General’s statement (NATO PR/
CP[2001]121).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content Attacks directed at the United States from abroad are attacks on all NATO members.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The members of NATO have a reason to believe attacks on 
the US from abroad could be attacks on all NATO members (the 
Washington Treaty stipulates this) and that this would not be in 
their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the attacks of September 11 2001 were 
attacks on all NATO members.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the attacks of Sep-
tember 11 2001 are not in the best interest of the members of 
NATO.
Box 17: The warning speech act in the North Atlantic Council’s statement (NATO PR/
CP[2001]124).
Thereafter, a statement by the secretary general (NATO Speech October 2 2001) on Octo-
ber 2 2001 declared that the attacks of September 11 2001 had indeed been attacks from 
abroad, and that therefore Article five was in effect. In his statement, Lord Robertson 
claimed that there was sufficient evidence to show the attacks had been committed by 
the Al-Qaeda network. While the various briefings on this evidence were classified, he 
drew the conclusions of this evidence: “On the basis of this briefing, it has now been deter-
mined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was directed from abroad 
and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 
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which states that an armed attack on one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all.”  While another statement by the secretary 
general (NATO Speech October 4 2001) on October 4 formally noted that the US requested 
certain deeds from its allies, these requests actually had the power of requirements since 
Article five was in force (Box 18): “Following its decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washing-
ton Treaty in the wake of the 11 September attacks against the United States, the NATO Al-
lies agreed today – at the request of the United States – to take eight measures, individually 
and collectively, to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism.”337
While the possible securitisation process within the North Atlantic Council is classi-
fied, the press releases and speeches analysed here concur with the grammar of securiti-
sation for control. By invoking Article Five, the North Atlantic Council gained the power 
to compel and require its members to act in accordance with its decisions without the 
possibility of refusal. This process of securitisation within NATO was part of the broader 
securitisation of the September 11 attacks on the US and demonstrates how the same 
‘event’ can be securitised with various functions and with various effects. To date (2011), 
NATO is still engaged in an armed conflict in Afghanistan, in operations that can be ar-
gued are one of the effects this process of securitisation has had on interunit relations.
III speech act: Require
Propositional content Nato Allies have to take eight measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism.
Preparatory condition
content
1) NATO Allies are able to carry out the measures requested 
by the US and agreed to by the North Atlantic Council.
2) It is not obvious that NATO Allies would carry out the meas-
ures on their own in the normal course of events.
3) The measures are part of the campaign against terrorism 
under Article Five of the Washington Treaty that has been in-
voked (reason for carrying out the tasks).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the tasks be car-
ried out as part of the campaign against terrorism in virtue of 
the evocation of Article 5.
Box 18: The require speech act in the Secretary Generals statement (NATO Speech Octo-
ber 4 2001).
337  The eight measures were (NATO Speech October 4 2001): the enhancing of intelligence sharing and 
co-operation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism 
and the actions to be taken against it; the providing, individually or collectively as appropriate and according 
to their capabilities, of assistance to Allies and other states which are, or may be, subject to increased terrorist 
threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism; the taking of necessary measures to 
provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory; the backfilling of 
selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against 
terrorism; the providing of blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies’ aircraft, in 
accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to 
operations against terrorism; the providing of access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields 




6.3.2.5. Securitisation for Legitimating Past Acts
Not all security discourse is about the future. Sometimes actions already taken covertly 
or even in public, are legitimised through a security argument.338 The security nature of 
some issues also has to be reproduced and maintained. This type of securitisation can be 
called securitisation for legitimating past acts, reproducing securitisation, or post-hoc 
securitisation.
This strand of post-hoc securitisation aims at the perlocutionary effect of the legitimi-
sation of past acts of the securitising actor e.g., a politically responsible decision maker, 
while the audience are the evaluators of political legitimacy. The perlocutionary aim is 
the justification of actions normally deemed illegitimate. This is a different type of speech 
act compared to the one which legitimises future actions, as the actions here have already 
occurred (i.e., it has different preparatory conditions). This strand can be used to repro-
duce security, to remind people, or to construct a post-hoc security status for an issue.339 
The illocutionary point of this variant of securitisation is assertive, the point is to say 
how things are: in utterances with the assertive point the speaker presents a proposition 
as representing an actual state of affairs in the world of the utterance e.g., we did X to 
secure Z. 
This strand also begins with a claim (Box 1) and a warning (Box 2), but they are fol-
lowed by an explanation, illustrated here in Box 19. The securitising actor attempts to 
convince the audience that her past actions, which went beyond the scope of everyday 
politics, were legitimate due to the repulsion of an acute and relevant threat (‘we dealt 
with the problem [with these measures] before it was too late and we would not have 
been around to correct our mistake’). Explaining is an assertive that has the perlocution-
ary intention to convince the hearer of the reasons for a past event, in this case an act by 
the speaker. The preparatory conditions of explaining include that the speaker has done 
the act and that it is not obvious to the hearer why the speaker did so.
338  The CopS has suggested that security arguments are about the future (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998, 32). 
Wilkinson (2007; 2010) criticises this, in addition to arguing that securitisation processes are not as neat as 
the original formulation of securitisation by the CopS would suggest. Mak (2006, 79) similarly asks whether the 
Mahathir administration which securitised the problem of Malaysia’s porous maritime borders in public only 
after definite policy actions, constitutes a securitisation move with a ‘specific rhetorical structure.’ I contend that 
the strand of post-hoc securitisation presented here refutes Wilkinson’s (2007, 20, 22) claim that securitisation 
processes would have to be modelled in a linear fashion within securitisation theory, or that there would not be 
theoretical vocabulary to reflect the dynamics of ‘unedited’ and nonlinear processes (see already Vuori 2003). 
I similarly reason that the strand provides an answer for Mak (2006, 79): securitisation is also possible after 
the fact. This strand of securitisation shows how security arguments can also be used after the fact, and that 
securitisation processes need not be understood as being as ‘neat’ as the original formulation of the processes 
suggested. This strand of securitisation therefore increases the scope of the types of securitisation moves that 
can be identified and analysed within the framework.
339  Wilkinson (2007, 17-21; see also 2010) identifies precisely this type of belated incorporation of events and 
even actors into a securitisation argument for the legitimacy of acts beyond ’normal politics’ in her analysis of 
the securitisation process in Kyrgystan’s overthrow of the government in 2005; the overthrow was conclusively 
deemed an issue of security only after the overthrow was a fact (while the ‘excessive’ acts were committed 
before a conclusive securitisation, the new leadership had the urge to securitise the overthrown government 





Propositional content R for past A of S.
Preparatory 1)  S has done A.2)  It is not obvious to H why S did A.
Essential Counts as an undertaking to the effect that R represents the actual state of affairs.
Box 19: Explain speech act in securitisation for reproducing securitisation (derived from 
Searle 1969, 66-67).
This strand of securitisation can be illustrated with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s (BBC 
News 5.3.2004) speech where he legitimated the United Kingdom’s participation in the 
Iraq war with a claim that Iraq represented an existential threat for the UK and an expla-
nation that this threat was acute and demanded immediate and drastic action. 
As Paul Roe (2008) has shown, the danger of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had 
already been established as a danger for the United Kingdom in the 1990s. In 2002, the 
Blair Labour government used the language of threats and danger in order to necessi-
tate military action against Iraq. While the general public accepted the negative image of 
Saddam Hussein, this was not enough to legitimise the use of force, a situation which Roe 
(2008, 624) calls ‘identification and non-mobilisation.’ The publication of official docu-
ments which assessed the threat of weapons of mass destruction as likely, influenced the 
views of the parliament via impressions of public opinion on the matter, and eventually 
the security nature of the issue was deemed significant enough to warrant military mobi-
lisation and bellicose engagement with Iraq in March 2003.
Massive anti-war demonstrations, including the ‘not in my name’ campaign (Collins 
2005), and opinion polls, however, clearly indicated that large segments of the British 
public did not support the decision to go to war with Iraq. This is why Blair had to reiter-
ate the reasons for engagement in the war. This is where the discourse sample used here 
came into play. 
Blair’s March 2004 speech contains a claim (Box 20) that represented the issue of Iraq 
as an existential threat to the UK: “It is because it was in March 2003 and remains my fer-
vent view that the nature of the global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real 
and existential and it is the task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political 
cost.” In the same breath, Blair also warned (Box 21) that the country would be in jeop-
ardy if this threat were ignored: “And that the true danger is not to any single politician’s 
reputation, but to our country if we now ignore this threat or erase it from the agenda in 
embarrassment at the difficulties it causes.” Blair finally explains (Box 22) why he led the 
UK to war: it was because the existential threat was urgent. “We were saying this is urgent; 
we have to act.” With these three elements in place, the speech concurs with the grammar 
of post-hoc securitisation presented above.
In the speech Blair also made it clear why he had to reiterate that the war was launched 
due to an existential threat: “The real point is that those who disagree with the war, disa-
gree fundamentally with the judgement that led to war.” The legitimacy of the war was 
based on the threat: “[T]he key point is that it is the threat that is the issue. The characteri-
214
Chapter 6
sation of the threat is where the difference lies. Here is where I feel so passionately that we 
are in mortal danger of mistaking the nature of the new world in which we live.” This means 
that not all had accepted the Blair securitisation of the issue, and that is why he had to 
continue to make securitisation moves involving past issues, as well as future events in 
the form of continuing the war effort. “Their argument is one I understand totally. It is that 
Iraq posed no direct, immediate threat to Britain; and that Iraq’s WMD, even on our own 
case, was not serious enough to warrant war. […] In other words, they disagreed then and 
disagree now fundamentally with the characterisation of the threat.”
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
The nature of the global threat Britain and others round the 
world face is real and existential and it is the task of the UK’s 
leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost.
Preparatory condition
content
1) Blair presents various types of proof for his claim in the 
speech. 
2) It is not obvious that the UK faces an existential threat, or 
that the invasion of Iraq would be a means to combat such a 
threat.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the UK being threat-
ened by a real and existential threat represents an actual state 
of affairs.
Box 20: The claim speech act in Tony Blair’s speech (BBC 5.3.2004).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content The country is in danger if the threat is ignored or erased from the agenda.
Preparatory condition
content
1) People in the UK have a reason to believe the country could be 
in danger (there have been terrorist attacks) and that this would 
not be in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the threat being ignored or erased from 
the agenda would occur in any case.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the UK is in danger, 
and that therefore to ignore the threat or erase it from the agen-
da, is not in the best interest of the people of the UK.
Box 21: The warn speech act in Tony Blair’s speech (BBC 5.3.2004).
In order to explain why Iraq was an existential threat, Blair presented various types of 
evidence on Iraq’s military capabilities and intentions. In addition, Blair facilitated his 
claims of existential threats with the events of September 11th 2001, as well as with global 
threats that defined the 2000s:340 “The threat we face is not conventional. It is a challenge 
340  Curiously Blair also linked the war in Iraq with the threats posed by Islamists, and justifies the actions of 
the UK with the protection of freedom and human rights with a security continuum: “Containment will not work 
in the face of the global threat that confronts us. The terrorists have no intention of being contained. […] But we 
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of a different nature from anything the world has faced before. It is to the world’s security, 
what globalisation is to the world’s economy. It was defined not by Iraq but by September 
11th. September 11th did not create the threat Saddam posed.”341 While not claiming that 
Saddam Hussein had something to do with the attacks on the US, the two were still linked 
together as threats in the ‘new’ world of unconventional threats. “From September 11th 
on, I could see the threat plainly. Here were terrorists prepared to bring about Armaged-
don.” This kind of talk facilitated the representation of Iraq as reaching for weapons of 
mass destruction as a threat similar to that of Islamists bent on world destruction. “The 
global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it.” In such a 
world wrought with danger, Blair explained that the decision to go to war was a necessity 
of survival: “leadership is about deciding.” 
III speech act: explain
Propositional content The urgency of the threat and the need for acting on it was the reason for invading Iraq.
Preparatory condition
content
1) Iraq was invaded.
2) It is not obvious why Iraq had to be invaded.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the urgency of the 
threat the UK was facing and the urgent need for action being 
the reason for invading Iraq represents the actual state of af-
fairs.
Box 22: The explain speech act in Tony Blair’s speech (BBC 5.3.2004).
According to Roe (2008, 631), Blair’s post-hoc maintenance of securitisation regarding 
the Iraq question was sufficient for the parliament to agree to the prime minister’s deci-
sion to go to war. This supports the argument that security is not always about the future; 
the security nature of an issue may have to be maintained, and sometimes it may be nec-
essary to remind others of the acuteness of the securitisation when the process began. 
Including this strand in the model of securitisation allows the study of the various stages 
of real processes of securitisation as the process continues and as securitisation moves 
change shape. Indeed, Blair’s speech also warned about the future: “[I]t is monstrously 
premature to think the threat has passed. The risk remains in the balance here and abroad. 
[…] This war is not ended. It may only be at the end of its first phase. […] The threat is there 
and demands our attention.” Thus, securitisation moves can change their shape, and can 
be built on or used to support each other.
surely have a duty and a right to prevent the threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a 
nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s. […] This agenda must be robust in tackling the security 
threat that this Islamic extremism poses; and fair to all peoples by promoting their human rights, wherever they 
are.”




6.4. Conclusions for the Development of Securitisation Theory
The main contributions of the present study are theoretical and methodological. I have 
reasoned and argued that the explication of the concept of securitisation via illocution-
ary logic increases the extension of the concept (see Figure 7) in a way that allows its 
application to a broader set of socio-political contexts, political orders, and types of ac-
tors (e.g., formal/informal authority and state/non-state) while still retaining its previ-
ous possibilities of application. As this broadening allows for the incorporation of various 
‘anomalies’ identified by critical appliers of the framework, the explication advances the 
research programme of Securitisation Studies.
Such an explication of the concept of securitisation allows for the analysis of various 
types of securitisation discourse in various kinds of social and political contexts. Indeed, 
at least five strands of securitisation can be explicated: securitisation 1) for raising an is-
sue onto the agenda, 2) for legitimating future acts, 3) for deterrence, 4) for control, and 
5) for legitimating past acts, or for reproducing the security status of an issue (i.e., post 
hoc securitisation). I contend that the grammar of these various securitisation moves is 
a means to infer certain types of political functions securitisation arguments can exhibit. 
Thereby, this provides an answer for one of the research problems set for the present 
study: the analysis of elementary speech acts can be used to infer the political function 
of complex speech acts of securitisation. As a result, the theory of securitisation can be 
deployed in the type of conceptual analysis which, for example, Quentin Skinner (2002) 
promotes: the theory can be used to infer what speech acts do, and thereby, it can be 
used to infer what they mean. This concomitantly provides a means to analyse conceptual 
change as regards security rationales in different time periods as well as between differ-
ent socio-political contexts.
To sum up my main methodological argument, my reasoning is that speech act logic 
and the explicated strands of securitisation as proposed here, can be used to infer po-
litical functions of security speech, even in the absence of the word ‘security’. A ‘security 
rationale’, or ‘security modality’, dependent on a fairly stable constellation of meanings, 
makes this possible. While this approach cannot be used to gain access to the ‘true’ in-
tentions or the sincerity of speakers (as speech acts rely on conventional sets of rules 
and practices), once such relevant rules are apparent in a certain context, it is possible 
to infer what the particular discourse sample means. An examination of what is entailed 
in the ‘security rationale’ may eventually allow assumptions of what the particular act of 
securitisation was used for.
Certain caveats are in order however. While illocutionary speech acts are convention-
al, perlocutionary effects are not: the same illocutionary acts may not always produce the 
same perlocutionary effects on different hearers, or even on the same hearer in different 
situations. Moreover, illocutionary speech acts may have unintended perlocutionary ef-
fects. While the approach to the functions of security speech operates under the assump-
tion of strategically behaving speakers, the situation of the communicative interaction is 
viewed as open. The speaker cannot decide what the hearer understands, or interprets; 
e.g., one person’s reassurance remains another’s threat. Yet, because the ‘security ration-
ale’ is fairly constant, we can assume what the meaning of the speech acts is. It must fur-
ther be kept in mind that discourse samples that contain illocutionary acts may not reveal 
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much of the perlocutionary effects of such acts, as most types of acts of securitisation do 
not have conventional consequences. The analysis of perlocutionary effects of securitisa-
tion requires means beyond the analysis of illocutionary speech acts, as does the analysis 
of the success of the politics of such moves. Yet, irrespective of the perlocutionary ‘suc-
cess’ of illocutionary acts, the act in the utterance of an illocution may already transform a 
situation: a securitising actor commits to a status transformation for the issue concerned 
in voicing ‘security’, which on its own may already have consequences in certain social 
settings. 
Beyond the above methodological problem, I demonstrated how the functions of securi-
tisation may vary along with the type of securitisation act committed. Securitisation can 
be used variously to argue for raising an issue onto the agenda, to provide legitimacy for 
future or past acts, as a means of control, and as a form of deterrence. This variety of func-
tions also entails that actors without formal authority to enact security measures can also 
speak security. Indeed, securitisation arguments can have multiple important political 
functions. In addition to the various functions of the strands of securitisation given above, 
securitisation provides an image of decision makers who know “how to go on” (Wittgen-
stein 1999a, § 323). As Murray Edelman (1972, 76) has noted, the efficacy of politics is 
not to be found in the verifiable positive or negative consequences of political lines or 
decisions, but rather in a politician’s ability to convey the impression of knowing what is 
to be done. To make a security argument is a means to create just such an impression. 
The above understanding of the purposes or functions of acts of securitisation avoids 
the formation of an orthodoxa within Securitisation Studies: securitisation can be about 
more than just legitimating the breaking of rules, or enacting extraordinary measures. 
Figure 7: The increased extension of the explicated concept of securitisation that includes 
the five strands of securitisation.
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This also shows how securitisation is different from Schmitt’s decisionism: the theoreti-
cal part demonstrated that while Schmitt’s ‘political’ can be seen as one way to wield 
asymmetric political concepts, the theory of securitisation does not equate Schmitt’s po-
litical. While in some situations and political orders, certain types of political actors can 
‘decide’ on, for example, martial law in the way it is codified into law, in more general 
terms, securitisation is an open social process that for most of the time has to be argued 
or explained in some way. 
After engagement with a variety of criticisms of the CopS approach to securitisation, new 
answers have been provided to deal with various aspects of this criticism. My reasoning 
was that the ‘model of securitisation’ should not be too tied to certain types of political 
orders, or even theories of politics. This means that it has to remain fairly abstract, and 
that empirical appliers have to provide their own operationalisations in accordance with 
their approach to politics in general, and the political order they examine in particular. 
For example, when viewed from a reproductive viewpoint to politics, who has to be con-
vinced of the securityness of an issue, varies not only from one type of political order 
to another, but within types of political orders, and even within particular political or-
ders. The shape of acts of securitisation can change as the process develops, and different 
moves may have various audiences. The relevant audience(s) of securitisation depends 
on the function(s) the securitisation act is intended to serve. It would not make sense to 
define the audience in the theory in a specific way, since audiences are dependent on the 
socio-historical situation: who has to be convinced of the necessity of security action, 
changes with the cultural and political systems in which the securitisation occurs. What 
can be stated within the model, is that an audience has to be such that it has the ability to 
provide the securitising actor with whatever that person is seeking to accomplish by the 
securitisation e.g., in the Wæverian model, legitimacy for actions that go beyond regular 
liberal-democratic practices of policymaking. The specific audiences have to be opera-
tionalised in each empirical analysis.
Whilst there is a vast amount of literature on securitisation, its opposite corollary i.e., 
desecuritisation, has not received as much attention, leaving the concept ‘undertheo-
rised.’ The position I took on desecuritisation was one where desecuritisation is viewed 
as a counter-move to securitisation, as if they were part of a game. The discussion of 
desecuritisation was also linked to the issue of the constitution and termination of social 
facts, with securitisation and desecuritisation having opposite roles. Further, the combi-
nation of securitisation/desecuritisation with identity frame theory allows the study of 
social dynamics of both securitisation and desecuritisation as political mobilisation, and 
the suppression of political mobilisation.
Similarly to the undertheoretisation of desecuritisation, the issue of the criteria for 
either the success or failure of securitisation has also raised much debate. On this, I dem-
onstrated how securitisation, and not security, should be considered a speech act. I fur-
thermore reasoned how perception of threats, securitisation and security action are logi-
cally, and at times also practically, separate. This is why studies of securitisation should 
commence from securitisation moves, and why security action cannot be a sufficient or a 
necessary criterion for the success, or, the lack of action, for the failure of securitisation. 
In my view, this provides an answer to some of the critical points raised: the success of 
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specific illocutionary acts of securitisation should be evaluated by study of their perlo-
cutionary effects. Beyond specific speech acts, the success of the politics of securitisation 
requires investigations beyond the study of discourse samples that manifest securitisa-
tion moves. To study illocutionary moves cannot inform whether or not such have been 
‘successful’, as this would depend on the perlocutionary effects of illocutions. Similarly, 
the success of the politics of securitisation is an issue beyond illocutionary speech act 
analysis.
I have also argued that the possibility of ‘silence’ is positive for the theory, as a theory, 
since it provides it with an explanatory potential. By investigating Chinese official dis-
course on the Cold War, anti-nuclear issues, the global war on terror, and global climate 
change, I demonstrated how securitisation discourses that are in place in some political 
contexts, can be non-existent in others. That securitisation discourses are not present 
everywhere where sought, means that the theory can help comprehend, and even, at 
times, explain some aspects of the political dynamics of such situations. This also means 
that empirical assumptions derived from the theory may be ‘falsified.’
The theory of securitisation has been viewed and applied here as a constitutive theory, 
from a middle-ground position: securitisation concerns illocutionary force and perlocu-
tionary effects, whereby images, signs and nonverbal acts can be used to perform illocu-
tionary acts and also can have perlocutionary effects. Images, however, usually require 
anchorage if an illocutionary act is involved (perlocutionary effects may come about even 
without intentional illocutionary acts). This is one example of how the context of utter-
ance is important in processes of securitisation. However, in my view, the study of securi-
tisation has to be based on illocutionary linguistics, so as to avoid conceptual stretching 
and to allow the identification of discourses of securitisation. Thus, what is required is 
a combination of an artificial model together with empirical analysis. The illocutionary 
aspect of securitisation is important in order for analysts to be able to infer political func-
tions, even meaning from ‘security speech.’ My reasoning is that the analysis of illocution-
ary acts of securitisation should be the foundation of securitisation theory, but that other 
socio-linguistic methods may be necessary in order to assess the perlocutionary effects 
i.e., the success or failure of such acts. Some strands of securitisation may have conven-
tional perlocutionary outcomes, but most do not. Securitisation is an illocutionary act; 
the ‘success’ of securitisation, however, depends on perlocutionary effects. From such a 
viewpoint, the normative dilemma of analysing securitisation for emancipation is some-
what mitigated: securitisation moves and their analysis have different forces.
While the perlocutionary aspect is important in respect to the ‘success’ of securitisa-
tion, and particularly the success of the politics of securitisation, it is also important not 
the let go of the illocutionary aspect of securitisation. Not all strands of securitisation 
have conventional perlocutionary outcomes, but they all are illocutionarily conventional. 
Securitisation can, for example, have the convention of the imbuement of legitimacy. Yet 
this convention is not deterministic because legitimacy cannot be ‘forced’ in the sense 
that a marriage is ‘forced’ once the appropriate ceremonies of a wedding are conducted 
by the appropriate people. If acts of securitisation did not have conventionally expected 
consequences, they would not be used: there has to be some expectation of what will 
result from a securitisation move, and the strands of securitisation reveal that such as-
sumptions can be plural. A similar expectation of consequence applies to many other 
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types of speech acts, e.g., to apologies: an apology has a conventional consequence, yet 
an apology may or may not be accepted, which makes the apologising actor vulnerable 
to refusal.
Further examination of the relation of legitimacy and securitisation may elucidate the 
matter here. Successful securitisation is by convention legitimate. Thereby, in commit-
ting an act of securitisation, a securitising actor makes a move towards the position of 
legitimacy. If the move is not contested or resisted and thereby refused (apathy equals 
legitimacy), and is otherwise felicitously performed (with the proper grammar and the 
appropriate social assets and so on), the actor gains what the convention of securitisation 
provides. To make such a move is not only about communication: there has to be the con-
vention, and to evoke such a convention already means to do something in its evocation.
In conclusion, I contend that the reinforcement of the linguistic root of securitisation 
theory will take the research programme of Securitisation Studies forward. Going down 
the linguistic root of the theory will strengthen it and can allow branching out both in 
terms of combining the theory with other approaches, such as Regional Security Complex 
Theory, theories of mobilisation, the study of asymmetric political concepts, even demo-
cratic peace theory, and in terms of providing the necessary meta-language to conduct 
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An empirical analysis of securitisation processes requires an abstract metalanguage that 
allows for distance from the particular contexts and situations that empirical entities 
reside in. However, in order to comprehend our of data, such abstractions have to be 
operationalised and contextualised. Non-democratic political orders such as the People’s 
Republic of China can be studied through the framework of securitisation theory, but this 
requires that the specificity of political, social, and temporal environments and contexts 
have to be taken into account, both in terms of the prevalent political practices and the 
possibilities of conducting practical research. In accordance, I will provide some histori-
cal, social, and institutional contexts to aid in the analysis and interpretation of the em-
pirical case studies. As the majority of empirical studies of securitisation have been con-
ducted in political contexts other than the People’s Republic of China, it is necessary to 
reflect on certain features of Chinese history and political institutions. These include the 
institutionalised ‘master signifieds’ of security that have been prevalent in China, general 
official security narratives, as well as features of the political order.
Although this study does not aim to be a comprehensive overview of Chinese poli-
tics, but to focus on the political function of securitisation processes, a historical narra-
tive does eventually emerge as the cases under scrutiny belong to different decades and 
leadership-eras.1 From this viewpoint, I argue that an examination of cases from different 
periods of Chinese politics may reveal durable patterns of rhetorical techniques and un-
derlying constitutive logics used in securitisation and resistance to it in mainland Chinese 
politics. Providing a complete genealogy or a fully fledged anthropological study of Chi-
nese security, and the major security crises or threats during the periods studied here, on 
all levels, and in all sectors of security, would obviously be beyond the scope of a single 
study. The focus here is on the domestic level and political sector of security.2 The politi-
cal sector is assumed to provide the greatest contrast to the original liberal-democratic 
context of the theory of securitisation, and thus the case studies deal with this sector.
1  A historical narrative spanning 60 years of the PRC is provided in Paltemaa & Vuori (forthcoming).
2  A brief macro-level discussion was already presented in Chapter 6.2.2.
7. Securitisation in the Chinese Political Context
Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? 




7.1. Chinese Security Narratives
In China, ‘security’ usually translates as ānquán (安全).3 However, the ancient Chinese 
did not have the concept ānquán, but used the concept ān (安; peace/peaceful) which 
was the opposite of wēi (危; danger/dangerous). An can also be understood as a verb: 
to make calm, to pacify. During the time when Sunzi (2005) was written, quán (全) had 
the meaning of ’retaining immunity’ or ‘remaining unharmed’ (Nojonen 2008).  Classi-
cal Chinese texts on ‘security’ emphasise that a leader should be prepared for calami-
ties even during peaceful times.4 Zhouyi advises (Nojonen 2008, 70-71): “When danger 
threatens, a ruler secures his position. When disaster threatens, a ruler secures his existence. 
When chaos threatens, a ruler takes command of the situation. That is why a ruler will not 
forget danger during peaceful times, disaster while in power, or chaos after having control 
of a country. This is how a ruler secures himself and guarantees the existence of the state.” 
Similar ideas are expressed by Zhuge Liang (Nojonen 2008, 230-231): “If one does not 
contemplate danger during peace and if one does not realise the horrors when occupation 
is near, it is like swallows making their nests into curtains or fish playing in cooking pots. In 
such a case destruction will not wait even for the first sunset.”5
Modern Chinese dictionaries define ānquán as the opposite of wēi and describe it 
as ‘without peril’, ‘not being menaced’, or ‘not causing mishaps’, for example. Although 
ānquán can be translated into English as both ‘safety’ and ‘security’, ānquán is the concept 
that is used in China when national security is discussed (by using the abstract concept); 
in the context of national security, the characteristic attribute of security is a lack of peril 
(没有危险, méiyǒu wēixiǎn), even though ānquán has several uses in other contexts. (刘
跃进2004, 43-45.) National security (国家安全, guójiā ānquán) is a concept that came 
into being only after other ‘modern’ concepts were introduced to China e.g., the ‘nation 
state.’6
As was already noted in Part I, ‘security’ has not had a fixed meaning even in Europe, 
and the problems of translation are evident there as well. While an exact match for the 
word security may be absent from various languages and societies, there seem to be con-
cerns that deal with the same problem as ‘security’. In the context of East Asia, while there 
was no shared concept for ‘security’ in the pre-20th century, the concept of ‘disorder’ (in 
Chinese, 乱, luàn) could function as an antonym for security (Radtke 2008, 204).7 Indeed, 
many East-Asian societies and political orders have been concerned with issues of ‘stabil-
3  The Japanese modern term of security Anzen-hoshō (安全保障) is quite similar to the Chinese ānquán (in 
Chinese 安全保障, ānquán bǎozhàng, translates as a security guarantee or the safeguarding or ensuring of 
security). Similarly to Chinese, Anzen on its own means safety or freedom from damage, while hoshō means 
guarantee. (Okamoto & Okamoto 2008, 235.) 
4  As Nojonen (2008) and Radtke (2008) note, Chinese classical lore on the formation and maintenance of 
empires and kingdoms has had a significant effect on Chinese thinking on stratagems as well as security. While 
Mao was well versed in Chinese classics, the contemporary cinema industry on the Mainland produces one 
historical epoch-film after another which perpetuates the spread of lore on ancient Chinese kingdoms.
5  I thank Matti Nojonen for his help with this paragraph.
6  The concept of securitisation has been translated into Chinese as ānquánhuà (安全化), with the literal 
meaning of being transformed or changed into security. See 巴瑞布赞, 奥利维夫, 迪怀尔德 (2002) for the 
Chinese version of Buzan et al. (1998).
7  The idea of such disorder or luàn (乱) is reminiscent of the Roman concept of a tumult. A tumult could be the 
result of either external or internal disorder (tumultus has the same root as tumor, which meant ‘swelling’, or 
fermentation) (Agamben 2005, 42).
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ity and unity’. Just as in contemporary Europe, where politicians may claim to serve the 
interests of security, many East-Asian leaders have legitimised their activities with the 
prevention of ‘disorder.’ Indeed, a ‘security rationale’ may be manifest somewhere with-
out the use of the word ‘security’.
7.1.1. Institutionalised Security in China
As has already been noted, in order for an issue to be securitised or for it to follow the 
logic of security, the word ‘security’ itself does not have to be used. Certain words or 
concepts (e.g., terrorism) automatically allude to the logic of danger, vulnerability, and 
fear and therefore the necessity to combat them does not need to be argued each and 
every time. The use of such watchwords, or institutionalised securitisation as Buzan et al. 
(1998, 27-29) term the phenomenon, reduces the need for elaborate arguments on the 
securityness of specific cases. Indeed, the continuous use of watchwords (like ‘counter-
revolution’, ‘socialism’, or ‘terrorism’) can be seen as an indicator of a successfully institu-
tionalised securitisation.8
Politicians can proclaim to be maintaining ‘security’, which is favourable compared 
to insecurity or outright chaos. Murray Edelman (1972, 9) has noted that governments 
which force unwelcome changes in their subjects’ behaviour have the greatest need for 
reassuring symbols. Security as ‘stability and unity’ is especially potent in China where 
‘chaos’ or ‘turmoil’ has been a recurrent fear throughout different eras of politics (Pye 
1992, 12-16; Buzan & Wæver 2003, 140, 152). In China, stability and unity are not mere-
ly slogans of leadership: they are embedded in the Chinese ‘collective memory’ through 
many forms of culture and tradition.9 According to Lucien Pye (1985, 185), both in Con-
fucianism10 and in the PRC the myth of the paramount leader is the main source of legiti-
macy: the most important cultural factor that shapes Chinese politics and the ability to 
maintain a centralised authority system has been the “exaggerated ideal of the great man 
as leader – the emperor, generalissimo, chairman – who is an amplification of the Confu-
cian model of the father as the ultimate authority in the family.”11
The fear of chaos has often led to an overwhelming emphasis on ideological consensus 
in China. Indeed, the restoration of harmony (和谐, héxié) was of major importance in 
Confucian philosophy. However, China is not unique in terms of a political order that em-
8  This was especially prevalent during the Cold War, as for example noted by Murray Edelman (1972 [1964], 
15): “’USSR’ and ‘Khrushchev’ can come to stand so repeatedly for danger that adaptive thinking becomes 
unlikely, and political actions that accept the USSR or Khrushchev as reasonable or as potential associates are 
met with hostility.” While this passage was about the US. in the 1960s, the same could be said about the PRC of 
the 1960s as well.
9  The patriotic education campaign after 1989 has presented the CCP as a saviour of the nation in various 
course materials in the form of stories about heroes of the revolution and the struggle against Japan (see e.g., 
Hughes 2006, 73-76; Wang 2008). These stories present the CCP as  the bringer of the Motherland to light from 
the century of humiliation by foreign powers. When China has been unified, it has been strong, whereas when 
China has been in disarray, it has been dominated by foreign powers. This is meant to infuse students with a 
strong sense of ‘stability and unity’ under the leadership of the CCP as equated with patriotism and love of the 
Motherland.
10  See Lee (2008) on the role of security in Confucian thought in Korea.
11  Interestingly, the party secretary of the CCP and President of the People’s Republic, Hu Jintao, has not been 
labelled the ‘core’ of the ‘fourth generation of leadership.’ Combined with the at least outward stability of recent 




phasises stability. In Malaysia, for example, the fear of ethnic conflict has also been a natu-
ralised element of state officials’ ’security mindset’; ethnic strife could lead to political in-
stability which, in turn, could undermine the economic successes Malaysia has achieved 
after its independence. The delicately balanced relations among the ethnic groups in Ma-
laysia have been institutionally securitised and codified through the National Security Act 
of 1960. This institutionalisation has been naturalised through decades of ‘emergencies’ 
that have formed daily processes of embedded security practices. In fact, the wartime 
colonial governance model has been adopted as the ‘permanent’ governing practice of 
Malaysia. (Shamsul 2007.)
Similar practices have been employed in Indonesia where ‘subversive forces’ from ‘cer-
tain quarters of society’ served an important political function to legitimise a rationalist 
form of ‘political paranoia’ during the Suharto era. The fear that the New Order main-
tained was that of a subversive (i.e., communist) force from within, which would destroy 
the harmony of the ‘people-state’ and bring about the dreaded ‘mad disorder.’ (Bubandt 
2005, 282, 284.) In the post-Suharto period of the 2000s, the replacement of communism 
with Islamist extremism has not been successful as a securitisation strategy in Indonesia 
(Emmers 2003; Bubandt 2005; cf., Kivimäki 2007).
In imperial China, many rituals and doctrines that dissented from the Confucian cos-
mological order became targets of government suppression; religious sectarian groups, 
beliefs and rituals which the authorities deemed heterodox, were a major governmen-
tal concern (Shek 1990, 87).12 Patsy Rahn (2002) sees this as even forming a historical 
‘ruler-sectarian paradigm.’ Accordingly, China has experienced an impressive number of 
quasi-religious popular uprisings: in the 18th and 19th centuries almost every popular 
uprising was in some way related to religious movements (Yang 1961). In addition to 
causing unrest and civil strife, these religiously justified uprisings actually questioned 
the cosmological order the imperial system was based on and thereby the whole political 
system of rule.13 
Barend ter Haar (2002) argues that the CCP has retained the practice of dividing peo-
ple into categories of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ from China’s imperial era. Such categorisations have 
been used to legitimise the use of violence, which has been a regular aspect of Chinese so-
cial life and politics, even before the 20th century. This violent aspect of Chinese society is 
dismissed in much cultural literature on China that emphasises the harmonious elements 
of Chinese philosophy and religions. According to ter Haar, the Yin-Yang principle is used 
to hide the presence of violent conflict in China, as well as the fact that more often than 
not harmony is not achieved, and even when it is, harmony is a result of the subjugation 
of the many by the few. The use of asymmetric political concepts has indeed been preva-
lent in the PRC. For instance, labels such as ‘reactionaries’, ‘class enemies’, ‘bad elements’, 
‘splittists’, ‘extremists’, and ‘imperialists’ carry a national security connotation (some do-
12  Wasserstrom (2003, 263) describes a similar pattern.
13  A significant aspect of the various ‘heterodox’ popular uprisings has been that the majority of participants 
were peasants. Indeed, mobilised peasants have been a force to contend with in China. Mao also argued that the 
peasantry was the most important resource for the communist revolution in Chinese conditions. The peasantry 
has retained a prominent position in the threat horizon of the CCP. While inner-party threat discourses and 
purges have focused on revisionism and counter-revolution, domestic threat assessments beyond revisionism 
in the party have been tempered by readings of Chinese history. MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 270-271) 
argue that the most serious domestic threat to CCP rule has been estimated to be peasant rebellion.
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mestically and others internationally).14 Counter-revolution has also been synonymous 
with national security, and the concept of counter-revolution has been institutionally se-
curitised i.e., security implications ‘automatically’ follow from its authoritative use.
After Deng Xiaoping had gained supremacy in the power struggles following Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, the major legislative reform accomplished in 1979 immediately 
addressed the issue of counter-revolutionary crimes. The new criminal law operated 
to prevent excesses prevalent during the Cultural Revolution by, for exam-
ple, prohibiting unlawful incarceration, the forced extraction of confessions, and 
the wilful fabrication of criminal charges. This law limited the applicability of 
counter-revolutionary crimes, and also restricted capital punishment for crimes com-
mitted “under particularly odious circumstances” or for those that caused “particularly 
serious danger” to the state (Baum 1995, 84). The restriction of the range of counter- 
revolutionary crimes operated to curtail excessive practices, for example, the 1967 
decree that defined any “malicious attack” against a party leader as counter-revolution-
ary (Baum 1995, 414). While rendering the extremes – at times bordering the absurd – of 
the Cultural Revolution less likely, at the same time, the 1979 legislation removed the right 
of people to question socialism, for example, with big character posters, so that public 
opposition to the Four Cardinal Principles (四項基本原則, sì xiàng jīběn yuánzé) defined 
by Deng earlier the same year could be deemed a counter-revolutionary crime.15 Some 
two decades later, the connection of counter-revolution and national security became 
explicit with the 1997 reformulation of the former “counter-revolutionary” penal code, 
originally adopted in 1951, that now refers to crimes of “jeopardising national security” 
(He 2001, 121; Dutton 2005, 271). In the original penal code, counter-revolutionary 
crimes, such as counter-revolutionary rumour mongering or counter-revolutionary 
murder, were defined as acts to the purpose of overthrowing the political power of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system, or otherwise jeopardising the 
country. Contemporary crimes that ‘jeopardise national security’ have retained the same 
maximum penalty of death.16
14  MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 304) note how during the Cultural Revolution, almost anything could be 
‘upgraded’ to a more serious crime by adding the attribute of ‘underground’. This implied a degree of organisa-
tion – which often was not the case. Similarly, any undesired activity that involved more than one or two people 
could be labelled as activity carried out by a ‘gang.’
Deng’s (1995b, 176-177) speech that promulgated the Four Cardinal Principles identified the enemy that the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was directed against, as an amalgam of “counter-revolutionaries, enemy agents, 
criminals and other bad elements of all kinds who undermine socialist public order, as well as new exploiters 
who engage in corruption, embezzlement, speculation and profiteering.” The existence of such institutionalised 
enemies made the continued existence of the state and its systems of control legitimate: “so long as class strug-
gle exists and so long as imperialism and hegemonism exist, it is inconceivable that the dictatorial function of 
the state should wither away, that the standing army, public security organs, courts and prisons should wither 
away. […] The fact of the matter is that socialism cannot be defended or built up without the dictatorship of the 
proletariat.”
15  The cardinal principles set the limits of permitted dissidence, with patriotism as one of the main guiding 
principles. Deng (1995c) also set three historical tasks that would be used as a measure to define the success 
and legitimacy of the post-Mao order: 1) to oppose hegemonism and strive for world peace, 2) the unification 
of China, and 3) the step up of economic construction. For Deng (1995b, 176), “socialism and socialism alone 
can save China.”
16  In addition to this new legislation on the endangerment of national security, the Chinese authorities passed 
other laws with national security implications in the late 1990s. To gain further legitimacy for its campaign 
against the Falungong, the government legislated to prohibit “heretical cults.” As part of this new law, religious 
crimes could now be classified as crimes endangering national security. Religious crimes are deemed serious as 
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7.1.2. Official Chinese Foreign and Security Policy Narratives on Domestic 
           and International Threats
Beyond institutionalised security or the various watchwords for it, ‘Chinese security’ can 
be examined as a historical narrative. Such a narrative demonstrates the persistence of 
certain preoccupations that stem from ‘Chinese experiences’, but also the effect of general 
developments in China’s international environment. Indeed, this narrative is closely con-
nected to the macrosecuritisation discourses already discussed above. As the previous 
examination of these discourses indicated, certain issues may or may not be portrayed 
as matters of concern vis-à-vis security. Therefore it is prudent to also include periods 
of politics that have not been overridden by such concerns in the general narrative of 
security in China.
The founding speeches of the PRC form an appropriate point to begin an introduc-
tion of Chinese national security concerns. Mao Zedong (1949a) listed the main ‘security 
goods’ the Communist Party and the People’s Republic should strive for in his opening 
speech to the First Plenum of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on 
September 21, 1949. The Plenum, which also took the authority of a National People’s 
Congress, concluded with the declaration of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 
1949 (Mao 1949b).
In his opening speech, Mao (1949a) was concerned with the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of the newly founded People’s Republic: “Our revolutionary work is not 
completed, the People’s War of Liberation and the people’s revolutionary movement are still 
forging ahead and we must keep up our efforts. […] Our national defence will be consoli-
dated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our land. Our people’s armed 
forces must be maintained and developed with the heroic and steeled People’s Liberation 
Army as the foundation.” He described the century of humiliation at the hands of foreign 
powers and declared that this would no longer be the case under the new order – an 
order which would bring about a strong civilisation and a capable nation. The Chinese 
falling behind other nations “was due entirely to oppression and exploitation by foreign im-
perialism and domestic reactionary governments. For over a century our forefathers never 
stopped waging unyielding struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors. […] Ours will 
no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up. […] The era in 
which the Chinese people were regarded as uncivilized is now ended. We shall emerge in the 
world as a nation with an advanced culture.” 
Mao further called for continued vigilance against the Guomindang, the former ruling 
regime and “the reactionary running dog of imperialism backed by American imperialism”, 
and other foreign reactionary imperialist forces: “After there is peace and order through-
out the country, they are sure to engage in sabotage and create disturbances by one means 
or another and every day and every minute they will try to stage a come-back. This is in-
evitable and beyond all doubt, and under no circumstances must we relax our vigilance. 
[…] Let the domestic and foreign reactionaries tremble before us! Let them say we are no 
good at this and no good at that.” Mao (1949a) also aligned the People’s Republic with 
the Soviet Union and the ‘New Democracies’, in accordance with the emerged global pat-
tern of the Cold War. He reasoned that China would have to rely on this alignment until 
such crimes can carry a sentence of life imprisonment or even the death penalty.  
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its military power would be sufficient to repel foreign threats: “Internationally, we must 
unite with all peace-loving and freedom-loving countries and peoples, and first of all with 
the Soviet Union and the New Democracies, so that we shall not stand alone in our struggle 
to safeguard these fruits of victory and to thwart the plots of domestic and foreign enemies 
for restoration. […] We will have not only a powerful army but also a powerful air force and 
a powerful navy.”
Political security was also a concern. Mao (1949a) declared that ‘people’s democratic 
dictatorship’ had been the means to achieve the People’s Republic, and that this should be 
maintained: “Our state system, the people’s democratic dictatorship, is a powerful weapon 
for safeguarding the fruits of victory of the people’s revolution and for thwarting the plots of 
domestic and foreign enemies for restoration, and this weapon we must firmly grasp. […] As 
long as we persist in the people’s democratic dictatorship and unite with our foreign friends, 
we shall always be victorious.”
The Chinese concept of security during the entire PR-era has consistently relied on this 
set of basic considerations introduced by Mao, that is, the basic fears and vulnerabilities 
of the PRC have remained fairly constant. Although the official Chinese security ‘concept’ 
has undergone changes in its content and implications for policy, it has retained a preoc-
cupation with sovereignty, territorial integrity, maintenance of the political order,17  and a 
realpolitik stance in foreign affairs. These basic elements of the Chinese security concept 
have been and are influenced by the external political context, the PRC’s determination 
of and identification with the world order, and perhaps most importantly, by the needs 
of its domestic economic and social stability. While the threat of a major war subsided 
in Chinese national security analysis by the mid 1980s, only in the 1990s have official 
Chinese security documents and statements begun to reflect broader understandings of 
security beyond the military and political sectors, and the role of these ideas is still fairly 
minimal.
In the context of the general discursive stability of security preoccupations in China, 
the communist era can be divided into five periods or stages. Wu Baiyi (2001) calls four of 
them the pro-Soviet period (1949-1957), opposition to both superpowers (1958-1970), 
the united front of counterhegemony (1971-1981) and the non-aligned security stance 
(1982-1991).18 The post-Cold War period in turn could be described as the drive for a 
multipolar world (1992-). As the four cases investigated in this study fall into the last four 
of these periods, it is good to examine the distal contexts of national security beyond the 
cases themselves. During the pro-Soviet period period, having just secured a victory in 
the civil war, the Communist Party was preoccupied with the safety of its territory, con-
solidation of the new regime, and the nation’s ideological unification.19 The unity of the 
Communist bloc and belief in Soviet assistance were seen as the guarantors of Chinese 
international security until the regime could be consolidated so that China would rise 
17  Although in recent times these have faded into the background since China has not been under direct 
military threat.
18  Howard (2001) also concurs with Wu’s historical analysis; see also Ong (2007) for a similar periodisation. 
Chinese foreign policy in the same period is usually divided into three periods: alignment with the Soviet Union 
(1949-1960), revolutionary self-reliance and confrontation with both super-powers (1961-1972), and partici-
pation as a swing player in the strategic triangle (1972-1989) (Nathan & Ross 1997, xiii).
19  These have remained major issues to this day, with a border demarcation under discussion with India, the 
Taiwan issue festering periodically, and some island conflicts occasionally flaring up.
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from its ‘century of shame’. In the mid 1950s, there seemed to be optimism as regards the 
success of the revolution. While the CCP had gone through many rectifications, and would 
continue to do so, there was a brief respite in these campaigns. Consequently, ideological 
security was not the primary concern here.
While China under Mao can be characterised with a sense of almost constant crisis, 
the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 declared that the ‘stormiest’ phase of the revolution 
was behind and that the majority of private property had been socialised. In his speech, 
Mao declared that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was 
essentially erased: “contradictions among the proletariat and the bourgeoisie have been 
basically solved” (Central Research Department of History 1986, 277).20 In this situation, 
the task for the party was to invest in production and industrialisation, no longer in the 
discovery and elimination of class enemies or revisionists. Similarly, in 1957, one of Mao’s 
most famous speeches on the correct handling of contradictions among the people em-
phasised that “never before has our country been as united as it is today. […] The days of 
national disunity and chaos which the people detested are gone, never to return.”21 Such an 
impression of lessened contradictions was also evident in Mao’s instigation of the leader-
ship system of the ‘two fronts’, where Mao would leave the everyday management of the 
country to the collective leadership. However, this interlude proved to be short-lived as 
already the massive rectification campaigns of the late 1950s demonstrate.
China’s international relations during the first period were characterised by close rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. Such friendly relations did not last long, however. The first 
realignment of the Chinese security concept was directly linked to the Sino-Soviet split, 
whereby China began to ‘oppose both superpowers’, or to “fight with two fists”, as Deng 
Xiaoping phrased Mao’s line of the period. This realignment went against the macrose-
curitisation pattern of the Cold War, and it took some time to realise the significance and 
seriousness of the ‘Sino-Soviet split’. For China, ideological competition and the threat of 
war with both superpowers were the dominant features of this period. The fear of imme-
diate, large-scale nuclear strikes drove the Chinese to develop nuclear weapons of their 
own, after Soviet assistance was withdrawn in the late 1950s. China then emphasised its 
role as a compatriot of Asian, African, and European underdeveloped states. This was 
later expressed through Mao’s theory of the three worlds.22
The Sino-Soviet split culminated in armed border conflict at the end of the 1960s. Such 
a real possibility of war seemed to push Mao to re-evaluate the worth of ‘fighting with 
two fists’. Even though Chinese domestic politics was still suffering from the effects of the 
Cultural Revolution, as the 1970s began, Chinese foreign policy and security perceptions 
began to be dominated by a realpolitik approach. While Mao’s rhetoric remained radical 
in foreign affairs, even actively revolutionary Maoist movements abroad were abandoned 
20  Still, some remnants of the old system remained: “the major contradiction still existing in China was between 
the advanced socialist system and the backward production forces in society” (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 3).
21  A back door of continued resistance by ‘bad elements’ in society was kept ajar even here: there remained 
the possibility of contradictions even among the people which would turn those into among enemies. “[T]his 
does not mean that contradictions no longer exist in our society […] we are confronted with two types of social 
contradictions – those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people.” The purpose of the dicta-
torship of the proletariat was defined by Mao as enabling the protection of the country from both internal and 
external enemies.
22  Ironically, it was Deng Xiaoping who presented Mao’s thesis to the UN general assembly in 1974, two years 
before he would once again be purged by Mao and the ’Gang of Four’ (see Deng 2002, 264-269).
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in exchange for diplomatic recognition and support for China’s UN-seat by the govern-
ments the Maoists were combating (Van Ness 1970; Tow 1994, 123).23 The greatest for-
eign security threat was perceived as Soviet expansionism, particularly after the 1969 
border conflict with the Soviet Union. The period of the ‘united front’ with the US that 
lasted through the 1970s displayed how China worked against Cold War assumptions to 
an even greater degree.
Relations with the Soviet Union were also key for the third realignment of the Chinese 
security concept in the 1980s. China found itself in a new situation as it no longer con-
fronted any serious external threats. The 1970s had seen the PRC attaining the Chinese 
UN-seat, including permanent membership in its security council, and the diplomatic 
recognition of the US. Thereafter, in the 1980s, the Soviet leadership began a rapproche-
ment with China. Economic reforms begun in the late 1970s received wide support and 
the Chinese leadership perceived its security environment to be the best since the found-
ing of the PRC (Deng 1993b, 126-129). This fourth period (of the the non-aligned security 
stance) provided signs of adjustment to China´s inherited security concept. Deng Xiaop-
ing and his supporters contended that the country needed a peaceful international envi-
ronment in which it could concentrate on economic development. This, in turn, paved the 
way for a more comprehensive conception of security in China.
In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, Chinese policy planners quietly began 
to amend the country’s security strategy. The first sign of this was the modification of 
China’s military doctrine after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The State Council also began 
to publish White Papers on its foreign and security policies. Such documents outlined a 
renewed security concept in China. This ‘New Security Concept’ was officially introduced 
in April 1996 when the “Shanghai Five” mechanism was initiated. The concept has be-
come prevalent in numerous international statements and White Papers. For example, 
in the May 2002 Position Paper on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security 
Issues, the Chinese authorities emphasise that “terrorism, illicit drugs, HIV/AIDS, piracy, 
illegal migration, environmental security, economy security, information security, and other 
non-traditional security issues are more pronounced.” The new security concept thereby 
contains political, defence, diplomacy, economic, energy, transnational crime, and envi-
ronmental issues, as well as geopolitical, ethnic, religious and other ones (cf., Informa-
tion Office 2004; 2006). Uncontrolled population growth, disparities in economic oppor-
tunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, epidemics, 
and international terrorism have received unprecedented attention in Chinese security 
speech.24 This has been accelerated by events like the Asian financial crisis and 9/11, and 
to a lesser extent by epidemics like SARS/avian flu (Cheng 2006, 91).25 
While there have been rectification campaigns in post-Mao China, their frequency and 
intensity have lessened to a great degree. Perhaps consequently, security has not always 
23  The Republic of China was still the representative of China in the UN.
24  In line with this new concept China signed the Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field 
of Non-Traditional Security Issues, which stated that current priorities of the parties are “combating traffick-
ing in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime, and cyber crime”, in November 2002. (Joint Decla-
ration 2002.)
25  Interestingly, in the aftermath of the desecuritisation of the Cold War macrosecuritisation, China presaged 




been the most prominent issue on the post-Mao agenda. With the absence of grand and 
salient external challenges since the mid 1980s, domestic stability has become the main 
‘security good’ pursued by the contemporary CCP (Swaine 2004; cf., Information Office 
2006). While the security of the CCP and the political security (i.e., existence of the politi-
cal system in China as the PRC) of the state are intertwined, as Martin I. Wayne (2008, 65) 
notes, the contemporary CCP confronts more threats than the state in China. This partly 
explains why threats to the CCP have also been presented as threats to the PRC and to the 
stability and unity of Chinese society: the greater the threat, the greater the ‘prize’, be it 
measured in terms of legitimacy or social control.
According to Ayoob (1995) and Alagappa (1998) the most frequent threats to state 
security in post-colonial and developing states generally emanate from within the states 
themselves, rather than from international sources, the most important facilitating con-
dition of which is a failure of political leadership. Since at least the mid 1980s, internal 
threats have also been overriding in Chinese ‘security perceptions’, as is evident from 
public statements by Chinese political leaders (see e.g., Deng 1993b, 126-129). In such 
respect, Wayne (2008, 23) has noted that even though Chinese authorities have repre-
sented the Xinjiang insurgency as springing from foreign influences, that is, ‘Western el-
ements’ in the mid 1990s, and then ‘Islamist forces’ in the 2000s, the root causes and 
majority of activities are domestic.26
The preoccupation with domestic stability is also evident in China’s position on a 
‘multipolar world’ in the post-cold War era. In this fifth period, ideological differences 
have been considered less important and national interests,27 especially of the economic 
kind, have became central. All in all, while non-traditional security issues nowadays receive 
26  While the Chinese authorities claim that Xinjiang has been under some form of Chinese rule for millennia, 
independent historical studies show that Uyghurs have not always been under Chinese rule. Yet, the various 
uprisings and violent incidents throughout the centuries do not form a constant or singular pattern of seeking 
independence, but instead have had varying motives and reasons behind them. The majority of Western discus-
sion in the media, and even some academic discussions, explain the contemporary violence as a reaction to 
Chinese policies concerning the practice of religion and indigenous culture in Xinjiang. Wayne (2008) and 
Gardner Bovigndon (2004) depart from this avenue of thought. While Bovigndon sees Chinese policies on 
‘regional autonomy’ as the principal source of unrest, Wayne sees a connection to developments in the neigh-
bouring region as having a major impact. It is important to note that while the unrest of the 1990s and 2000s 
has received the greatest media attention outside China, the greatest PRC-era sporadic outbursts of violence 
and unrest in Xinjiang correlate with unrest throughout the rest of China, namely the Great leap Forward, the 
Democracy Wall Movement, and the unrest of 1989 (Millward 2004).
The various insurgencies in Xinjiang have had international dimensions from the dynastic eras until the most 
recent military operations of the United States. Bovigndon (2004, 9-12) identifies three types of international 
influences in Xinjiang politics. Firstly, the Soviet Union provided a model and a mirror for Chinese policies. 
Indeed, Soviet influence in Xinjiang was already great during the Republican Era, and the Bingtuan were origi-
nally set up to counter and possibly even fight this influence in the 1950s. While the Soviet Union, with its own 
approach to ‘minority issues’ worked as a positive and negative model for the CCP, in the 1990s the ‘success’ 
of ousting the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and the independence of Central Asian states provided Xinjiang 
separatists with a ‘positive model’: perhaps “East-Turkistan” could achieve the same in China. In addition to this 
model effect, the military operations in Central Asia provided Xinjiang insurgents with opportunities to train, 
acquire arms, and gain veterans.
27  The Chinese notion of national interest is contested, but it is seen to be guided by materialist theory and to 
aim at practical interests. In the Mao-era, in accordance with Marxist ideas, national interest was understood to 
be the interest of the ruling class. In the post-Mao era the national interest is evoked in Chinese discussions to 
be a reaction against the ‘revolutionary diplomacy’ of Mao. National interest is now seen to represent the ruling 
class and the nation. In Chinese, both the nation and the state are often understood to refer to the same thing, 
guójiā (国家; the state). Current mainstream Chinese IR thinking views the national interest in international 
relations as sui generis and separated from domestic politics. (Yong 1998, 312-313.)
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attention in Chinese security documents, the real shift of focus has been away from the 
military-political sector and towards economic security. Contemporary Chinese political 
realists tend to emphasise economic and technological development over pure military 
force (Yong 1998, 314-315). Economic security is understood as measures to ensure the 
country’s economic stability and sustained development, and thereby to guarantee its 
‘comprehensive power.’ Economic security is not only relevant for the national economy 
but it also entails societal and individual safety. Chinese economists tend to insist, how-
ever, that economic issues have security implications only when they affect the security of 
society, national sovereignty, and military or diplomatic capabilities (Wu 2001, 279).
As China is increasingly involved in world affairs, it has to confront an increasingly 
complex environment that includes new and prolific threats. Moreover, the more China 
engages with other states and non-state actors, the more obligations it also assumes. 
Some Chinese IR scholars have thus argued that global threats and survival require new 
forms of globalist thinking (Yong 1998, 319). For example, 倪世雄 (2001) lists globalist 
perspectives among the five paradigms of Chinese IR scholarship. Traditional military 
threats have subsided, but political, economic, and ideological challenges are represented 
as having intensified for China. Technological developments too present Chinese security 
planners and decision-makers with further challenges.28 China’s position on the global 
climate change macrosecuritisation supports these kinds of observations.
7.2. The Chinese Political Order and Functional Actors in Securitisation 
Processes
Beyond the context of institutionalised security and prominent fears and vulnerabilities, 
the empirical study of securitisation has to take into account the nature of the political 
order, the mechanisms through which both politics and government are engaged in that 
order. As has already been noted, securitisation, its contestation and even resistance to 
it can be affected by political orders and diagrams of power. Without knowledge of the 
role and functionality of the CCP, it is not possible to comprehend Chinese politics; it is 
important to realise how the power of the CCP has been constituted and the PRC has been 
set up as a diagram of power.
As could be discerned from the overview of Chinese security narratives above, ideo-
logical threats have remained a major concern for the PRC. This can be seen in both the 
types of institutionalised master signifiers of threats, as well as in the legitimisation of 
foreign policy lines, even though, at times, actual policy has strikingly gone against their 
face value. Thereby, examination of the ‘nature’ of the Chinese political order may provide 
an understanding as to why ideology has had such a major impact on the construction of 
political threats in the PRC.
 
7.2.1. Totalitarianism and Post-Totalitarianism
There has been much debate on the ‘nature’ or ‘type’ of the Chinese political order un-
der the leadership of the Communist Party. Some view it as totalitarian, while others as 




merely authoritarian.29 The transition from China under Mao to the various post-Mao 
leaderships is often considered key here, especially as post-Mao China has embraced a 
form of ‘market socialism with Chinese characteristics’.
The problem with the debate on the nature of the Chinese political orders is that the 
term ‘totalitarianism’ has its roots as a journalistic label,30 and it has been used to deni-
grate the political orders and societies that have been attributed with it, especially in 
the US.31 Here however, the term is used analytically, and as such, it can be observed that 
the Chinese order does concur with features of more recent models of totalitarianism. 
Furthermore, in my view, the transition from Mao’s rule to the post-Mao order has not 
been one from totalitarianism to authoritarianism, but one from totalitarianism to post-
totalitarianism.32
Examination of the structural logic of totalitarian orders, and what post-totalitarian-
ism entails will help us comprehend how Chinese politics operate and how securitisation 
functions there. Exploration of the variety of these orders is also important because the 
original totalitarian model33 came under severe criticism and was to a large extent aban-
doned in China Studies by the late 1970s for its inability to explain the internal develop-
ments of claimed totalitarian orders and how these regimes actually operated in Eastern 
Europe and China.34 However, the concept should not be totally discarded, and accord-
ingly, a recent modification of the totalitarian model by Sujian Guo (1998; 2000) has been 
29  The classic debate on totalitarianism in Mao’s China was between Benjamin Schwartz (1960) and Karl A. 
Wittfogel (1960a; 1960b) (see also Wittfogel et al. 1960). Similar problems of cross-cultural comparisons are 
evident in an exchange between Maria Chang (1979) and Lloyd Eastman (1979) on pre-Mao China and fascism 
(for a discussion see Wakeman [1997]).
30  The first recorded mention of the term would seem to date from 1923 when the Italian journalist Giovanni 
Amendola used the term to describe Mussolini’s attempts to suppress political opposition at that time (Nevan-
linna 2002, 93). However, it was in the Cold War athmosphere following the Second World War that the term 
was popularised as a concept in political science (Brooker 2000, 8), and its usage came to encompass the whole 
Socialist Bloc, inclusive of the PRC.
31  Totalitarianism has, as a rule, been used to denigrate those political regimes it has been ascribed to, rather 
than as an analytical concept (Žižek 2002a, 4); totalitarianism and authoritarianism have often been used as 
political terms to label undesirable regimes. In this present study, however, they are only used as analytical 
concepts in a three-fold categorisation of political systems i.e., democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian. 
Authoritarian systems are exclusionary regimes in which the government attempts to control the number and 
nature of legitimate political actors in society (Dickson 1994). Totalitarianism has the same feutures, but also 
others (see Guo 2000; Elo 2005).
On the political use of totalitarianism, see Žižek (2002a, 4) and Elo (2005, 42-44).
32  See Vuori (2007) and Paltemaa & Vuori (2009).
33  A classic treatise on the ‘totalitarian syndrome’, or model, was offered by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew 
K. Brzezinski (1956) as they argued that totalitarian dictatorships were a ‘new species of autocracy’ and an 
‘adaptation of autocracy to twentieth-century industrial society.’ The totalitarian model encapsulated the idea 
of a total control of individuals. It sought to dissolve their private lives and thought, and believed that social life 
could be altered without limits (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956, 15-16). Friedrich & Brzezinski listed six features 
in their understanding of the totalitarian syndrome: 1) an elaborative transformative ideology, 2) a ruling single 
mass party led by one individual, 3) the use of physical and mental terror against enemies of the system, 4) “a 
technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party or the government, 
of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, and motion pictures,” 5) “a similarly 
technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of the effective use of weapons of armed combat,” and 6) 
central control of the economy.
Carl Schmitt (1933) was influential in this respect with his division of qualitative and quantitative totalitarianism. 
In the former the society engulfs the state, while in the latter the state dominates and presides over society.
34  See Brooker (2000) for an example of this criticism. See Guo (2000) and Elo (2005) for updated models 




particularly useful for the present study. 
Guo (1998; 2000) refined the classical model of totalitarianism (Friedrich & Brzezin-
ski 1956) through a focus on the structure of totalitarian systems and by examination 
of the real system of the PRC.35 His model, inspired by Imre Lakatos’s (1970) model of 
research programmes, makes a distinction between the hard core of the system and its 
other operational features. According to Guo, the fundamental features of the core have 
to be part of a real system in order for its totalitarian nature to be sustained. Thus, the 
hard core defines the limits of totalitarianism; if the core is compromised the system 
loses its totalitarian ‘nature’, which would equal system change.36
The hard core of a totalitarian system consists of an ideology that is presented as the 
only correct and allowed world-view, and which at the same time defines the set objec-
tives of the system. The ideology thus legitimises the totalitarian political system: the 
actions and policies of the power holders are legitimate and correct because they aim 
to attain the objectives set by the ideology.37 (Guo 1998; 2000.) The construction of an-
tagonistic others and the revolutionary legitimisation of the prerogative state, are major 
features of the dynamic of totalitarian political orders. The ideology also makes the use 
of force possible: having only one accepted ideology also legitimises the use of force in its 
protection. The core consists of three elements: A) an absolutist ideology and inevitable 
goal, B) ideological commitment and C) a dictatorial party-state system. A fourth feature 
is the protective belt of action means: in the Chinese context, the repeated and massive 
use of state and peer-terror, mass mobilisation, as well as control over information and 
media, education, culture, economy, means of production, military forces and weapons.38 
35  There have been three major paradigms to analyse the structure of power in socialist political orders, viz. 1) 
the totalitarian power scheme (Friedrich & Brzezinski 1956), 2) the state/class conception (Castoriadis 1985; 
Djilas 1966), and 3) the authoritarian regime idea (Rigby 1970). The merits and problems of these various 
paradigms will not be examined in depth here (for criticisms, see Staniszkis 1992, 62-88 and Elo 2005 for 
example) as the intention in this present study is not to construct a comprehensive theory of totalitarianism.
Within the paradigm of the totalitarian approach, in addition to Friedrich and Brzezinski, Arendt (1976) and 
Linz (2000) have been oft-cited. Arendt treats totalitarianism as a specific existential situation, while Linz 
contrasts totalitarian and autocratic power structures. Sujian Guo (2000) focuses on the structural aspect of 
totalitarianism, while Kimmo Elo (2005) has studied the dynamics of the totalitarian system.
36  Jadwiga Staniszkis (1992, 12-13, 79-82) terms this distinction between the core of the system and the 
measures required for its protection, as the duality of the prerogative and the normative state. For her, the 
prerogative state is guided more by the functional rationality of self-reproduction than by any ideological 
vision. In effect, the transformation of ideology can be a means to retain the totalitarian prerogative state. Such 
transformations e.g., the introduction of Deng Xiaoping theory into the canon of Chinese ideology (Kauppinen 
2005), illustrate how the prerogative state is not omnipotent, for it also requires some degree of legitimacy and 
legitimisation (including self-legitimisation by the authorities) (cf., Wæver 1989b; Wæver 1995; Holm 2004; 
Elo 2005).
37  The structural logic of totalitarianism modelled by Guo concurs with the logic of securitisation. By labelling a 
matter as a threat to the existence of the system and state, the use of any measures to resolve the issue becomes 
justified. In other words, certain issues can be moved into an area of special politics by labelling them as issues 
of security i.e., matters of (regime) survival. The hard core of totalitarian political systems is institutionally 
securitised, as it cannot be compromised without the loss of the ‘nature’ of the system. Even though threats to 
the system are automatically issues of national security, specific issues will still have to be specifically securi-
tised as threats to it. What is constructed as national security reveals something about the speaker’s values and 
motives, and thereby the nature of the political order the authoritative speaker is part of.
38  China is not unique in protecting the core of its political system. Indeed, I have argued that all political orders 
tend to securitise their core values (Vuori 2007). Such securitisations seem to arise more frequently in socialist 
systems, which are legitimised through a ‘self-posited prerequisite of historiosophic subjectivity’ of the leading 
party (Staniszkis 1992, 13-14): severe problems arise when such subjectivities are expressed at a lower level. 
This is closely tied to revolutionary legitimacy. If other progressive identities or subjects emerge, the party has 
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This core is protected through the adaptation and use of the action means and methods 
on this protective belt of the system. The elements on the protective belt are depend-
ent on the resources available to, and the socio-historical situation of a real system. This 
means that it is unhelpful to define such elements conclusively within the model, as they 
are constantly under a process of revision and adaptation.39 
It is as if Deng Xiaoping (1995b, 174) had operationalised the core principles of the ab-
stract notion of totalitarian models, when he promulgated the ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ 
of the Communist Party in 1979. These principles that could not be violated whilst almost 
any other principles of the party were sacrificeable for the sake of economic growth con-
sisted of four phrases: 1) keeping to the socialist road, 2) upholding the ‘people’s demo-
cratic dictatorship’, 3) leadership by the Communist Party, and 4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. These principles concur with the features of a totalitarian order, and 
they have been consistently referred to whenever the Chinese authorities have framed 
certain issues as a political threat to the PRC:40 they have been a consistent referent of 
political security in the post-Mao era.
The transition from Mao’s China to post-Mao China may be viewed as a transition from 
revolution to the state i.e., from constitutive power to constituted power. Here, the Four 
Cardinal Principles form the core of such a post-totalitarian order. Indeed, despite be-
ing at times mere lip-service or ‘autocommunication’, official ideology is still crucial for 
the legitimacy of a post-totalitarian political order, and its control over society. The body 
of these fundamental principles, universal truths and official norms, involves a small 
number of core elements that define the order’s ‘essence’ and play a major role in its uni-
fication. This core has to be sustained in order to maintain the order’s essence, legitimise 
the leadership of the authorities, and their proclaimed historical mission. For example 
Hughes (2006, 9) observes how Chinese leaders have continued to legitimise their rule 
with what has become known as ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’, which has its origins in the legit-
imacy crisis of the party overseeing the introduction of market reforms. The four cardinal 
principles are at the core of ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory.’ Any threat to this core is a threat to 
the existence of the party and the state. To label social movements, forms of behaviour 
or even individuals as threats to these principles is a very powerful tool to constrain and 
suppress political opponents, religious practices or dissident movements, since after the 
successful securitisation of an issue, the full brunt of the action means can be brought to 
bear on whichever issue deemed as a threat. However, use of any action means and meth-
ods from the protective belt will be a form of special politics, not the norm. In a totalitar-
a limited range of options, where an ‘enemy’ is often required or called for: the party’s historiosophic identity 
has to be expressed in struggle, or more precisely, in repression (ibid.). Revolutionary legitimisation excludes 
the legalised existence of other arguments of legitimate political subjectivity. Nevertheless, the manifestation of 
such opposing arguments cannot be entirely eliminated, which is why such political orders may shift to the use 
of ‘security practices’ rather than ‘total discipline’ (cf., Foucault 2007).
This kind of cyclical ‘regulation by crisis’ suspends the institutional system and allows its temporary realign-
ment as contrary to the normal functioning of the system. This temporarily restores equilibrium, and maintains 
the illusion of control. The inertness of the political structure is revealed by repeated political crises, which 
paradoxically stabilises and reproduces the system.
39  Just as in the preparation for martial law in Poland in 1981 (Staniszkis 1992, 82-83), the Communist party in 
China developed a set of extraordinary legal regulations (the so called cult legislation) as it began its campaign 
against the Falungong in 1999 (see Case IV below). The prerogative state changed the form of the normative 
state in order to reproduce and secure itself politically.
40  See Cases II and III below, as well as Paltemaa & Vuori (2006).
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ian system all issues are politicised (Elo 2005), everything is within the purview of the 
state, but not all issues are securitised, and not all politics is about survival.41
In addition to the structure of totalitarian orders, their dynamism has also been a fo-
cus of attention in the development of understandings and models of totalitarianism. 
The change of such dynamism is also at the core in the transition from Mao’s rule to the 
post-Mao China of reform. For example Robert Tucker (1961, 284-286) emphasised the 
commitment to social transformation as a central characteristic of a totalitarian order. 
He noted that an important feature to differentiate sub-types of totalitarian orders was 
their motivation to undertake revolutionary politics, which he called ‘revolutionary dyna-
mism.’ If a regime in charge of such a political order loses this, it will become an ‘extinct 
movement-regime’, but which could, nevertheless, survive for long after and ‘exercise 
power in order to exercise power.’ Tucker therefore noted that instead of facing extinc-
tion, a totalitarian order based on a revolutionary movement might go through an altera-
tion of its dynamism as a result of a qualitative change in the motivation of revolutionary 
politics.42 
This loss of revolutionary momentum described by Tucker is aptly captured by Václav 
Havel (1992), who argued that the initial totalitarian order applied to most of the Social-
ist states in Europe at the beginning of the Cold War, was replaced with a post-totalitarian 
order as the new political systems settled. In post-totalitarianism, ideology no longer has 
any great influence on people, but still plays its part in the system.43 
Ideology will still set some aspects of the public transcript (Scott 1990) of the ‘power-
ful’ as it binds what they can and what, conversely, the powerless sometimes must do and 
say. The post-totalitarian order aims for harmony and peace,44 the obedience of its sub-
jects in the system, without overt use of coercion; the post-totalitarian order relies more 
on ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1977). Thereby, to defy or otherwise exceed the ex-
pected conformity and discipline will be regarded as an attack on the system itself i.e., on 
the core values of the system which define its nature. The influence of individuals, even 
their ‘lifestyles’, can be tolerated if they are in tune with the direction the order is head-
ing (Buruma 2001). In this way, the forms and limits of the landscape of conformity may 
change, with top leaders defining the broad strokes and ‘security professionals’ modulat-
ing the limits of the allowed. In this case, citizens do not  have to believe in the system, 
but merely comply with it to a degree that will not jeopardise the ‘official truth’ which 
remains rhetorically committed to the original ideology of the totalitarian order. Such 
‘rituals of complicity’ become more important than the ideological zeal that may have 
41  Although the professionals who comprise the protective belt of action means (e.g., the secret police), define 
and target citizens and activities for security measures, in the case of new phenomena, or activities on a mass-
scale, the authorities have to engage in security speech in order to mobilise the system and label the specific 
targets of the security measures. The public performance of such acts also serves as a form of legitimisation 
speech, even if this were mere autocommunication.
42  Tucker did not use the label totalitarian, but ‘revolutionary mass-movement regimes under single-party 
auspices.’ See also Elo (2005) for a recent thesis on the dynamism of totalitarian systems.
43  Staniszkis (1992) and Havel (1992) argue that the transition from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism did 
not undermine the prerogative nature of power in the European socialist systems. This also seems to be the case 
in China, where the prerogative state has become more pragmatic. As is clear from the everyday politics and 
society of contemporary China, it is not the letter of ideology, but the interests of the authorities in their own 
reproduction (through the maintenance of ‘stability and unity’), which is decisive now.




driven the initial totalitarian stage. At this stage, the political order will no longer actively 
control all that it can, but it is sufficient to control what is necessary to perpetuate the 
system (cf., Foucault 2007). In China’s post-Mao era, this has translated as ‘maintaining 
stability and unity’, ‘upholding the four cardinal principles’, and more recently, striving 
for a ‘harmonious society.’
Conformity is necessary for the system, because if too many subjects cease to comply, 
the symbolic order will crumble and lead to system change.45 Totalitarian leaderships 
often frame themselves as the savior and guarantor of the nation and thus exclude any al-
ternative representations of the state, political or social orders and actors within it (Holm 
2004). For example, the leadership in China presents itself as the sole guardian of, as 
Vivienne Shue (1994) puts it, ‘benevolence, truth and glory’. The nation is also built on 
a narrative or myth of struggle, with a pantheon of national heroes ranging from glori-
ous workers to its intellectual founding fathers. The reification of an encircled ‘us’ by the 
regime renews discipline, legitimates the use of repression, and maintains a crucial link 
between the leadership and the people (cf., Bourdieu 1991). This also informs the images 
and labels the leadership is likely to give to those it deems to be its enemies.
However, this is not a black-and-white question for freedom is also a technique of gov-
ernment, one of governing through the absence of political government (Foucault 2007, 
48-49; Huysmans 2006a, 92-93).  Autocratic leaderships may not want to eliminate all 
opposing identities entirely, since antagonistic struggle is useful in managing and main-
taining the system as well as for renewing discipline.46 Total suppression may also prove 
too costly with respect to other objectives of the regime. Therefore, if dissidence can be 
surveilled, and thereby its effects limited, it may be allowed to continue. This is a matter 
of risk calculation and the setting of levels of tolerated disobedience or resistance, a mat-
ter of managing the system, a matter of governance.
The analysis of freedom as a technique of government demonstrates that the social 
dynamic of freedom creates structures, which are beyond the grasp of individual actors: 
The social dynamic governs more effectively than sovereign interventions, even with the 
use of force. This is apparent in China’s internet-control practices, but also, for example, 
in the belief that secret police ‘are everywhere’ in Xinjiang (Wayne 2008). If the agencies 
engaged in this free interaction remain compliant with the officially declared reality, and 
practice autonomous discipline, the need for the totalitarian system diminishes and it is 
replaced by a post-totalitarian system; while discipline allows nothing to escape, secu-
rity ‘lets things happen’ (Foucault 2007, 45). If individuals and the social dynamic they 
create comply with the core values of the political order, they can be left to practice self-
45  This is where the Internet poses the greatest danger from the point of view of the authorities: a single dissi-
dent may potentially encourage vast numbers as her symbolic resistance has the potential to be reproduced 
with a speed that can overcome the technologies and procedures of surveillance and censorship. In this respect, 
the ‘rhizome’ of networked communication becomes especially threatening to the authorities’ grasp of control 
(cf., Bogard 2006).
As such, the CCP has, however, had good reason to set up its new, networked milieu to circulate information, 
which has been deemed a necessity for continued economic growth. The CCP has had the need to maintain 
economic growth, as prosperous citizens appear to be willing not to ‘rock the boat’, and keep, so to speak, ‘living 
the lie’ instead. In this respect, Huxley’s (1998) ‘soma’ seems more preferable and efficient to Orwell’s (1992) 
‘Big Brother’, although both principles are still at work in the PRC. Soma, however, seems to be winning, as much 
of post-Mao political legitimacy has been invested in the continuing rise in living standards.
46  Even ‘Big Brother’ had his Goldstein (Orwell 1992).
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governance.47 However, panoptic practices ensure that individuals do not step out of line; 
security professionals will constantly modulate the limit of (excessive) freedom.48 
While totalitarian political orders are transformative and employ forced-draft methods 
to achieve their ideological goals at almost any human and social cost, post-totalitarian 
political orders have lost this momentum and thorough ideological commitment. Never-
theless, post-totalitarian orders may still cling to the forms of its previous totalitarian or-
der, and its ideology remains the basis of its self-legitimisation. Indeed, this transforma-
tive process can be seen in China in many fields of life e.g., in the politics of technology,49 
propaganda work,50or even religion.51
7.2.2. The Party-State
The previous sub-chapter laid out the Chinese political order in terms of its ‘nature’, so 
that the role of the party-state, in terms of the practical organisation of politics and in-
47  Of course, there is no ‘secret document’ in a ‘safe’ in Zhongnanhai, and there is even no authentic freedom 
for the leadership of the party itself: the authorities are as much inmates in the system as their subordinates, 
although their autonomy may be comparatively greater, and what is expected of them is a different category of 
subjugation. Patric McGoohan’s allegorical television show “The Prisoner” (1967, Everyman Pictures) is very 
enlightening here.
48  For example, if the Chinese ‘online Panopticon’ functions well, access to online environments can be allowed. 
Similarly, citizens of the post-totalitarian system exercise both self-control and repression of themself through, 
in effect, ‘living the lie’, and complying with the officially declared reality (Havel 1992). Such bifurcation of 
official realities and the actual situation is quite evident, for example, both in class-status being defined by class 
origin rather than class relations, and in the ‘floating populations’ of rurally registered people who actually live 
in cities, numbering at over a hundred million.
The power of panoptic practices should also not be overemphasised, as such systems can only observe the 
‘inmates’ who remain in the ‘prison’ (Lyon 1994; 2007). In such respect, as even the Chinese online Panopticon 
in not perfect, the authorities employ other techniques of government beyond surveillance. While utilising 
Foucault’s concept of discipline, the problematics of Internet-control can be approached through the concept of 
the ‘politics of insecurity’ (Huysmans 2006a): by decentralising the modulation of safe and insecure to ‘security 
professionals’ (e.g., a secret police and internet sensors) the CCP can ‘let things happen’ and rely on security 
practices instead of total discipline. The argument here is that the Chinese authorities have endeavoured to set 
up an online China in a way that makes it less likely that individuals can ‘leave’ the Chinese post-totalitarian 
order via ICT-networks. As Maria Los (2006, 71) has argued, the ultimate feature of totalitarian domination is 
the absence of exit. By relying on security (in Foucault’s sense) and the post-totalitarian order, discipline does 
not, however, have to be complete; local resistance and individual ’lifestyles’ can be tolerated for as long the 
levels and limits set by the ’Party’ and its security professionals are not breached. The logic of governmental-
ity guides the other techniques and practices of government, so as to keep the probabilities of organised and 
effective resistance low.
For various criticisms of the limits of a panoptic understanding of surveillance, see Lyon (2006).
Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil (1985, Embassy International Pictures) also approaches the possibilities of escape 
from and resistance to such a system.
49  Technology, for example, ceases to serve the same socially transformative function as it formerly had in 
totalitarianism, yet it remains important as a means to protect the core values of the system; under a post-
totalitarian order even forms of technology that could jeopardise the system can be tolerated if they serve the 
other stated objectives of the order, but still only if their application can be controlled (see Paltemaa & Vuori 
2009).
50  The transition from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian political order is also evident in the Chinese propa-
ganda-system which no longer focuses as much on how its citizens think, but more on what they think about. 
The lesson drawn from the 1989 ‘disturbances’ (see Case III below), and of the first decade of the reform period, 
was that the party had to reinforce its propaganda work. The premier leader of the 1990s, Jiang Zemin indeed 
underlined the importance of ‘thought work’ and ‘agenda setting.’ See for example, Chan (2002) and Brady 
(2008) on the development of the Chinese propaganda-system in post-1989 China.




stitutionalised power as well as the practical level to conduct politics, may now be con-
sidered. While I do not deal with the issues of bureaucratic politics or the role of Chinese 
security experts in how security realities are established, it is useful to get some sense of 
the styles of politicking prevalent in the PRC.52
Succinctly put, a characteristic feature of the Chinese political order is the ‘party-state’, 
which refers to the parallel structures of both the party and the state, at various levels 
of social organisation. In this dual structure, the party is dominant as regards the actual 
state organs, and party structures also penetrate deeper into society than the state struc-
tures do. The same individuals will usually occupy the top positions in both structures, 
and the party thus retains its control over the political order and is able to prevent the 
emergence of political competitors.
On the formal state side, the highest authority in China is the National People’s Con-
gress (NPC), which convenes once every four years. The NPC delegates its authority to the 
State Council, which, effectively, is equivalent to the cabinet of the PRC. On the party side, 
the highest formal authority is the Party Congress, which meets infrequently. The Con-
gress delegates its authority to the Central Committee, which in turn delegates it to the 
Politburo. In practice the most authoritative party, and thereby party-state organ, is the 
Standing Committee of the CCP. While the delegates in the party and people’s congresses 
number in the thousands, the Standing Committee has only some 20 members. Such a 
dual structure of delegation is repeated at lower levels of administration and govern-
ance.
The party-state has been a characteristic feature of the Chinese political order. How-
ever, it has not been stable throughout the PRC era. The exceptionality of the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution (see Case I below), is evident in the fact that the party and the 
state in effect fused into one, and the exception being that it was the party that was ‘shut 
down’ as ad-hoc ‘revolutionary’ committees seized power from party bureaucrats. The 
post-Mao order, under the authority of Deng Xiaoping, resuscitated the party (see Case 
II below), and since the late 1970s, the party-state has been a relatively stable diagram 
of power.
When examined more closely, it soon becomes apparent that the Chinese bureaucratic 
system is the largest in recorded human history, and accordingly has perhaps the most 
complex ‘matrix’ of bureaucratic relations of authority. Some of these are formal, while 
many are ‘informal’, which is another major characteristic of the Chinese political order. 
Such a situation has been termed a system of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal 
2004, 187), which works along vertical ‘strips’ (条, tiáo) and horizontal ‘chunks’ (块, 
kuài) within the bureaucracy; the relationships of authority between the vertical and the 
horizontal are not always clear, and informal personal connections may play a key role in 
how the system is actually managed.53 When bureaucratic and political communication 
has been geared to flow from top to bottom, this kind of a system creates many difficul-
52  For general insights into the ‘sausage factory’ of Chinese governance and policymaking, see for example 
Lieberthal & Oksenberg (1988), Lieberthal & Lampton (1992), Saich (2001), Unger (2002), and Lieberthal 
(2004); see for example Barnouin & Yu (1998) for a study of how the exceptional politics of the Cultural Revolu-
tion affected the Foreign Ministry, and Lu (1997) on the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making in the 
PRC.
53  The general principle is that the Centre decides on issues where the authority is not clear, and decisions are 
delegated to as low a level of administration as possible.
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ties for good governance, as lower level administrators and politicians have an interest in 
falsifying information, and further, there is no trustworthy system to receive information 
from outside the bureaucracy ‘matrix.’
While the bureaucratic system is immense, and the de jure authoritative party and 
state decision making bodies include a great number of people, the number of de facto 
leaders in the PRC is only around 20-30. Accordingly, the study of Chinese politics has 
largely consisted of the study of elite and informal politics, aptly called ‘Zhongnanhaiol-
ogy’ after ‘Kremnology’ that concerned the outside analysis of elite politics of the Soviet 
Union. A common framework here has been ‘factionalism’ (see for example Unger 2002). 
Indeed, inter-personal relations are an important aspect of Chinese factional politics. It is 
however very difficult to characterise the various factions with descriptions such as ‘con-
servative’ or ‘liberal’, as these may have confusing connotations derivative of their use in 
other political orders, and because such labels would not be consistent throughout differ-
ent eras of Chinese politics e.g., a ‘radical’ reformer of the 1950s could be labelled a ‘con-
servative’ in the 1980s, even though their proposals may have remained quite similar.
While the Chinese political order has its own political beltway and bureaucratic pol-
itics beyond what China scholars call factional or informal politics, these bureaucratic 
dynamics will not affect the cases investigated in this present study to the degree they 
would in instances that deal with, for example, issues that concern illegal immigration 
as a security problem in Europe.54 The cases studied here are examples of the types of 
crises that the formulation of securitisation theory originally focused its attention on: 
these cases are closer to the ‘spectacular’ rather than ‘mundane’ politics of security and 
securitisation.
7.2.3. Functions of Propaganda
Propaganda is an essential element for the functioning of the Chinese system of the party-
state. It is important to realise here that propaganda, or public relations as it is officially 
translated by the Chinese Communist Party today (see Brady 2008), has not been under-
stood in the negative or even pejorative sense that it has in Europe and the US. Propa-
ganda in China has been considered legitimate as it has served an essentially educational 
function to integrate various elements of society. Whereas Western political discourse 
is meant to appease constituents, Chinese political discourse is meant to be persuasive. 
This persuasiveness arises out of (moral) justification. According to Guo Xuezhi (2002), 
political legitimacy in China since the dynastic eras has emanated from moral superior-
ity. 
Chinese political discourse is also very ideological and it is crafted to appear unchang-
ing and universal. Godwin Chu (1977) has argued that Chinese political communication 
differs from that of the West by being explicitly normative and value-oriented, that is, 
oriented toward altering the values of its audience. The aim is to teach and bind the au-
dience to a certain ideological position, rather than to disseminate information. Despite 
aesthetic transformations, this is still largely the case for party propaganda. Alan Kluver 
54  For example, bureaucratic support for the students in 1989 (see Case III below) does not equal bureaucratic 




(1996, 130-134) lists three types of audiences for Chinese propaganda, viz. I) officials for 
whom official language is a game and a tool for social impact, II) intellectuals for whom 
official language is a tool of aggression and defense, and III) the masses for whom official 
language is transformatory in that it legitimises and delegitimises different forms of ac-
tion.55 The Chinese propaganda system also has an international dimension and function, 
and is divided into three sections, namely internal party propaganda, domestic propa-
ganda and foreign propaganda (Shambaugh 2007).
As such, propaganda in China has been an important tool to create a political lexicon 
that has defined and restricted political discourse (Starr 1973, 127-43). Michael Schoen-
hals (1992) argues that this formation of a strictly defined official language is the stron-
gest means of political control in China. The government issues official lists (Schoenhals 
1991) of ‘scientific’ formulations of phrases which implies a tight connection between 
the signifier and the signified. Through these lists, form and content become one. This 
restricts language to ‘what is’ instead of ‘what could be’; the use of formalised language 
is a means for the deliberate formation of hegemonic discourses and a way to violently 
circumscribe the society’s rhetorical space and its social reality. Accordingly, the Com-
munist Party has authoritative positions from which official security issues are phrased. 
The paramount leader has a key role in the ‘trickle down effect’ of official propaganda 
(Shambaugh 1992) and (even in the era of commercial media) also a major role in the 
construction of security issues. The role of the paramount leader is central in defining 
the ‘formulations’ (提法, tífǎ) and ‘lines’ (路线, lùxiàn) that have a constraining effect on 
the discourse that follows them. A certain definition or label of an issue justifies certain 
political actions, and conversely denies certain forms of behavior. Political security has 
been a major constricting discourse and practice throughout the PRC-era.56
Bourdieu (1991) emphasised that a distinctive characteristic of the ‘political field’ is 
that professionals engaged in it have to regularly appeal to non-professional groups or 
forces that lie outside it. Politicians have to regularly renew and secure their support, 
their ‘political capital’, which will then enable them to be successful in their engagements 
and battles with other politicians and professionals of the field. Because the power of 
politicians is symbolic, they must constantly nourish and sustain a bond of belief and 
trust with those outside the field, who, in turn, provide those within the field with their 
power. In socialist systems, ‘autocommunication’ is often utilised for this purpose, so 
that, instead of the provision of new information, the purpose of communication is to 
maintain the political order by repetition of political ‘mantras’ or ‘codes’ (Lotman 1990; 
cf., Palmujoki 1995). In China, conformity to this mantra has been used as an indication 
of loyalty to the party, and to leading factions within it. Party cadres have to show public 
deference to the official line, or ‘public transcripts’ as James C. Scott (1990) would phrase 
it.57 Lucien Pye (1981; Baum 1996 concurs) has noted how words in China are not only 
political objects, but loyalty tests in a system defined by inter-factional struggle. Political 
55  The legitimate forms of action in this context refer to the legitimate forms of action of the masses, i.e., what 
the regime allows or does not allow to be done or said.
56  See Dutton (2005) for a history of policing and defining the ‘enemy’ in China.
57  While neither ‘public’ nor ‘hidden transcripts’ are more ‘authentic’ than the others, or free from other forms 
of power relations or effects of domination, what Scott’s (1990) work illuminates is that scripts, roles and forms 
of domination vary from ‘stage’ to ‘stage.’ ‘Where you stand depends on where you sit’ (Allison & Zelikow 1999). 
For a critique of Scott’s understanding of power, see Mitchell (1990).
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loyalties are measured through the extent the official line is followed. During the Mao-era, 
although citizens did not have the means to influence politicians, they were nevertheless 
very active in keeping up with ‘politics’, as missing the latest twist in the formulation of 
certain issues could have had dire consequences (Nathan 1985).
Even though Chinese politics has been very secretive, and the ‘masses’ have not been 
permitted access to the processes that go on behind the great spectacles58 of Chinese pol-
itics, Chinese leaders have often appealed to the masses for support in this or that cam-
paign.59 Even though the leadership is engaged in a ‘dictatorship of the class enemy’ they 
still have to appeal to the progressive masses, which have ‘democracy.’ Argumentation is 
not only about intellectual acceptance, it is also about creating a basis for action (Perel-
man 1996, 19): people are truly convinced after they are willing to take action. Although 
autocratic systems may not support genuine interaction, they do require participation in 
the ‘ritual of complicity’ (Havel 1992).
7.2.4. The Media as a Functional Actor
As was already noted, while bureaucratic politics is not a concern here, the diagram of 
power of the Chinese political order does contain some ‘functional actors’ that are perti-
nent for some of the cases studied here. Proclamations and discourses evident in Chinese 
mass media can be used as indicators of official and authoritative views to a greater de-
gree than, for example, in Europe, which arises from its role of as a ‘functional actor’ in 
China. Mao Zedong was keenly aware of the usefulness and importance of mass commu-
nication: after the declaration of the People’s Republic, one of the first orders of business 
for the Chinese Communist Party was the establishment of a radio-system that could be 
received in even the remotest of Chinese villages. It was deemed to be of utmost impor-
tance that all Chinese could follow the exploits of the CCP and its leadership as saviors of 
China.
Media professionals were given a dual role right from the beginning of the PRC. Jour-
nalists and Xinhua, the news agency of New China, were given the task of disseminat-
ing propaganda to educate the masses. The Chinese media became the ‘mouthpiece’ 
(喉舌, hóushé) of the CCP, but in Maoist ideology, the mouthpiece of the party was also 
considered to be the mouthpiece of the people (Lee 1990). In addition to dissemina-
tion of propaganda, the second task of the Chinese media has been to report to party 
authorities on social conditions in the country and help in party rectification. This has 
assumed various degrees of secrecy, and it has been ideologically ‘raw’, that is, it has not 
always followed official formulations. The most sensitive of such reports, Reference News 
(参考消息, cānkǎo xiāoxi) and Internal Reference Final Proofs (内部参考清样, nèibù 
cānkǎo qīngyàng), have been received only by the top leaders. This function of the media 
58  The political spectacle refers to the creation and circulation of symbols in political processes; politics appears 
as a drama where meaning is conferred through crisis situations, emergencies, rituals and myths. These form 
a moving panorama of a world that the mass public never really touches, but which can have major effects on 
their daily lives, and which they have to fear or cheer. (Edelman 1972.) Interestingly, Chinese media outlets have 
been restricted to 20% bad news: the Chinese authorities have wanted control of both the ‘positive’ and the 
‘negative’ spectacles presented to the Chinese public. This is very similar to Stalin’s Soviet Union where there 
was no bad news (Žižek 2002b).
59  As Radtke (2008, 203) notes, security speech on both internal and external aspects of security has been the 
preserve of elites in China. 
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has been considered very important. For example, during the heights of the social and 
political chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when party and state authori-
ties were ‘under attack by the masses’, Mao still received and read his Final Proofs and 
was quite aware of what actually occurred at the grass-roots level, while he kept other 
leaders out of the loop (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 79-81).60 Through this inner-
party news, journalists have been able to serve a function of criticism.61 This critique of 
the party’s policies and social conditions has however not been allowed to be viewed by 
the Chinese public. 
Being aware of the dual role of journalists and other media-professionals is very im-
portant in order to understand the functioning of the Chinese media where, for example, 
pre-censorship has been relatively low.62 This has been accomplished through the no-
menclature system, and by making editors and editor-in-chiefs responsible for the ar-
ticles of those below them, and, recently, service providers for online content on their 
servers. This has meant that while journalists have indeed often pushed the boundaries 
of what can be said and published, the editors have at times been more interested in ‘safe’ 
reporting. The dual role has also meant that while the propaganda departments have is-
sued lists of correct phrasings and definitions of political issues that have defined how 
issues are presented to the public, journalists have had greater opportunities to report on 
actual events and problems through the Reference News. 
Chinese reporters have had a dual channel to affect securitisation processes. While 
publishing, they have had opportunities to challenge official lines, or to present ‘hidden 
transcripts’ for wide audiences.63 While writing within the party-system, they have had 
the opportunity to report on situations that officials may have deemed threatening to 
60  Mao even set up an ad hoc intelligence collection service in the spring of 1966 to supplement the established 
inner news, and in August he began receiving Rapid Reports (快报, kuàibào) which at times came out hourly 
for only a handful of the top leaders (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 80-81).
61  The function to report on social conditions to the party is also evident in contemporary online environments. 
In addition to journalists, the special Bureau of Information and Public Opinion under the party’s Publicity 
Department, and the Centre for the Study of public Opinion under the State Council, have been tasked with 
reporting on online developments (Tao 2007). These bureaus that represent both aspects of the party-state, 
have been assigned with the duty to surveil, analyse, and report events and trends on major Internet sites, 
both state-run and commercial, to the Party Central Committee and its Politburo. These offices issue daily and 
weekly reports on current issues in the virtual realm, as well as special reports on major incidents, as they 
emerge. Like the Reference News, these reports keep the leadership aware of developments, which allows quick 
responses when necessary.
The Internet Bureau of the Party’s Publicity Department (former Propaganda Department) and the Internet 
Propaganda Administrative Bureau of the State Council, head the propaganda and media censorship effort for 
Internet-based media (Tao 2007, 4-6). Chinese online media censorship regulations issued by the two bureaus, 
form an evolving and constantly updated body of administrative guidelines (entitled ‘information advisories’) 
and orders on allowed online contents. The basic principle is that all Internet-based media companies require 
licences which allow them to distribute only news already published by official media. No independent news 
gathering or editing is allowed for private media outlets. As for state-run media, it is officially a part of the 
party-state propaganda machine. Information advisories guide online news work by ordering how and which 
news items should be published and which not, which sources to use for news, as well as regulating the life-
spans of on-going online debates. Media companies that do not follow these regulations are punished by fines, 
cancellations of operating licenses and arrests of journalists (Tao 2007).
62  See for example Zhao (1998; 2000) on the role of the effects of marketisation on Chinese media and on the 
dual role of Chinese journalists.
63  The party seems to tolerate hidden transcripts, as long as they remain hidden. People can say what they want 
using English on university campuses for example, but when a foreigner is observing radical views, someone 
will soon informatively whisper in his ear that should those things be said in a tea-house, the speaker’s ‘number 
would be up’ (personal experience 2004). 
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the party or the revolution. In this way, journalists have pushed the boundaries of the 
‘sayable’ in China, yet paradoxically, they have also functioned as ‘watchdogs’ for the cen-
tral authorities, for example, by reporting on infringements by local authorities. Thus, to 
write critical reports on social conditions does not necessarily entail political dissidence; 
even critical and investigative journalists can be loyal to the party and its aims.64
Along with the reforms which have been undertaken in Chinese society since the late 
1970s, its media field too has undergone major transformations. The media has been 
significantly liberalised from the situation in 1978 when it was commonly quipped that 
China had ‘two dailies and one magazine.’65 By 2007, though, there were already 700 
television stations, 8000 magazines and 2000 dailies whose circulation was more than 
100 million. In 2008, China became the largest ‘netizen’ population in the world with 253 
million online users (Internet Usage and Population in Asia, June 30. 2008). The plurality 
of voices in online environments is even greater than those in other types of media, for 
example, at the end of 2008, it has been estimated that there were some 100 million blogs 
and 50 million bloggers (China Daily 6.1.2009). 
However, even though the range and variety of media operators has increased signifi-
cantly, the liberalisation of the media field remains limited as it has mainly focused on 
financial issues, so that this pluralisation of outlets and voices permitted in the Chinese 
media has not meant the complete relinquishment of political control.66 In terms of con-
trol, this pluralisation has brought with it a shift from disciplinary to security practices 
(cf., Foucault 2007), and, in terms of propaganda, an emphasis on ‘thought work’ (思想工
作, sīxiǎng gōngzuò) and ‘agenda setting’ (舆论导, yúlùn dǎoxiàng).  Compared to the Mao-
era though, the party has significantly loosened its grip on the mass media in China. Such 
relinguishment of control has created more space and opportunities for identity ascrip-
tions, and thereby for the contestation of and resistance to securitisation in the context 
of various processes.
64  However, the autonomy of journalists has been very limited or conditional, as Elin Sæther (2008) terms the 
possibilities for critical journalism in China.
65  These were Renmin ribao, Jiefang ribao, and Hongqi.
66  In the mid 1990s the party decided to gradually remove financial support of the media and to liberalise its 
ownership together with the general trend of the times, which forced media outlets to seek funding from the 
market. The shift to an open market has meant that media outlets have had to begin competing for consumers, 
which has had an effect on the content presented in the media. For example, this liberalisation produced a 
great variety of life-style magazines and programs. The party however retained its censorship practices and the 
dual role demanded of journalists. This was achieved through a complex and multi-layered web of ownership, 
rules, regulations and controls. The party and state propaganda and later public relations bureaus, for example, 
constantly issued their instructions on correct formulations of sensitive issues. Similarly, who could write, and 
what could be written about was constantly modulated, too. For example, Xinhua retained the exclusive right to 
publish news that concerned China as a whole.
The careers of journalists were linked to good performance records, which meant that any trouble with censors 
could have ramifications on one’s career. In practice, the party also nominated or at least accepted the nomina-
tions for leading editors in media companies. Further, stories have also been censored after the fact, journalists 
have been imprisoned (e.g., 31 journalists were in prison in 2007), editors dismissed (e.g., in Southern Weekend, 
南方周末, nánfāng zhōumò), and even whole papers closed down (e.g., the World Economic Herald). Indeed, as 
regards the freedom of the press, Reporters without Borders have consistently listed China in the last quarter 
of its listing of 169 states i.e., among states with least freedom of the press.
246
Chapter 7
7.2.5. The People’s Liberation Army as a Functional Actor
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a prime example of how the party exercises con-
trol over the political order and Chinese society as a whole.67 While there is both a state 
Central Military Affairs Commission and a Party Military Affairs Commission, the latter is 
totally dominant.68 The party’s control over the ‘gun’ was an essential aspect of Mao’s po-
litical views. Accordingly, the party and the PLA have developed a symbiotic relationship 
so that political loyalty to the party has at times been considered vastly more important 
than military expertise.69 After the revolution, most leading party figures were veterans 
of the anti-Japanese and civil wars, which fused the party and the military even more 
strongly. This symbiotic relationship is similarly evident in that the PLA has formal quo-
tas of representatives in political organs. The PLA is the final practical guarantor of the 
CCP and, as such, has at times been called in to deal with threats in a ‘brute’ manner. In 
this sense it is a key functional actor in the most severe instances of securitisation in the 
PRC. Major refusal on such occasions by the PLA would quite likely mean the collapse of 
the CCP, or at least of the factions attempting to mobilise the PLA.
The effective political influence of the PLA has varied in Chinese politics. During the 
Cultural Revolution, not all PLA units acquiesced to be ‘seized’ by revolutionary commit-
tees, and even fought with the Red Guards. However, during the worsened split with the 
Soviet Union, the PLA was called in to restore order, which entailed that the PLA effec-
tively took over many state functions. Deng Xiaoping’s policy was to reduce the influence 
of the PLA e.g., to cut back on its opportunities for autonomous economic activities, and 
to make being ‘expert’ more important than being ‘red.’ However, the 1989 securitisation 
process worked against these aims, when Deng had to call in many political favours and 
grant more influence to some leading military figures.70
The effects of 1989 were, however, short lived as the need for a professional and tech-
nologically more capable military became apparent in the way the US has been able to 
conduct itself in military operations since the early 1990s. Jiang Zemin, who was the 
first military leader in China who did not have military experience himself, effectively 
followed Deng’s line as he worked towards the separation of the civilian and military 
 
67  See the 1996 special issue of The China Quarterly (146), especially Joffe (1996) and Swaine (1996) on party-
army relations in China, Lieberthal (2004) on how the PLA is situated within the party and state bureaucratic 
system, Shambaugh (2002) for an extensive study of the PLA modernisation, and Blasko (2006) for a concise 
presentation of the structure, tasks, and capabilities of the PLA.
68  The commission also seems to have a key role in the way leadership transition has been established in 
post-Mao China. In this arrangement, the commission is led by the departing party leader for a period, whilst 
the new premier leader takes hold of the other leading positions in the party and the state. This pattern was set 
by Deng Xiaoping and repeated by Jiang Zemin.
69  Joffe (1996) characterises the party-army relationship with six characteristics at the turn of the millennium, 
viz.: 1) integration at the top, 2) separation at the bottom, 3) modernisation and professionalism of the PLA, 4) 
political control of the PLA by the CCP, 5) command and control of forces by the PLA, and 6) non-interventionism 
by the PLA. It seems that while various politicians have at times used the PLA for their own machinations, which 
may have increased the political clout of the PLA, there does not appear to be a tradition of the PLA inserting 
itself into politics beyond bureaucratic interests of the various branches of the armed forces.
70  The 1989 and 1966 cases show how the PLA has been actively called in to ‘protect the motherland’ against 
domestic enemies. In less ‘exceptional’ situations, the PLA is mostly tasked with protecting China from foreign 
threats. Domestic security is a task for the Ministry of Public Security (公安部, gōng’ānbù) and the Ministry of 
State Security (国家安全部, guójiā ānquán bù).
247
Chapter 7
aspects of governance. He was able to prove his doubters wrong, taking a firm grip on the 
PLA.71 With Hu Jintao, this policy line of professionalisation has continued.
71  See You (2002) on Jiang’s relations with the PLA.
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The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution represents one of the most paradoxical devel-
opments in Chinese politics.1 Even though the Chinese political order of the time con-
formed to a type of totalitarianism, the supreme – and excessively idolised – leader seem-
ingly turned power over to the streets. Mao called on the ‘masses’ to attack the party 
establishment, provoking China into internal conflicts that escalated to the use of force in 
the extent of making civil war a real possibility. Considering the size of China, the number 
of those who suffered during the various mass-campaigns of the Cultural Revolution can 
be counted in the millions. The colourful and extravagant campaigns were also noted 
outside China and inspired political foment around the world in the late 1960s.
The Cultural Revolution has been studied from a variety of perspectives. For example, 
Barbara Barnouin & Yu Changgen (1993) and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008) provide 
comprehensive political histories of the period, while MacFarquhar (1974; 1983; 1997) 
studies the historical developments of China that preceded this period.2 In addition the 
general historical developments of the Cultural Revolution, there have also been historical 
studies that approach it on a micro level. Thurston (1990) is a study of the use of violence 
1  Michael Schoenhals (2002) questions the need for a label of the ’Cultural Revolution’ for a period of Chinese 
politics. He argues that this label portrays either the period 1966-1968 or 1966-1976 as unique and a special 
form of Chinese politics (the 1981 official resolution of party history [Beijing Review 1995c, 63-66] divides 
the Cultural Revolution into three stages, viz. May 1966 to April 1969 [most turbulent period with purges of 
leadership], April 1969 to August 1973 [the Lin Biao affair], and August 1973 to October 1976 [struggle over 
succession]). Schoenhals argues that instead of ‘unique politics’, the era of the Cultural Revolution should be 
seen as just Chinese politics. In accordance, the title of his article [Schoenhals 2002] on this issue was supposed 
to read: “Is the Cultural Revolution really necessary” – and, not ‘was’ [it necessary] into which the editors of the 
volume changed it; email correspondence 2004). This viewpoint is implicitly supported in this study as well: 
the Cultural Revolution should be studied just like any other period of Chinese politics. Here the focus is on the 
developments from late 1965 to late 1966 when the Cultural Revolution and its leadership purges at the highest 
echelons of the party were instigated via securitisation arguments.
As MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 188) note, Mao’s preferences were at times similarly paradoxical, as 
demonstrated by the fact that he seemed to relish upheaval (乱, luàn) and accordingly turned the party inside 
out while criticising bureaucratism and ‘ecclecticism’ during the CR, yet also appreciated the benefits of having 
a properly functioning bureaucracy that could provide him with information and service.
2  There have also been significant publications of Cultural Revolution documents in Chinese e.g., in the Cultural 
Revolution Database, but also as translations e.g., Myers et al. (1986; 1989; 1995a; 1995b), and Schoenhals 
(1991; 1996).
8. Case I: The Beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution
We should guard against an internal revolt, 




during the Cultural Revolution, Han (2000) is an example of studies that concentrate on 
the village level, while Esherick et al. (2006) contains a series of articles with various 
historical perspectives.
Further, the use of language, whether at the level of speech acts or a broader discourse 
and narrative, has also been the focus for studies on the Cultural Revolution. Schoen-
hals (1992), for example, includes chapters on the Cultural Revolution that approach 
Chinese politics via the theory of speech acts. More general views on the operation of 
discourse and narratives are provided by Apter & Saich (1994), who examine revolution-
ary discourse in Mao’s republic in general. Chong (2002) presents studies of the master 
narratives of the Cultural Revolution and various counternarratives that have worked 
against them. Perry & Li (2003) discuss the rude use of language of the Red Guards. Dut-
ton (2005), in his study of policing in Chinese politics, places the Cultural Revolution into 
the wider history of the CCP.
I do not attempt to provide a grand explanation for the Cultural Revolution, or for Chi-
nese Politics in general for that matter,3 but to study the use and function of security argu- 
ments as a ‘technique’ of power and political struggle during these years. The Cultural Rev-
olution has been the most dramatic Chinese expression of state-sponsored efforts to sti- 
mulate and shape confrontational politics – but it was not the last (Perry 2007, 9-10). Thus, 
the political processes labelled under the Cultural Revolution involved a great variety 
of issues, but the focus here will be limited only to security arguments; the Cultural Revo-
lution was not just about security, but a distinct security argument can be detected in the 
early speeches which set the political process underway. This kind of analysis is neces-
sary to understand the function of security arguments in Chinese politics. Although there 
have been many changes, there are also continuities that span both the Mao and the post-
Mao eras of Chinese politics. These should not be underestimated (cf., Perry 2007, 9).
The case study on the Cultural Revolution begins my investigation of how specific but 
grand scale or ‘spectacular’ security issues have been constituted in the political sector of 
security in the PRC. Of interest here is what ‘security’ meant for the CCP in the late 1960s, 
how ‘security’ was used politically, and what the socio-political context was like in the 
moves studied here.
8.1. The Historical and Socio-Political Context of the Beginning of 
        the Cultural Revolution
There have been many interpretations of the reasons for the so -called Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution.4 As Michael Schoenhals (1996, 3) has noted however, one searches 
3  As has already been noted, Michael Dutton (2005), for example, explains the entirety of Chinese revolutionary 
politics (1926-1976) with the friend-enemy dyad of Carl Schmitt (1996). For Dutton, the Cultural Revolution 
was a manifestation of the political, which ended with this period of Chinese politics; Dutton argues that the 
reform era no longer contains the political in terms of defining internal enemies. I however contend that this 
totalising method to interpret Chinese politics is perhaps not the most appropriate: if one follows Schmitt’s 
metaphysics of the political, arguably the political will remain the political, regardless of the tactics and means 
of leadership struggles? Instead, looking at both the Mao-era and the political eras following it through the same 
analytical framework (e.g., the theory of securitisation) will enable the assessment of whether there has been 
significant change in terms of the constitution of internal political ‘enemies’ or ‘threats’, without subscribtion to 
an apriori metaphysical theory of the political.
4  Some view the Cultural Revolution as a power struggle between Mao and the other leading members of the 
party while others emphasise the ideological differences between the factions. See for example MacFarquhar 
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in vain for a blueprint or a distinct manifesto that would explain the need for this Revolu-
tion. Contemporary explanations from leading politicians can be found scattered around 
speeches, editorials and inner documents of the party.5 Barnouin & Yu (1993, 175, 199) 
find that the most systematic presentations for the necessity, purpose and achievements 
of the Cultural Revolution, can be found in Lin Biao’s speeches.6 
Beyond the various contemporary political speeches that outlined motivations and 
necessities for the Revolution, scholars have found (distinct) ideological and political 
motivations that underlined its launch.7 Firstly, in the late 1950s Mao’s ideological think-
ing became more radical (Barnouin & Yu 1993, vii-viii, 2). For Mao, even the success of 
the revolution did not guarantee that there would not be any ideological differences or 
conflicts in China (e.g., Mao 1957); ideological differences could only be solved through 
class struggle, which became one of the main slogans for the period (e.g., The Polemic 
1965). Furthermore, Mao seemed to prefer to retain the ‘creative moment’, and resist the 
sluggishness and revisionist tendencies of bureaucracy through the means of a continu-
ous revolution. Together with the polemics with the Soviet Union8 these lines of thought 
resulted in a belief that not only Chinese society, but the party itself was vulnerable to 
revisionism. Consequently, Mao continued to subject the party to various rectification 
campaigns right up to his demise. 
Like the Polemics, the beginning of the CR is closely connected with developments 
in the Soviet Union which had severe effects on Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev’s re-
pudiation of Stalinism9 put the veneration of Stalin, and by extension, of Mao too, into 
question. Furthermore, Khrushchev’s views on how the relations between the two blocs 
of the Cold War should be engaged played an important role here:10 peaceful transition to 
socialism and the dissenting view of Lenin’s peaceful coexistence did not fit Mao’s views 
(1974; 1983), MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008), Dittmer (1974), Schrecker (1991), and Dietrich (1998).
5  For example, as the turmoil on the streets was coming to an end and shifted to the period of greatest state 
terror that was expanded beyond the party apparatus to uncover undesirables inside and outside the party, Mao 
legitimised the Cultural Revolution at the 12th Plenum of the Eight Party Congress in October 1968 thus: “the 
current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was absolutely necessary and most timely for the consolidation of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the prevention of capitalist restoration and the building of socialism” (quoted in 
Barnouin & Yu 1993, 172). While the analysis here is focused on the launch of the CR, this speech demonstrates 
how a post-hoc security argument to justify the CR was maintained throughout its duration.
6  The most systematic is Lin Biao’s six-hour report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, in which he outlined 
the history of the CR and argued for two reasons to continue the CR: 1) the socialist revolution had not yet been 
‘carried out to the end’ nor had class struggle ceased in the ideological and political fields, and 2) the revolution 
still had a ‘thousand and one’ tasks to fulfil, including mass criticism, repudiation, purification of class ranks and 
consolidation of the party organisation (Lin 1989).
7  See MacFarquhar (1974; 1983; 1997) for historical studies of the background developments that preceded 
the Cultural Revolution.
8  These exchanges are collected in The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement 
(1965).
9  E.g., “On the pretext of ‘combating the personality cult’, Khruschev has defamed the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat and the socialist system and thus in fact paved the way for the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. 
In completely negating Stalin, he has in fact negated Marxism-Leninism which was upheld by Stalin and opened the 
floodgates for the revisionist deluge.” (The Polemic 1965, 439.)
10  E.g., “Under the signpost ‘peaceful coexistence’, Krushchev has been colluding with US. imperialism, wreck-
ing the socialist camp and the international communist movement, opposing the revolutionary struggles of the 
oppressed peoples and nations, practicing great-power chauvinism and national egoism and betraying proletarian 
internationalism.” (The Polemic 1965, 440.)
The continuation of Khrushchev’s ‘line’ even after he was deposed by coup, gave even more reasons for Mao to 
be alarmed, for he might also share Khrushchev’s fate.
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of the world.11 Such dissenting views, combined with Mao’s radical thinking led to the 
‘polemics’ between the two Communist Parties. The most important example of those 
here is the ninth polemic ‘On Khrushchev’s Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for 
the World’ (The Polemic 1965, 415-480) that established a major foundation to justify 
the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 7). Importantly, it already 
included a security argument in the form of a “black vision of a possible liquidation of 
Communism” (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 12),12 which would be used to legitimise 
the coming Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the polemic identified a great danger for Com-
munism: “[Class struggle] is a protracted, repeated, torturous and complex struggle. […] 
It is a struggle that decides the fate of a socialist society.” (The Polemic 1965, 423.) “His-
tory furnishes a number of examples in which proletarian rule suffered defeat as a result of 
armed suppression by the bourgeoisie [e.g., the Paris Commune and the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic]. In contemporary times [i.e., the Hungarian 1956 uprising], the rule of the prole-
tariat was almost overthrown.” (Ibid., 468.) “In short, it [i.e., whether the CCP and the PRC 
will remain in the hands of proletarian revolutionaries and whether they will continue 
to march along the correct road of Marxism-Leninism, and whether the emergence of 
Khrushchev’s revisionism will be prevented] is an extremely important question, a matter 
of life and death for our Party and our country.” (Ibid., 478.) 
As if in accordance with the ‘grammar of securitisation’, the argument of the ninth 
polemic was that the downfall of socialism was not inevitable nor insoluble: “the resto-
ration of capitalism in the socialist countries and their degeneration into capitalist coun-
tries are certainly not unavoidable” (The Polemic 1965, 470). The polemic also provided a 
‘way out’ of this perilous situation in the form of Mao Zedong’s fifteen theories and poli-
cies (ibid., 471-479).13 The threat discourse legitimised Mao’s policies which otherwise 
11  See Feng (2005) on Mao’s ‘operational code’ and ‘worldviews.’
12  “As long as imperialism exists, the proletariat in the socialist countries will have to struggle both against the 
bourgeoisie at home and against international imperialism. Imperialism will seize every opportunity and try to 
undertake armed intervention against the socialist countries or to bring about their peaceful disintegration. It will 
do its utmost to destroy the socialist countries or to make them degenerate into capitalist countries. The interna-
tional class struggle will inevitably find its reflection within the socialist countries.” (The Polemic 1965, 422-423.) 
In addition to the history of purges within the party, these kinds of statements based on Lenin’s theories would 
provide the necessary resonance for the manner in which the securitisation of specific party representatives 
would develop from 1966 onwards. 
13  When examined from a distance from the tactics of Mao’s politics, the threat of Soviet revisionism was part 
of the wider macrosecuritisation patterns of the Cold War. John Foster Dulles had proposed the doctrine of 
‘peaceful evolution’ as the most appropriate means to effect regime change in Communist states for the United 
States. “Kruschev’s revisionism entirely caters to the policy of ‘peaceful evolution’ which US. imperialism is pursu-
ing with regard to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries” (The Polemic 1965, 466). However, China was 
against this principle from the outset, just as Mao was against Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the US. 
‘Peaceful evolution’ (和平演变, hépíng yǎnbiàn) has remained a major concern and a threatening subject even in 
post-Mao China. This becomes evident, for example, in Deng’s (1993e) speech in 1989: “The West really wants 
unrest in China. It wants turmoil not only in China but also in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The United 
States and some other Western countries are trying to bring about a peaceful evolution towards capitalism in 
socialist countries. The United States has coined an expression: waging a world war without gun smoke. We should 
be on guard against this. Capitalists want to defeat socialists in the long run. In the past they used weapons, atomic 
bombs and hydrogen bombs, but they were opposed by the peoples of the world. So now they are trying peaceful 
evolution. The affairs of other countries are not our business, but we have to look after our own. China will get 
nowhere if it does not build and uphold socialism. Without leadership by the Communist Party, without socialism 
and without the policies of reform and opening to the outside world, the country would be doomed. Without them, 
how could China have gotten where it is today?” In this avenue of thought, the PRC could not be allowed to 
succumb in the way the Soviet Union had fallen apart in the 1990s.
252
Chapter 8
mainly concerned domestic issues. Indeed, Mao apparently retained a perception of a 
constant danger of capitalist restoration that even approached a form of paranoia: the 
purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to ‘combat and prevent revisionism’ (反修防修, 
fǎn xiū fáng xiū) i.e., the prime objective of the CR was to expose and eliminate enemies 
within the party (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 22-23).
However, the problems with the Soviet Union, whilst perhaps contributing to Mao’s 
motivations, were not the only motivations to launch the CR. Firstly, it would seem that 
Mao wanted to retain the ‘creative moment’, and continue the revolution and the estab-
lishment of new ‘Ordnungs’ (cf., Schmitt 1996).14 A second factor that has been viewed as 
a contribution to the launch of the CR was the cult of personality developed to idolise Mao 
(Barnouin & Yu 1993, vii-viii).15 The increased idolisation of Mao strengthened the third 
factor that played into the CR: Mao had become increasingly alienated from other party 
leaders (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 83). Beyond the initiation of the CR, there are also factors 
that have been viewed as contributing to its duration. These include the authority Mao 
was able to wield without question as well as the tradition of struggle of the CCP which 
cadres easily fell back on:16 “normal differences among comrades inside the party came 
to be regarded as manifestations of the revisionist line or of the struggle between the two 
lines” (Beijing Review 1995c [1981], 69).
Whichever the ‘real’ motivations of Mao may have been, the Cultural Revolution was 
a means to deal with even the highest level of party cadres. Such means to manage the 
party leadership increased the factional divisions and competition, making them one of 
the characteristic features of the period.17 The struggles between radical and conserva-
tive factions that pledged their loyalty to the Chairman shook the political order to its 
core and roots. While ideology was ostensibly what the CR was about, in effect, it played 
little part in the factional struggles at the top or at the root of factional divisions.18 What 
Mao’s ‘real’ motives were is not of interest here, nor do I claim to present an explanation 
14  Nevanlinna (2002, 116) emphasises that the state is merely a façade for the non-totalitarian world; totalitar-
ian rule almost necessitates that the structures of the state do not solidify. In a letter to Jiang Qing dated July 
8 1966, Mao expressed that he desired to create ‘great disorder under heaven’ in order to achieve ‘great order 
under heaven’, and which would be achieved by extraordinary means (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 52).
15  This cult of Mao was a means for Lin Biao to eventually rise to the position of heir apparent. Lin’s rise began 
in 1960 when Mao seemed to approve of Lin’s adulation of Mao in the military. In 1964 this success led to 
the editing of the ‘little red book’ which contained quotes from Mao. However, by the turn of the 1970s Lin’s 
line of excessive idolisation no longer worked, and his number seemed to be up, which may have contributed 
to the ‘Lin Biao Affair’ i.e., his attempted coup and defection (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 199-246; MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 324-336).
16  See Dutton (2005) for a history of purges of inner enemies within the party.
17  The main division line between ‘conservatives’ and ‘radicals’ on the issue of the Cultural Revolution was 
over whether it should be an orderly mass campaign, or a revolt against the party establishment. Mao seemed 
to need the support of the radicals and the ‘masses’, as most veteran cadres were against the destruction of the 
party establishment (and thus their systems of support) and the promotion of anarchism.
18  When Mao was recalling the ‘all-round civil war’ which the Cultural Revolution had escalated into by the 
autumn of 1967, he commented to Edgar Snow on the factionalism of the time: “everywhere people were fight-
ing, dividing into two factions; there were two factions in every factory, every school, in every province, in every 
county; every ministry was like that, the Foreign Ministry was split into two factions […] the Foreign Ministry was 
in chaos […] In July and August 1967, nothing could be done; there was massive upheaval throughout the country.” 
(Quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 199.) For Dutton (2005) this was a quintessential example of the 
Schmittian friend-enemy dyad; the question was: who was the enemy to be suppressed. The inspiration for the 
friend-enemy distinction more likely emanated from Lenin’s Kossack dictum of Kto, Kogo (кто кого?), or ‘Who, 
whom?’ (i.e., ‘who will prevail over whom’) (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 201). 
See Barnouin & Yu (1998) for a study of the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of the PRC.
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for why he elected to pursue the line of politics he did. Instead, what is analysed in this 
chapter are his tactics in the pursuit of his politics, and especially how securitisation dis-
courses played a part in these tactics.
8.2. The Tactics of Political Singularisation and the Legitimisation 
         of Rule-Breaking
As already noted, the Cultural Revolution has been interpreted both as a line struggle 
within the party and as a means to purge and reset its top leadership. While Mao’s social 
and political authority was essential to launch and maintain the process, he was not its 
sole architect. The Leftist faction that came to dominate the Cultural Revolution Group 
tried to steer the movement in various directions. Even this faction, however, was not 
united, but at times divided between Lin Biao’s faction and Jiang Qing’s radical faction. 
While these groups used various tactics in their struggles to gain Mao’s favour, and thus 
an improved standing in the party hierarchies, of relevance here are security arguments 
in these power-plays, and the identity frames that were used in them.
The party and even the People’s Republic had already witnessed several ‘line strug-
gles’ and purges or ‘rectifications’ (see e.g., Dutton 2005).19 To label someone a leader of 
an erroneous line, or even the head of hidden ‘headquarters’, was a pre-existant practice 
within the party. Such tactics involved a security logic: those who were unwilling to abide 
by the Leninist principles of centralist democracy constituted a threat to the party.20 In 
terms of securitisation theory, there was a set of ‘master signifiers’ that had been ‘institu-
tionally securitised’ in the previous purges the party had been through. Names and labels 
given to ourselves and others matter a great deal as they articulate people’s relations to 
others (Koselleck 2004b, 155-157).  The use of such master signifiers is an example of 
how ‘asymmetric’ classifications are used in Chinese politics. The use of concepts like ‘er-
roneous lines’ excludes certain groups from the core of the party and thus, concomitantly, 
creates a unity within it. This serves the purpose of ‘political and social singularisation’ 
(ibid., 156).
A prime example of such tactics is the singling out of Peng Zhen, a leading figure in the 
party and a political opponent of Mao. With the help of Jiang Qing, Mao would seem to 
have set an elaborate trap for Peng, who remained unaware until it was too late.21 Of con-
19  Mao termed the purge of Peng Dehuai as the eight line struggle, of Liu Shaoqi as the ninth, and the struggle 
against Lin Biao as one between ‘two headquarters’ and the tenth line struggle. Jiang Qing’s attempt to label 
Zhou Enlai as the instigator of an 11th line struggle in the mid 1970s was unsuccessful, even though the pi-Lin 
pi-Kong (批林批孔, pī-Lín pī-Kǒng) campaign (criticise Lin Biao and Confucius) of 1974 received the addition 
of pi Zhou Gong (批周公, pī-Zhōu Gōng), which alluded to Zhou Enlai. 
20  It is important to note that the purges of Yang Shangkun and Luo Ruiqing that were at the hinge of the launch 
of the Cultural Revolution were not based on a security argument. Yang was formally dismissed (without any 
evidence presented) on charges of bugging Mao’s quarters, leaking party secrets, committing serious errors, and 
maintaining ‘extremely suspicious links’ with Luo Ruiqing, the PLA chief of staff (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 
2008, 36-37). In the desecuritisation of the ‘enemies’ of the CR, all of the charges against Yang were declared 
to be political frame-ups. Luo was purged on the grounds of not ‘putting prominence to politics’ as well as his 
‘reluctance to report to Lin Biao on a regular basis’ (ibid., 19-23). Mao however equated the ‘eclecticism’, or 
putting similar emphasis on political and professional matters, that Luo was charged with, with revisionism as 
eclecticism did not follow the enemy-friend dyad. For Mao, “revisionism is not wanting struggle, and not wanting 
revolution” (quoted in ibid., 24). Luo’s subsequent attempted suicide functioned as clear evidence of his resist-
ance to the party (ibid., 27).
21  This trap was set by publishing a critique (Yao 1986) of Wu Han’s play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office (Wu 
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sequence for this study is that the use of the grammar of securitisation was the final stage 
in this tactic to purge Peng and the others (i.e., Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, Yang Shangkun and 
his wife); to label them as security threats was a move that placed their fate unreservedly 
in the hands of Mao. Further, the tactic also provided a simple legitimisation narrative for 
the general public: sudden changes in the consolidated party leadership need not be in-
terpreted as a sign of factional power-plays, but rather as a necessity for national security 
and the survival of the revolution. The unity of the party would be maintained, and the 
singling out of forces within, but in league against it, served precisely this function.
In such processes of singularisation, exclusive claims at generality are made through 
self-definition, including identity imputations and frames. These effect counterconcepts, 
which discriminate against the ‘excluded’ (Koselleck 2004b, 156). Thereby the excluded 
are imbued with negative identities. The People’s Republic had seen a plethora of vari-
ous rectification movements that purged the party of ‘Rightists’ and other ‘reactionar-
ies’, and furthered the struggle against ’class enemies.’22 Such labels functioned to deny 
the reciprocity of mutual recognition, by which the Cultural Revolution would appear to 
have been just another rectification campaign. However, it went further than any previ-
ous campaigns and ‘broke the rules’ that had otherwise guided the People’s Republic 
since its inception.
Overall, the Cultural Revolution appeared as a means to combat dangerous threats, 
whether they appeared in the form of counter-revolutionaries and spies or insects, mice 
and sparrows, all of which required violent combat in order to achieve victory and the 
consolidation of the continuous revolution. Thus, political enemies were designated as 
‘evil demons and tigers’,23 which is a modus operandi that has been transported from 
the imperial into the PRC-era in, if not explicit forms after Mao’s times, at least its op-
1986) without the authorisation of the Propaganda Department; the trap was set in a way that Peng would get 
into trouble either by neglect of the article or by it’s endorsement (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 17). To 
protect Wu (and himself), Peng did not allow the central publication of the article. However, Lin Biao authorised 
its publication in the Liberation Army Daily, which labelled the play as “an anti-party, anti-socialist and anti-Mao 
Zedong Thought poisonous weed which should be criticised” (quoted in Barnouin & Yu 1993, 56). Peng’s reaction 
was to authorise the ‘February Outline Report’ (中共中央 1966a), which he interpreted as approved by Mao. 
However, when Peng eventually realised that Mao had been behind the whole affair, it was already too late: 
Peng’s fate had been sealed all along. Already in April 1966, Mao had declared the Outline to be a “reversal of the 
relations between the enemy and ourselves, putting one into the position of the other” (quoted in Barnouin & Yu 
1993, 61). From that time onwards, there would be no academic or artistic issues that could be separate from 
politics; both were considered concerned with class struggle.
The way Mao dealt with Peng Zhen, later the ‘February Adverse Current’ in 1967, and eventually with Lin Biao 
at Lushan in 1970, brings to mind the tactical ploy or stratagem recommended by Chinese strategic classic Tai 
Gong (Nojonen 2008, 173): “Offer your opponent the things he likes, and abide by his will. Thus you increase his 
arrogance, and he will inevitably develop habits that he likes. This way you can direct his actions, and you will 
gain opportunities to do away with him.” 
22  These include the Anti Corruption Campaign 1951-1952 (三反, sānfǎn), the New Anti Corruption Campaign 
1953 (新三反运动, xīn sānfǎn yùndòng), the campaign to oppose corruption, speculation, waste, fragmentism 
and bureaucracy 1953 (五反运动, wǔfǎn yùndòng), the Rectification Campaign 1954 (干部整风运动, gànbù 
zhěngfēng yùndòng), the anti-corruption campaign among tax-collectors 1955 (税务部门反贪污运动, shuìwù 
bùmén tānwū  yùndòng), another Rectification Campaign 1957 (整风运动, zhěngfēng yùndòng), and the Anti-
Rightist movement 1957 (反右派运动, fǎnyòupài yùndòng). In fact, the Cultural Revolution was preceded by an 
anti-corruption campaign almost every year. (Han 2000, 14.)
23  Tigers were understood as animals with a close connection to demons in traditional Chinese folk-beliefs 




erational logic (ter Haar 1997; 2002). This ‘demonological paradigm’ has been used in 
China to form a dyad of an ‘us’ (天下, tiānxià; all under heaven) and an inhuman ‘them’ 
(妖怪, yāoguài; demons) that has legitimised most severe violent acts (ter Haar 2002, 
36, 47).24 During the Cultural Revolution, the youth, in the form of the Red Guards, were 
to be the ones to carry out violent struggle against the threats that endangered China 
(Thurston 1990). In this way, the CCP utilised identity frames with cultural resonance 
at the local level in order to make its national level discourse more effective. As Barend 
ter Haar (2002, 56-57), in terms very close to the grammar of securitisation, notes: “This 
discourse [the demonological paradigm] helped create an other that could be dealt with 
aggressively outside the customary channels for solving political conflicts, which were 
perceived as too gradual.” Indeed, after Mao’s call to “bombard the headquarters” (毛泽
东),25 many peasants used the opportunity to ‘settle old scores’ with local administrators 
(see for example Han 2000).
The CCP has claimed to be against all forms of anti-scientific superstitions, inclusive 
of many anti-demonic practices prevalent in Chinese folk-beliefs. Yet, the party has not 
been adverse to the option to label some individuals or social groups as ‘bad elements’ 
for removal from society, and even elimination by means of drastic violence (Haar 2002, 
54).26 As evidenced by the frequency of purges within the CCP and in Chinese society 
in general (see for example Dutton 2005), the practice of ‘demonising’ individuals has 
not vanished: ‘demons’ were replaced with ‘struggle’ and ‘counter-revolution’ (ter Haar 
2002, 54). Indeed, during the Mao era, which frequently utilised the grammatical rela-
tionships of the demonological paradigm, counter-revolution was a violent threat that 
had to be responded to with equal counterviolence. Even though the threat was different 
to that of the imperial era, violence remained the means with which to deal with it i.e., the 
means to exorcise the ‘evil.’27 The actual referent of the threat that China faced was left 
24  For example, from 1850 onwards the Taipings referred to both external conflict and internal strife in 
demonic terms; the Taipings were the divine army needed to combat demons, while individuals who ranged 
from local opponents to the Manchus were represented as demons (Haar 2002, 47; see also Haar 1997). While 
Chinese sectarian scriptures often portray apocalyptic destruction as a cosmic event principally carried out by 
spirits and demons, some sectarians, like the Taipings, have felt compelled to commit violent acts to expedite 
the arrival of the millennium (Shek 1990, 103). Not all Chinese sectarian groups have rebelled or become 
violent. Similarly, not all millenarian religious groups have used violence (Rinehart 2006, 26). Yet, the urgent 
and immediate eschatology of sectarian groups makes their potential for subversion greater than orthodox 
forms of religion (ibid., 108).
25  Mao scribbled his own ’big character poster’ (毛泽东 1966) on an old issue of Beijing Daily at the August 
1966 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee which witnessed the largest leadership change in 20 years at 
the top of the party (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008). The crux of Mao’s poster was the identification of the 
‘bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu Shaoqi.’ Mao’s ‘poster’ was circulated at the Plenum, and published 
nationally a year later when Liu’s purge was already public knowledge (People’s Daily August 5 1967).
26  Cf., Schmitt’s (1996) concept of hostis: all systems retain the possibility to decide upon inner enemies.
27  This demonological paradigm may also explain Mao’s use of quasi-religious language like ‘ox-monsters’, 
‘snake-demons’, ‘evil spirits’, and ‘poisonous weeds’ in his political rhetoric, and practices like ‘loyalty dances’ 
that were prevalent in Maoist politics (Perry & Selden 2003b). Such concepts and practices have long traditions. 
Awareness of demonic folklore was widespread and provided cultural resonance for the steering popular tradi-
tions into support for the CCP.
For example, the ox-demon (牛鬼, niúguǐ) which appears in many folk tales, was used to dehumanise people; 
in the CCP’s usage it labelled its targets as being a threat to society as well as backward, in a time when there 
was a call to “smash the old and build the new” (Haar 2002, 56). Public morality has been connected to notions 
of security on the level of individuals or smaller segments of society in China: the deceased were believed 
to become avengeful ghosts or forces of protection, depending on the behaviour of individuals and groups in 
respect of correct morality (Radtke 2008, 204).
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open, which allowed its convenient use in various situations.28
Indeed, the logic and legitimisation of the CR suggested that the struggle of the pro-
gressives had not ended with the victory in the civil war and the consolidation of the 
CCP; it was to continue with violent means for the sake of the revolution, and eventually 
Mao Zedong.29 Thereafter, the securitisation of various top-party representatives allowed 
and facilitated their legitimate removal from the leadership and their securitisation then 
served the factional struggle and inner-party politics of the time. In general, the security 
aspect of the Cultural Revolution served to construct an enemy within society and the 
legitimisation of a greater degree of violence against this enemy than would have other-
wise been normally permissable.
Beyond the use of violence, the securitising arguments legitimised further ‘breaking of 
rules’. In early 1966, the Communist Party had total control of Chinese politics and socie-
ty. Yet, counter to this objective and practice, the Cultural Revolution allowed unmediated 
attacks on party officials and institutions. Mao seemingly ceded power to the ‘streets’ 
with his policy of ‘seizure of power’, until the crackdown on the Red Guard movement in 
1968.30 These practices and the mass campaigns of terror directed to expose revisionists 
Political legitimacy in some other Asian societies also depends on the exercise of political power in ways 
that resonate with religious notions of righteousness and world order, for example in Cambodia (Kent 2006, 
350-351).
28  Recall Murray Edelman’s (1972) argument of the obscurity of threats as a useful political tool.
29  Anne Thurston (1990) has analysed the use of violence during the Cultural Revolution from three levels: 1) 
a permissive level that contained the long-term, underlying factors that make the use of violence possible, 2) 
the proximate level, i.e., those social and ideological conditions that foster and legitimise violence, and 3) the 
immediate conditions that lead individuals to act violently. The focus of securitisation theory and this analysis 
has been at the second level.
30  For example, the big character poster that criticised the university authorities at Beida University of 
sabotage against the Cultural Revolution could have been deemed as a political crime in 1966. Before this 
apparently unmediated attack, criticism of authorities had always been organised and initiated by the authori-
ties themselves. Mao nonetheless hailed this as the “first Marxist-Leninist big character poster” (Mao 1966). The 
handling of the Beida incident by sending ‘work teams’ as a standard operating procedure to deal with the issue, 
was to be one of the undoings of Liu Shaoqi in 1967; despite the prior purge of Peng Zhen and the others, Liu 
Shaoqi did not seem to perceive the Cultural Revolution as a new kind of mass campaign, or even as a threat to 
himself. In endorsing the formulations of the ‘May 16 Circular’ (中发 267), he did not recognise himself as ‘one 
of the representatives of the bourgeois who had sneaked into the party.’ Nor did Liu try to adhere to his decision 
to send in the work teams to deal with the Beida incident, when Mao declared this to be the wrong line of action. 
See MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 63-65) on the issue of work teams.
The power seizure policy of 1967 revealed that Mao had a design for an entirely new state machine (Barnouin 
& Yu 1993, 108-109); it seems that Mao’s plan was to replace the old state organs of power with ‘revolutionary 
committees’ based on ‘great alliances of all revolutionary organisations’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
239). The youth of China had been brought up in a culture of violence (see Thurston 1990); as MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals (2008, 131) note, the destruction the Red Guards was allowed to wreak went against the normally 
controlled and calibrated political violence of the party. Massive unrest seems to have been Mao’s goal, as he 
toasted “to the unfolding of nationwide all-round civil war” on his 73th birthday in December 1966 (quoted in 
ibid., 155). In the end, most power seizures failed, and the military increased its influence, for example, in the 
form of the militarisation of ministries; even the ‘revolutionary committees’ retained the distinction between 
the revolutionary masses and the party vanguard (ibid., 160, 170-171, 240). The ‘new political system’ Mao had 
envisaged turned out to be a modification of the old, mainly manned by officers of the PLA (ibid., 247).
The PLA played a dual role during the CR: on the one hand it had the responsibility to maintain order, while on 
the other it played a crucial role in the power seizures. Some segments of government (e.g., ministries of public 
security and the national media) were off limits for the Red Guards; rectification movements within the PLA 
were also at times restricted, especially in units close to border regions. The PLA was, however, not consistent 
in how it played along with the power seizures, which succeeded in some places while failed in others (some 
PLA units fought with Red Guards, even before they were called to ‘restore order’). The Cultural Revolution 
Group tried to use the power seizures to gain a power-base in the PLA, but this was not completely successful; 
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of one sort or another put into question the whole basis of the political order. Indeed, it 
would seem that Mao desired to replace the whole system with personal leadership.
Mao was the self-evident hero of the revolution, but replacement of the collective 
leadership was a drastic measure. Since the Long March, the apex of CCP leadership had 
remained relatively stable with leadership changes of only secondary importance. The 
seventh Party Congress in 1945 had established the basic patterns of power structures 
within the party that lasted for some two decades until the CR was instigated.31 In the 
mid 1950s, the revolution seemed consolidated enough to allow the party to focus on 
more practical matters.32 In 1958 Mao had defined his own role in the party as retire-
ment to the ‘second front’ of principal leadership and handing over to Liu Shaoqi and 
other leading cadres the day-to-day operations of the party and the state. However, in the 
early 1960s, it seems that Mao chose to break with this set pattern (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 
25); the targets of the purges concluded as part of the CR clearly went beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ of previous rectification campaigns (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 41).33 By 
August 1966, with the CR as his tool, Mao was able to replace the agreed-upon method 
many provincial commanders still preferred to maintain ‘law-and-order.’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
174-183.) In terms of securitisation theory, the PLA was an important functional actor on the level of practice 
in this process of securitisation and the politics that followed.
31  Mao was elected as the Chairman of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the secretariat, which included 
Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ren Bishi. After the foundation of the PRC, Mao became the head of state 
with Liu Shaoqi as his deputy and Zhou Enlai as the third in the state hierarchy. This structure remained fairly 
stable until the CR. Indeed, Mao remarked to British Field Marshal Montgomery in 1961 that Liu’s position as 
his successor had been firmly established since the seventh Party Congress (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 37).
32  In September 1956, the Eighth Party Congress had declared that the socialist system had been essen-
tially established: “contradictions among the proletariat and the bourgeoisie have been basically solved” (Central 
Research Department of History 1986, 277), even though there still remained some remnants of the old system: 
“the major contradiction still existing in China was between the advanced socialist system and the backward 
production forces in society.” (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 3.) Mao (1957) began his 1957 speech on the correct 
handling of contradictions among the people by emphasising that “never before has our country been as united 
as it is today. […] The days of national disunity and chaos which the people detested are gone, never to return.”
In this situation, the task for the party was the development of production and industrialisation, not the hunting 
down of class enemies or revisionists. In this spirit of normalisation, even the reference to Mao Zedong thought 
was removed from the party constitution by Deng Xiaoping (only to be reinserted again in the constitution at 
the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 [The Constitution 1986]).
By the start of the anti-Rightist campaign, at the latest, Mao had, however, changed his view on this issue (see 
Dutton 2005, 189-191). In 1959 he used language that would become characteristic of the Cultural Revolution: 
“The struggle at the Lushan conference is a class struggle, a continuation of the life and death struggle between the 
two major antagonistic classes – the bourgeois and the proletarian classes.” (Quoted in Barnouin & Yu 1993, 10.) 
The implications of this line of thought would become evident in the latter half of the 1960s.
33  MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 46-47) note how many party cadres found the accusation against Peng, 
Luo, Lu and Yang of being anti-party, hard to believe (in addition to providing many examples of how leading 
cadres did not see the CR going beyond the anti-Rightist Movement e.g., ibid., 58, 72-73). Liu Shaoqi among 
others explained away this apparent contradiction by presenting revisionists as hiding under the banner of the 
party. The issue of such revisionism sneaking into the party was an issue of class struggle that was ‘independ-
ent of man’s will.’ This line of argumentation was already evident in the polemics with the Soviet Union: “The 
class struggle in socialist society is inevitably reflected in the Communist Party. The bourgeoisie and international 
imperialism both understand that in order to make a socialist country to degenerate into a capitalist country, it 
is first necessary to make the Communist Party degenerate into a revisionist party. The old and new bourgeois 
elements […] constitute the social basis of revisionism, and they use every possible means to find agents within 
the Communist Party.” (The Polemic 1965, 423-424.) In practice however, it was only with Mao’s authority 
that revisionists could be uncovered; only Mao could ‘decide’ who the revisionists at the top of the party were 
(MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 48). While the other leaders who were purged as revisionists came under 
Mao’s fire unsuspectedly, it seems that only Lin Biao was proactive in becoming a target of campaigning by 
planning Mao’s assassination and trying to defect.
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of rule, the collective leadership with himself.34 In February 1967 the Central Committee 
ceased to function and was de facto replaced by the Cultural Revolution Group.35
While Mao was in a position of unquestionable power even as the CR was launched, he 
none the less operated with security arguments to purge the top leadership. It would ap-
pear that such purges, without special justification, would have been viewed as an abuse 
of power, even in Mao’s case. This may be one practical function for the use of ‘singularis-
ing’ identities and concepts i.e., for the securitisation of several top leaders of the party 
as counter-revolutionaries.
8.3. The Securitisation Process
The opening salvoes of the Cultural Revolution burst into the cultural sphere when Mao 
began to criticise the opera Hai Rui Dismissed from Office (Wu 1986),36 and Yang Shang-
kun was dismissed from his post in 1965. The ‘Five Man Group in Charge of the Cultural 
Revolution’ was against the interpretation of the play in a political way and proposed in 
the so called ‘February Outline’ (中共中央 1966a) that it should be treated as an ‘aca-
demic issue’. The targeting blasts from Mao in late 1965 were followed with more ex-
plicit and ferocious attacks in May 1966, when the Central Committee decided to revoke 
the ‘Outline Report on Current Academic Discussions made by the Five-member Cultural 
Revolution Group’, to dissolve the ‘Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution’ and 
its offices, and to set up a new Cultural Revolution Group directly under the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau (中发 267).37 
34  The August 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee raised Lin Biao to second rank within the party, expelled 
Liu Shaoqi from the party, and at the same time terminated the division between the first and the second ‘front’ 
of the party.
The police and security forces were also forced to ‘break the rules’ with regard to the activities of the Red 
Guards, which in effect resulted in the collapse of the entire public security system (Dutton 2005, 220-221). 
Instead of the defence of the party, the referent object had shifted to Mao and Lin Biao by January 1967 (ibid., 
224).
35  In line with the exceptionality of the CR, after the 11th plenum Zhou Enlai chaired meetings of the Central 
Caucus Revolution Group (中央碰头会议, zhōngyāng pèngtóuhuìyì; CCRG) which was an administrative body 
that had no mention in the party constitution (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 99). The CCRG formally rose 
above the State Council at the Twelfth Plenum of 1968 (ibid., 279).
While the CCRG worked together with Lin Biao to produce and maintain the securitisation discourse in the early 
years of the Cultural Revolution, in terms of securitisation theory, this leadership group was ‘creating space’ for 
the Central Case Examination Group, which worked as the practical tool to foment violence against the targets 
specified in the general securitisation of ‘revisionists’ and ‘counter-revolutionaries.’ Established in 1966 as an 
ad-hoc committee to investigate the cases of Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang, the Group was abolished by the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, after it had prepared the cases of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao 
Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, in 1978. See Schoenhals (1996, 93-94) and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 
281-284) on how this organ with a permanent staff of thousands, worked in practice.
36  Political satire was in vogue in the early 1960s China. Those in the literary field could use the metaphorical 
language of satire to criticise Mao and the party leadership. Mao also recognised the use of satirical novels 
and plays as ‘anti-party’ weapons. (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 16-22.) Ironically, Mao at first seemed to endorse 
the history of Hai Rui in 1959-1962, and as a result, Wu Han’s play was published in 1961 (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 15). It was only after Jiang Qing’s repeated efforts and as the political environment shifted 
that the play became a veiled target and a means to launch political purges at the top level. (It appears that Kang 
Sheng eventually convinced Mao in 1964 that the play established a parallel between Peng Dehuai who had 
been purged in 1959 and Hai Rui, and that this represented an attempt to reverse Peng’s verdict.) See Barnouin 
& Yu (1993, 51-72) on the detailed developments of the interpretation and function of the play.
37  In addition to the onerous contents of this circular Mao already operated through exceptional measures: he 
bypassed the official line of command and instructed Kang Sheng and Chen Boda to transmit orders to the party 
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This decision was presented in the ‘May 16 Circular’ (中发 267), which already con-
tained elements of security.38 It claimed (Box 23) that “while feigning compliance, the 
outline actually opposes and stubbornly resists the great Cultural Revolution. […] Using 
the banner of ‘under the guidance of Mao Zedong thought’ as cover, the outline actually 
attempts to open up a way opposed to Mao Zedong thought, that is the way of modern revi-
sionism, the way for the restoration of capitalism.”  Peng Zhen, a leading figure in the party 
and a political opponent of Mao, was singled out as the true author of the Outline. The 
authors of the Outline were then labelled as “a bunch of counter-revolutionaries oppos-
ing the communist party and the people.” Their activities were presented as fierce : “their 
struggle against us is one of life and death, and there is no question of equality. Therefore, 
our struggle against them, too, can be nothing but a life-and-death struggle, and our rela-
tion with them can in no way be one of equality.” An element of the future was also present: 
“Far from being a minor issue, the struggle against this revisionist line is an issue of prime 
importance having a vital bearing on the destiny and future of our party and state, on the 
future complexion of our party and state, and on the world revolution.”39
I speech act: claim
Propositional content Peng Zhen and the others are revisionists, opposed to Mao Zedong Thought, and trying to restore Capitalism.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The circular lists the main errors of the ‘February Outline.’ 
2) It is not obvious that the ‘Outline’ was in error (Peng Zhen 
and the ‘Group of Five’ were leading party members).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that Peng Zhen and 
others are opposing Mao Zedong Thought and trying to re-
store Capitalism represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 23: The claim speech act in the May 16 circular (中发 267).
The Circular further warned (Box 24) that the bourgeoisie had infiltrated the party and 
were planning to restore capitalism and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dic-
tatorship of the bourgeoisie: “Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked 
into the party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles are a bunch of coun-
ter-revolutionary revisionists.” The dimension of the future is important here: “Once condi-
tions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into 
a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.” The Circular not only listed struggles already won, but 
it warned of future ones to come: “Some of them we have already seen through, others we 
have not.” The warning also utilised the status of Khrushchev as a signifier of institution-
alised securitisation as the issue was about the threat of revisionism becoming a reality 
secretariat to draft the circular to revoke the February Outline, and instructed the Politburo to hold an enlarged 
meeting that comprised of more radicals (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 64).
38  Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai had already distanced themselves from Peng Zhen at this point, as it was they 
who made the proposal to Mao within the Politburo Standing Committee that a new circular should be drafted 
to annul the ‘February Outline’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 33).




in the CCP as well, which should be prevented at any cost: “Some are still trusted by us and 
are being trained as our successors, Khrushchev-like people are still nestling beside us. Party 
committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.” 
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Representatives of the Bourgeoisie who have sneaked into 
the party will seize political power and turn the dictatorship 




1) Party cadres have reason to believe that the bourgeoisie 
within the party could turn the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and that it is not in 
their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
would be turned into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the bourgeoisie 
turning the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie is not in the cadres’ best interest.
Box 24: The warning speech act in the May 16 circular (中发 267).
Finally, the Circular required (Box 25) that party-members take action in order to pre-
vent the restoration of capitalism i.e., to secure the revolution and the sovereignty of the 
socialist regime: “Party committees at all levels must immediately stop carrying out the 
‘Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge 
of the Cultural Revolution.’ The whole party must follow Comrade Mao Zedong’s instruc-
tions, hold high the great banner of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose 
the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called ‘academic authorities’ who oppose the 
party and socialism, thoroughly criticise and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in 
the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art, and publishing, and 
seize the leadership in these cultural spheres.” The means to achieve this would be to purge 
the leadership of the CCP: “To achieve this, it is necessary at the same time to criticise and 
repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the 
government, the army, and all spheres of culture, to clear them out or transfer some of them 
to other positions.”
The Circular summoned both the authority and socio-political capital of the Central 
Committee to brand the issue of the ‘February Outline’ as one of the security of the revo-
lution and the socialist system in this move of securitisation for control. It was on this 
basis that the purges of the ‘pragmatist’ faction were founded. As MacFarquhar & Schoen-
hals (2008, 38) note, the purge of Peng and the others was a ‘hinge event’: it was the last 
that preceded the CR and was at the same time the first purge of the CR.
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III speech act: Require
Propositional content
Party committees at all levels must immediately stop carry-
ing out the ‘Outline’ and expose the reactionary bourgeoisie, 
and seize the leadership in cultural spheres.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Party members are able to carry out the requirements of 
the circular.
2) It is not obvious that party members would carry out the 
requirements on their own in the normal course of events.
3) The requirements are necessary to prevent the restora-
tion of Capitalism (the reason for carrying out the require-
ments).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the requirements 
of the circular be carried out in virtue of exposing the bour-
geoisie in the party and thereby preventing the restoration 
of Capitalism.
Box 25: The requirement speech act in the May 16 circular (中发 267).
8.3.1. Lin’s May 18 Speech to the Enlarged Session of the Politburo
Lin Biao’s (林彪 1966) May 18 speech drove the security argument of the May 16 Circu-
lar to its conclusion.40 Lin claimed and warned that Peng Zhen and the others (Luo Rui-
qing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun plus his wife)41 were planning a counter-revolution-
ary coup d’état. Lin facilitated his claim and warning by recalling at length the Chinese 
imperial history of prior successive coups to gain political power: “From our national 
history of successive states with very short periods of ten, twenty, thirty, fifty years between 
coups, we see that there are many cases of losing state power.” Not only that, but Lin also 
listed statistics of frequently occurring coups around the world: “Today, coup d’états have 
turned into a general mood. Coups have become a common practice in the world.” Lin also 
tied the issue of Peng and the others together with the ‘counter-revolutionaries’ that had 
already been ‘ferreted out’ by the party: “Luckily, during these past years we have crushed 
one by one, […] and destroyed great sentries like  Peng Dehuai and Zhang Wentian.” Lin (
林彪 1966) then claimed (Box 26) that the greatest issue in the question of Peng Zhen 
and the others under discussion, was the security of the revolution and the socialist state: 
“The biggest issue is preventing a counter-revolutionary coup d’état, guarding against sub-
version, guarding against ’bitter repeated hits.’”
40  Lin who did not like to read books or documents, had 16 experts whose task was to read books and 
documents on Chinese history and philosophy as well as on foreign affairs and to brief him on these matters. 
These helped Lin interpret Mao’s historical quotes, allow him to use such himself, and to provide material for 
his major speeches that he mostly wrote himself. (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 206-207.)
41  This later named ’Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang anti-party clique’ was (coincidentally?) in charge of the capital, 
propaganda, daily control of the PLA, and the CCP’s paper flow; as well as remnants of the ’Yan’an roundtable’ 
(MacFarquhar 1983, 470-472). This comprehensive grasp of power was among the facts Lin listed as evidenc-
ing their complicity in the bourgeois coup plot.
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I speech act: claim




1) Li gives evidence of this by reporting Mao’s findings, cit-
ing statistics of coups, and reminding about the Chinese his-
tory of successive coups. 
2) It is not obvious that Peng Zhen and other leading Party 
members are planning a coup.
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that Peng Zhen and others planning a coup represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 26: The claim speech act in Lin Biao’s May 18 speech (林彪 1966).
Furthermore, Lin warned (Box 27) against turning a blind eye to revisionism, and urged 
to remain on guard at all times (especially when the situation seemed good): “We can not 
turn a deaf ear or a blind eye or be indifferent. Not to struggle arduously, forgetting these 
kinds of issues, not to see the essence of issues, would be a blunder. Not to be on guard invites 
great trouble.” Lin argued that the bourgeoisie was constantly planning to retake political 
power and to subvert the socialist state. Therefore politics should be kept in mind, so as 
not to make a mistake leading to the loss of state power: “After the victorious revolution 
we already captured state power, many comrades do not consider state power per se as an 
issue, for them it is merely an issue of construction, an issue of education, an issue of tack-
ling with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kaishek], dealing with the US, but not thinking about wrest-
ing state power can lead to losing state power, the dictatorship of the proletariat can still 
change into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.”42
II speech act: warn
Propositional content State power can be lost and the dictatorship of the proletari-at can turn into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The politburo has reason to believe there could be a coup 
(there have been coups in the past, for example) and that it is 
not in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that there would be a coup.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that state power being 
lost (which would happen if things remain the same) is not 
in the politburo’s interests.
Box 27: The warning speech act of Lin’s May 18 speech (林彪 1966).
However, the issue of a counter-revolutionary coup was not inevitable. As Wæver (Buzan 
et al. 1998; Wæver 1995) has noted, (most) security arguments are about the future: the 
security argument warns of the danger of inaction and presents the way out of the threat. 
42  This is an example of the way Lin used his research staff to relate Chinese classics to his political speeches 
in the style of Mao Zedong.
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Lin appears to have been following such an avenue of thought (林彪 1966): “[W]e cannot 
slacken our ideology, in operations we should adopt specific measures to have the ability to 
prevent disasters before they happen. We should grasp the capitalist representatives, the 
time bomb and the landmine,43 to discover them beforehand, to dig them out and eradi-
cate them.” The party should retain its vigilance as the counter-revolutionaries remain a 
threat: “If this is not done, one day, at a mature and opportune time, there will be a counter-
revolutionary coup d’état, perhaps during a natural disaster, perhaps during war, perhaps 
a century after Mao Zedong, these kinds of political crisis may come about.” His speech also 
contained the element of two possible futures: “Of course there are two prospects. Their 
scheme is not certain to succeed, is not certain of victory, and is not sure to be realized. […] 
They can succeed, they can be defeated.” For Lin, success at all critical junctions entailed 
keeping up a constant guard against counter-revolutionaries: “If we do not pay attention, 
if all are scatterbrains, they can succeed. If we are on guard they can not succeed. They 
want to chop our heads off, unreliable! In the event they want to start something, make a 
counter-revolutionary coup, we will chop their heads off. At any time, no matter how good 
the situation, there is always a gloomy side. When times are good, you must see the gloomy 
side. If there is no bad, good can not be considered as good. The reason for good being good 
is bad. The reason for bad being bad is that there is good.”
After presenting such a dangerous situation with the possibility of dire consequences: 
“From this great mass of evidence we can see that we should guard against an internal 
revolt, prevent a counter-revolutionary coup d’état”, Lin then requested (Box 28) that the 
members of the standing committee remain vigilant and keep their guard up: “We must 
use Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon to criticise and expose various kinds of revisionism, 
criticise and expose the representatives of the bourgeoisie on all fronts and in every depart-
ment, ferret out the bourgeoisie thought beating the gong of capitalism, to carry the great 
proletarian cultural revolution to the end, and to carry the socialist revolution to the end.” 
Such deeds would provide security: “This will guarantee us against revisionism, avoid cap-
italist restoration. This is the utmost essence, the crux of the issue. In practice this meant 
opposition to Peng Zhen and the others, to maintain Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman 
Mao as the absolute ruler of the party and the state.
Lin’s argument conforms with the grammar of a securitisation move for legitimating 
future acts. The acceptance of such a move would provide legitimacy for continued strug-
gle, to purge leading party members, and for the supreme position of Chairman Mao (林
彪 1966): “After this struggle there will not be a sense of peace. There are still some people 
with private ownership and the conception of the exploiting class, deeply rooted and per-
meated into every cell of their being. They want to play tricks at all times, to improve their 
guard.” The security argument of a coming coup allowed Mao to gain the upper hand in 
the factional struggles. This was necessitated by the dire situation: “We must grasp poli-
tics and not let go, grasp and apply Mao Zedong’s works. This is a demand of the revolution. 
This is a demand of the situation, a demand of the struggle against the enemy, a demand 
of war preparedness, a demand of thoroughly obtaining the victory of the great proletar-
ian cultural revolution, a demand of guarding against and opposing revisionism, and it is 
a demand of guarding against capitalist restoration. […] If we do not direct our actions ac-
43  Zhou Enlai also referred to the purge of the ‘Peng-Luo-Lu,Yang anti-party clique’ as the removal of a ‘time 
bomb’ in his speech on May 21, 1966 (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 37-38).
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cording to the needs of the revolution, it will inevitably lead to great errors, it will inevitably 
lead to defeat.”44 
III speech act: request
Propositional content
The Politburo should prevent a counter-revolutionary coup 
d’état by grasping politics and Mao Zedong Thought, and by 
criticising and repudiating Peng Zhen and the others.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The politburo is able to do what Lin requests.
2) It is not obvious that the politburo would do what Lin re-
quests of their own accord.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the politburo be-
ing on guard, grasping Mao Zedong Thought, and repudiat-
ing Peng Zhen and the others, is legitimate and becomes an 
actual state of affairs.
Box 28: The request speech act in Lin’s May 18 speech (林彪 1966).
While not an indicator of the ‘success’ of the securitisation (cf., the discussion on three ‘(t)
ions’ above), the gravity of the speeches and of the purge is evident in that it was accom-
panied by the securing of Beijing with military forces. In addition to troop movements, a 
special task force, the Capital Work Team, was set up and military and public security per-
sonnel were reorganised in order to respond to Mao’s concerns over the security of the 
capital (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 49-51). Mao could have ordered these move-
ments and dealt with the other leaders with force,45 but chose to use security arguments 
to curb the leaders who appeared not to follow his vision of continuous revolution. Thus, 
from the point of view of Securitisation Studies, it is precisely this line of operation that 
makes the beginning of the Cultural Revolution relevant.
8.3.2. Lin Biao’s October 25 Speech
In the most systematic attempt at explaining the ‘need’ for a Cultural Revolution that 
the top leadership had made in 1966 up to that point (Schoenhals 1996, 3), Lin Biao (中
发 542) claimed (Box 29) that the Cultural Revolution was an issue of the very survival 
of the revolution:46 “The result [of the superstructure not catching up with changes in 
44  The emphasis of Mao’s thought as the weapon against the counter-revolutionaries also paved the way for 
the personality cult of Mao: “Mao Zedong thought is the beacon of humanity, the most penetrating weapon of the 
world revolution, it is the universal truth of the entire world. […] Chairman Mao is a genius […] everything the 
Chairman says is the truth, one of the Chairman’s words outstrips the meaning of ten thousand of our sentences.” 
(林彪 1966.)
45  He probably would have been successful, for example, in sidelining his opponents without recourse to the 
language of coups and emergencies by asking them to step down in private.
46  Mao convened a Central Committee working conference in October, right on the heels of a Red Flag editorial 
which had identified two opposing political lines within the party for the general public. The as yet unidentified 
representatives of the reactionary bourgeois line would become clear after this working conference, with the 
purpose of ‘thoroughly criticising and repudiating’ this reactionary line. While Liu Shaoqi still remained as part 
of the ‘people’ in October, the April 1 1967 Red Flag article, which identified him as the ‘top party person in 
power taking the capitalist road,’ marked his final and deadly fall from the top of the party.
265
Chapter 8
the economic base] will be the restoration of capitalism and the subversion of the people’s 
democratic dictatorship, which protects the system of public ownership.” Not only that, but 
China would once more be subjugated by foreign powers: “The socialist system of public 
ownership will be overturned, and China will become ruled by revisionists and regress to a 
semi-feudal and semi-colonial status.” The Cultural Revolution would be the answer: “Thus 
to carry out a Great Cultural Revolution or not is a major political question that will decide 
whether or not proletarian political power can be consolidated and the fruits of revolution 
can be developed. It is a major political question that will decide the success and failure of 
our revolution.”
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
Carrying out a Great Cultural Revolution or not is a major po-




1) Li provides reasons for why preventing new social produc-
tive forces from developing would lead to the restoration of 
capitalism and the subversion of the people’s democratic dic-
tatorship. 
2) It is not obvious that capitalism will be restored.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that whether or not to 
carry out a Cultural Revolution being a major political ques-
tion that decides the success or failure of the revolution rep-
resents an actual state of affairs.
Box 29: The claim speech act in Lin Biao’s October 25 speech (中发 542).
Lin facilitated his claim with references to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which were 
portrayed as having already regressed to bourgeois restoration: “If we do not grasp this 
point, the development that has occurred in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia will also take 
place here.” Without the Cultural Revolution, China would end up in the same position as 
well: “Unless we firmly grasp the Cultural Revolution and unless we carry the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution through to the end, we too will end up changing our colour 
midway.” Lin also emphasised his claim by warning (Box 30) that without the Cultural 
Revolution the fruits of the socialist revolution would be lost and the People’s Republic 
would be subverted by revisionism: “It must be realised that without the successful unfold-
ing of the Cultural Revolution and ideological construction, the fruits we have gained in the 
first two great constructions [political construction and economic construction] will be 
lost. Thus it is incumbent on us to emulate Chairman Mao’s launching of a cultural revolu-
tion on a massive scale.”
Finally, Lin explained (Box 31) the purge of Pen Zhen and the others: “Inside our party, 
there are also people hoping to be restored to rule. Peng [Zhen], Luo [Ruiqing], Lu [Dingyi], 
and Yang [Shangkun] are such types, who contemplate in vein the launching of a counter-
revolutionary coup. If we had not undertaken this Cultural Revolution or if we had not gone 
after them, they would have come to attack us.” He called for renewed struggle and the 
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carrying on of the Cultural Revolution with the threat of a counter-revolutionary coup i.e., 
loss of state power: “These [reactionary letters and handbills] are all signs of people hop-
ing to be ‘restored to rule.’ When the time is ripe, these nasty types will come out and stir up 
trouble and rebel against the people. […] Therefore we must go for them and strike at them. 
If we do not attack them, they will attack us.” (中发 542.)
II speech act: warn
Propositional content Without the successful unfolding of the Cultural Revolution the gains of the two great constructions will be lost.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The politburo has reason to believe capitalism could be 
restored and the fruits of the revolution could be lost and 
that it is not in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that capitalism would be restored in any 
case.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that not to launch a 
Cultural Revolution on a massive scale is not in the politbu-
ro’s best interest.
Box 30: The warn speech act in Lin Biao’s October 25 speech (中发 542).
III speech act: explain
Propositional content To prevent a counter-revolutionary coup was the reason to purge Peng Zhen and the others.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The purges had been made.
2) It is not obvious why the purges had to be made.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the purge of 
Peng Zhen and the others having been a preventive measure 
against a counter-revolutionary coup, represents the actual 
state of affairs.
Box 31: The explain speech act in Lin Biao’s October 25 speech (中发 542).
Lin’s October 25 1966 speech provided the template for the post-hoc maintenance of the 
securitisation argument: this pattern would be used over and over again as one rectifica-
tion campaign after another would come to define the next decade of Chinese politics. 
The purge of Peng Zhen and the others paved the way to eliminate Liu Shaoqi from the 
party. As the CR moved on, Liu was – in an increasingly systematic manner – criticised in 
order to destroy his popular image. Mao’s first heir apparent, and a veteran of the revo-
lutionary war, was vilified as a major revisionist and the leader of the ‘dark headquar-
ters’ whose aim was the restoration of capitalism. While the Cultural Revolution initially 
targeted ‘enemies’ within the party, by the 1970s, ‘undesirables’ were sought after even 
beyond the party on a massive scale.
Once the threat discourse had served its purpose to legitimise the purge of most top-
leaders from the party, the effects of the Cultural Revolution spread outwards to finally 
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encompass almost the entirety of Chinese society. For example, in January 1970, Mao 
linked the Soviet threat to class struggle within China, and launched yet another cam-
paign (the ‘one smash, three antis’). The line of the campaign deemed it imperative to 
eliminate counter-revolutionaries before a Soviet onslaught (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 190-
191). Another example is the campaign that targeted the ‘Counter-revolutionary May 
16 Conspiracy’ and investigated 10 million people nationwide.47 Current CCP historians 
present this campaign as an effort to ‘ferret out’ non-existent class-enemies (MacFarqu-
har & Schoenhals 2008, 221). If this is indeed so, then the fact that a non-existent con-
spiracy was successfully securitised, and had such massive consequences, only highlights 
the point that an issue can become a security concern regardless of whether or not there 
is a ‘real’ threat.48 
8.3.3. Public Securitisation at the Start of the Cultural Revolution
The Chinese propaganda system is divided into three sections: internal party propagan-
da, domestic propaganda, and foreign propaganda (Shambaugh 2007). This distinction 
between internal party and domestic propaganda was also apparent in the process of 
securitisation at the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The criticism of Wu Han that 
served as the opportunity to begin the process of purges in the top leadership only be-
came public in April 1966. Lin’s speeches and the May 16 circular analysed above were 
initially restricted to inner-party circulation only. Although the May 16 circular was dis-
seminated for cadres together with the February Outline with the instruction to study 
and compare them, the issue was not initially propagated to the greater public (see 中发 
267).49 In the Wenhui daily, Jiang Qing wrote an article which repudiated the February 
Outline (中共中央 1966a), and the May 16 Circular was eventually published in Renmin 
ribao on May 18 1967 as ‘A Great Historical Document” (中发 160). The security argu-
ment contained in it was maintained until the re-evaluation of the Cultural Revolution era 
(e.g., the May 16 circular was celebrated both in Renmin ribao and Red Flag also on the 
second and 10th anniversaries of its issuance; 人民日报 16.5.1976).50 
47  ‘Cleansing the class ranks’ was a campaign that targeted some 36 million people with 750 000 to 1.5 million 
people killed in order to ‘resolve contradictions between the enemy and us’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
253-262).
48  The use of torture to impose upon the victim being interrogated the correct nature of their crimes, may have 
played no small role in ‘uncovering’ alleged hidden networks of this ‘May 16 Conspiracy.’ 
See Dutton (e.g., 2005, 14, 34-41) on past practices in the use of false intelligence created as a result of torture 
in previous rectification campaigns within the party. The cycle of extorting confessions to which to then give 
credence even has it own concept: 逼供信 (bī-gòng-xìn). Such practices magnify the sense of threat and breed 
excesses as ‘phantom menaces’ can begin to be found almost anywhere.
Ironically, most of the 1966 beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution within the top leadership, were identified 
as the conspiracy’s main culprits (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 233); for example, in the late summer of 
1970, Chen Boda was accused of being a ‘sinister backstage boss’ of the conspiracy (ibid., 237). In 1972, he was 
formally labelled a “GMD anti-Communist element, Trotskyite, renegade, special agent, and revisionist, guilty 
of the most heinous crimes” (quoted in ibid., 356). The use of security watchwords was common in everyday 
exchanges, and even the most banal acts could be interpreted as a form of revisionism, and thereby, as a threat 
to the revolution.
49  The circular received the second-highest level of classification (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 41). 
However, the children of many leading cadres who had been involved in the Red Guard Movement also received 
information on the contents of documents such as the May 16 Circular, and this unofficial information circulated 
widely among the Red Guards (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008).
50  The institutionalised securitisation formulated in the May 16 circular was also used in the securitisation of 
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The wider public saw the beginning of the Cultural Revolution as a mass-campaign 
against corruption. On June 2, 1966, a commentary appeared in Renmin ribao, entitled A 
great revolution that touches the people to their very souls (Peking Review 10.6.1966).51 
It hailed the ‘big-character poster’ put up by Nie Yuanzi and six others of the Philoso-
phy Department of Beijing University on May 25, as the first Marxist-Leninist poster in 
the whole country.52 This poster was reproduced in full in major newspapers across the 
country. It proclaimed that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a struggle be-
tween the antagonistic world outlook of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which in-
variably resulted in one vanquishing the other. This revolution, the editorial declared, 
was a serious struggle to shatter all schemes for the ideological restoration of capitalism. 
Specifically, the revolution was supposed to accomplish the following: 1) to dig out the 
ideological roots of revisionism, 2) to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, and 
3) to defend Mao Zedong thought.
Another public turning point was the publication of the Decision Concerning the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in August 1966 (the so called 16 points; 中共中央 
1966b), which turned the student movement into a mass movement that encompassed 
all spheres of society. The crux of the issue was bourgeois infiltration even at the highest 
levels (中共中央 1966b): “At present, our objective is to struggle against and overthrow 
those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticise and repudiate 
the reactionary bourgeois academic ‘authorities’ and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and 
all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other 
parts of the superstructure not in correspondence with the socialist economic base, so as to 
facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.” The ‘enemy’ was once 
again identified: “Who are our enemies? […] Concentrate all forces to strike at the handful 
of ultra-reactionary bourgeois rightists and counter-revolutionary revisionists, and expose 
and criticise to the full their crimes against the party, against socialism and against Mao 
Zedong thought so as to isolate them to the maximum.” The sixteen points presented a gen-
eral crisis of bourgeois infiltration: “The main targets of the present movement are those 
within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.” 
However, the Cultural Revolution went beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of previous rectifi-
cation campaigns. When the May 16 Circular of 1966 was published in 1967, Zhou Enlai’s 
comments on May 21 helped to identify the ‘targets’ of the movement which would focus 
on “the center, rather than the localities, the domestic scene rather than the international 
one, inside rather than outside the party, and higher levels rather than lower levels. […] The 
stress will be on the inside and at the top.” (Quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
41.) These formulations identified the levels of the securitisation: the CR was used to 
purge almost all of the top leadership of the party. In 1976, a decade after its original 
issuance, when the circular was celebrated, the nature of the Cultural Revolution as na-
tional security was still maintained (人民日报 16.5.1976): “If the Cultural Revolution had 
not taken place, it would not have taken long before a counter-revolutionary restoration on 
a national scale would inevitably occur, our party would turn into a revisionist party, and 
the 1976 Tiananmen Incident (see Case II).
51  The reorganisation of the Beijing Party committee and the Central Military Commission was made public 
on June 4.
52  See MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 55-58) for a background story of the poster.
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the whole of China would change color.” Indeed, the decade of the Cultural Revolution was 
characterised by the continuous hunt for enemies that had sneaked into the party.
8.4. Desecuritising the Targets of Securitisation – Managing 
        Official History
Mao’s supreme position in the party may be a significant contributing factor for why it 
seems that there was almost no resistance to the securitisation discourses that became 
dominant during the period.53 As MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 43) note, many of 
those who refused to accept the fate of being subjected to ‘class struggle’, turned to sui-
cide. In contrast to some of the later cases examined here, instead of the formation of a 
desecuritisation or counter-securitisation counter-discourse, many simply used suicide 
as a form of ‘resistance’ (to commit suicide was often taken as evidence of resistance to 
the party, or of being anti-party).54 The historical record indicates that Liu Shaoqi and 
the other leading party-members purged on ‘security grounds’ would seem to have not 
offered much of a struggle (MacFarquhar 1983, 470-472).55 While this was the general 
53  See MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 262-268) for examples of the excesses the Mao cult. Even when 
someone thought loyalty dances and formalised ritual ways of speaking were monotonous and ridiculous, not 
to play along with such rituals of complicity would have run the risk of being classified as a class enemy.
54  See Thurston (1990) on suicide as a form of violence during the CR.
The situation in 1960s and 1970s China was completely different to that of the 1990s or even the 1980s. 
During the Cultural Revolution, dissidents had immense difficulties to get their voices heard, and if this did 
occur beyond a mere handful, the likelihood of extreme punishment increased with every new person ‘in the 
know’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 350). The CCP propaganda machine was an important functional 
actor in effecting the dominant security realities of the Cultural Revolution. The resources of this machine and 
the general landscape of conformity made dissidence on a larger scale, a virtual impossibility.
The opportunities for dissidence and more lasting counter-discourses only became more tenable in the ‘period 
of reform.’ This is even evident in the way dissidents with high profiles were dealt with. During the Cultural 
Revolution dissidents were usually executed, but, for example, Wei Jingsheng received prison terms instead. 
Similarly for leaders who lost factional struggles: Liu Shaoqi died in prison, largely due to lack of medical treat-
ment, yet Zhao Ziyang died under semi-house arrest but was allowed hobbies and medical care.
55  Peng Zhen tried to manouvre to the best of his ability in his defence of Wu Han in 1965, but as he lacked 
the crucial information that it was Mao who was behind the attacks on the play, his resistance to the faction 
of Jiang Qing failed step by step. Once the securitisation discourse, as analysed here, was presented to the 
Central Committee and the Politburo, it was too late and Peng yielded. His final form of resistance came as part 
of his self-criticism in his denial to be anti-party: “as for attempting a coup and subversion of the Centre, and 
having illicit relations with foreign countries, even in a dream I could not have thought of such things” (quoted in 
Barnouin & Yu 1993, 70).
However, Peng’s denial counted for nothing as even his closest associate, Liu Shaoqi, made no attempt to prevent 
Peng’s purge in the enlarged Politburo meeting. No-one seemed to dare stand up against Mao, as even the May 
16 Circular was adopted without a single change; indeed, the entire Politburo agreed with Mao’s distortions of 
the facts that most were aware of. For example, the circular claimed that the February Outline was “concocted 
[…] behind the back of Comrade Kang Sheng”, that Peng “did not make it clear that it was being sent to the Central 
Committee for examination as an official document”, and that it did not “get the approval of Comrade Mao Zedong” 
(中发 267), when most of those present knew very well that Kang had indeed participated in the meeting to 
prepare the report and that the draft had been approved by the Standing Committee, and that Peng had shown 
it to Mao (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 29 note how Mao raised only two formal objections to Peng’s initial 
text, and agreed to its circulation in the name of the Center).
Further, private comments made by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping indicate that they were unhappy with the 
way the Cultural Revolution was launched, but their bewilderment similarly indicates that they were not aware 
of Mao’s machinations; Mao operated behind the backs of the people who were formally in charge of both the 
‘first front’ and the state. (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 63.)
Liu similarly did not resist his own repudiation as the ‘top party person taking the capitalist road’ until after 
several struggle sessions against him in the summer of 1967 when he wrote that he would no longer accept 
accusations of being against the party, against socialism and Mao Zedong Thought. Thereby he was formally 
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trend, and although there was no major counter-discourse to the Cultural Revolution nor 
for its fundamental reasons, until after Mao’s death, not all leaders submitted to their po-
litical (and in some cases physical) demise without a fight. Three of the most important 
of such incidents are the ‘February Adverse Current’, the ‘Wuhan Incident,’56 and the ‘Lin 
Biao Affair.’
Mao’s policy of power seizures that went beyond the purge of individual leaders did 
meet with some resistance within the party apparatus. In January and February 1967 
a number of leading military and party figures voiced their anger on the policy, but this 
criticism did not target Mao directly; it was focused on the activities of the Cultural Rev-
olution Group.57 During a meeting of the Central Caucus some veteran cadres queried 
whether it was correct to direct the CR at the party and whether so many revolutionary 
veterans should be subjected to attacks and humiliation, and if order and stability should 
be maintained in the army (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 117; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
191). Some even defended deposed leaders. For example, Chen Yi (quoted in Barnouin 
& Yu 1993, 117) pointed out that “they [Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Liu Lantao, and 
An Ziwen] never opposed Chairman Mao.” Such reactions of veteran cadres demonstrate 
the extent to which Mao was ‘breaking the rules’: these cadres attempted to preserve 
the established order and its procedural rules as they saw how the Red Guards were, in 
practice, dismantling the party.58
Mao disliked this criticism from veteran cadres, since they seemed to call into question 
the wisdom of the whole Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 185). 
He even went so far as to threaten to start a new guerrilla war together with Lin Biao 
against the cadres who wanted to denigrate the CR and, thereby, to restore Liu Shaoqi 
expelled from the party as a “traitor, renegade, and scab” in November 1968 (New China News Agency 1986), 
and died a year later imprisoned as an evacuee from the assumed Soviet attack of 1969 (Mao 1974b [1969], 
285; Barnouin & Yu 1993, 91-92; Barnouin & Yu 1998, 93-95; MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 277-278). Chen 
Shaomin was the only leading cadre who resisted Liu’s dismissal from the party, simply by not raising her hand 
in the 12th Plenum in 1968. As a result, she later lost her posts in the party and the National People’s Congress 
(Barnouin & Yu 1993, 174-175).
56  The Wuhan Incident, deemed as a counter-revolutionary revolt by Lin Biao and the CCRG, was the “most 
spectacular uprising against the Cultural Revolution by members of the Chinese politico-military establish-
ment” (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 214). Armed clashes between factions in Wuhan had occurred while 
Mao was stationed there. This incident is a prime example of just how warlike the ‘civil war’ Mao was fomenting 
really was. In August 1967 there were 20 to 30 daily reports of armed clashes (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 
2008, 216).
57  Mao had criticised Jiang Qing for overstepping her authority, but he had also ordered that such criticism of 
her and the other members of the Cultural Revolution Group, should only come from within the group. However, 
the old guard disregarded this order and attacked the Group in meetings of the Central Caucus. (MacFarquhar 
& Schoenhals 2008, 191.)
58  In the discussions that prepared for the Resolution on Party History (Beijing Review 1995c [1981]) which 
repudiated the Cultural Revolution in 1981, some suggested that the party had ceased to exist for a period 
of time after the Twelfth Plenum. Deng however argued that while the regular activities of the party had 
indeed stopped temporarily, the party nevertheless still existed. (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982, 
276-296.) This testifies to just how ‘exceptional’ the policies following the securitisation discourses of the 
Cultural Revolution were.
The Resolution itself emphasises how Mao ‘broke the rules’ (Beijing Review 1995c [1981], 62, 64): “inner-party 
life came to a stand still, and many activists and large numbers of the basic masses whom the party had long 
relied on were rejected. […] Mao Zedong’s personal leadership characterised by ‘Left errors’ took the place of the 
collective leadership of the Central Committee, and the cult of Comrade Mao Zedong was frenziedly  pushed to the 




and Deng Xiaoping, even capitalism (Barnouin &Yu 1993, 118).59 The cadres’ response to 
this was self-criticisms, which had the effect that the excesses of the CR would neither be 
assessed nor criticised during Mao’s lifetime. Most of the leading cadres who criticised 
the CR were labelled as ‘Black Generals’ (黑干将, hēi gànjiàng) of the ‘February Adverse 
Current.’ (Ibid., 118-120.) Lin Biao labelled the incident as “the most serious anti-Party 
event after the 11th Plenum of the CC and represented ‘a rehearsal of capitalist restoration’” 
in his keynote speech at the 12th Plenum in October 1968 (quoted in Barnouin & Yu 1993, 
174; see also MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 185, 274-275).60 The result of the ‘coun-
tercurrent’ was the further weakening of the Politburo’s role, to the benefit of the Cultural 
Revolution Group, and especially Jiang Qing.61
Mao’s reaction and subsequent handling of the ‘adverse current’ helped Lin reach the 
zenith of his career at the Ninth Party Congress in which the Constitution of the Commu-
nist Party of China (1986) was revised to, among other things, name him as Mao’s succes-
sor. However, Lin soon fell  out of favour with Mao, and eventually died under mysterious 
circumstances while apparently trying to defect to the Soviet Union. It would seem that 
unlike most other leaders disposed of by Mao, Lin did not idly wait for his turn, but he, 
or his son, made plans for the assassination of Mao. The plan did not succeed, as Lin had 
insufficient support even within the Army that was his main support base.62 Lin’s posi-
tion had relied too heavily on being the chief acolyte of the cult of Mao, so that Lin, who 
had ironically warned at the onset of the CR in 1966 of a coup d’état, was himself accused 
of launching one in August 1970 (Barnouin & Yu 1993, 221).63
Lin’s defection and death gave the public impression that also the second of Mao’s 
hand-picked heir apparents had transpired to be ‘capitalist roaders’ of the worst kind. In 
addition to discrediting the infallibility of Mao,64 the Lin affair seemed to accelerate the 
deterioration of Mao’s already weak health. The last campaigns carried out as part of the 
59  “If someone opposes the CCRG, I will resolutely oppose him! You attempt to negate the Great Cultural Revolu-
tion, but you shall not succeed! Comrade Ye Qun, you tell Lin Biao that he is not safe either. Some people are trying 
to grab his power, and he should be prepared. If this Great Cultural Revolution fails, he and I will withdraw from 
Beijing and go back to the Jinggang Mountains to fight a guerrilla war.” (Quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 
2008, 195.)
60  Kang Sheng supported Lin’s formulation, while Chen Boda viewed it as an attempted “subversion of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat” (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 196).
Most of the key players of the ‘February Adverse Current’ were however permitted membership of the Ninth 
Central Committee in 1969 (ibid., 294). 
61  The CCRG ceased to function after the Ninth Party Congress where the most important members of the 
group were promoted to the CC and the Politburo, and Lin Biao was named as the heir apparent in the new Party 
Constitution (The Constitution 1986).
62  See Kau (1975), Barnouin & Yu (1993, 199-246), and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 324-336) for details 
of the ’Lin Biao affair.’
63  In 1972 Lin received his formal verdict: “at every stage in the history of China’s revolution, at every crucial 
stage in the two-line struggle within the party, Lin Biao always stood on the side of the erreneous line, opposed 
Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line, resisted Chairman Mao’s strategic policies, and more than once plotted to 
usurp Chairman Mao’s leadership.” Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan mobilised the Central Propaganda Group 
to declare that: “extensive documentation shows that the bandit Lin was a Soviet revisionist special agent boss who 
remained deeply hidden for a long time.” (Quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 346-347.)
64  In his attempts to shield some veteran cadres during the period of struggle sessions, Zhou Enlai noted that 
“Chairman Mao observed Liu Shaoqi for over twenty years; only then did he write his big-character poster” (quoted 
in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 196). After the same was repeated with Lin Biao, although not meant as a 
criticism of Mao, many in China must have been bewildered on why their ‘great helmsman’ would have chosen 
the worst capitalist roaders for his closest comrades in arms, while the rest of the nation was mobilised to ferret 
their very followers out.
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CR could thus no longer enjoy the charismatic leadership of Mao and his ‘close comrade 
in arms’, who had turned out to be a ‘bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, ren-
egade and traitor.’ Lin’s fall led to a massive factional reorganisation, and the ‘criticise Lin 
Biao and Confucius’ campaign became a prelude to the power-grab attempts that would 
follow Mao’s death in 1976 (see Case II).
The power-struggles that followed Mao’s demise have had an important effect on how the 
Cultural Revolution has been represented in official histories. The radical faction (文革派, 
wéngé pài) of Jiang Qing had risen to power from outside the established party structures 
on the wave of the CR. As such, Jiang and her faction had an invested interest to continue 
the CR, even beyond Mao’s reign. Conversely, the older party cadres (老头, lǎotóu pài), had 
the opposite objective: they desired to remove Jiang Qing, and the Cultural Revolution. 
The victory of Deng Xiaoping’s faction in this struggle determined the judgement of the 
CR in its aftermath.
Lowell Dittmer (2002, 5) has identified five stages, or shifts, in the use of the ‘Cul-
tural Revolution’ in ‘making the past serve the present’ i.e., in reinterpreting past po-
litical events in terms that favour the contemporary political situation. These stages are 
the period of Hua Guofeng’s rule when the CR was tacitly discontinued yet still overtly 
defended (1976-1978),65 the period in which the CR was explicitly discontinued and 
implicitly criticised (1978-1980),66 the period of controversy between explicit repudia-
tion of the CR and an implicit defence of it in the form of periodical ideological tighten-
ing (1980-1983),67 the period when the campaign to ‘totally negate’ the CR was in place 
(1984-1986), and the post-Tiananmen period which has been characterised by official 
total repudiation and effective silence (1990-).68
While reflecting political situations and being affected by other major events, these 
periods also coincide with the desecuritisation of the ‘targets’ of the Cultural Revolution. 
The first period was that of the struggle for Mao’s legacy after his death in 1976. This was 
also the time that the trial of Jiang Qing’s faction was being prepared. Deng also began 
to rehabilitate cadres who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution.The Central 
65  E.g., by Hua’s line of the ‘two whatevers.’
66  For example the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee that officially desecuritised the 1976 Tianan-
men incident did not also desecuritise the Cultural Revolution: “Comrade Mao Zedong initiated this great 
revolutionary primarily in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union had turned revisionist and for the purpose of 
opposing revisionism and preventing its occurrance. As for the shortcomings and mistakes in the actual course of 
the revolution, they should be summed up at the appropriate time.” (Dittmer 2002, 7).
While the tone became increasingly critical, in 1979 an authoritative criticism of the CR had to be toned with 
a comment on the necessity to combat revisionism: “The Cultural Revolution was launched with the aim of 
preventing and combating revisionism. […] But the point is that, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, the 
estimate made of the situation within the party and the country ran counter to reality, no accurate definition was 
given of revisionism, and erroneous policies and methods of struggle were adopted, deviating from the principle of 
democratic centralism.” (Xinhua 28.9.1979.)
67  It seems that the criticism of the Cultural Revolution tempered the opportunities for criticism that emanated 
from the ‘left’ of the party (Dittmer 2002, 14).
68  Perhaps ironically, the securitisation of the 1989 student movement worked towards the desecuritisation 
and silence of the Cultural Revolution in that attempts to rehabilitate the need for the Cultural Revolution 
were suppressed: it was not permissible to renew legitimisation of ‘excessive democracy’ right on the heels of 
suppressing a popular movement that was presented to parallel the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In a June 
1991 Politburo meeting Jiang Zemin set the official line: “Any attempt to rehabilitate the Cultural Revolution in 
any way goes counter to the will of the public, the party, and the army” (quoted in Dittmer 2002, 19).
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Advisory Commission was set up to allow older cadres some ‘honour’ as they retired.69 
Thus, unlike Mao and even Hua, beyond the ‘Gang of Four’, Deng did not instigate any 
major purges of the radical faction. The most important rehabilitation was that of Liu 
Shaoqi, which was finally granted in 1980.70 The Central Discipline Inspection Commis-
sion71 declared that Liu’s sentence in 1968 had been “the biggest frame-up the CCP had 
ever known in its history, which had been created out of thin air by fabricating materials, 
forging evidence, extorting confessions, withholding testimony.” Liu was desecuritised with 
an objectivist strategy:72 “It is now clear that the danger of so-called right revisionism did 
not actually appear in our party before 1966” (Renmin ribao 3.4.1980). Mao’s thought 
was thereby separated from Mao the person and those others that had exploited it; it 
was these individuals who had committed mistakes and not the party or the ‘thought’ 
itself. By July 1980, Deng had put forth the line that described the Cultural Revolution as 
essentially negative and placed responsibility for it directly on Mao’s personal mistakes 
(Dittmer 2002, 11).
The rehabilitation of most of the victims of the Cultural Revolution coincided with the 
trial of the ‘Gang of Four.’73 As a chapter-title given in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 
454) suggests, the trial of the Gang and the ‘Lin Biao Clique’, as well as the rehabilitation 
of past ‘transgressors’ was somewhat akin to an ‘exorcism of the Cultural Revolution.’ 
However, most of the everyday crimes committed during the Cultural Revolution were 
still not investigated, and many still try to petition the government over injustices com-
mitted during the 1960-1970s today. Deng tried to provide some semblance of solace to 
the general public through the 1981 Resolution on Party History (Beijing Review 1995c 
[1981], 63) in which Mao was depicted as “a leader laboring under a misapprehension.” 
Although Mao was criticised for making mistakes (his misapprehension was “capitalized 
on by counter-revolutionary cliques, led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the 
party, the state and the whole people”), he still remained the founder and greatest hero of 
the People’s Republic.74
After Mao’s demise and the political power struggles that ensued, most leading mem-
bers purged during the Cultural Revolution have been rehabilitated, albeit some post-
humously. Although there has been no thorough reassessment of the era, the party has 
desecuritised the previous targets of securitisation at the beginning of the Cultural Revo-
69  This Commission would however have an ironic role to play in the securitisation process of 1989.
70  See the document  中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第五次全体会议关于为刘少奇同志平反的决议 (2002 
[1980]); Xinhua (12.3.1980).
71  See also Dittmer (2002, 11) and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 454).
72  The leaders of the ‘February adverse current’ and of the 1976 ‘incident’ were also rehabilitated and their 
posts returned in 1979.  The shift towards the repudiation of the CR was also evident in the rehabilitation of 
Peng Dehuai in 1978 only becoming ‘sayable’ – with its implication that Mao must then have been wrong – in 
1979. (Dittmer 2002, 7-8.)
73  See Case II on how this is connected to the desecuritisation of the Tiananmen Incident of 1976. The decision 
to put the ‘Gang’ on trial was made in the 16th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth NPC in which Hua 
Guofeng resigned from the position of premier (he was replaced by Zhao Ziyang). For a transcript of the trial, 
see Beijing Review (1995b [1980]) and New China News Agency (1995 [1980]).
74  The Resolution (Beijing Review 1995c [1981], 66) emphasised that Mao, “[i]n his later years, he still remained 
alert to safeguarding the security of our party, stood up to the pressure of the social-imperialists, pursued a correct 
foreign policy, firmly supported the just struggles of all peoples, outlined the correct strategy of the three worlds 
and advanced the important principle that China would never seek hegemony.” 
In addition to the resolution, the Sixth Plenum was important as Hua Guofeng resigned from the post of Chair-
man of the Central Committee to be replaced by Hu Yaobang.
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lution, by use of the ‘objectivist strategy’ (i.e., a matter is claimed not to be a security 
threat; Huysmans 1995, 65-67), as is evident in official party history (CCP CC Party Histo-
ry Research Centre 1991, 324): “Based on the ‘Left’ point of view and confused understand-
ing of the enemy and the people, these unrealistic demands and assessments provided the 
chief reason for launching the ‘Cultural Revolution.’ Much of the blame was placed on Lin 
Biao: “[H]e spilt preposterous lies that there were people within the party who attempted 
to stage a coup d’état, creating an atmosphere of terror in the party.” Even in the moderate 
language of the 1981 ‘Resolution on Party History’ (Beijing Review 1995c [1981], 60-
61): the Cultural Revolution brought about “the most serious setback and heaviest losses 
suffered by the party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic.” 
These losses were accredited to Mao’s “entirely erroneous appraisal of the […] political 
situation in the party and the state.” As if in accordance with an ‘objectivist strategy’, the 
resolution declared that Mao’s misperceptions “conformed neither to Marxism-Leninism 
nor to Chinese reality.”75 The party had not been threatened by a counter-revolutionary 
coup after all.
8.5. Conclusions of Analysis: Justification of Exceptionality
The analysis of the case of the Cultural Revolution indicates that there was a distinct 
security argument which gave the impetus to the political processes that have been la-
belled the Cultural Revolution: it was legitimate to remove large parts of the top leader-
ship and for the ‘masses’ to attack party authorities because counter-revolutionaries had 
‘sneaked’ into the party. The threat of a coup was used as the basis to legitimise the ‘Cul-
tural Revolution’ that ‘broke the rules’ of the constituted political order of the CCP and the 
PRC. The Cultural Revolution was not only about security, yet this security argument and 
the confrontational politics of the era influenced the political struggles which contained 
elements of regime, or political security.
In the initial stages of the launch of his campaign, Mao remained behind the scenes, 
and thereby allowed his political opponents to commit to political lines that he could 
later deem as mistaken or even counter-revolutionary. Accordingly, it was Lin Biao who 
was the speaking actor in most of the important instances of securitisation moves. With 
Mao’s approval, these moves had drastic consequences for their targets: most of the lead-
ership of the party was removed from their posts, and some even perished in the ‘strug-
gles’ waged against them. While all did not agree on the line of the Cultural Revolution, no 
clear counter-discourse that would have deployed security rationale apparently emerged 
before Mao’s death. Even during the foment that could be described as civil war, actions 
were directed against various factions and the Red Guards, and not the Cultural Revo-
lution itself. The PLA can be viewed as a functional actor here, since the line of power 
seizures was not altogether successful, as not all units of the military acquiesced to be 
taken over.  
After Mao’s death, the legacy of the Cultural Revolution was the key to determine who 
would gain the political spoils. As Jiang Qing’s radical faction lost this battle, the Cultural 
75  Dittmer (2002, 13) notes how the resolutions’ main criticisms of the Cultural Revolution were: 1) that 
‘revisionism’ was not validly defined, 2) that it confused antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, 3) 
that it attacked the party, and 4) that it was all critique without any constructive program.
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Revolution was eventually deemed as having been operated under false pretences, or 
‘misapprehensions’ which were utilised by ‘counter-revolutionary cliques.’ Accordingly, 
most of the ‘targets’ (e.g., Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi) of the securitisation moves of 1966 
were desecuritised in the 1980s at the latest. This way of handling the CR concurs with a 
general political tradition of ‘using the past to ‘serve the present’ i.e., to use reinterpreta-
tions of history to legitimise current lines of policy.76 In the case of the CR, instead of ‘im-
partial’ truth commissions it was the party that assessed the CR period, and produced the 
interpretations that would become dominant. Indeed, the desecuritisation of the ‘targets’ 
of the Cultural Revolution is clearly an instance of the political use of interpretations of 
history. Therefore, it can be enquired: does the framework of securitisation/desecuritisa-
tion bring anything new to the analysis of such instances?
My reasoning is that the framework of securitisation/desecuritisation can illuminate and 
help to get a grasp of how history is made to serve the present in China. While this phe-
nomenon is recognised and has been analysed extensively, the framework can be used 
to analyse the details of the functions such reinterpretations serve. Conversely, analyses 
of reinterpretations of previously securitised issues can aid to understand how desecu-
ritisation occurs, and how protagonists of desecuritisation in other circumstances may 
perhaps make their moves more successful.
Although the Cultural Revolution could also have been dealt with by merely allowing 
it to ‘wither away’, the method it was actually dealt with demonstrates how overt dese-
curitisation may be useful, or even necessary politics. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
most Chinese were strongly opposed to the continuation of the types of policies that had 
characterised the Cultural Revolution, and Deng Xiaoping was able to utilise this senti-
ment to solidify his position in the party. This becomes evident not only in the desecuriti-
sation of the 1976 Tiananmen incident (see Case II), but also in the overall repudiation of 
the Cultural Revolution. By desecuritising Liu Shaoqi, Deng effectively also desecuritised 
himself and his policy line to accelerate reforms that went in the face of Mao’s ideologi-
cal positions. At the same time though, Deng had to be cautious so as not to weaken the 
position of the party. The answer to this conundrum was to recognise the mistakes of the 
man, but not of his ‘thought.’77 Indeed, before repudiating his mistakes, Deng canonised 
Mao’s thought in 1979 in the form of the ‘four cardinal principles.’ 
The official silence maintained on assessments of the Cultural Revolution since 1991 
effectively demonstrates the success of desecuritisation. Although the status of the CR has 
remained a sensitive issue, this sensitivity is not about whether the estimates of threats 
to national security were accurate or not, but rather the sensitivity emanates from the 
view that perhaps it was the party, or at least its representatives, that was actually more 
threatening to the nation than those who were labelled and punished as counter-revo-
lutionaries. While the CR’s status and pundits have been desecuritised, instances of se-
curitisation in the 1980s demonstrate that the category and possibility remain; 1980s 
mass-campaigns like those against ‘spiritual pollution’ and ‘bourgeois liberalism’ retain 
76  Zhou Enlai (1989 [1975], 295) was explicit on this principle in his report to the Fourth NPC in 1976.
77  For example, the party resolution on some issues in the history of the party (Beijing Review 1995c, 61) 
formulates that “these erroneous ‘Left’ theses, upon which Comrade Mao Zedong based himself in initiating the 
‘Cultural Revolution’, were obviously inconsistent with the system of Mao Zedong Thought […] these theses must be 
thoroughly distinguished from Mao Zedong Thought.”
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and maintain the ‘grammar’, the category, and possibility for political threats to national 
stability and unity, and thereby threats to national security (see Case III).
Beyond the question of desecuritisation and the management of official history, analy-
sis of the Cultural Revolution through the framework of securitisation theory is relevant 
for the study of the Cultural Revolution, as well as for studies of the use of asymmetric 
political concepts in Chinese politics. That we can gain insights on the Cultural Revolution 
through this framework demonstrates how we do not need to consider the CR as a unique 
period or form of Chinese politics (cf., Schoenhals 2002), but that we can study it like any 
others. By analysing these political processes through the same analytical framework, we 
can also see that the types of issues that were institutionally securitised during the CR 
as well as the general logic of its operation have endured beyond the label of the Cultural 
Revolution, as will be demonstrated by the analysis of the other cases below.78
Indeed, the Cultural Revolution had an immense effect on Chinese politics and society 
that still reverberates today. The downfall of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao revealed that these 
two heir apparents, handpicked by Mao himself, had transpired to be ‘counter-revolu-
tionaries’ of the worst kind. In addition, some 75 percent of the full or alternate members 
of the Central Committee had come under suspicion of being ‘counter-revolutionaries’ or 
‘traitors’ by the Eleventh Plenum in October 1968 when Mao planned to bring the initial 
stage of the Cultural Revolution to an end (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 273). The 
humiliation many party cadres were subjected to, even those in the highest positions, ef-
fectively destroyed much of the authority of the CCP. Combined with the experiences at 
the general level of society, trust and respect for the party plummeted, particularly in the 
view that formerly it was considered infallible: no longer would everything the party said 
be feared and respected as ‘great, glorious, and correct’. Such a decline is also apparent in 
the other cases studied here.
Mao listed the Cultural Revolution as the second of his great achievements. Yet it was 
a failure in terms of the ideological tasks Mao had imbued it with. For example, Jiang 
Zemin’s (2002) doctrine of the ‘Three Represents’ as well as Hu Jintao’s ‘principles of 
honour and disgrace’ (see Mille 2007) fly right in the face of Mao’s polemics with the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the issue of the ‘party of the whole people’ and 
the ‘state of the whole people’ (The Polemic 1965). Mao’s utopian fantasies that turned 
out to be disastrous in both industrial production (the Great Leap) and general govern-
ance of society (the Cultural Revolution), paradoxically allowed the pragmatic Deng to re-
lease himself from the shackles of ideological purity and most other orthodoxies. Indeed, 
for Deng, the only orthodoxy that remained was encapsulated in the form of the Four Car-
dinal Principles (Deng 1995b). After the Cultural Revolution, some people dared to think, 
speak, and act more than before, which became even more evident in 1976 (‘Tiananmen 
Incident’), 1978 (‘Democracy Wall’), and during the student movements of the 1980s, 
and eventually in 1989 (‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’). Today, ‘mass incidents’ (群体
性事件, qúntǐxìng shìjiàn) are counted in tens of thousands.
78  This view is alternatively supported by Perry (2007) and argued against by Dutton (2005).
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In the mid 1970s, the two top leaders of China, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, were in poor 
health. In anticipation of Mao’s death, those factions that had survived the Cultural Revo-
lution were now jockeying for positions. Overall, Chinese society was in a pitiful state 
after a decade of mass campaigns and struggles. In this context, the year 1976 came to see 
a great amount of social unrest, and it witnessed the largest autonomous social mobilisa-
tion in the period of the PRC. This mobilisation culminated in the so called Tiananmen 
Incident in April.
While the 1976 ‘Tiananmen Incident’ is usually alluded to in broader historical stud-
ies, it has not been the focus of academic interest to the same extent as the other cases 
presented here have.1 Indeed, as Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun (2004, 211-212) 
note, outside China, the 1976 Tiananmen Incident has remained underanalysed. However, 
the developments of 1976 were an important episode in the transition from the Mao- to 
the post-Mao era of Chinese politics. As in all the other cases in this study, securitising 
discourses played a significant role here as well.
Overall, the 1976 Tiananmen Incident has often been viewed as a result of the fac-
tional struggles between radical leftists and Deng’s pragmatists. As Teiwes & Sun (2004, 
217) summarise, the ‘incident’ emerged as a result of 1) popular determination to honour 
Zhou; 2) Mao-generated constraints for such activities; 3) discontent with the strength-
ening of the Leftist line; 4) long-term erosion of Mao’s authority among the general pub-
1  See for example Garside (1981), which is a contemporary eye-witness account from a foreign journalist 
stationed in Beijing at the time of the ‘incident’; Black & Munro (1993) contains a chapter on the 1976 events; 
Baum (1996) links the incident into the context of dealing with the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s legacy; 
MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 413-430) show how the incident played into the final stages of the Cultural 
Revolution; Teiwes & Sun (2004) present a recent historical account of the events and politics.
The Cultural Revolution Database contains documents that relate to the 1976 Incident, as do Myers et al. (1989 
and 1995a). 两次天安门事件 (1989) provides documents and a comparison to the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident.’ 
Hook et al. (1976) contains contemporary accounts and documents of the events.
9. Case II: The Counter-Revolutionary Political Incident 
     at Tiananmen Square 1976
A small handful of class enemies used the 
Qingming festival’s mourning of premier Zhou 
as a pretence for creating a counter-revolutionary political 




lic; and 5) anger against the radical faction within the Politburo. In other words, people 
had had their fill of the radical policies and campaigns of the Cultural Revolution, and 
were angered when they were denied the opportunity to show their respect and sup-
port for a more rational and pragmatic line, represented by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaop-
ing. The anger and discontent resulted in an unprecedented type of social foment in the 
PRC. While Mao had manipulated the ‘masses’ to mobilise a decade before, events on the 
streets of major Chinese cities this time round would affect elite politics in an autono-
mous fashion. 
The purges that had initiated the Cultural Revolution ten years before have been 
deemed a ‘hinge-event’ (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008). From this viewpoint, the 1976 
Incident is another hinge-event, as it was one of the last processes of securitisation con-
nected with the Cultural Revolution. Its desecuritisation is similarly connected with the 
desecuritisation of the ‘culprits’ of the Cultural Revolution; the desecuritisation was one 
of the means Deng Xiaoping used to solidify his hold on power in the power-struggles fol-
lowing Mao’s death. Here, the Incident and its subsequent role in Chinese politics serves 
as an example of how the politics of securitisation can fail, even when the grammar of 
securitisation has been followed to the letter by experienced securitisers possessing the 
necessary formal authority for initiating an official security discourse.
The 1976 Incident is also a hinge in the sense that it begins to display elements of 
contestation, which will continue to increase as the examination of the cases progresses 
in this study. The analysis of the securitisation of activities on Tiananmen Square in 1976 
and their subsequent desecuritisation is used here to investigate how securitisation ar-
guments become part of Chinese authorities’ responses to challenges to their hegemony. 
Beyond this general question (and with which the other cases of this study deal with too), 
of particular interest here is how and why the politics of securitisation can fail in China. 
9.1. The Historical and Socio-Political Context of the ‘Counter-
         Revolutionary Political Incident’
The history of the People’s Republic knows two counter-revolutionary Tiananmen inci-
dents, those of 1976 and 1989.2 The battle over who would control Mao’s legacy already 
raged while Mao still lived. With the setback of the betrayal of Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen 
turning out to be easily controlled by Jiang Qing, and Zhou Enlai in bad health, Mao al-
lowed Deng Xiaoping to return to the higher echelons of the party and the state in 1973.3 
Deng effectively took over the positions of Zhou when he was hospitalised. However, 
Deng’s pragmatist line began to veer too far away from the Cultural Revolution with his 
proposals on China’s development strategy and the reform of scientific research. In or-
der to fight back, the radical faction began to call Deng’s initiatives the ‘three poisonous 
weeds.’ The faction continued their anti-Deng manoeuvring with metaphorical attacks 
2  The very first ’incident’ on Tiananmen Square actually happened already on October 31 1972 when thousands 
of Beijing residents dug up decorative flowers from the Monument of the People’s Heroes (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 376-438). While Zhou Enlai took this event to be serious sign of possible trouble, it did not 
receive the same kind of attention nor public securitisation as the ‘incidents’ of 1976 and 1989 did.
3  Mao was already manoeuvring to reduce the increased influence of the PLA and to keep Jiang Qing’s faction 
in line, for which Deng was appropriate. Accordingly, Mao forced Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen to present 
self-criticisms of supporting factionalism in 1974 (see MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 399-400).
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on Zhou and Deng in the press (e.g., by using the pi-Lin, pi-Kong, pi-Zhou –campaign; 
批林批孔批周). By late 1975, Mao seemed to agree that Deng was trying to reverse ‘correct 
verdicts’ and thus undermine the Cultural Revolution (see e.g., Renmin ribao 10.3.1976). 
The leftists used the media to further charge Deng with being anti-Mao and anti-Cultural 
Revolution (see e.g., Renmin ribao 10.3.1976; 28.3.1976).
The proximate development towards the 1976 Incident began with Zhou Enlai’s death 
on January 8 1976. He had been one of the most revered and popular politicians in China,4 
with a political career that spanned half a century, half of which as the premier of the 
PRC. The ‘four modernisations’ (Zhou 1989 [1975]) was one of the final policy lines Zhou 
launched in 1975, and as such he was the symbol of reform in the mid 1970s.5 The news 
of Zhou’s death6 dominated Chinese media for a week with unprecedented demonstra-
tions of respect for a Chinese leader both nationally and internationally (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 415). After Zhou, Deng Xiaoping became the living symbol of this policy 
line.7
Deng (1989 [1976]) gave a eulogy for Zhou on January 15, but after this he was side-
lined from the position of Acting Premier. In his stead, the obscure and factionally neutral 
Hua Guofeng was appointed as Acting Premier, against the designs of Jiang’s faction. The 
movement to ‘beat back the right-deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts’ targeted 
Deng (see e.g., Renmin ribao 10.3.1976 and 28.3.1976). This campaign was particular-
ly unpopular; people had had enough of mass campaigns against revisionists. Mao ap-
peared quite cold towards Zhou, as he conspicuously did not attend Zhou’s funeral (e.g., 
Baum 1996, 27), and also limited mourning to a minimum.8 Such acts only further added 
to the disillusionment with both Mao and his Cultural Revolution that had begun with the 
Lin Biao Affair at the latest. The pragmatist line of reform Deng represented was more 
favoured than the lines present in official media.
The radical faction appeared to be out of touch with the mood which supported reform. 
After the initial period of mourning, the Chinese media, controlled by the radical faction, 
began to suppress the mourning for Zhou and rather emphasise the political struggle 
against Deng.9 In March they launched a veiled campaign against Zhou and Deng through 
an article in the Wenhui bao (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 421) implying 
that Zhou was a ‘capitalist roader’ who had helped an ‘unrepentant’ Deng Xiaoping return 
to power: “that capitalist roader inside the party helped the still unrepentant capitalist 
roader onto the stage.”10 This and other moves that discredited Zhou and Deng were not 
4  As he remains to date. This is apparent from a Xinhua poll of schoolchildren ages 13-18 on the top ten heroes 
conducted in 2005 (Xinhuanet 27.5.2005).
5  There had been earlier attempts at more pragmatist reform, particularly by Chen Yun in the 1950s before the 
Great Leap Forward. See Paltemaa & Vuori (2009) on the ebb and flow of the Chinese politics of technology.
6  See ‘Obituary for Zhou Enlai’ (1989 [1976]).
7  Having been sidelined for most of the Cultural Revolution added to Deng’s popularity as he could not be 
blamed for the excesses of the past ten years, and seemed too to have defied the madness of the radicals.
8  After the initial period of mourning the ‘five no’s’ were implemented: no black armbands, no wreaths, no 
mourning halls, no memorial activities, and no handing out of photos. Such prohibitions were not adhered to 
well.
9  The faction seemed just as remote from reality, when it claimed that the rescue efforts after the Tangshan 
earthquake on July 28 that left 242 000 people dead, more than 160 000 injured and a million homeless were 
used to suppress the campaign against Deng Xiaoping (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 435-436).
10  Teiwes & Sun (2004, 216) suggest that the article may have been a local move, as it displayed the lack of 
coordination and control of the radical faction, soon to be generally known as the ‘Gang of Four.’ This lack of 
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received well and protesters surrounded the offices of Wenhui bao to demand an explana-
tion. In Zhou’s home city, on the campus of Nanjing University, large slogans and posters 
were posted up that censured the paper and the ‘conspirators’ who were claimed to be 
trying to ‘usurp power.’ The protestors compared these conspirators to Khrushchev, who 
had long since become a byword for the betrayal of the socialist revolution. Jiang Qing 
and others of the ‘Shanghai Gang’ were named without recourse to methaphor.11 Mass 
protests which commemorated Zhou but opposed the ‘conspirators’ spread throughout 
the city. The heads of the party in Jiangsu province (where Nanjing is situated) who were 
not supporters of the radical faction, did not suppress the demonstrations.12 In contrast, 
news of the events in Nanjing was blacked out in the radical faction controlled media. 
This however did not prevent unofficial messages from reaching the capital, e.g., in the 
form of texts painted on traincars. By the end of March, more mass movements that com-
memorated Zhou (and showed support for Deng) also broke out in most other major 
cities.
The movements and especially the events in Nanjing alarmed the radical faction. 
Measures to end these unauthorised mourning activities were discussed in a Politburo 
meeting on April 1t 1976, along with the future plans to continue the anti-Deng campaign. 
Of relevance here is that the events in Nanjing were not securitised, nor was there any 
decision to use force to suppress them. As a result, this emergency meeting failed to quell 
the movement.13 The social foment reached its peak during the Qingming festival (清明, 
Qīngmíng) on April 4 1976, when several hundred thousand people progressed to place 
commemoration wreaths and poems at the Monument of the People’s Heroes on Tianan-
men Square. This was an expression of open defiance to the radical faction, led by Jiang 
Qing.
Mao had condemned the ‘use of the dead to oppress the living’ in 1966, when some half 
a million people had arrived for a memorial ceremony to Tianjin cadres who had commit-
ted suicide after being submitted to struggle sessions (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 
172).14 The Red Guards had, however, retained the tradition of ‘sweeping the graves’ of 
revolutionary heroes, and the greatest monument for such heroes was the Monument 
coordination may be accounted for as hubris especially exhibited by Jiang Qing after wielding the power of the 
Cultural Revolution for a decade.
11  In Nanjing, Wang Hongwen was mostly not named as a member of the ‘Gang of conspirators’ (Teiwes & Sun 
2004).
12  See Garside (1981, 110-129) for a description of events in Nanjing.
13  Before Nanjing was put back under ‘control’ 600-700 000 people had taken to the streets (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 421-422).
14  The wreaths that commemorated Zhou Enlai on the Monument of the People’s Heroes were juxtaposed with 
the portrait of Mao on Tiananmen Gate, an act which symbolised the two lines of pragmatism and continu-
ous struggle represented by the two long-time leaders. The same symbolic move was repeated by the student 
movement of 1989 when first the image of Hu Yaobang, and later even more provocatively, the ‘Goddess of 
Democracy’ were poised against the same image of Mao (see Case III). The unauthorised placement of wreaths 
violated the symbolic order the party had constructed on the Square that represented the place where the 
people could meet their leaders.
However, China is not unique in state leaders’ funerals being used as a form of political protest or resistance. 
Agamben (2005, 67-68) draws attention to the tumults that often accompanied the funerals of Roman state 
leaders; public mourning has many times produced a period of social ‘anomie’ that has broken or temporarily 
subverted the social order, and which has similarly been approved or tolerated by state and religious authori-




of the People’s Heroes on Tiananmen Square. The Qingming festival provided an oppor-
tunity for Beijing residents to voice their shared grievances with the radical faction and 
to show not-quite-so veiled support for Deng and a policy line of reform; Mao and the 
radical faction had stifled the opportunity to sufficiently express grief over the loss of the 
pragmatist leader who represented rational socialism. Mao’s weak health combined with 
the return of Deng signalled an end to the Mao-era, and the festival provided a political 
opportunity to voice the direction one wanted China to take – for those usually without 
voice. 
The situation in Beijing was highly problematic for the radical faction. Not only had 
the people seemingly autonomously mobilised in mass numbers15 in support of Zhou 
Enlai16, but some of the slogans and poems on the Monument of the People’s Heroes were 
directly critical and attacked Jiang Qing and her faction. In reaction to this, the Politburo 
convened for another emergency session on April 4.17 As Wu De, the mayor of Beijing at 
the time noted in his report on events on the square, there had never before been such 
a spontaneous movement in the capital since the inception of the People’s Republic. Wu 
connected the event to Deng Xiaoping, but proposed further investigation and empha-
sised that the wreaths were not significant. At this point the events were still not deemed 
as counter-revolutionary i.e., they were not yet securitised.18
During the same meeting, in the late evening, Renmin ribao journalists reported from 
the square that anti-Jiang Qing sentiments were being expressed there. Wu, who was 
against forceful action, had to acquiesce to the will of the Politburo, and some people 
were subsequently arrested on the square. Jiang proposed the mobilisation of troops to 
the square but the rest of the Politburo insisted that the use of force should be limited to 
security forces and the militia. Wu also had to acquiesce to the overnight removal of the 
troublesome wreaths. 19
As Teiwes & Sun (2004, 226-227) note, it was a highly irregular, but crucial, decision 
for the Politburo to remove the wreaths and mobilise security forces into the vicinity of 
the Square, without authorisation or even reference to Mao. More in accordance with 
standard operating procedures, the meeting decided to inform Mao of the events on the 
square in terms that would underline their seriousness. Mao’s nephew Mao Yuanxin20 
told Mao that some of the poems were trying to split the centre, that they attacked the 
Chairman directly, that the dead were being used to exert power over the living, and that 
there had to be a hidden mastermind or ‘club’ organising the events, matters which all 
15  Beijing municipal authorities estimated that some two million people had visited the square by April 4 
(MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 424).
16  In comparison, as a Hungarian reporter noted at the time, not a single flower had been placed on the 
Monument after Kang Sheng had died shortly before Zhou (Hook et al. 1976, 662).
17  See the document ‘中央政治局四月四日会议记录及毛远新关于中央政治局四月四日讨论天安门事件情况
给毛泽东的报告’ (2002 [1976]); see also MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 424) and Teiwes & Sun (2004, 
224).
18  As Teiwes & Sun (2004, 224) note, to shift the description of the events from merely noting counter-revolu-
tionary aspects to actually label them a counter-revolutionary incident as such would have meant, and indeed 
did mean, a significant escalation in seriousness and the likelihood of the use of force.
19  See the document ‘中央政治局四月四日会议记录及毛远新关于中央政治局四月四日讨论天安门事件情况
给毛泽东的报告’ (2002 [1976]); see also Baum (1996, 33-34) and Teiwes & Sun (2004, 224-225).
20  Mao’s various ailments were at this point so severe that his nephew was the means of communication used 
between the chairman and the other leaders.
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called for immediate measures.21 Accordingly, the Politburo made a securitisation move 
to raise the issue onto the agenda, which Mao accepted.22 On the morning of April 5 when 
the wreaths had already been removed, Mao gave three directives to be transmitted by 
his nephew to the Politburo:23 1) the events were a “counter-revolutionary rebellion” (
反革命暴乱, fǎngémìng bàoluàn), 2) the Politburo had the authority to use force, but no 
firearms or combat troops,24 and 3) Deng should be placed under investigation.25
In the meantime, the most visible of the measures the Politburo had taken to resolve 
the issue was the physical removal of the wreaths from the Square during the night be-
tween April 4 and 5, and then denial of access to the Square. In the early hours of 5 April 
two hundred trucks drove into the square and unceremoniously removed the wreaths. 
Anyone who protested against this at the time was arrested. No explanation for the re-
moval of the wreaths was given. The normal practice during the Qingming festival was 
and is to leave such memorials in place for a week. Beijing residents who had brought 
their wreaths to Tiananmen had defied the will of their supreme ruler and could there-
fore expect to be branded as counter-revolutionaries. Yet most of the poems and inscrip-
tions brought to Tiananmen were simple eulogies to Zhou.26 Others expressed defiance 
and anger at those bent on the destruction of his political legacy of rational or pragmatic 
socialism, and there were numerous warnings against Khrushchev-type plotters. The re-
moval of the wreaths was perceived as an insult both to Zhou and the people, and news of 
the arrests also increased the potential for unrest.27
When those who returned to the square found the wreaths gone, protest began and 
demonstration became increasingly passionate. Some even turned violent by overturning 
and burning security vehicles and the command centre of security forces on the square. 
As these events unfolded on the Square, the Politburo still debated the level of force to 
respond with, that Mao had authorised. Wu De had to once again accede, and drafted a 
speech that was repeatedly broadcast on the square on the evening of April 5 (人民日报 
8.4.1976b). The decision to take forceful measures to quell the protests had now been 
made. Once the hackled security forces took action in the afternoon and evening, the pro-
tests were suppressed with the use of five battalions of PLA personnel, three thousand 
security officers and ten thousand militiamen all armed with clubs.28 The subsequent 
21  See the document ‘中央政治局四月四日会议记录及毛远新关于中央政治局四月四日讨论天安门事件情况
给毛泽东的报告’ (2002 [1976]); see also MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 424-425).
Deng (2002, 397) reports that Mao legitimised some of these measures, after the fact. Mao’s nephew briefed 
Mao on the events of April 5 the next morning, describing how the ‘enemy’ had set ablase buildings and vehicles 
in addition to spreading ‘counter-revolutionary propaganda’; with Deng being compared to Imre Nagy of the 
Hungarian 1956 uprising. On April 7 Mao ordered the removal of Deng and the appointment of Hua as the 
premier instead (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 427-428).
22  While the radical faction had been in power for ten years, they wielded little capital that did not emanate 
from Mao; nor would the formal positions of the radical faction even imbue them with power and authority 
once Mao was gone.
23  See the document ’毛泽东对毛远新关于四月六日中央政治局讨论天安门事件情况报告的批语’ (2002a 
[1976]); see also Baum (1996, 35) and Teiwes & Sun (2004, 227-228).
24  Mao had been informed of the disagreements on the level of force that should be used within the Politburo.
25  Mao did not accept that Deng was the mastermind behind the events, without any proof.
26  Some of the poems were published in 1979 as part of the desecuritisation of the incident (see Xiao 1979).
27  See Garside (1981, 110-129) for a contemporary eye-witness account of the events.
28  See Baum (1996, 34) and Teiwes & Sun (2004) on the disagreements even within  the radical faction on how 
much force should be used to quell the ‘counter-revolutionary activity.’ The operation seemed restrained, as 
the immediate security action did not apparently result in any serious injuries (两次天安门事件 1989; Baum 
283
Chapter 9
nationwide crackdown lasted until late May.29 Approximately, four thousand people were 
detained for a short period, while the most severe punishments extended to some 60 
executions (He 2001). 30
9.2. The Radicals’ Tactics: Bad Elements and Revisionist Masterminds
The radical faction of Jiang Qing already positioned itself for the post-Mao era and it 
therefore did its uttermost to sideline Deng Xiaoping and discredit the pragmatist Zhou 
Enlai. Since Jiang had risen to her position from outside the party establishment, she 
needed the Cultural Revolution’s ‘exceptionality’ to maintain her position. The Tianan-
men Incident was the final move that allowed Deng to once again be dismissed.
However, the securitisation of this incident was not as trouble free as the securitisa-
tion of leading cadres a decade earlier. Unlike then, the question was now of a nation-
wide, indeterminate social movement that was not led by any of the leading factions, 
even though it opposed Jiang. In hindsight, it does not seem that the protests were coor-
dinated, but were the result of a shared grievance and an opportunity to express it. Dis-
crediting Zhou was similarly not an easy task as he was the only member of the Standing 
Committee who had endured the Cultural Revolution. The radicals followed the practices 
of the institutionalised securitisation of the Cultural Revolution and described Deng as a 
member of the same brand of enemies who had already been purged. This line is evident, 
for example, in a 人民日报 (18.4.1976) article which lists the ‘lessons learned’ from the 
incident: “it shows that the bourgeoisie is to be found inside the Communist Party. The two-
line struggle in the party is a life-and-death struggle between the two antagonistic classes 
– the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.” The message was that ‘Capitalist roaders’ were still 
within the party, that there was a need for continued struggle, and that the measures al-
ready taken (e.g., suppression of the incident, and Deng’s dismissal) were legitimate. The 
publication of the ‘May 16 Circular’ in 人民日报 (16.5.1976), ten years after its original 
issuance, worked towards the same goal: the commentary portrayed the dismissals of 
Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping as part of a continuous struggle: “Deng Xiaoping, the arch 
unrepentant party capitalist roader, played the commander’s role in vehemently stirring up 
the right deviationist wind which culminated in the counter-revolutionary political incident 
at Tiananmen Square. Before the Great Cultural Revolution he was the No. 2 chieftain of Liu 
Shaoqi’s bourgeois headquarters.”
As to the Incident itself, the radicals employed the tactic of ‘bad elements’. The pur-
pose was to divide the participants of the protests into a minority of ‘bad elements’ and 
a majority of hapless, but innocent people, who were only misled by the minority (e.g., 
人民日报 8.4.1976b): “a tiny handful of bad elements with ulterior motives made use of 
the Qingming Festival to deliberately create a political incident.” The plausibility of such 
1996, 402-403; Teiwes & Sun 2004, 229). MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 427) report that 59 people were 
jailed with only three left uncleared of the charges of counter-revolution, when the verdict of the ‘incident’ was 
overturned. Baum’s (1996, 36) number of four thousand arrests presumably refers to the whole campaign, as 
other sources indicate that there were only some hundred people left on the Square as the militia operation 
began.  
29  There had been ‘counter-revolutionary disturbances’ in other cities as well in early April. In Hunan, one 
‘activist’ was killed by a mob of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ (Hook et al. 1976, 667-669).
30  MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008 431-432) note how inconsistent the numbers of the detained and jailed 
during this campaign are, as varying from between 10 000 losing their lives, to merely 390 arrested.
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claims was in question however: the securitisation of the incident was not easy because 
it was difficult to explain why the incident could last as long as it did, if it indeed merely 
was instigated by ‘a handful of bad elements’. Nevertheless, such problems did not con-
cern the Politburo, which followed this tactic in the legitimisation of the decision to dis-
miss Deng and promote Hua Guofeng (人民日报 18.4.1976): “The whole nation warmly 
supports the two resolutions of the party central committee, vehemently denounces the 
counter-revolutionary activities of a handful of class enemies, and indignantly criticises the 
crimes of Deng Xiaoping in attempting to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
restore capitalism.” 31
The nationwide crackdown that followed the suppression of the incident was rein-
forced by a series of articles in 人民日报 (e.g., 10.4.1976; 18.4.1976; 16.5.1976). For ex-
ample, the April 10 editorial titled “A Great Victory” depicted Deng Xiaoping as both saved 
and deposed by Chairman Mao with language that followed the formulation of the first 
editorial: “a counter-revolutionary political incident was perpetrated at Tian’anmen Square 
by a handful of class enemies who openly hoisted the ensign of supporting Deng Xioping and 
carried out counter-revolutionary activities. This was by no means accidental. […] They 
tried to hoodwink the masses and created disturbances. They were extremely insidious and 
ruthless!” The editorial explained the actions of the militia as defence against ‘insidious 
counter-revolutionaries’: “No matter how frenziedly this handful of class enemies behaved, 
they could not withstand a single blow and they disintegrated in no time when confronted 
by the revolutionary masses and the powerful dictatorship of the proletariat.”
Such articles sought to provide further evidence of a counter-revolutionary current 
that was swiftly quelled in April, and Deng Xiaoping was depicted as the Imre Nagy –like 
mastermind behind this current. The post-hoc maintenance of the securitisation of the 
‘Incident’, put the ‘disturbances’ on a security continuum of counter-revolutionary events 
and ‘masterminds’ (人民日报 16.5.1976): “In the past decade we have waged struggles 
against Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping. All these struggles have proved that the 
bourgeoisie is indeed inside the Communist Party. […] The crux of the matter here lies in 
the fact that these capitalist roaders are persons in power who have sneaked into the very 
structure of the dictatorship of the proletariat.” The nature of the 1956 Hungarian uprising 
that had been used as a negative example since the Anti-Rightist Movement following the 
‘Hundred Flowers period’, and throughout the Cultural Revolution, was once more har-
nessed in attempts to discredit Deng Xiaoping. However, the editorials and other articles 
failed to provide evidence for such claims. The attempted securitisation did not convince: 
legitimacy for the Central Committee’s decision to remove Deng Xiaoping’s positions 
within and outside the party was not ensured. Indeed, Deng remained the last living sym-
bol of pragmatism and rationality among the highest echelons of the party.
31  The removal of Deng was portrayed as crucial (人民日报 18.4.1976): “The small number of people who were 
duped have been quickly awakened. The situation is excellent.”
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9.3. The Securitisation Process
As already outlined above, this securitisation process began with a debate within the Po-
litburo, which decided to make a securitising move towards Mao. Once Mao had approved 
this interpretation of the events, the Politburo operationalised it. Part of this operation-
alisation included both security operations and the public framing of the ‘incident.’
9.3.1. The Immediate Securitisation
The public securitisation of the unrest at Tiananmen Square began in the evening of April 
5 as Wu De’s (人民日报 8.4.1976b) speech was broadcast through loudspeakers on the 
Square.32 Wu claimed (Box 32) that “a tiny handful of bad elements with ulterior motives 
made use of the Qingming Festival to deliberately create a political incident, directing their 
spearhead at Chairman Mao and the party center in a vain attempt to change the general 
orientation of the struggle to criticise that unrepentant capitalist roader’s revisionist line 
and beat back the right-deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts.”33 To indicate the se-
riousness of the situation, he used several watchwords of institutionalised security. He 
warned (Box 33) that “We must clearly see the reactionary nature of this political incident, 
expose the schemes and intrigues of the bad elements, heighten our revolutionary vigilance, 
and avoid being taken in.”  
Furthermore, he required (Box 34) that revolutionary masses and comrades take up 
class struggle as the key link and defend Mao as well as the capital by ‘dealing resolute 
blows’ to the counter-revolutionaries: “Revolutionary masses and cadres of the municipal-
ity must take class struggle as the key link, act immediately, and by concrete action defend 
Chairman Mao, defend the Party Central Committee, defend Chairman Mao’s proletarian 
revolutionary line and the great capital of our socialist motherland, deal resolute blows at 
counter-revolutionary sabotage and develop the excellent situation.” This had to occur by 
leaving the Square immediately so as to avoid helping or playing into the hands of the ‘re-
actionaries’: “Today, there are bad elements carrying out disruption and disturbances and 
engaging in counter-revolutionary sabotage at Tiananmen Square. Revolutionary masses 
must leave the square at once and not be duped by them.” This repeated securitising move 
for control proved effective, as the majority vacated the Square. The some 200 people 
who resisted were arrested by the security forces that took over the square starting from 
9:30 pm.
The Politburo reconvened during the night of April 5-6 to discuss reports on the sup-
pression. While PLA troops were on standby, the Politburo decided to only mobilise the 
militia. Hua Guofeng framed the events as counter-revolutionary and proposed that a 
32  A transcript of the speech was published in 人民日报 on April 8 1976.
While Wu’s role in the securitisation of the events proved to be fatal for his career, Deng Xiaoping’s daugh-
ter (Deng 2002, 396-404) notes that he was ‘merely following orders.’ As such, Wu then was not the ‘true’ 
securitising actor even though as the Mayor he had the formal duty to securitise for control in such events. 
This underlines how it is not that important who is talking security, or how sincerely or wholeheartedly that 
someone talks security; far more relevant is in the name of what and with which authority security is spoken on 
such occasions. It must also be kept in mind that securitisation for control requires formal authority.
33  In the published version of the speech, ‘that unrepentant capitalist roader’ was named as Deng Xiaoping.
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nationwide notice should be drafted to explain the nature of the incident.34 In terms of se-
curitisation theory, Hua proposed a post-hoc public securitisation of the events. The pub-
lic notice would define the events since official news from the square had, thus far, been 
suppressed.35 Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao, who accepted the handling of the events, 
and declared that ‘the nature has changed, get rid of him.’36 Mao similarly authorised the 
publication of the national notice as well as Wu De’s April 5 speech in Renmin Ribao.
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
‘Bad elements’ have created a political incident and are en-




1) Wu refers to the ongoing campaign against reversing cor-
rect verdicts as evidence of the reactionary nature of the ‘dis-
turbances.’ 
2) It is not obvious that placing wreaths on the Monument of 
the People’s Heroes is reactionary or counter-revolutionary.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the commemo-
rative activities on Tiananmen Square being counter-revolu-
tionary by nature represents an actual state of affairs
Box 32: Wu De’s claim speech act on April 5 1976 (人民日报 8.4.1976b).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
The revolutionary masses can be duped by the ‘bad elements’ 
and fail to see the reactionary and counter-revolutionary na-
ture of the ‘disturbances.’
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The ‘revolutionary masses’ have a reason to believe the 
‘disturbances’ could be reactionary (disturbances have been 
deemed counter-revolutionary in the past, for example) and 
that it is not in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the ‘disturbances’ are counter-revo-
lutionary.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the revolution-
ary masses being taken in by counter-revolutionary ‘bad ele-
ments’, if the masses do not raise their vigilance, is not in the 
best interest of the ‘masses.’
Box 33: The warn speech act in Wu De’s speech on April 5 1976 (人民日报 8.4.1976b).
34  See the document ‘中央政治局四月五日会议记录’ (2002 [1976]). See also Deng (2002, 396-404; Teiwes & 
Sun 2004, 231).
35  See MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 428, 602) on how news of the ‘incident’ was suppressed until April 
8.
36  See the document ‘毛泽东关于天安门事件性质问题所写的字迹及毛远新和毛泽东谈话的笔记’ (2002 
[1976]), and MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008, 428).
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III speech act: Require
Propositional content
The revolutionary masses and cadres must take class struggle 
as the key link and act immediately in various ways so as not 
be duped by the ‘counter-revolutionary bad elements.’
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The masses and cadres are able to carry out Wu’s require-
ments.
2) It is not obvious that the masses and the cadres would car-
ry out the requirements on their own in the normal course of 
events.
3) The requirements are necessary to prevent the ‘bad ele-
ments’ from duping the masses (the reason to carry out the 
requirements).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that Wu’s requirements 
be carried out in virtue of not being duped by ‘counter-revolu-
tionary bad elements.’
Box 34: The require speech act in Wu De’s speech on April 5 1976 (人民日报 8.4.1976b). 
9.3.2. Securitisation after the Incident
On April 7, the Politburo met to resolve the immediate crisis and produced two Central 
Documents (9 and 10 respectively).37 The first promoted Hua to first vice-chairman of the 
Central Committee and Premier of the State Council and the second labelled the events as 
a “counter-revolutionary incident.” Further, Mao’s proposal to strip Deng of all his party 
positions was unanimously accepted and the Politburo declared “that the nature of the 
Deng Xiaoping problem has turned into one of antagonistic contradiction”, but also that 
he would be allowed “to keep his party membership so as to see how he will behave in the 
future” (Central Committee 1976, 663). This outcome of the frantic drafting of the official 
version of the nature of the ‘incident’ was then published in Renmin ribao the next day. 
Deng’s demotion was also made public and the demonstrations were publicly branded as 
a “counter-revolutionary political incident at Tiananmen Square” (人民日报 8.4.1976a).
The editorial claimed (Box 35) that a handful of class enemies organised a counter-
revolutionary political incident at Tiananmen Square: “a small handful of class enemies 
used the Qingming festival’s mourning of premier Zhou as a pretence for creating a counter-
revolutionary political incident in a premeditated, organised and planned manner.” The 
editorial listed various types of evidence for the counter-revolutionary nature of the ac-
tivities on the square, for example, that the ‘bad elements’ had made reactionary speech-
es, posted reactionary poems, distributed leaflets, and agitated for counter-revolutionary 
organisations. Indeed, the editorial went into great detail on the violent activities of the 
counter-revolutionaries, with examples like overturning vehicles, beating people and set-
ting ablase a barracks building on the square.
The editorial further warned (Box 36) that the activities of the ‘counter-revolutionary 
bad elements’ intended to restore capitalism and amounted to similar counter-revolu-
37  The two documents are published in Chinese in 两次天安门事件 (1989, 19).
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tionary plans as Lin Biao’s earlier plan for a coup d’état: “The clamours of these counter-
revolutionaries about combating ‘Qin Shihuang’38 and demanding ‘genuine Marxism-Len-
inism’ were out-and-out counter-revolutionary agitation in the same vein as the language 
used in Lin Biao’s plan for a counter-revolutionary coup d’état, Outline of Project ‘571.’”39
 
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
A small handful of class enemies created a counter-revolu-




1) The editorial listed various types of evidence for the coun-
ter-revolutionary nature of the activities on the square. 
2) It is not obvious that placing wreaths and poems on the 
Monument of the People’s Heroes is reactionary or counter-
revolutionary.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the activities on 
Tiananmen Square being counter-revolutionary by nature 
represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 35: The claim speech act in the April 8 人民日报 editorial.
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
The ‘revolutionary masses’ can be duped by the ‘bad ele-
ments’ and not see the reactionary and counter-revolution-
ary nature of the ‘disturbances.’
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The ‘revolutionary masses’ have a reason to believe the 
‘disturbances’ could be reactionary (disturbances have been 
deemed counter-revolutionary in the past for example) and 
that it is not in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the ‘disturbances’ are counter-revo-
lutionary.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the ‘revolution-
ary masses’ being duped by counter-revolutionary ‘bad ele-
ments’, if the masses do not raise their vigilance, is not in the 
interests of the ‘revolutionary masses.’
Box 36: The warn speech act in the April 8 人民日报 editorial.
38  Qin was the first emperor of China, and the most hated political figure in China. Mao often compared himself 
to Qin.
39  The title given to the plan to assassinate Mao.
The use of Lin Biao as a watchword for a national security threat, illustrates how the functions of signifieds can 
remain the same but the signifiers change: Lin, who had himself used the threat of a coup as a political ploy, had 
himself become a signifier for the threat of counter-revolutionary coups.
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The editorial finally explained (Box 37) that the worker-militia, the police and the mili-
tary all defended Chairman Mao, the Central Committee, Chairman Mao’s Revolutionary 
line, and the capital against the ‘counter-revolutionary bad elements’: “[O]n receiving an 
order from the Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, tens of thousands of worker-
militiamen, in co-ordination with the people’s police and PLA guards, took resolute meas-
ures and enforced proletarian dictatorship. With high morale, the heroic Beijing militiamen 
valiantly filed into Tian’anmen Square and mounted powerful counterattacks.”
III speech act: explain
Propositional content
The defence of Chairman Mao, the Central Committee, Chair-
man Mao’s Revolutionary line, and the capital against the 
‘counter-revolutionary bad elements’ was the reason for reso-




1) Militia and other security forces were ordered in and the 
protests were dispersed.
2) It is not obvious why the people mourning Zhou Enlai had to 
be dispersed using force.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the dispersion of 
the protests as a way of defending Chairman Mao, the Central 
Committee, Chairman Mao’s Revolutionary line, and the capital 
against the ‘counter-revolutionary bad elements’, represents 
the actual state of affairs.
Box 37: The explain speech act in the April 8 人民日报 editorial.
As was already noted, the securitisation of the Incident was not straightforward.40 How-
ever, the radical faction considered it a success because even though Deng was allowed to 
retain his party membership and was not dragged into the streets, he had been usurped 
from positions of leadership.41 There are also other signs that the securitisation of the 
incident had been ‘successful’ within the leadership: this securitisation functioned as a 
basis for further practical security activities. General Chen Xilian, who was in charge of 
the Military Affairs Commission, ordered the drawing up of contingency plans to deal 
with further possible ‘counter-revolutionary political incidents’,42 while Wang Hongwen 
ordered the prevention of similar events in Shanghai (人民日报 8.4.1976a, 436-437). 
The security nature of the incident was reinforced through a series of mass rallies that 
were organised to demonstrate how the ‘counter-revolutionary countercurrent’ had been 
40  Some militia units had not wanted to take part in the April 5 crackdown on Tiananmen (MacFarquhar & 
Schoenhals 2008, 437-438).
41  The elation of the faction becomes evident from Yao Wenyuan’s diary entry for the day: “Three basic lessons 
learned from crushing this counter-revolutionary coup d’état are to act in the interests of the proletariat, to smash 
all bourgeois democratic conventions and fetters (like convening a plenum and having an ‘election’, or obtaining 
the approval of the ‘National People’s Congress’, etc.), and to take decisive organisational action to get rid of bad 
people” (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 430).
42  One of the three contingency plans for Beijing was put into action, and Shanghai similarly put on immediate 
‘war preparedness’, on September 9 1976 when Mao died (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 441).
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thwarted by the correct decisions of the party centre (see MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 
2008, 432-433).43 The post-hoc maintenance of the securitisation continued throughout 
the rest of April and late May. The securitisation of the incident was used to legitimise 
the dismissal of Deng, by weaving it into the general tapestry of the Cultural Revolution 
in a series of articles in 人民日报 (e.g., 10.4.1976; 18.4.1976). For example, the commen-
tary (人民日报 16.5.1976) on the May 16 Circular that was one of the key documents in 
launching the Cultural Revolution claimed (Box 38) that “Deng Xiaoping, the arch unre-
pentant party capitalist roader, played the commander’s role in vehemently stirring up the 
right deviationist wind which culminated in the counter-revolutionary political incident at 
Tiananmen Square.” The incident worked as evidence of the legitimacy of and need for 
the decade of struggle against the bourgeoisie who had ‘sneaked into the party’: “Deng 
and company feverishly forged counter-revolutionary opinions by various base means to 
mislead the people and create splits […] to clear the way for Deng Xiaoping to usurp the 
party leadership and seize state power.” 
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
Deng Xiaoping stirred up the ‘right deviationist wind’, culmi-
nating in the ‘Incident’, in order to clear the way to usurp the 
party leadership and seize state power.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The commentary lists various types of evidence for the 
counter-revolutionary nature of Deng Xiaoping. 
2) It is not obvious that as a veteran of the revolutionary war 
and a leader of the party, Deng is a reactionary or a counter-
revolutionary.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that Deng Xiaoping 
being a counter-revolutionary attempting to usurp power 
represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 38: The claim speech act in the 人民日报 (16.5.1976) commentary on the May 16 
circular.
Furthemore, the commentary warned (Box 39) that Deng Xiaoping’s “line is a continua-
tion of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line pushed by Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.” This 
line was to be considered extremely dangerous: “If this line were followed, not only would 
the achievements of the Great Cultural Revolution be nullified but also those of the entire 
Chinese revolution. The capitalist road taken by Deng Xiaoping would lead back to the semi-
colonial and semi-feudal old China and reduce China to an appendage of imperialism and 
social-imperialism.” This warning was facilitated by references to the May 16 Circular and 
the securitisation contained in it: “their struggle against us is one of life and death, and 
there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them, too, can be nothing 
but a life-and-death struggle.”
43  ‘Evidence’ of the role of the  ‘bad elements’ behind the counter-revolutionary violence was also later 




II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Deng’s line would nullify the achievements of the CR and 
those of the revolution itself and China would return to being 




1) The readers of the commentary have a reason to believe 
Deng’s line could be counter-revolutionary (leading party 
figures had been uncovered as counter-revolutionaries in the 
past for example) and that this is not in their best interest.
2) It is not obvious that Deng’s policy lines are counter-rev-
olutionary (they had also been promoted by Zhou Enlai for 
example).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that following Deng Xi-
aoping’s line, leading to the nullification of the revolution and 
the subjugation of China, is not in the interests of the read-
ers.
Box 39: The warn speech act in the 人民日报 (16.5.1976) commentary on the May 16 
circular.
Lastly, the commentary’s conclusion was a call for control along the lines of the ‘way 
out’ that had already been utilised for a decade (Box 40): “We have won great victories, 
but the struggle has not come to an end. The struggle to criticise Deng Xiaoping’s counter-
revolutionary revisionist line must be carried on in depth.” The requirements were already 
a ‘standard operating procedure’: “The broad masses of party members, cadres and other 
people must conscientiously study Chairman Mao’s important instructions concerning the 
Great Cultural Revolution and the anti-right deviationist struggle, study the theory of con-
tinuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, get clear on the questions of 
where the bourgeoisie is to be found and enforcing all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoi-
sie, and persist in combating and preventing revisionism and continuing the revolution.”
In terms of immediate effects, the security system was successfully mobilised, and the 
autonomous social unrest of April 1976 suppressed. However, as the year went on, there 
were signs of resistance to the line of discrediting Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, it gradually 
became clear that the benefits of securitising the Incident and outmanouvering Deng 
were to be short-lived for the radical faction. The politics of securitising the Incident can 
be deemed to have been a failure for the radical faction and even Hua Guofeng. This is 
evident from the way the ‘Counter-revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’ 
was relabelled as the ‘Revolutionary Political Incident at Tiananmen Square’ in 1978, 
along with the return of Deng Xiaoping.
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III speech act: Require
Propositional content
Party members, cadres and others must get clear on the ques-
tions of where the bourgeoisie is to be found, enforce all-round 
dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, and persist in combating 
and preventing revisionism and continuing the revolution.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The masses and cadres are able to carry out the require-
ments of the commentary.
It is not obvious that the masses and the cadres would carry 
out the requirements on their own in the normal course of 
events.
2) The requirements are necessary to prevent Deng Xiaoping 
and company from duping the masses and usurping the party 
leadership and state power (reason for carrying out the re-
quirements).
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the requirements 
of the commentary be carried out in virtue of not being duped 
by Deng Xiaoping’s counter-revolutionary revisionist line.
Box 34: The require speech act in the 人民日报 (16.5.1976) commentary on the May 16 
circular.
9.4. Desecuritisation of the ‘Incident’ – A Failure of the Politics of 
        Securitisation
After the ‘Lin Biao Affair’, disillusionment with the Cultural Revolution had become in-
creasingly apparent as was evident, for example, from the audacity of dissident posters 
put up (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008). Another indication of this was the mobilisa-
tion in defiance of a leading faction that happened in March-April 1976. Nothing like this 
had ever been seen before. Indeed, the suppression of the Tiananmen protests was the 
gravest crisis in the 27 years of Communist rule in China. The Politburo had, in effect, con-
demned not only the millions of people involved in the commemorations of Zhou in the 
capital, but also the countless hundreds of thousands or even millions who had partici-
pated in similar demonstrations elsewhere. Thus, if there truly were such a huge number 
of counter-revolutionaries in China, the party was indeed in grave danger. However, de-
spite the various contingency plans, no similar major events occurred during the summer 
of 1976. Yet, passive resistance remained, and ‘ominous signs’ of Mao’s ‘dynasty’ coming 
to a close were ‘read’ from many developments and events throughout the year.
As was already noted, the securitisation of the ‘Tiananmen Incident’ was not well re-
ceived as it happened, and it remained an unpopular verdict; while the securitisation suc-
ceeded in terms of immediate control, the post-hoc securitisation of the Incident failed to 
provide legitimacy for the suppression of the popular activities. The official story did not 
receive much support either. In many places investigators ran into a wall of silence and 
meetings condemning the demonstrations were passive. Many officials did not see the 
investigations through to conclusion. On a more individual level, people who had copied 
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poems and eulogies from the square hid their copies for later use (Garside 1981, 136).
Such resistance was facilitated by the many natural signs traditionally seen to presage 
the fall of a dynasty that occurred in 1976. Even in New China, such traditional beliefs 
still held sway over people’s minds.44 The press published articles that reminded peo-
ple of such signs but argued that no one should believe them, a strong indicator that 
people still voiced these ‘superstitions’. As the anti-Deng campaign progressed, respect 
for authority declined and social discipline weakened. During the summer, strikes and 
labour unrest broke out. Peasants also broke free of collective landholdings to engage in 
individual farming. The crime rate too, rose steeply. The rules laid down for the anti-Deng 
campaign were widely flouted, armouries were broken into and arms seized for factional 
warfare, military units fought pitched battles with armed groups, and the commander of 
the armed forces facing Taiwan died under mysterious circumstances. The Party Centre 
too was split as the Gang fought with Hua Guofeng. (Garside 1981, 135-138; MacFarqu-
har & Schoenhals 2008, 435-436.)
With the death of Mao on September 9, the respite provided by the Tiananmen sup-
pression proved to be short-lived for the beneficiaries of the securitisation tactic. On Sep-
tember 11, Hua Guofeng began to deal with the ‘issue of the Gang of Four.’45 Hua securi-
tised Jiang’s faction to Li Xiannian, to whom Hua argued that to neglect to draw up a plan 
for action against them might be the “end of the party, the end of the country, and the end 
of all of us!” (quoted in MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 443). After debating various 
courses of action, Hua, Li Xiannian and Wu De eventually concluded that a coup-of-sorts 
would be the most favourable stratagem as the Gang did not have wide support within the 
PLA and its members were disliked among the general population. The immediate power 
struggle that followed Mao’s death, resulted in the fall of the ‘Gang of Four’ and their ar-
rest by Hua Guofeng on October 4 for “crimes against the party and against socialism” (中
发 16),46 and the ‘Gang’ was inserted into the continuum of counter-revolutionary party 
leaders and cliques (Renmin ribao 22.12.1976): “The crux of the Gang of Four’s crimes is 
to usurp party and state power.” 
After the ‘Gang of Four’ was toppled by Hua Guofeng’s faction, there were several calls 
for the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and the reassessment of the Tiananmen incident. 
In October, Hua defined the propaganda line on the Gang and Deng: both should be criti-
cised together; the Gang’s errors had been rightist rather than leftist; there should be 
silence on the Tiananmen incident; and there should be no criticism of anything Mao 
had ‘instructed or approved’ (Baum 1996, 43). Nevertheless, Hua was in a difficult posi-
tion as it seemed that placing the blame on just four individuals would be insufficient to 
signal ‘business to go on as usual.’ Accordingly, senior generals and other party veterans 
44  The popularity of Falungong in the 1990s illustrates how pre-socialist beliefs have still retained a base of 
support in the PRC (Case IV).
45  While this name for the radical faction became widely used after Hua’s coup, Mao had also used the term 
previously when he made Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen present self-criticisms: “Don’t function as a gang of 
four. Stop doing that any more. Why do you keep on doing so?” (quoted in Baum 1996, 31). Teiwes & Sun (2004, 
234) emphasise that the ‘Gang’ was not as solid or united as it is usually represented. There were disagreements 
among the four leading figures of the radical faction, and they were not very successful in coordinating or 
planning their moves after the death of Mao. All four leading figurers were also not disliked in the same fashion. 
See for example Deng (2002, 403) on how Wang Hongwen was not vilified in the same fashion as Jiang, Yao, 
and Zhang.
46  See MacFarquhar & Schoenhals (2008) for details on the arrests.
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indicated that they would not confirm Hua’s positions in the Central Committee, if Deng 
was not rehabilitated (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 452). Under such pressure, in 
the spring of 1977, Hua had agreed to characterise the April 4 demonstrations as having 
started out as peaceful and ‘reasonable’. By the summer of 1977, he had to concede his 
defeat: in July 1977, the 3rd Plenum of the 10th Central Committee adopted a resolution 
which restored Deng to all his former posts.47  Yet the Tiananmen Incident retained its 
counter-revolutionary label. The obvious reason for this was Hua’s and his loyalist fac-
tion’s active role in its forceful suppression  (Baum 1996, 43, 50).
In the winter of 1977-1978, despite constant popular pressure to recognise the 
Tiananmen demonstrations as revolutionary and against the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng 
clung to his position to retain the securitised status of the incident. For Hua, because 
the Four had held high positions in both the party and the state, they must have been 
correct in their judgement on the incident. However, Deng’s faction used their popular 
support to gain the advantage in the inner-party struggle. In a Central Committee work 
conference, Chen Yun appealed for the reversal of the verdicts on such figures as Peng 
Zhen and Yang Shangkun, and characterised the 1976 incident as ‘revolutionary’ (Baum 
1996, 62). Under increased pressure, Hua informally accepted this view and thus opened 
the way for the formal desecuritisation of the 1976 incident. On 15 November 1978 the 
Guangming Daily announced that a hundred thousand victims of the 1957 Anti-Rightist 
Campaign had been rehabilitated by the Central Committee, and that the Beijing Party 
committee had declared the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1976 as “completely revolu-
tionary” (Beijing Review 1995a [1978]; 人民日报 21.12.1978)48 with the people having 
heroically risen up against the ‘Gang of Four.’49 The Gang of Four was condemned for the 
fomentation of chaos, separation of revolution from production, the practice of fascist 
dictatorship, the conversion of Mao’s thoughts into a religious dogma, and the revival of 
feudal thinking (Dittmer 2002, 6). By separation of this ‘renegade faction’ from the CCP 
and its leadership, Mao’s infallibility was maintained. His authority was still required to 
justify decisions regarding major policy lines. 
Speaking to Japanese delegates on 26 November 1978 Deng dealt with his prior dis-
missal from office and the verdict of the Tiananmen incident by explaining that Hua 
Guofeng had not been able to meet with Mao and had been briefed on the events only by 
a member of the Gang of Four. “If Chairman Mao had been in good health, if he had been 
capable of making up his own mind, he would not have made such decisions” (quoted in 
Garside 1981, 207). Deng’s approach to desecuritising the incident was therefore objec-
tivist: the desecuritisation strategy was to argue that the threat claimed by the leftists 
had been illusory and deceitful. Thus, the Gang was portrayed as the instigators of the 
failed securitisation, which then facilitated the desecuritisation of the issue: the Gang 
was blamed for most of the mistakes the party had committed during the last ten years of 
Mao’s rule.50 Deng redescribed the protest against the leftist clique as not having been a 
47  See the document ‘中国共产党第十届中央委员会第三次全体会议关于恢复邓小平同志职务的决议 ’ (2002 
[1977]).
48  Deng had noted already on 19 September 1977 that in view of the large numbers of people involved in the 
Tiananmen incident, it definitely could not be labelled counter-revolutionary (Deng 1995a).
49  Wu De who had been ‘forced’ to securitise the Incident as it unfolded was dismissed from his posts.
50  Deng took de facto control of the party at the 11th National Party Congress, and rode the popular tide of 
more freedom of expression, even though Hua still retained his official positions. Zhao Ziyang became premier 
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threat to the party, but actually part of the revolution. This desecuritisation was formally 
authorised by the Central Committee. Paradoxically, the Central Committee had also been 
the securitising agent in the securitisation of the incident. But this desecuritising Central 
Committee contained the ‘other’ or the ‘target’ of the original securitisation. This ‘target’ 
turned out to be the actual ‘self ’ and the culprits of the ‘deceitful’ securitisation to be the 
‘true threat’. With such factional tactics, the 1976 Tiananmen incident had become com-
pletely desecuritised.51 However, the grammar of counter-revolutionary threats, as such, 
was retained for future use.
9.5. Conclusions of Analysis: When Securitisation as Politics Fails
The analysis of the case of the 1976 ‘counter-revolutionary incident’ indicates that the 
securitisation process consisted of various securitising moves that served different func-
tions (e.g., mobilising the system, control and post hoc legitimacy). These moves also had 
various audiences: the audience for raising the issue onto the agenda was Mao himself, as 
his authority was necessary to securitise the issue publicly; in the securitisation moves 
for control, the audience was those on the Square; in the post-hoc securitisation moves, 
the audience became the whole nation. All these moves functioned to legitimise the dis-
missal of Deng, the suppression on the Square, and the nation-wide crackdown that fol-
lowed. However, while the securitisation was used in factional politicking, it seems to 
have been a reaction to autonomous social unrest, and in that sense in stark contrast to 
the previous case of the Cultural Revolution.
The immediate level of referent objects in the securitisation of the ‘Tiananmen Inci-
dent’ comprised of Mao Zedong, the Central Committee of the party and the capital city of 
the socialist motherland. On a more profound level, however, the question was of social-
ism, the revolution and the sovereignty of the People’s Republic. All these were legitimate 
and widely accepted referent objects, and had been used throughout the previous decade 
to legitimise social foment on an unprecedented scale. This time, the ‘small handful of 
evildoers’ among the demonstrators that had ‘infiltrated and deceived the masses,’ were 
portrayed as engaged in counter-revolutionary troublemaking, restoring capitalism and 
leading China down the revisionist road.
Beyond this general pattern, there were several securitising actors during the process 
who voiced securitisation moves with varying functions. As the incident unfolded, the 
moves for raising the issue onto the agenda were contested. The securitising actor – or 
more precisely the securitising organ – was the Central Committee of the party. The radi-
cal faction, led by Jiang Qing was the most vocal in calling for the use of force. Upon hear-
ing of such moves, Mao agreed to the securitised formulation, but not to the use of force. 
As the Mayor of Beijing, Wu De was the securitising actor in the securitisation moves for 
control that were broadcast to the square before the security forces moved in. In the post-
in 1980, Hu Yaobang became party secretary in 1981 (the position of chairman was ended) and Deng became 
chairman of the Military Commission in 1981 (MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2008, 453). Hua however remained 
a regular member of the Central Committee until 2002, just six years before his death in 2008.
51  In the Resolution on issues of party history of 1981 (Beijing Review 1995c, 66), the incident is characterised 
as being“a demonstration of support for party’s correct leadership as represented by Comrade Deng Xiaoping. It 




hoc securitisation of the incident, the securitising actor became the Politburo. All of these 
actors’ ultimate authority emanated from Mao, whose approval was always necessary for 
any moves to take effect.
It seems that the Tiananmen Incident and its securitisation were a hinge-event: it was 
the first outburst of autonomous and trans-provincial social unrest during the PRC-era. 
The securitisation was also the last major process of the Cultural Revolution. The secu-
rity arguments presented in 1966 – that were the foundation of the legitimisation of the 
Cultural Revolution – had operated in the favour of Mao and the faction of Jiang Qing. The 
hinge that concluded the Cultural Revolution was in stark contrast: although Jiang fol-
lowed the pattern of the previous decade and seemed successful in the sense of mobilis-
ing the security system and suppressing the immediate threat of social unrest, in the final 
analysis, the politics of securitisation proved unsuccessful. This demonstrates that there 
can be no guaranteed success in securitisation processes, or in the politics of securitisa-
tion. But why was the 1976 process unsuccessful?
Whether threats are ’real’ or not, is not that relevant for security arguments; what 
is relevant is whether the security argument itself is accepted by relevant audiences, 
thus providing legitimacy, or some other political utility for the securitising actor. A ’real’ 
threat is thus not necessary for securitisation; politics that take a matter to be a threat, is 
sufficient. From this viewpoint, it is not relevant whether or not the demonstrators of the 
Tiananmen incident were threats to the party, but rather whether the construction of the 
incident as a security issue served its political function i.e., either legitimacy or control. 
While the initial suppression was successful, in the end, the securitisation of the Incident 
seems to have provided neither of these. The failure of the politics of securitisation had 
to do with factors beyond the securitisation moves themselves; the securitising actors in 
1976 had both the socio-political capital and the appropriate language at their disposal. 
However, the general flow of politics was against the securitising faction, and not even the 
power of security could save them. This illustrates how no-one can be guaranteed suc-
cess in the politics of securitisation, even if the securitisation itself is achieved.
The suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstration in 1976 was the party’s 
gravest crisis in its 27 years of rule in China. For the first time, there was wide popular 
resistance to a ruling faction, even if this was still not resistance against the party itself. 
The demonstrators supported the pragmatist politics that Zhou and Deng represented, 
and thus threatened the leftists, Mao’s political legacy of continuous revolution and rule 
by mass movements i.e., the Cultural Revolution itself. The security arguments were a 
fundamental aspect of the political battles that were fought in the tumultuous political 
atmosphere that anticipated Mao’s passing. It is important to realise here that the securi-
tisation was a means to an end; despite being a reaction rather than a proaction, the nega-
tive labelling of the demonstrations could be used against Deng Xiaoping and the policy 
lines he represented. In effect, the radicals suppressed a demonstration that supported 
another faction and was against them. 
There were several factors that both facilitated and impeded the success of the securi-
tisation of the Incident. In terms of functional actors, some security forces refused orders 




the media, it served the securitisation process without friction. It is important to note that 
the media was under the total control of the party, and more specifically on the national 
level, under the control of the radical faction. Thereby there was no independent source 
of mass communication. This had made many consumers of the Chinese media proficient 
in reading between the lines for hints as to what really was occuring in the shadow play of 
Chinese politics. The dismissal of Deng was apparently not viewed favourably, nor taken 
at face value for it seemed quite clear that the radical leftists were attempting to utilise 
this history of revisionist threats and their previous portrayal in the party-controlled me-
dia. This time, the facilitating effect of those threats was unsuccessful, as it was impos-
sible for most people to believe that Zhou had been a threat to the party. Furthermore, 
Deng seemed like the leader who would bring the policies of mass movements to an end 
and thus he became the symbol of reform and rationality. 
There were also other impeding factors for the success of the politics of securitisation. 
The year 1976 saw many events and ‘signs’ that indicated challenges to the stability of 
Chinese society. Those included Zhou’s death, the anti-Deng campaign (that summoned 
memories of the Cultural Revolution), a great meteorite shower in the Northeast (a tra-
ditional sign of a collapse of the dynasty), the Qingming demonstrations and a decline in 
Mao’s health, bad weather that affected the harvest, Marshal Zhu De’s death (as the sec-
ond great figure of the revolution that year), and the Tangshan earthquake that claimed 
half a million victims (also a presage to the end of dynasties). All these events facilitated 
the disapproval of the ruling leftist-clique, and impeded the security claims they pre-
sented.
When examining the success and failure of the securitisation, it is also important to 
note that the 1976 Tiananmen Incident was against an unpopular clique within the par-
ty, not against the party itself. The struggle over the verdict of the Incident, post hoc, 
remained an integral part of the power struggle that took place between the radicals, 
Hua Guofeng, and the pragmatist factions within the party. The ‘masses’ did not accept 
the branding of either Zhou or Deng as capitalist roaders, and especially the presenta-
tion of the incident as threatening the revolution. Thereby there was a clear way for its 
subsequent desecuritisation: the faction supported by the residents at the Square was 
the target of securitisation, but after the inner-party struggle was won, they were able, 
ironically, to also desecuritise themselves. Those securitisers who tried to securitise the 
Incident, lost the factional struggle, and in turn themselves ended up as the threats to the 
party. The reversal of the verdict of 1976 is also closely connected to the rehabilitation of 
other victims of Mao’s mass campaigns. It coincided with the rehabilitation of the victims 
of the Anti-Rightist campaign of the 1950s and tied in with the re-evaluation of the Cul-
tural Revolution as a whole. The failure of the politics of securitisation did, however, not 
mean the end of such practices.
The handling of the 1976 events signalled a profound change in Chinese society be-
yond the failure of the politics of securitisation for Jiang’s faction. Autonomous social 
unrest would come to characterise 1980s China. The reversal of the verdict of 1976 
functioned as a precedent: progressive movements that are first represented with nega-
tive frames may eventually be recognised as positive; many student movements in the 




Deng Xiaoping was the symbol for such possibilities, as he was the leading figure behind 
the millions of rehabilitations in the late 1970s. In contrast, he would be instrumental in 
the securitisation of another ‘incident’ on Tiananmen Square just over a decade later.
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The 1980s in China was a decade of transition to the post-Mao era of politics. The legacy 
of the Cultural Revolution still haunted Chinese society, but the number of societal liber-
ties gradually increased as the decade went on. The Communist Party leadership seemed 
to agree on the general direction of required reform, but how this reform should be im-
plemented and what its limits should be, was much less clear. The lack of clarity in and 
the divisiveness of this issue were apparent in the policy zig-zags that came to define the 
period. In the 1980s, there were altogether six cycles of fang/shou (放/收, fàng/shōu; let 
go/tighten): a periodical release of political and moral control followed by a clampdown 
(Baum 1996, 6). Each political ‘freeze’ was ‘warmer’ than the previous one, which indicat-
ed a general trend towards increased openness. The protest movement of 1989, however, 
resulted in a revival of discussion on ideological security (e.g., Deng 1993d, 347-349) and 
effectively a clamp down on all liberal political reform. The movement also proved to be 
the last of the large scale fang-shou cycles: whilst the reform of the economy continued 
after Deng’s southern tour in the early 1990s (see e.g., Fewsmith 2001), liberal political 
reform since the end of the 1980s has been non-existent.
China-watchers and scholars have scrutinised contemporary mainland Chinese pro-
test extensively, with a major focus on the 1989 student movement. Several studies were 
published immediately after the events unfolded. These include Salisbury (1989), a 
day-to-day first-hand account of the events, and Saich (1990) which puts together more 
scholarly analyses of the first impressions of the events. Han & Hua (1990) and Oksen-
berg et al. (1990) contain documents that were immediately available at the time.1 Many 
of these initial studies focused on the student movement and its ‘democratic image’ that 
was often misleadingly fused with the context of other global developments in the wake 
1  Various collections of documents on the events of 1989 have been especially significant for the present 
study e.g., 两次天安门事件 (1989) which compiles and compares documents from both the 1976 and the 1989 
Tiananmen ‘incidents’, Oksenberg et al. (1990) which presents the ‘basic documents’ of the 1989 case, while 
Nathan et al. (2001) contains a more comprehensive collection of documents on it; 張良 (2001a; 2001b) contain 
even more documents in Chinese. Han & Hua (1990) is a collection of various forms of student discourses 
during the spring of 1989. Yu & Harrison (1990) similarly contains texts from students, but also from workers 
and some military personnel too.  Zhao (2009) contains a journal Zhao Ziyang kept while under house arrest 
after being deposed.
10. Case III: The Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion of 1989
This is a most serious political struggle that concerns 




of the collapse of the Cold War discourse of 1989.2 The interest in the student movement 
has not waned later either.3 For example, Calhoun (1994a) is a general description of the 
events from the students’ viewpoint, Brook (1998) focuses on the military suppression 
of the movement, while Zhao (2004) provides a more elaborate sociological study of the 
student movement.4 Interest in the protests has even reached the level of individual ac-
tivists. Black & Munro (1993) contain interviews and ‘human level’ investigations of the 
lives of Chinese democracy activists ranging from the 1976 Tiananmen incident to the 
1989 movement, and Buruma (2001) traces the lives of the leading dissidents a decade 
after the protests.
The events of 1989 have a significant position in more general works as well. Baum 
(1996) embeds the 1989 events into the broader historical developments of post-Mao 
China, while others examine the repercussions of the events of 1989. Those studies that 
deal with Chinese nationalism in general (e.g., Hughes 2006) deserve to be mentioned 
here, as well as those that focus on the patriotic education campaign in particular (e.g., 
Wang 2008; Vickers 2009). There have also been several books that take the events of 
Tiananmen as their outset-point e.g., Suettinger (2003) and Vogel et al. (2004) in the field 
of Chinese foreign policy, and Fewsmith (2001) in the context of Chinese domestic poli-
tics. In general, ‘June Fourth’ is often viewed as a limit-event, also reflected in the titles of 
several books (e.g., Sullivan 1995).
In this body of research, the methods by which the student protestors attempted to le-
gitimise their movement have also attracted attention and a wide array of conceptualisa-
tions. For example, Jeffrey Wasserstrom (1994) has used Northrop Frye’s (1957) theory 
of genres to examine both Chinese and Euro-American narratives of the 1989 protest 
movement. He broadly demonstrates that while in the ‘West’ the protests are presented 
as a tragedy, in China they are presented as a romance.5 Elizabeth J. Perry notes the im-
portance of the ‘casting’ of various roles in the protest and the ‘theatrics’ of the events 
during the movement (Perry 2002a).  Likewise, Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasser-
strom (1994) have analysed the importance of political ‘street theatre’ and the repertoire 
of protest activities that were designed to mobilise support and defuse opposition by 
following the ‘script’ set by the May Fourth Movement of 1919.  In a similar vein, Frank 
N. Pieke (1994) argues that through what he refers to as ‘recontextualising’ the 1989 
movement, as the bearer of the historic mission of the past popular movements in China, 
the activists gained very potent political leverage and they were therefore harder to sup-
press.  Craig C. Calhoun (1994b) has drawn directly on new social movement literature 
and highlights the importance of studying ‘identity politics’ in the 1989 movement and 
2  Bergère (2003 [1992]) was an early exception to the general trend of teleological expectations of the PRC 
following the rest of the Socialist World during the misnomered ‘End of History’ (Fukuyama 1992).
3  The student movement is an important aspect of Asikainen et al. (2009) where the perspective of  the events 
spans two decades.
4  Callahan (2006) views the activities of the movement as part of the cultural resistance in the Asia Pacific. 
Also Weller (1994) positions the students into a longer history and context of resistance, chaos, and control in 
China.
5  Callahan (2006, 86-92) has studied a photography book on the protest movement (‘June Four: A Chronicle of 
the Chinese Democratic Uprising’ 1989) published in Hong Kong, and concurs with Wasserstrom’s conclusion 
of narratives presented from the point of view of the protesters as often forming a romance. The analysis of 
these kinds of images could be one way to approach the study of images in real securitisation processes too, 
especially as the PLA also published its own ‘counterpart’ of images of ‘June 4th’ (解放军画报社 1989) which, in 
turn, emphasised the heroism of the soldiers and vilified the violence of the protesters.
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in Chinese social mobilisation in general. Indeed, identities and roles, even the choice of 
settings, help legitimise political acts for those who might otherwise oppose them, in that 
they were not properly or appropriately motivated (Edelman 1972, 100). This function of 
the setting of political acts is evident in the protest activities of the student movement of 
1989, which utilised various symbolically loaded ‘theatrics’ and settings as part of their 
protest activities.
I would like to add to these viewpoints that the 1989 Student Movement also demon-
strates how securitisation theory can be used to study both resistance and its suppres-
sion. Security arguments and their contestation represent moves in a ‘game’ of legitimate 
social mobilisation and its suppression. The focus here is thus on the security arguments 
played on both sides of the struggle.
10.1. The Historical and Socio-Political Context of the Student Movement
Chinese politics of the 1980s was characterised by the cynicism of the generations that 
had been ‘scarred’ by the Cultural Revolution. This led to three ‘belief crises’ during the 
decade: a crisis of faith in socialism, a crisis of belief in Marxism, and a crisis of trust in 
the party (Chen 1995). The party’s reaction to these crises was to legitimise its continued 
rule with strong patriotic arguments instead of the ideological fervour of the Mao-era. 
Even the Four Cardinal Principles promulgated by Deng (1995b) in 1979 can be read as 
being more patriotic and less ideological than those principles that previously guided 
Mao’s policies. The trend was also evident in Article 24 of the new PRC Constitution of 
1982: “the civic virtues of love of the Motherland, of the people, of labour, of science and of 
socialism; it educates the people in patriotism, collectivism, internationalism and commu-
nism, in dialectical and historical materialism.” This kind of laxing of ‘communist think-
ing’6 contributed to what came to define the 1980s: the Fang/Shou cycles. 
The reforms of the 1980s led to a more open political atmosphere, even though the 
crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement at the turn of the 1980s had taken away the 
most optimistic attitudes vis-à-vis political reform. The leadership reacted to increased 
activity in society with campaigns such as those against ‘spiritual pollution’ and ‘bour-
geois liberalisation’ (Deng 1993a; Deng 1993c; Tong 1988).7 This formed a pattern of ebb 
and flow of relaxing and tightening political control in the 1980s. Democracy activists 
and students were prominent figures in these various social movements, who marched 
under the banners of ‘socialism’ and ‘patriotism.’8 Such social foment had noticeable ef-
fects. For instance, the reform oriented Hu Yaobang had to step down from the position 
of party secretary in 1987, formally due to the leniency he had displayed towards dem-
onstrating students. Indeed, from the point of view of the students, the official reaction to 
the 1986 student protests had been mild. This was largely interpreted as a signal that the 
6  As Hughes (2006, 23) notes, the core value of ‘communist thinking’ is missing from this post-Mao formula-
tion of virtue under Deng Xiaoping.
7  Security arguments were evident in these as well, as in Deng’s (1993a) 1985 speech on bourgeois liberalisa-
tion: “In China, bourgeois liberalisation means taking the capitalist road and leads to disunity. I am not talking 
about the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland now but about unity on the mainland. Bourgeois liberalisa-
tion would plunge our society into turmoil and make it impossible for us to proceed with the work of construction. 
To check bourgeois liberalisation is therefore a matter of principle and one of vital importance for us.”
8  The party eventually adopted these as its own official line, as Jiang Zemin announced in 1998 that ‘socialism’ 
and ‘patriotism’ are ‘by nature the same’ (quoted in Hughes 2006, 58).
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party had changed in terms of consenting dissent (Béja 2009, 6). However, the reaction 
to the protests just three years later was dramatically different. As Bergère (2003) notes, 
something was significantly different in 1989 in comparison to the previous unrest of the 
decade. 
With hindsight, the deposed Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang (2009, 4-5) listed three rea-
sons for the students’ activities: 1) Party Secretary Hu Yaobang’s positive image as an 
uncorruptable promoter of reform, 2) discontent with Hu’s demotion in 1987, and 3) the 
backing off from the path of reform in 1988. Although Zhao retained the view that there 
were people on the streets with ulterior motives, for him, they were only a small minor-
ity in comparison to those with ‘legitimate’ grievances. Beyond Zhao’s perceptions, four 
main factors have been identified that together facilitated the formation of the largest au-
tonomous protest in the PRC-era, both in terms of the absolute numbers of participants 
and the broadness of that participation.
The first of these factors was that the international environment appeared more fa-
vourable towards political freedoms. Generally, the mood in society was also coming to 
a threshold of endurance as the economy was overheating and the officially promoted 
principles of equality were clearly flouted in more and more extravagant forms. By the 
end of the 1980s, particularly university students experienced a form of Zeitgeist that 
encouraged social activism. The ‘people power’ that had toppled the authoritarian order 
in the Philippines and other developments towards some form of democracy in South 
Korea and the Republic of China (on Taiwan) were Asian examples of possible change. In 
the Soviet Union and the European socialist states, the increased political leeway made 
voicing critique seem more ‘feasible’ in Chinese socialism as well (Manion 1990; Wass-
erstrom 2009),9 especially as Sino-Soviet relations were improving. The Chinese situa-
tion in the 1980s seemed undeniably backward in comparison to these developments, 
and even potentially fatal for the market-oriented model of development (Walder 2009, 
258) promoted by Deng and implemented by his ‘whiz grandpas’, Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang.
The other three factors were primarily domestic. Firstly, the Cultural Revolution had 
left deep scars on many, and the liberal atmosphere on many university campuses con-
tributed to the plural crises of faith prevalent in the Zeitgeist. A significant number of 
Chinese intellectuals and students felt alienated from the political order and not all these 
intellectuals or students acquiesced to the official narrative for the disasters of the Cul-
tural Revolution as only the fault of a few misguided leaders. Secondly, the party itself was 
deeply divided on the main issues of the 1980s: economic reform and political liberalisa-
tion. The reform period that had begun in 1978 had not shared out its benefits evenly, 
and students and intellectuals were concerned about their future and the corruption that 
seemed chronic in the CCP. The continuation of economic reforms was under threat from 
leftist conservatives, while many proponents of these reforms advocated reform of the 
political system as well. This division resulted in stark and constant policy shifts, which 
further contributed to the instability of everyday life in China and made the future of 
economic reforms seem uncertain. Finally, the constant economic policy twists and turns 
also exacerbated the negative effects of the overheated economy e.g., in 1988 the official 
inflation rate exceeded 25 percent so that although wages had been nominally growing, 
9  This is already explicit in Wang Dan’s (1990) essay in March of 1989.
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purchasing power had been lost.
All these factors contributed to why all segments of society, except peasants (O’Brien 
2009), supported and joined the students calling for openness, dialogue and an end to of-
ficial corruption. It is important to note that the students were against corruption, nepo-
tism, and general bad governance, and not against socialism or the party as such.10 These 
themes resonated with other segments of society. Thus, when combined with a tactically 
fortuitous opportunity, the student movement of 1989 began in earnest.
The seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement was approaching in the 
spring of 1989.11  Student activists were already prepared for political activity, when the 
sudden death of the previously deposed reformist CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang on 
April 15 1989 provided them with an opportunity to begin protest activities earlier. Like 
in 1976, the death of a popular statesman provided the opportunity for protest in 1989. 
A key event was the April 22 official memorial service of Hu Yaobang, where the govern-
ment did not receive the petition of the students presented in a very emotional manner. 
The authorities’ initial tolerance of the mourning cum protest gave the students a politi-
cal opportunity to widen their activities, which then spread quickly from the campuses to 
Tiananmen Square in Beijing and to other cities and provinces.12
Division in the top leadership became evident in the official media’s extensive, and 
even sympathetic, reporting of the students’ activities, in addition to Zhao’s conciliatory 
speeches on the protests. Low level officials and retired party cadres also spoke in favour 
of the students (Walder 2009, 259).13 For the media savvy, this was an indication that 
there was room to vent frustrations.14 Thus, as the escalating student activities were not 
unambiguously suppressed, other segments of society began to express their support 
for the students and to voice their own and more specific problems.15 Both students and 
intellectuals saw that continuing and widening the reforms to cover the political sector 
was the only way to develop China and lift it out of its economic problems. However, the 
movement did not have a common message, as everyone voiced their ideas independent-
ly. There were several cliques among the students,16 whose demands ranged from ending 
corruption to the toppling of party rule altogether. 
10  After May 13 the students had only two demands: dialogue with the authorities and an official affirmation 
of the protests.
11  See Perry (1999) on the political role of anniversaries in China.
12  While the protests at Tiananmen Square, and the iconic image of the ‘Tank Man’ captured the collective 
impression of the events of 1989, protest was a national phenomenon and force was used outside of Beijing in 
other parts of China. See Nathan et al. (2001) for official reports on these events.
13  See for example ‘Some PLA Officers Send Open Letter to Central Military Commission’ (1990).
14  For example, workers were eventually allowed to enter the students’ headquarters on Tiananmen Square 
as ‘bodyguards.’ However, even here the students retained their elitist attitude towards the other segments of 
society who participated in the mass demonstrations. 
Fatefully, the workers set up their own autonomous worker’s unions. This seems to have been one of the most 
important tipping points towards the eventual use of force. In the history of protest in China, student protests 
have been tolerated to a much greater extent than workers’ protest, and this tendency was reflected in the 
convictions given after the suppression as well.
15  See for example ‘Fourteen Beijing Press Units Send Open Letter to CCP Central Committee and State Council’ 
(1990) and ‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions Issues Statement’ (1990).




10.2. Authorities’ Tactics: Divide and Rule
Much in the same way as in 1976, the central securitising tactic that the authorities em-
ployed against the students was to divide the participants of the protests into a minority 
of ‘bad elements’ and a majority of hapless but innocent people; the latter were allegedly 
being misled by the minority of degenerate ‘troublemakers’ and ‘counter-revolutionar-
ies’ with ulterior motives.17 This ‘bad element’ tactic would be employed several times 
in the authorities’ attempts to destroy the moral ground of the movement and thus deny 
its symbolic capital.18  This tactic was already present in the initial public securitisation 
move of the 1989 movement in the Renmin ribao editorial of April 26: “Taking advantage 
of the situation, an extremely small number of people spread rumors, attacked the CCP and 
state leaders by name, and instigated the masses to break into the Xinhua Gate at Zhong-
nanhai.” The problem was not the patriotic students: “The students on the square were 
themselves able to consciously maintain order.”, but the people exploiting them: “However, 
after the memorial meeting, an extremely small number of people with ulterior motives 
continued to take advantage of the young students’ feelings of grief.”
The stance prevailed throughout the securitisation process of the 1989 movement and 
was maintained even after the declaration of martial law and the mobilisation of the mili-
tary to clear Tiananmen Square. The real target of the harsh action, it was claimed, was 
not the masses of patriotic but naïve students, but the anti-China forces that had manipu-
lated the students and exploited the movement as part of their counter-revolutionary 
plan targeted at the socialist system and Chinese sovereignty.  As Deng Xiaoping (2004) 
argued: “The opponents are not only the masses who cannot distinguish right from wrong, 
but also a group of reactionaries and a large segment of the dregs of society.  They are at-
tempting to subvert the state and overthrow the CCP which is the essence of the issue.”
While the authorities divided the participants of the movement into innocent (or at 
least less guilty) mass followers and evil core activists, they remained reticent on who 
these bad elements exactly were in practice. This made it possible for them to sow inse-
curity within the ranks of the activists and thus raise the psychological cost of joining the 
movement, and thereby, to lower the cost of possible future hard repression. In practice, 
the ‘troublemakers’ were the leaders of the movement, which raised the cost of becom-
ing one. There was also another need for focusing the attention on a smaller group and 
not the rank and file of protest: to have cracked down on them, even in a rhetorical form, 
would have brought the CCP awkwardly close to opposing the ‘masses’ or the ‘people’. 
Such an impression would have rendered the party’s securitisation speech less potent.
Beyond the tactic of ‘bad elements’, the authorities presented the ‘troublemakers’ as 
jepordising the core values of China. One of the major securitising acts of the reform pe-
riod had been conducted by Deng Xiaoping in preparation for the first suppression of the 
Democracy Wall movement, when he gave a speech on the “four cardinal principles” on 
March 30, 1979 – keeping to the socialist road, upholding the proletarian dictatorship, lead-
ership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought (Deng 1995b, 174-175). 
17  Both hardliners and the more conciliatory Zhao Ziyang described the students and the broader masses of 
demonstrators in such terms.
18  The tactic of ‘bad elements’ was also evident in 1976 (Case II), in the securitisation of the Democracy Wall 
Movement (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006) and in the case of Falungong too (Case IV).
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In the spring of 1989 these principles were once again deployed as the referent object 
of securitisation.19 Deng argued that this new movement represented “bourgeois liber-
alism” and was directly opposed to these four cardinal principles (邓小平 2004). The 
hard-line premier, Li Peng (1990c), also characterised the essence of the movement as 
one of bourgeois liberalism versus the cardinal principles in his report on the work of the 
government in 1990: “In essence, it [the 1989 movement] manifested the sharp conflict 
between bourgeois liberalisation and the Four Cardinal Principles and an acute struggle 
between infiltration and anti-infiltration, between subversion and anti-subversion, and be-
tween the forces of peaceful evolution and against peaceful evolution.” The divisive and 
negative frame used by the authorities became the central issue in the struggle between 
the authorities and the activists; it made the movement appear an explicit threat to na-
tional security.
10.3. The Securitisation Process
The day after the news of Hu Yaobang’s death, hundreds of students went to Tianan-
men Square to place wreaths on the Monument of the People’s Heroes. Their number 
soon increased to tens of thousands and the period before the official memorial service 
witnessed the first mass rallies, the setting up of the first autonomous student organisa-
tions along with two demonstrations in front of the Xinhua Gate of the Zhongnanhai com-
pound of the party leadership. The clashes between security forces and students during 
the night of 18-19 of April suggested a possible end situation to the protests for the stu-
dents: they could eventually become martyrs. At this early stage, the conservative faction 
already began to show its concern with the developments.
10.3.1. Initial Securitisation Moves
Anxiety over the expanding and escalating student protest can be gauged by many a com-
ment made by members of the premier leadership. For example, Wang Zhen, one of the 
eight ‘elders’, stated that “These students are in rebellion, comrade Xiaoping. They have 
attacked Xinhua Gate. We have got to do something right away!” (王震 2001[1989], 155.) 
In this particular instance, the securitising actor was Wang Zhen and the audience Deng 
Xiaoping.20 Wang’s speech unit functions here as an example of the types of securitisation 
19  In his speech on these cardinal principles, Deng had already described how “certain bad elements” in the 
Democracy Wall movement had caused trouble by raising unreasonable demands and making accusations, 
“openly opposing the dictatorship of the proletariat” and “slandering Comrade Mao Zedong.” They had allegedly 
proclaimed that the “proletarian dictatorship is the source of all evils” and “criticised the Communist Party of 
China.” (Deng 1995b, 182.)  The other central referent objects for securitisation were the modernisation policy 
and social stability.  As Deng (ibid., 184) argued: “Departure from the four cardinal principles and talk about 
democracy in the abstract will inevitably lead to unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and anarchism, to the 
complete disruption of political stability, and to the total failure of our modernisation programme.” (Paltemaa & 
Vuori 2006.)
20  Other similar moves for raising the issue onto the agenda had both Deng and Zhao Ziyang as their 
audience. 
After the power-struggle with Hua Guofeng, the position of Party Chairman was abolished, and Deng did not 
hold formal positions beyond being the chairman of the Central Military Commission. De facto however, he was 
the premier leader of China, as the 12th party congress had decided in secret that the Politburo would consult 
the Central Advisory Committee (i.e., the eight party elders) on all important matters of policy. As the General 
Secretary after the dismissal of Hu Yaobang, Zhao was the de jure premier leader of the party-state. He was, 
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moves that aimed to raise the issue of the students’ activities onto the security agenda.21 
His speech unit includes a claim (Box 35), which is simultaneously a warning (Box 36): 
the students are in rebellion i.e., a threat to the party. This claim is substantiated with 
evidence (the students have attacked Xinhua Gate)22 and the move is completed with an 
urge (Box 37): we have got to do something. This urge is not, however, substantiated with 
any concrete suggestions.
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The students are in rebellion.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Wang provides evidence of this, by reporting that the stu-
dents have attacked Xinhua Gate. 
2) It is not obvious that students are rebelling, as the majority 
of students are considered to be patriotic.
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the students being in rebellion represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 35: The claim speech act of Wang’s speech unit (王震 2001[1989], 155).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content The students are in rebellion.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Deng has reason to believe that students could be rebelling 
(there have been student protests before) and that it is not in 
his best interest.
2) It is not obvious that the students are in rebellion (they 
could be protesting legitimately).
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the students being in rebellion is not in Deng’s best interest.
Box 36: The warn speech act of Wang’s speech unit (王震 2001[1989], 155).
however, de facto subordinate to the eight party elders. Interestingly, one of the ‘crimes’ Zhou was accused of 
after he was deposed was the televised revelation of this decision of Deng and the other party elders having the 
de facto premier position. 
21  Although Wang was one of the eight elders and thus in a position to raise such issues for Deng, analysis of 
his speech unit does not mean to suggest that Wang was behind the securitisation of the movement. His move 
is merely an example of this type of security speech. The mainstream understating is that Li Peng’s faction was 
gunning for the securitisation in an infight with Zhao Ziyang’s faction. Indeed, Zhao (2009, 6) reports that Li 
Peng made similar suggestions to him on April 19. These types of warnings appear to have been in the plural, as 
the investigative report (see Zhao 2009) on Zhao’s case lists as his first ‘crime’ the failure to respond to Hu Qili’s 
and Rui Xingwen’s warnings of turmoil (Zhao 2009, 63).
22  Although intellectuals have often been branded as undesirables in China, the progressive protest of students 
also has a special position in the pantheon of nationalist heroes in China. The May fourth movement is one of the 
most famous anti-foreign movements in China of the year 1919. This student movement has been considered 
to be the start of the ‘Chinese enlightenment’ and the rise of nationalism. The Chinese intellectual has also 
traditionally served the function of ‘speaking truth to power’ in a self-sacrificing manner. The ‘bad’ nature of 
student protest is therefore not a foregone conclusion in Chinese society, even during socialist rule. Argumenta-
tion begins where the self-evident ends (Perelman 1996, 13).
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III speech act: urge
Propositional content We’ve got to do something right away.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Wang and Deng have reason to believe that they could do 
something.
2) Wang has a reason to urge Deng to do something (the stu-
dents are in rebellion).
3) It is not obvious to Wang and Deng, that Deng would do 
something of his own accord. 
Essential content Counts as an attempt to get Deng to do something right away in virtue of the students being in rebellion.
Box 37: The urge speech act of Wang’s speech unit (王震 2001[1989], 155).
These initial moves towards securitising the student activities by the ‘hardliners’ were 
not successful in bringing about an official condemnation or the use of hard measures 
against the activities.23 Before Zhao’s trip to North Korea, the official line included three 
fairly ordinary points (Zhao 2009, 5-6): 1) Social activities should return to normal after 
Hu’s memorial services were concluded; 2) there should be dialogue on multiple levels 
on all views held; and 3) bloodshed should be avoided, with any transgressions only pun-
ished according to the law. 
Such a moderate position would, however, not last. In his memoirs, Zhao (2009, 9) 
presents the change of the initially lenient line on the protests as Li Peng’s ploy that uti-
lised Li Ximing and Chen Xitong. As Zhao left for North-Korea, Li was formally in charge 
of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Li Ximing and Chen asked Wan Li to call a 
meeting to hear their report on the situation. The meeting on April 24 portrayed the 
student demonstrations as a “grim situation” which could “be headed towards nationwide 
turmoil.”24 The demonstrations were presented as nation-wide, comprising of various 
segments of society (e.g., high-school students and workers) and as directed against Deng 
Xiaoping personally.25 With Li Peng holding the formal procedural power as the chair-
man, the Standing Committee decided to issue an urgent notice reporting on the situation 
and recommending countermeasures,26 to charge the Beijing Municipal Committee with 
mobilisation of the masses to expose the plotters, to conduct a resolute struggle against 
the enemy forces opposing the party and socialism, and to present a report to Deng Xi-
aoping in person the next morning. 
23  While rumours of excessive police violence against students during the Xinhua Gate incident were prevalent, 
it would appear that the stories of bloodshed resulted only from a student injury to his hand on a broken bus 
window (Zhao 2004).
24  See ‘Minutes of the April 24 Politburo Standing Committee Meeting’ (2001, 77-80).
25  Zhao’s (2009, 10) portrayal of this political struggle testifies to the difficulty of accessing a person’s ‘real’ 
motives: “I am not sure what was behind Li Ximing and Chen Xitong’s behaviour: either their old mentality of class 
struggle was at work or they had other ulterior motives.”
26  See ‘Urgent Notice on Doing Current Work Well and Carefully Preventing the Situation from Getting Worse’ 
(2001, 81-82): “Begin immediately to defend resolutely stability and unity in the political situation.” Party stand-
ing committees on the provincial level were charged with deeming what these resolute measures should be.
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10.3.2. The Watershed Editorial of April 26
On April 25, Li Peng reported to Deng on the meeting of the Standing Committee the 
day before,27 effectively making a securitisation move towards Deng: “We feel that the 
situation in Beijing now is extremely grim. […] Some of the posters and the slogans that 
students shout during the marches are anti-party and antisocialist. They are clamouring for 
a reversal of the verdicts on spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalisation.”28 Li’s call was 
facilitated by making the threat seem more personal: “The spear is now pointed directly 
at you and the others of the elder generation of proletarian revolutionaries. […] There are 
open calls for the government to step down […] and to get rid of the category of ‘counter-
revolutionary’ crimes.” Also international developments were used to facilitate the threat 
impression. For example Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing, remarked that “Some students 
have imitated Poland’s Solidarity to form their own Solidarity Student Union.” The ‘bad 
element’ tactic is similarly evident in this inner-party discourse: “The small number of 
leaders of these illegal organisations have other people behind them calling the shots. […] 
These actions [the Xinhua Gate incident and looting in other cities] seriously harm social 
stability and unity, and they disrupt social order. Those of us on the Standing Committee29 
all believe that this is turmoil and that we must rely on law to bring a halt to it as soon as 
possible.”
The other people present in the meeting toed Li’s line. Yao Yilin stated that “the nature 
of this student movement has changed. It began as a natural expression of grief and has 
turned into social turmoil,” while Yang Shangkun emphasised that “it is crucial that we 
maintain social order throughout the country, especially in the Capital.” The move to raise 
the issue onto the agenda proved to be successful, as Deng voiced his agreement with the 
Standing Committee’s decision: “This is no ordinary student movement.” He agreed with 
both the ‘bad elements’ tactic and the fundamentality of the threat: “A tiny minority is 
exploiting the students; they want to confuse the people and throw the country into chaos. 
This is a well-planned plot whose real aim is to reject the Chinese Communist Party and 
the socialist system at the most fundamental level.” Furthermore, Deng was for a public 
securitisation of the threat: “We must explain to the whole party and the nation that we 
are facing a most serious political struggle. We have got to be explicit and clear in opposing 
this turmoil.” From this point on, this assessment would define the student movement and 
the social foment beyond it.
Deng’s acceptance of the nature of the protests as turmoil (动乱, dòngluàn) was cru-
cial.30 He presented the protests as a conspiracy designed by a small group whose pur-
pose was to reject the Communist party and the socialist system at the deepest possible 
level. In order to curtail the unrest, decisive measures would have to be taken and the 
turmoil be crushed. Deng linked this turmoil with events in Eastern Europe, especially to 
those in Poland, from where he derived a lesson: ‘concessions lead to chaos.’ This explicit 
27  See ‘Important Meeting Minutes’ (2001, 94-96), and ‘A Document Circulated Among Senior Party and 
Government Officials Earlier This Month’ (1990, 203-206).
28  There were indeed calls for the reassessment of the 1986 student movement, but by May 2 these were 
dropped as it was considered to be politically too sensitive (Manion 1990, xix), as is also evident from the way 
in which Li Peng used them as ‘evidence’ of the anti-party essence of the activities.
29  Recall, Zhao Ziyang was in North Korea at the time.
30  The 1986 student protests were labelled with the less dramatic term of a ‘disturbance’ (闹事, nàoshì).
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and clear stand Deng now called for was made public the next day in the April 26 Renmin 
ribao editorial that transpired to be perhaps the most important turn of events during 
the whole process.
Deng’s definition of the nature of the events served the function of control. Virtually 
the same words were used the next day, this time, as securitisation for deterrence31 and 
for legitimating future acts. This demonstrates how the same words can serve different 
functions in different situations. Rumors of a meeting with Deng before the issuing of the 
editorial were widespread, which increased the power of the formulation.32 The edito-
rial served as a deterrent against further protest and as a basis of legitimacy for pos-
sible future ‘special procedures’ e.g., the eventual declaration of martial law (人民日报 
21.5.1989) and the use of military force to suppress, in Deng’s (邓小平 2004 [1989]) lat-
er words, the “counter-revolutionary rebellion” (反革命暴乱, fǎngémìng bàoluàn): “This is 
a well planned plot […] to confuse the people and to throw the country into turmoil […]  its 
real aim is to reject the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system at the most fun-
damental level. […] This is a most serious political struggle that concerns the whole party 
and nation.” (人民日报 26.4.1989.)
The editorial contained a claim (Box 38) – the protests are a plot for turmoil – and a 
warning (Box 39) – the aim of the plot is to reject the party. These were followed by a dec-
laration (Box 40): the protests are a serious political struggle. On their own, the protests 
were not condemnable, as protesting students had initiated progressive movements that 
are an integral part of the national myth. The editorial therefore refers to plots to confuse 
people, to a small group manipulating the masses of the students. The editorial construct-
ed the issue as one of national security. Hence, the protestors should heed this and desist 
from further protests, lest they be in league with criminals and be acted upon as such. At 
the same time, the declarative editorial formed a basis to legitimise the possible use of 
force against the protestors. In effect, the label of ‘turmoil’ became the crux of the issue 
between the students and the government, and led to the intensification of the protests.
The editorial was widely read, but the deterrent tactic failed miserably: April 27 saw 
the largest student protests until then and the editorial became the focus of contention. 
That the police were not committed to preventing the students from reaching Tiananmen 
Square increased their morale and the impression that their demands might actually go 
through. The labelling of the protests in the April 26 editorial became the crux of the is-
sue, and all student demands thereafter contained a demand for the reassessment of the 
student movement. Zhao (2009, 8) also identified the April 26 editorial as the key event 
that turned the demonstrations into a ‘mess’: “The situation before the publication of the 
editorial and the situation afterwards were different. If the right measures had been taken 
to direct the situation, then there would not have been such dire results.” The failure of 
31  This inference is corroborated by Zhao’s (2009, 13-14) description of the intentions of the editorial: “The 
original intention of the April 26 editorial’s designations ‘anti-party, anti-socialist’ was to deter the students. The 
result was the opposite: the demonstrations had grown bigger. This showed that the old ways of political labelling 
that had worked before were no longer effective.” This quote also attests to the practices of using asymmetric 
political concepts to label issues with security implications in China; it shows how the ‘security rationale’ is in 
effect without ‘security words’ being used. Further, it also shows how ‘securitisation’ is an artificial concept, and 
not part of ‘folk-taxonomies.’
32  Zhao (2009, 10-11) presents the view that Li published the formulation of the events in 人民日报 (26.4.1989) 
the next day against the wishes of Deng, who did not want to be identified as the source of the formulation and 
thereby, of the securitisation of the events.
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the deterrent tactic shows how securitisation moves can have unintended consequenc-
es, which may actually be counter-productive in regard to the intended objectives of the 
move.
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The protests are a plot for turmoil.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The editorial lists the reasons and evidence as to the accu-
racy of the claim. 
2) It is not obvious that student protests are turmoil, as Chi-
nese history has witnessed patriotic and progressive protests 
before.
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the protests being a plot for turmoil represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 38: The claim speech act in the April 26 人民日报 editorial.
II speech act: warn
Propositional content The aim of the plot is to reject the party.
Preparatory condition 
content
1)  The readers of the editorial have reason to believe that the 
protests could be a plot to reject the party, which is not in their 
interest.
2)  It is not obvious that the protests are a plot to reject the 
party.
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the protests are not in the reader’s best interest.
Box 39: The warn speech act in the April 26 人民日报 editorial.
III speech act: declare
Propositional content The protests are a serious political struggle.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The editorial is in a position where it has the possibility to 
declare a matter as a serious political struggle. 
2) The protests were not already considered to be a serious 
political struggle and planned turmoil aimed to reject the 
party.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the protests re-
ceive the status of a serious political struggle and of planned 
turmoil aimed to reject the party.
Box 40: The declare speech act in the April 26 人民日报 editorial.
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The stricter labelling of the student activities demonstrated how Zhao lost the initial 
point of contention with the hardliners and fell in line with the formulation during his 
trip in North-Korea.33 However, he continued to work against the formulation and the 
presentation of the student protests as a grave issue. As regards the other side of the 
inner-party struggle, Zhao’s desecuritisation moves proved to be unsuccessful and the 
situation between the students and the party escalated. More and more people showed 
their support for the students and many took part in the mass demonstrations. These 
new activists eventually included journalists and even party cadres.
10.3.3. The Declaration of Martial Law and the Use of Force
After it had become clear that the labelling of the student protest had not had a deterrent 
effect, and Zhou’s conciliatory attempts had also not appeased the students as the pro-
tests gradually became more intense, leading to a hunger-strike in May, the party leader-
ship took further steps. Deng (邓小平 2001a [1989]: 440-447) moved to securitise the 
issue to the extent that martial law now needed to be declared. Deng claimed that the goal 
of the manipulators behind the protests was to set up a bourgeois republic based on the 
Western model and warned that if things were left to develop freely, China would take a 
historic step backward and the leadership would end up under house arrest.34 Thus, as 
a remedy for this extreme threat, Deng proposed the declaration of martial law,35 which 
was effected soon after (see 人民日报 21.5.1989).
This securitisation move by Deng took place in the May 17 Standing Committee meet-
ing that discussed the student hunger strike and the implications of the broader month-
long movement.36 Li Peng accused Zhao of making the party speak with two voices, which 
had resulted in the escalation of the protests. Deng agreed with Li’s position and claimed 
(Box 41) that “Our adversaries are not in fact those students but people with ulterior mo-
tives. Their two basic slogans are ‘Down with the Communist Party’ and ‘Overthrow the 
socialist system’, and their goal is to set up a bourgeois republic on the Western model. Not 
to understand this basic question is to mistake the nature of the movement.” This formula-
tion effectively undermined Zhao’s position of not presenting the students as a threat: the 
threat was not the students but the ‘people with ulterior motives’. Deng then emphasised 
that the party was at a turning-point: “[T]he question before us is not how to settle all our 
different views; it is whether we now should back off.”
There was support for Deng’s view. Bo Yibo argued that the party was at “a point of no 
retreat. To retreat any further would be to hand China over to them.” Qiao Shi also support-
ed Deng’s position: “Their goals are quite clear: to overthrow the leadership of the Com-
munist Party and change the socialist order.” Yang Shangkun, in turn, reinforced the line of 
the discussion with a stern warning and suggestion for action: “Our backs are against the 
wall. If we retreat any further we are done for. […] The crisis we face is extremely serious: 
 
33  See ‘Telegram, Zhao Ziyang to Standing Committee’ (2001, 98), and Zhao (2009, 11).
34  Perhaps ironically, it was Zhao Ziyang who ended up under house arrest.
35  The party secretary Zhao Ziyang was opposed to the declaration of Martial Law and eventually had to step 
down. His desecuritisation moves had failed.




This movement could lead to turmoil in the whole country and unleash forces that cannot 
be controlled. […] This is a critical juncture, and we have to put the movement down as soon 
as possible.” 
I speech act: claim
Propositional content
Our adversaries are not the students but people with ulterior 




1) The discussion contained reasons and evidence as to the 
accuracy of the claim. 
2) It is not obvious that there are people with ulterior mo-
tives manipulating the students.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that people with ulte-
rior motives being the adversary trying to set up a bourgeois 
republic represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 41: Deng’s (邓小平 2001a) claim speech act in the May 17 Standing Committee meeting. 
Deng argued that the events of the past month had shown how ‘grave’ the situation had 
become. He then presented a warning (Box 42): “If we do not turn things around, if we let 
them go on like this, all our gains will evaporate, and China will take a historic step back-
ward.” Deng’s warning referred to the core values of the Chinese political order. If the 
party stepped back from the editorial’s formulation, it would mean the surrender of these 
values: “To back down now would be to give in to their values; not backing down means we 
stick steadfastly to the April 26 editorial.” Deng presented the editorial’s formulation as an 
existential issue for the party and the socialist order. The situation in Beijing made the 
issue not only existential, but also urgent: “Beijing can not keep going like this. […] [I]f we 
do not [settle the instability in Beijing first] we will never be able to settle it in the other 
provinces, regions, and cities.” He even presented a more personal possible outcome: “If 
things continue like this, we could even end up under house arrest.” 
As if in accordance with the grammar of securitisation, Deng also had a ‘way out’ of this 
‘grave situation’: “After thinking long and hard about this, I have concluded that we should 
bring in the People’s Liberation Army and declare martial law in Beijing. […] The aim of 
martial law will be to suppress the turmoil once and for all and to return things quickly to 
normal. This is the unshirkable duty of the party and the government. I am solemnly propos-
ing this today to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and hope that you will consider it.” 
Since Deng was not a member of the Standing Committee that had the formal authority to 
decide on martial law, formally Deng’s conclusion was a proposition (Box 43). However, 
he was the de facto leader of China and, accordingly, the meeting tasked the Standing 
Committee to report to him and the party elders on the deployments of martial law once 
it would be decided in a later meeting that same day.
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II speech act: warn
Propositional content
If things are not turned around, China will take a historic 




1)  The Standing Committee has reason to believe the party 
could lose its position and China could take a historic step 
back, which is not in their interest.
2)  It is not obvious that the party will lose its position and 
the Standing Committee will end up under house arrest.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that giving in to the 
demands of the protesters, or recanting the April 26 editorial 
is not in the Standing Committee’s best interest.
Box 42: Deng’s (邓小平 2001a) warn speech act in the May 17 Standing Committee meeting. 
III speech act: propose
Propositional content The Standing Committee should bring in the People’s Libera-tion Army and declare martial law in Beijing.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The Standing Committee is able to declare martial law.
Deng is in a position to make such proposals (he is the chair-
man of the Central Military Commission).
2) It is not obvious that the Standing Committee will declare 
martial law of its own accord.
Essential content Counts as an attempt to get the Standing Committee to de-clare martial law and to mobilise the PLA into Beijing.
Box 43: Deng’s (邓小平 2001a) propose speech act in the May 17 Standing Committee meeting. 
The meeting of the Standing Committee that followed was, however, not in agreement on 
the issue of declaring martial law.37 Zhao and Hu Qili were against, while Qiao Shi did not 
make his position known.38 Thus, even Deng’s authority was insufficient to receive un-
questioned success in terms of securitisation among the top leadership. This illustrates 
how acts of securitisation are open social processes that can, and indeed also do fail. As 
the Standing Committee remained indecisive on the issue, the decision was deferred to 
another meeting where Deng and the other party elders could come to a resolution. Zhao 
offered his resignation. Although his offer was declined, he no longer took part in the 
meetings on the declaration of martial law.39
37  There was not even agreement among the ones in favour on what precisely Deng’s talk in the previous 
meeting entailed: Li Peng argued that Deng had made the decision on martial law, while Yao ‘strongly supported’ 
Deng’s ‘proposition.’
38  While Nathan et al. (2001, 254) documents that there was a formal vote on the issue, Zhao (2009, 29) 
himself claims that no formal vote took place. This position fits well into his general legalistic resistance of his 
treatment after 1989.
39  See ‘Minutes of the May 17 Politburo Standing Committee Meeting’ (2001, 252-255), ‘Yang Shangkun’s Talk 
to a Small-Group Meeting at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission’ (2001, 263-266), and 
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A meeting consisting of party elders, members of the Standing Committee, and mem-
bers of the Military Affairs Commission, took place on the morning of May 18 to fur-
ther discuss the issue of martial law.40 The discussion repeated the views of the previous 
meeting with Deng: martial law was a necessity in order to prevent the complete over-
throw of the party and the socialist system. With Zhao now absent, no dissenting views 
were forthcoming. The meeting decided to declare martial law on midnight May 21, to 
begin the mobilisation of troops and hold a large meeting for officials on May 19. As the 
chairman of the Central Military Commission, Deng himself signed the order to mobilise 
troops.41
Li Peng’s speech on May 19 disseminated the decision to declare martial law to wider 
audiences.42 The speech repeated the essence of the security argument that had been 
formed in the discussions among the Standing Committee and the party elders. Li opened 
his speech by stating the formal authority of the speech and making a securitisation move 
for control: “Today, in accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee of the Po-
litburo of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee and the State Council have 
convened a meeting of central and Beijing Municipal Party, government, and army cadres 
to ask that everyone urgently mobilise, take firm and forceful measures, take a clear stand 
to halt turmoil, restore social order, and protect stability and unity, to ensure that reform, 
opening up, and socialist modernisation can be smoothly carried out.” Li legitimised this 
call for dramatic action by describing how the ‘turmoil’ that had already been dissipating 
had become worse, and how a ‘minority’ used the students on hunger strike as hostages: 
“All these incidents demonstrate that we will have nation-wide major turmoil if no quick 
action is taken to turn and stabilise the situation.” He further claimed that “Our nation’s 
reforms and opening to the outside world, the cause of the four modernisations, and even 
the fate and future of the People’s Republic of China, built by many revolutionary martyrs 
with their blood, are facing a serious threat.” The tactic of ‘bad elements’ was once again in 
operation: “[A]n extremely small number of people want to achieve through turmoil their 
political goals, which are to negate the leadership of the Communist Party and to negate the 
socialist system […] and totally negate the people’s democratic dictatorship.”  The speech 
indicated that the issue came down to the core values of the political order: “Their goal is 
to achieve absolute freedom which brazenly opposes the Four Cardinal Principles.” In other 
words, the protests were a threat to the very survival of the revolution, the party and the 
state.
Li warned that things could not be allowed to continue as before: “If they should achieve 
their goals, reform and opening, our democratic legal system, and socialist modernisation 
would all go up in smoke, and China would undergo a reversal of history. A China with great 
hope and a great future would become a China without hope or future.” Faced with these 
threats to vital referent objects, he concluded that “[w]e are forced to take decisive, firm 
Zhao (2009).
40  See ‘Minutes of an Important Meeting on May 18’ (2001, 269-278).
41  Some military commanders refused to follow the order to mobilise, which subsequently led to a restructur-
ing of command.
42  This speech can be found in the New York Times (20.5.1989), Li (1990a, 255-258), Li (1990b, 309-315), 
as well as ‘Materials from the Big Meeting of Central and Beijing Municipal Party, Government, and Military 
Officials’ (2001, 296-300) and, for example, excerpts of the speech’s telecast can be seen in Tiananmen – 20 
Jahre Nach den Massacre (directed by Shi Ming and Thomas Weidenbach 2009, Längengrad Filmproduction).
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measures to halt the turmoil. […] Our party is the governing party; our government is a peo-
ple’s government. To fulfil our responsibilities to our sacred motherland and to the entire 
people, we must take firm, decisive measures to put a swift end to the turmoil, protect the 
leadership of the party, and protect the socialist system. Li’s securitisation move sought 
both control in terms of the requirement for mobilisation of the security and military 
apparatuses,43 and legitimacy for the declaration of martial law (人民日报 21.5.1989).44
However, the response to the declaration of martial law was not what had been de-
sired nor expected. The mobilised troops failed to reach the central areas of Beijing as 
residents obstructed their vehicles already at the outskirts of Beijing. Citizens lectured 
the troops on the good intentions of the students as well as on the good relations between 
the people and its liberation army. This situation of Beijing residents flouting martial law 
lasted for approximately two weeks. While the move for control had succeeded and the 
military had been mobilised, the move for legitimacy had failed as Beijing residents had 
actively resisted the mobilisation.
Following the failure of martial law to bring an end to the protests,45 the issue was 
moved to another rung of securitisation. PLA troops were now ordered to clear Tianan-
men Square, by “any means necessary.”46 Deng (邓小平 2001b [1989]) presented the 
events in a global context, both in terms of the threat and the referent object of security: 
“The causes of this incident have to do with the global context. […] When the West stirs up 
turmoil in other countries, in fact it is playing power politics. […] This turmoil has taught 
us a lesson the hard way, but at least we now understand better than before that the sover-
eignty and security of the state must always be the top priority. […] [W]hat they are really 
after is our sovereignty.” He used the experiences of the Cultural Revolution to facilitate 
the sense of urgency and danger: “Imagine for a moment what could happen if China falls 
into turmoil. If it happens now, it would be far worse than the Cultural Revolution.” Fur-
thermore, for Deng, the issue was not only national, but would have global effects, if left 
unchecked: “If the turmoil keeps going, it could continue until party and state authority are 
worn away. Then there would be civil war, one faction controlling parts of the army and 
another controlling others. […] This would be a disaster on a global scale. So China must not 
make a mess of itself. And this is not just to be responsible to ourselves, but to consider the 
whole world and all of humanity as well.” This discussion ended with Deng’s conclusion 
that force should be used as the solution to the issue: “I agree with all of you and suggest 
the martial law troops begin tonight to carry out the clearing plan and finish within two 
days.” The formal decision to order the troops in was made by the Standing Committee:47 
“So long as everybody agrees, then it [the PLA should move in by using any means neces-
43  Li (1990a, 313): “All Communist Party members must strictly abide by party discipline. […] At the same time, 
we also hope that the broad masses will fully support the PLA, the public security cadres, and the police in their 
efforts to maintain order in the capital.”
44  Following Li’s speech, Yang Shangkun gave a short speech as the president of the People’s Republic that 
succinctly repeated the essential securitisation argument (Li 1990a, 314): “To restore normal order, to restore 
public order, […] there is no choice but to move a group of the PLA to the vicinity of Beijing. […] This was done out 
of absolute necessity.”
45  This was succinctly characterised by Deng (2001, 340): “We can all see what has happened. Martial law has 
not restored order. […] Our party and state face a life-and-death crisis.”
46  For the inner-Party discussion of the Party elders, see Deng (邓小平 2001b [1989], 480-488) and ‘Minutes 
of the Politburo Standing Committee meeting, June 3’ (2001, 485-488).
47  ‘Minutes of the Politburo Standing Committee meeting, June 3’ (2001, 485-488).
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sary, although no-one should die in the Square] will be unanimous.” Troops began moving 
in on the Square on the evening of June 3, as the martial law declaration was continuously 
broadcast.
On their way to Tiananmen Square, the troops clashed with protestors. There are con-
flicting reports on the numbers of casualties, although it seems that they are in the hun-
dreds rather than thousands. Violent resistance by some protesters was used by the party 
as evidence of the rebellious nature of the incident, and images of destroyed vehicles and 
dead soldiers were broadcast and published widely. The troops cleared the Square before 
the sunrise of ‘June Fourth’. Still, some tried to enter the square the next morning. The 
military used force to stop them.48
10.3.4. Securitisation after June Fourth
There were a few days of silence from the party centre. The first announcement after the 
crackdown was a news conference in which the State Council spokesman Yuan Mu (1990, 
363) presented the explanation for what had happened on June 3-4: “a shocking counter-
revolutionary rebellion, unprecedented in the history of the Republic, has occurred in the 
capital.” The official line following the violent dispersion of the protests was formulated 
in public in Deng’s (邓小平 2004 [1989]) first public appearance after the ‘incident’, a 
speech to the martial law troops in Beijing on June 9. The speech was widely publicised.It 
was one of the single most relevant cases that defined the official nature of the incident, 
thus crystallising the formulation and the political line.49 While the securitisation process 
preceeding the events of June 3 and 4 had presented the situation as ‘grave turmoil’ (严
重的动乱, yánzhòng de dòngluàn), the speech of June 9 was even harsher in its definition 
of the events. Now the events were portrayed as a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (反
革命暴乱, fǎngémìng bàoluàn). Deng’s speech thus follows the grammar of reproducing 
security: counter-revolution threatened socialism and the Communist Party, whereby the 
protests had to be crushed without any concessions. Concessions would only have led to 
bourgeois liberalism and, eventually, to the destruction of the party.
Taking the domestic and international situation into account, Deng (邓小平 2004) de-
clared that the events were unavoidable: “This disturbance would have come anyway. Dic-
tated by both the international climate and the domestic climate in China, it was destined 
to come, and the outbreak of this disturbance is independent of man’s will.” Thus the refer-
ent object of the security argument was the Communist party and socialism, which were 
under threat from a “counter-revolutionary rebellion” and “bourgeois liberalism”: “It all 
became clear once the incident broke out. They have two key slogans: one is to overthrow 
the Communist party, the other is to topple the socialist system. Their aim is to establish a 
bourgeois republic totally dependent on the West.” Martial law had relieved the leadership 
48  The symbolically and visually strong ‘Tank Man’ incident happened on June 5 near the Beijing Hotel. These 
images show how the interpretation of images is open, and requires anchorage. In Europe and the US. the Tank 
Man represents the courage of the unknown individual in the face of state repression. In China, the video of 
the man repeatedly stopping the column of tanks was used as evidence of the PLA doing all they could to avoid 
harm to the demonstrators, despite their ‘rebelliousness.’ See for example Tiananmen – 20 Jahre Nach den 
Massacre (directed by Shi Ming and Thomas Weidenbach 2009, Längengrad Filmproduction).
49  For example, the Mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong (1989), reified this line in his report to the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee on “checking the turmoil and quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion”. For 
analysis, see Vuori (2008b).
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of the rules that normally bound policies and the voice of protest was silenced by force. 
By labelling the protests as a “counter-revolutionary rebellion,” all that they had said be-
came criminal. Securitisation thus had major effects: the loss of life and the renunciation 
of the option for political change. Concessions were presented to be a point of no return, 
since in Poland they had led to the collapse of the system.50 Thus the ‘way out’ of the 
threatening situation was to give no concessions and to crush the protests. Deng’s speech 
referred to the prior experience of old revolutionaries and to the necessity to understand 
that turmoil must be dealt with immediately, lest the situation lead to chaos, similar to 
the Cultural Revolution.
Deng’s (邓小平 2004) speech contains three speech acts that are consistent with the 
reproduction of security. He claimed (Box 44) that the protests were counter-revolution-
ary violence. With reference to the bad influence of foreign powers and to a small group 
of evildoers who had misled the masses, the speech testified to the counter-revolutionary 
nature of the incident: “Some comrades cannot see the nature of the issue, and believe it is 
simply a problem of dealing with the masses. In fact, the opponents are not only the masses 
who cannot distinguish right from wrong, but also a group of reactionaries and a large 
segment of the dregs of society. They are attempting to subvert the state and overthrow the 
Communist party which is the essence of the issue.” The conclusion was succinct: “We were 
only cracking down on counter-revolutionary rebellion.”
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The protests were a counter-revolutionary rebellion by na-ture.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Deng lists reasons and evidence as to the accuracy of the 
claim. 
2) It is not obvious that student protests are counter-revolu-
tionary, as Chinese history has witnessed patriotic and pro-
gressive protests, which are a part of the national myth.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the protests be-
ing a counter-revolutionary rebellion by nature represents an 
actual state of affairs.
Box 44: The Claim speech act in Deng’s speech to the martial law troops (邓小平 2004).
The element of warning (Box 45) was also evident: the aim of the protests was to topple 
the socialist system: “Their aim is to establish a bourgeois republic totally dependent on the 
West.”  A counter-revolution would lead to the end of socialism and China ending up as a 
vassal state of the West. The ‘century of shame’ is a part of the national myth and opposi-
tion to foreign rule justifies almost any measures. 




II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Counter-revolution leads to the end of socialism (China’s 




1) The hearer has a reason to believe, that China could be-
come dependent on the West, and that it would not be in the 
interest of the hearer (China was dependent before the era 
of socialism).
2) It is not obvious that China would become dependent on 
the West regardless.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that a counter-revolu-
tion leading to China’s dependency on the West (the end of 
socialism) is not in the hearer’s best interest.
Box 45: Warn speech act in Deng’s speech to the martial law troops (邓小平 2004).
Thirdly, Deng explained (Box 46) that resolute measures were necessary to prevent a 
counter-revolution, the toppling of the socialist system and dependency on the West; and 
because in the minds of some, there was still confusion about the nature of the incident, 
Deng explained what the protests were all about and what their true nature was: “Al-
though some comrades do not understand it for the time being [the necessity of adopting 
resolute actions to suppress the rebellion], they will eventually understand and support 
the decision of the party central leadership. […] If we do not understand this fundamental 
problem [that subversion of the state and overthrow of Communism are the essence of 
the issue], it means we are not clear about the nature of the issue.” Deng was optimistic as 
to the party’s success regarding this explanation: “After making conscientious efforts in 
our work, I believe we will be able to win the support from the overwhelming majority in the 
party for determining the nature and handling of the issue.”
III speech act: explain
Propositional content
The prevention of a counter-revolution (the maintenance of 
socialism and China’s freedom) was the reason for resolute 
measures [declaring martial law and dispersing the protests 
by use of force].
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Martial law was declared and the protests were dis-
persed.
2) It is not obvious why the protest of (patriotic) students 
had to be dispersed by force.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the dispersal of 
the protests as a way of preventing a counter-revolution rep-
resents the actual state of affairs.




In terms of effects, the securitisation did not come without a cost for the party. Indeed, 
the securitisation of the student movement and the way it played out had major effects 
on inter-unit relations both within China and in China’s international relations: the ac-
tions of the party were condemned internationally, which had a negative impact on for-
eign trade over the next two years. The arms embargo sanctions that the US and many 
European states imposed remain in place two decades later. The events of 1989 are still 
referred to in discussions on China’s human rights record, and they generally continue to 
plague the international image of the PRC.51
In terms of domestic effects, Zhao Ziyang’s failure to desecuritise the events led to his 
dismissal from all his posts and placement under house arrest and investigation. Student 
protest had once again affected the premier leadership as Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao. 
This change of leadership was not a victory for the conservative faction of Li Peng, as 
Jiang was a compromise figure who lacked connections to either faction. Beyond such 
neutrality, Jiang’s management of the situation in Shanghai played in his favour in the 
nomination. 
The changes in the leadership also posed problems for the line of reform. While liberal 
political reform was effectively frozen, Deng managed to re-establish the line of reform 
with his 1992 ‘southern tour’ (see e.g., Fewsmith 2001). The lifting of martial law in Janu-
ary of 1990 had already begun the normalisation of the domestic situation. The use of 
force had entailed the calling in of many favours from leading military figures and the 
subsequent increase of their influence. With the normalisation of the situation and the 
victory of the southern tour, Deng managed to retire most of these military figures.52
As Andrew J. Nathan (2009, 39) notes, the key lesson party leaders learned from the 
events of 1989 was that equal dialogue with society beyond the party was not advisable. 
This is also what Li Peng argued to Zhao Ziyang during their debates on how to handle 
the protests: to let the students negotiate with the party as equals would have meant the 
negation of the leadership party and the whole socialist system.53 The collapse of most 
other socialist systems and the continued absence of the new states from the interna-
tional limelight seem to have convinced the ‘fourth generation’ of party leaders of this 
line of thought as well. The official line on ‘June Fourth’ has become hegemonic and any 
other interpretations have become political taboo. 
10.4. Resistance and Desecuritisation Moves
The autonomous nature of the 1989 unrest is evident in the unprecedented levels of con-
testation of and resistance to the official definition of the nature of the student movement 
in 1989. Indeed, desecuritisation moves were already widespread during the progression 
51  Incidentally, as Google pulled out of China in 2010, the events of 1989 and also the Falungong were often 
listed in Western media as the topmost among the keywords that are blocked and censured by China’s system 
of Internet-control.
52  The line of both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao has been the professionalisation of the military, which has also 
meant the reduction of direct political power of the PLA. While Jiang’s chances to control the military were 
in question at the beginning of his rule, he managed to gain a firm footing over it through the promotion of 
generals and improvement of salaries and other conditions of regular soldiers. 
53  See ‘Materials for the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee’ (2001).
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of the demonstrations. For example, Zhao Ziyang (1990) made public desecuritisation 
moves, in his speech to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) delegates. Beyond such con-
testation among the authorities, protest leaders tried to resolutely present their activi-
ties as not counter-revolutionary but essentially reformist. Accordingly, most student and 
other protesters began their posters with a plea for desecuritisation.54 However, some 
poster writers went even further and presented counter-securitisation arguments,55 
which justified their ‘breaking of rules’56 by representing Li Peng and the party elders as 
a threat to the future of China.
However, the desecuritisers on the streets lacked the formal positions necessary to 
achieve desecuritisation, even if the audience on the streets agreed with them. As the 
General Secretary, Zhao had the position required for such a move, but even his attempts 
proved to be a failure: Deng and the other elders remained convinced that the movement 
was about national security which required forceful measures. Despite, or perhaps even 
due to such failures, the contestation and resistance contributed to the escalation of the 
conflict between the authorities and the social movement: attempts at co-option or a 
softer line were interpreted as signs of weakness by hardliners both within the authori-
ties and the protesters.
10.4.1. The Contested Nature of the Securitisation within the Leadership
Zhao Ziyang was against the presentation of the student protest as a major political is-
sue from the beginning. He however seemed to fail to appreciate the determination Li 
Peng and Zhao’s other political opponents had in pushing through their point of view. As 
already presented above, Li was able to use Zhao’s absence to securitise the issue. While 
Zhao acquiesced to Deng’s position, Zhao did not end his attempts to desecuritise the 
protests. Ironically, these desecuritisation moves would be the ‘crimes’ he was charged 
with in the investigation conducted after his dismissal from office; the 30 point investiga-
tive report (see Zhao 2009) that followed the three year investigation of Zhao’s case, lays 
out his crime of splitting the party on the issue of the student activities. Thus, it would 
seem that Zhao’s crime was to lose the contest over the security nature of these events.
Zhao’s (1990, 132-134) most important desecuritisation move was his speech to the 
Asian Development Bank delegates on May Fourth. In his speech, he presented the view 
that China was not in a major crisis: “China will not experience any great turmoil.” In fact, 
for him, the students’ demands were in line with the leadership of the party: “I would 
like to stress and point out that the basic slogans of the student demonstrators are ‘uphold 
the Communist Party’, ‘uphold socialism’, ‘uphold the constitution’, ‘uphold the reforms’, ‘ad-
vance democracy’, and ‘oppose corruption.’ […] They are not opposed to our basic system.” 
The students were even promoting the party’s line of anti-corruption: “What the students 
are most upset about is the phenomenon of graft and corruption.” Zhao’s proposition for 
dealing with such demands was moderate: “Through democratic and legal avenues, and 
54  See ‘An Open Letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of China’ 
(1990, 55) and Hunger Strikers at Tiananmen (1990) for example.
55  See ‘An Open Letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of China’ 
(1990, 55) for example.
56  The demonstrators violated Beijing municipal regulations that had been put into force after the 1986 student 
protests (Manion 1990, xix-xx).
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in an athmosphere of rationality and order, we should exchange opinions, increase our un-
derstanding of each other, and together explore ways of resolving the problems that are of 
common concern.”  
Zhao’s conciliatory approach did not, however, please the hardliners. It was also un-
able to convince all students to cease their protest activities. The hard line position was 
already evident in the Politburo meeting that preceded Zhao’s ADB speech.57 Zhao argued 
for leniency and the need to “accelerate the reform of our political system, especially the 
building of a system of socialist democracy based on law.” He referred to the international 
situation and the Zeitgeist of the time: “Times have changed, and so have people’s ideologi-
cal views. Democracy is a worldwide trend, and there is an international countercurrent 
against communism and socialism that flies under the banners of democracy and human 
rights.” Zhao even presented a warning against taking a hard stance on the issue: “If the 
party does not hold up the banner of democracy in our country, someone else will, and we 
will lose out.” 
Promoting a stricter line, Li was not impressed. For him, the issue was already grave 
enough: “The seriousness of this protest movement is unprecedented, and the range of its 
impact is also serious.” The issue was about core values: “What they want is the kind of 
absolute freedom that tramples on the Four Cardinal Principles”, and the honour of the 
veterans of the revolution: “They attack, slander, and insult Comrade Xiaoping and other 
party and state leaders.” For Li, the party was the cusp of fate: “If they get their way, then 
everything – reform and opening, democracy and law, building socialist modernisation, you 
name it – will vanish into the air and China will take a huge step backward.”
Despite such opposition within the Standing Committee, Li Peng and the other Polit-
buro members who opposed Zhao, agreed formally with his position. In practice, how-
ever, they worked against its implementation, and especially fought against any moves to 
overturn the ‘verdict’ of the April 26 editorial. This issue was also brought up by Zhao in 
a Standing Committee meeting,58 in which his position to shift the responsibility for the 
April 26 editorial onto the Standing Committee’s formulation on April 24 failed. Li was 
able to stick to the position that since Deng had voiced his approval for the formulation, 
it was thereby equal to Deng’s own words. The level of success of Zhao’s opponents only 
dawned on him when his request to meet Deng one-to-one was instead responded to with 
an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee. Yet even at this stage Zhao (2009, 28) 
tried to make a desecuritisation move towards Deng: “The only way to bring about some 
kind of resolution would be to somewhat relax the judgement from this editorial. This is the 
key and, if adopted, will gain wide social support. If we remove the labelling of the student 
movement, we will regain control over the situation. If the hunger strike continues and some 
people die, it will be like gasoline poured over a flame. If we take a confrontational stance 
with the masses, a dangerous situation could ensue in which we lose complete control.” The 
move failed, and Deng proposed the declaration of Martial Law.
Furthermore, after the decision to declare martial law, Zhao’s attempt to resign was re-
jected, as this would have made the division within the leadership too apparent. Thereaf-
57  See ‘Minutes of Politburo Standing Committee Meeting’ (2001, 134-143).
58  See ‘Remarks of Comrade Zhao Ziyang’ (2001, 153-156) and Zhao (2009, 27), and ‘Minutes of the May 
16 Politburo Standing Committee Meeting’ (2001, 234-239) and ‘Minutes of the May 17 Politburo Standing 
Committee Meeting’ (2001, 243-250) for similar disagreements between Zhao and Li.
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ter Zhao continued his attempts to contest the hard line, even as he became increasingly 
isolated from what was going on in the leadership. Zhao’s (2009, 30-31) May 18 letter to 
Deng repeated previous desecuritisation moves: “The current situation is extremely grave. 
[…] The crucial request that must be granted in order to stop the hunger strike is the revers-
al of the labelling and judgement made of them in the April 26 editorial, and acknowledge-
ment of their actions as patriotic.” Zhao’s suggestion might have led to a complete dese-
curitisation of the events and a victory for the students. However, by that time things had 
progressed too far for the party to be able to back down from its position without loss of 
its authority. Accordingly, Zhao used a security rationale to legitimate his extraordinary 
suggestion: “Even if you must eventually take some resolute measures to maintain order, we 
must take this first step. Otherwise, imposing harsh measures while a majority of people are 
adamantly opposed may result in serious repercussions that threaten the fate of the party 
and the state.” It would thus seem that security arguments can play a part in arguing for 
desecuritisation but in this case, even the strength of security was to no avail: the formal 
declaration of martial law two days later further escalated the conflict.59
Zhao would not repent his ‘deeds’ and maintained his stance throughout the decade 
and a half of house arrest. In terms of contestation of and resistance to securitisation, 
as Zhao lost his positions within the party, his contestation turned into resistance. In 
1997 he wrote a letter to some delegates of the 15th Party Congress, where he once again 
presented a desecuritisation argument (Zhao 2009, 78-79): “Please allow me to propose 
the issue of re-evaluating the June Fourth incident, which I hope will be discussed. […] First, 
no matter what extreme, wrong, or disagreeable things occurred in the midst of the stu-
dent demonstrations, there was never any evidence to support the designation of ‘counter-
revolutionary rebellion.’ If it was not a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’, then the means of 
a military suppression should never have been used to resolve it.” Zhao placed the blame 
on the party’s interference in the course of the students’ activities: “The situation would 
have subsided if we had not interpreted the students’ activities as being anti-party and anti-
socialist, but had accepted their reasonable demands and had adopted measures of patient 
negotiation, dialogue, and reducing tensions.” Zhao legitimised his revisionist view with 
historical precedent: “The principles of resolving historical problems could be followed, 
such as ‘not nitpicking over details’ and ‘focusing on the lessons to be learned’ rather than 
individual blame.” Repercussions for this move included reductions in his visitor allow-
ance and travel to other parts of China. 
Yet Zhao’s resistance did not end with this, or even with his death. His posthumously 
published journal, covertly recorded under house arrest and smuggled out, also presents 
his ‘objective strategy of desecuritisation’ (Zhao 2009, 33-34): “It was determined then 
that the student movement was ‘a planned conspiracy’ of anti-party, anti-socialist elements 
with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What 
was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said there were ‘black 
59  Moreover, not only did Zhao’s failed desecuritisation moves fail to halt the process of securitisation, on the 
contrary, they facilitated the escalation of the conflict. They also cost him personally, when in June 1989, Zhao 
was formally deposed from his positions within the party in the 13th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, 
placed under house arrest and investigated for three years. Zhao’s ADB speech, as well as his May 18 letter to 
Deng were both used as evidence of his ‘crimes’ of splitting the party. 
Zhao remained under house arrest after the investigation was concluded, until his death in 2005. In effect, Zhao 
became a ‘nonperson’, who was expunged from almost all official media (Béja 2009, 6). Zhao was afforded no 
opportunity for a repeat of the commemoration allowed for Hu Yaobang.
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hands’ within the party. Then who were they?” As part of his general ‘legal’ approach to 
even the issue of his own ‘case’, Zhao was asking for evidence: “It was said that this event 
was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the 
evidence? […] After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interroga-
tions? Have I been proven right, or have they?” He seems to suggest that time has been on 
his side and the objective state of affairs would be in his favour: “Can it be proven that the 
June Fourth movement was ‘counter-revolutionary turmoil’, as it was designated? […] By 
now, the answer to this question should be clear.” Despite Zhao’s ‘objectivist’ or ‘legalist’ 
reasoning, two decades after the events, the official verdict of 1989 still stands.60
Zhao’s (e.g., 2009, 36, 41-43) legalist position is also evident in his journal that por-
trays the manner in which he was removed from office, investigated and effectively kept 
under house arrest without formal decisions as having been ‘illegal’ according to the 
rules of the party. This illustrates how security can be utilised to break the formal rules 
of the party, even in the post-Mao era. Zhao (2009, 43) himself compares these practices 
to those in fashion during the Cultural Revolution. It would seem that in a grave crisis, 
the party can resort to its time-old practices (cf., Dutton 2005). In terms of the violation 
of procedural rules and norms of the party being similar to the flouting of such norms 
in Mao’s China, the handling of Zhao is qualitatively quite different to many of the party 
leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution. For example, Liu Shaoqi died in prison, 
while Zhao remained in semi-house arrest, where he was permitted visitors and trips 
outside Beijing. It would seem that the Jiang and Hu-Wen leaderships could not afford an 
official or public verdict on Zhao, one way or the other. Thus, he was preferably kept out 
of sight and, therefore, out of mind.
While Zhao was the leading ‘non-person’ to attempt to desecuritise the events post 
hoc, even the post-Zhao government made moves towards softening its stance on them. 
The hard-line position was for the retention of the label “counter-revolutionary rebel-
lion” (反革命暴乱, fǎngémìng bàoluàn), while the liberal faction tried to soften the issue 
by characterising the events as either a “student upheaval” (学潮, xuécháo), an “emer-
gency incident” (事变, shìbiàn), or even merely an “incident” (事件, shìjiàn) (Baum 1996, 
314). Deng and Yang Shangkun, however, retained the use of the labels “turmoil” (动乱, 
dòngluàn) and “chaos” (混乱, hùnluàn): in 1991, the Central Committee made a formal 
resolution that downgraded the label to “turmoil” (ibid.). This is the furthest extent that 
the desecuritisation of the events has reached. When Jiang Zemin first discussed the pro-
tests with the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir in 1994, he used the term “political 
disturbance”. However, this type of low-key approach would seem to be targeted more at 
the international community, in order to obviate the 1989 incident in any discussions on 
60  Could it be that the former party secretary arguing to his captors of the illegality of their actions vis-à-vis the 
party constitution did not comprehend the state he was ruling was itself a ‘state of exception’, or that he himself 
being considered a threat to socialist rule legitimated the breaking of rules, such as the party constitution?
Zhao (2009, 42-43) did recognise that the material provided as evidence against him at the Central Committee 
Plenum in which he was formally dismissed from his post which painted him as a conspirator representing 
counter-revolutionary forces in the country and overseas, sought to “completely destroy my political and moral 
standing.” This concurs with what Judith Butler (2006, xix) has noted on negative labels such as treason, or 
counter-revolution in that they do not necessarily aim to question the credibility of the views being held, but 
rather the credibility of those voicing them. The securitisation of the 1989 events, present in the meeting as 
‘background material’, was used to legitimise the ‘exceptional’ purge of Zhao, in a manner that he himself 
described as a return of Cultural Revolution language and practice and the breaking of the rules of the CCP.
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China. The official verdict still stands, and dissenting views on the 1989 events are still 
not permitted within China. For example, activists of the ‘Tiananmen Mothers’ -move-
ment are regularly harassed and even imprisoned (Béja 2009, 12).
Unlike in the case of the 1976 ‘Tiananmen incident’, the faction that supported the 
securitisation of the issue won the factional struggle within the party. This meant that 
there would not have been any appropriate target for blame had the verdict been quickly 
overturned. Furthermore, many people in major political positions are still bound to the 
policy of securitisation. These included Jiang Zemin, who rose to power largely in virtue 
of how he conducted himself during the crisis, as he was brought in as an outsider and 
someone who had taken a hard line on the ‘disturbances’. From his reaction to Zhao’s 
1997 letter, it would seem that Jiang was particularly sensitive to the issue. Accordingly, 
a reversal of the verdict would seem unlikely during the era of the ‘fourth generation of 
party leadership’ under the current Hu-Wen administration.
10.4.2. Activist Identities and Desecuritisation
In social movement theory, the framing of identities includes assertions on the nature 
of individual actors’ consciousness and moral character (Laraña et al. 1994; Hunt et al. 
1994, 192-194).  It can also be argued that imputations of individual identities are closely 
related to securitisation/desecuritisation.  Movements composed of what are deemed 
‘dangerous individuals’ can be securitised straightforwardly, but if a movement’s activists 
manage to project their identities as morally desirable, they can relatively easily desecu-
ritise their collective action.  This can be inferred from the manner in which the activists 
framed their collective identities in the case investigated here: the activists worked hard 
to prove that they were, as individuals, in the vanguard of the revolution as well as patri-
ots.61 As Hughes (2006, 53) notes, the students did not reject the party’s calls for patriot-
ism, but only appropriated them to their own political ends and means.62
Faced with the actual securitisation moves of the authorities, but probably also in 
anticipation of them, the students framed their collective identities on existing precon-
tracts of acceptable and desirable social activism in mainland Chinese society.63 In 1989, 
61  As Wright (1999) points out, this was also a strategy to protect individual protestors from any personal 
repercussions which could be severe.
62  The students also reappropriated official slogans and formalities in order to ridicule them with ironic laugh-
ter, for example (Link 1992).
63  The students had good reason to believe that their activities would be suppressed, as had occurred in both 
1978 and in 1986. However, they also had reason to believe that they would not be dealt with harshly, as the 
1980s had continued to show more and more laxity towards students’ expression of views. The reversal of the 
1976 verdict was also a source of inspiration and comfort: even after the April 26 editorial began the securitisa-
tion process in earnest, many students believed that history was on their side, and that they would prevail 
in overturning this verdict as well. This background demonstrates how previous processes of securitisation 
and desecuritisation may have significant effects on later processes of securitisation in terms of facilitating or 
impeding them.
Ren Wanding (1990, 48) reflected on the historical character of the movement: “During the past forty years, 
beginning in the fifties when the democratic parties tried to obtain equal status with the Communist Party, through 
the April Fifth revolution of 1976, through the Democracy Wall Movement from ’79 to ’81, through the student 
movements in ’85 and ’86, through the intellectuals’ petition for the release of victims from the Democracy Wall 
Movement in 1989, up to this Democracy Movement led by the students, we have developed maturity.” The events 
of 1976 were also discussed explicitly, for example, by Ren Wanding (1990) in his speech on Tiananmen on April 
21. There were also direct comparisons between the two movements (see e.g., ‘Our “April Student Movements” 
and the “April Fifth Movement”’ 1990).
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the student movement used identity frames that were similar to those of the Democracy 
Wall activists in the late 1970s.64 The differences in the way the movements laid stress 
on different aspects of their activism demonstrates how frame alignment of collective 
identities with contemporary resonant ideas operate in the identity imputations of social 
movements. For example, the Democracy Wall movement emphasised its role as the revo-
lutionary vanguard that represented true Marxism,65 whereas the 1989 activists stressed 
their patriotic nature and contribution to the development of the motherland.66 Thus, 
while the Democracy Wall movement stressed its role as a socialist democracy move-
ment, the students in 1989 were keen to stress that theirs was a patriotic democracy 
movement. This can be explained by the different social situations of the two movements: 
in contrast to 1978, in 1989 there were no longer any influential Maoists in power who 
could attack the movement as not following the true Mao Zedong line.67 Furthermore, 
the Deng regime no longer called for the ‘liberation of minds’ and ‘seeking truth from the 
facts’ in order to correctly interpret Marxism, as it had done in 1979, but rather for the 
modernisation of the motherland.68
The 1989 student movement framed its objectives to match those of the socialist 
state.69 This was apparent, for example, in the aims of the Provisional Students’ Federa-
tion of Capital Universities and Colleges, as issued in the form of a handbill in Beijing in 
April 1989. These aims supported the CCP and socialism, along with economic reform, 
democracy and progress.70 Some students practiced deliberate ‘frame alignment’ in order 
to reduce the risk of hard repression. For example, Teresa Wright (1999, 154) reported 
how after the Renmin ribao editorial of April 26 had been broadcast in Beijing, students 
of the Normal University decided to call a demonstration in which the editorial’s claim 
that the demonstrators had shouted “Down with the Communist Party!” was countered 
64  While the way the students operated had similarities with the activism of the Democracy Wall Movement, 
there were also distinct differences in the ways the two movements legitimised their activism. 
In the Democracy Wall movement the way activists constructed their collective action was as a part of the 
greater narrative of the unfolding revolution in the PRC and the line struggle in the CCP.  In doing so, the activ-
ists drew heavily on the resonant Marxist explanations of social movements as conduits of popular interests 
and the communist lore of revolutionary heroism. They also employed the same framing technique the Red 
Guards had used during the Cultural Revolution, i.e., claiming to be on the progressive side of history and 
identifying themselves with true socialism, the revolution, and the masses, and declaring their adversaries to 
be the enemies of these valuable goals (see Mehnert 1969, 47). In this vein the Democracy Wall movement was 
constructed as a movement of the youthful and patriotic revolutionary vanguard and enlighteners. For further 
analysis, see Paltemaa & Vuori (2006).
65  This could be seen in the way the Democracy Wall movement activists constructed themselves as “an 
awakened generation” (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006).
66  The theme of patriotism was prevalent in the 1980s. As Hughes (2006, 20) notes, the many critical artis-
tic movements of the 1980s emphasised that there was no contradiction in loving the motherland i.e., being 
patriotic, yet critical of the older forms of nationalism like the Cultural Revolution. The students of the 1989 
movement were similarly engaged in a contest for ‘appropriate nationalism.’
67  Even the leading ‘conservative’ party elder, Chen Yun, had already been critical of Mao in the 1950s.
68  These differences were a matter of degree, however, as the theme of representing true socialism was 
also present in the 1989 movement’s identity avowals, as was patriotism in those of the Democracy Wall 
movement.
69  As Manion (1990, xxi) also notes, the leadership and the students claimed to be striving for very similar 
goals. There was however a major generation gap, and with it near complete disagreement on what was to be 
considered legitimate political activity. Indeed, “the party had appropriated the responsibility and the exclusive 
right to solve problems and promote democracy” (ibid., xxiii).




with the slogan “Long Live the Communist Party!” Drawing, inter alia, on the primacy of 
the modernisation policy to the regime, a leading activist in the 1989 movement, Wu’er 
Kaixi (1990, 135-137), framed the movement’s collective identity as: “This student move-
ment has but one goal, that is, to facilitate the process of modernisation by raising high 
the banner of democracy and science, by liberating people from the constraints of feudal 
ideology, and by promoting freedom, human rights, and rule by law. […] Fellow students, fel-
low countrymen, prosperity for our nation is the ultimate objective of our patriotic student 
movement.”
Collective identities were also brought to the fore when the activists reacted to the au-
thorities’ securitisation moves. As noted above, the issue of being labelled the ‘creators of 
turmoil’ became the crux of the matter for the students. The reversal of this ‘verdict’ was 
on all the lists of demands the students presented to the authorities, and also featured 
on many posters that denied the allegations of the April 26 Renmin ribao editorial. As an 
open letter to the CCP Central Committee (1990, 50) asserted: “What right do you have 
to label the actions that students rightfully take to show their concern for the welfare of the 
country and its people ‘illegal activities incited and participated in by a small handful of bad 
people who aim to destroy the stability and unity of our country’?”
Other students also demanded apologies from the media and authorities for labelling 
the movement as ‘turmoil.’71 It was also clear from the students’ statements that they 
were very much aware of the need to get across their own collective identity avowals 
in public. This was seen in the way in which a student reacted to the tactics used by the 
authorities during a televised dialogue broadcast in late April that was regarded as a de-
feat by the protestors (Was it a Dialogue 1990, 113): “The most frustrating aspect of the 
whole affair is that the masses of brave young students who have risked their own safety in 
the pursuit of democratic reforms were made out to be nothing but a bunch of hot-headed, 
impertinent young whelps.” The students connected their struggle to the glory of previ-
ous revolutionary student movements: “We now issue a stern warning to you: the time 
for clever antics has come to an end. The masses of students can see right through you. We 
hope you will act out of concern for the interests of the whole country, and recognise this 
huge patriotic student movement as the successor of the May Fourth Movement of seventy 
years ago.”
These examples illustrate how the 1989 movement used patriotic and progressive col-
lective identities to both mobilise support and in an attempt to desecuritise the move-
ment, after the authorities engaged in soft repression through securitisation. The activists 
drew heavily on both the way generations of mainland Chinese had been taught to think 
about social activism since 1949,72 and older ideals in Chinese tradition (Pieke 1994).  
71  See e.g., “Provisional Students’ Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges Special Bulletin” (1990, 
72).
72  Of these values, see Yang (2000, 391). 1989 activists whom Perry (2001) interviewed similarly recognised 
how they were drawing on the tradition of the Cultural Revolution: while Red Guards had felt they were the 
most revolutionary, democracy activists in 1989 felt they were the most democratic. There were also other 
similarities between the activism of 1989 and that of the Cultural Revolution, viz.: 1) the spontaneity of mobili-
sation, 2) the use of big character posters, 3) ‘linkups’, and 4) the personalisation of elite bureaucratism and 
corruption (Dittmer 2002, 17). Some party leaders also emphasised the similarity of the student activities to 
those of the Red Guards: “[M]any practices today have alarming similarities with the Cultural Revolution. […] 
Now, there are big and small character posters everywhere in educational institutions of higher learning. Another 
example is ‘establishing ties.’ (See ‘Yuan Mu and Others Hold Dialogue with Students’ (1990). 
While the ‘older generation’ of democracy activists were sources of inspiration for the students of 1989, and the 
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For example, Lucian Pye (1990) has noted how ‘selfishness’ is actually one of the 
greatest sins in Chinese society73 and how this forced the 1989 protestors to make very 
abstract demands, despite the fact that many of the motivations for protest were quite 
practical (e.g., having to work in the countryside, being paid less than a taxi-driver, and 
poor housing conditions). Thus, in order to escape the charge of ‘selfishness’, the stu-
dents raised lofty and idealistic slogans to claim the moral high ground over the CCP 
leadership.74 Accordingly, there was a clear emphasis on ‘unselfish’ motives as the driving 
force behind the individual activists, for example, as one protestor asserted in an Open 
Letter to the Central Committee (1990, 57): “I express these personal viewpoints simply as 
a Chinese citizen, and as one of the millions of college students.  I have a loyal and patriotic 
heart, and I long for our country’s prosperity and strength”, and as students of the Beijing 
Aeronautics Institute similarly claimed (A Letter to the Citizens of Beijing 1990, 75-76): 
“We have no selfish motives, nor hidden ambitions.  Our actions these last days sprang from 
our patriotic hearts, our pure and loyal love for our great motherland.  We do not ‘desire to 
plunge the world into chaos’, nor are we a ‘small handful’ of bad people with ulterior mo-
tives.”
The hunger strike in mid-May 1989 was in itself the ultimate demonstration of self-
sacrifice, and thus an act of desecuritisation, which some of the activists felt forced to 
engage in after the CCP failed to withdraw from its securitisation stance.  The hunger 
strike vow contains a good example of the assertion of patriotic selflessness on the part 
of individual protestors (Hunger Strikers 1990, 200-201): “Our purest feelings of patriot-
ism, our simple and complete innocence, have been called ‘turmoil’, have been described 
as ‘ulterior motives’, and have been alleged to have been ‘exploited by a small handful of 
people.’  We wish to ask all true Chinese […] and those who have concocted these accusa-
tions against us to place your hands on your hearts, and ask your consciences what crimes 
have we committed.  Are we creating turmoil? […] Death is not what we seek.  But if the 
death of one or a few people can enable more to live better, and can make our motherland 
prosperous, then we have no right to cling to life.” The activists resorted to the imagery of 
unselfish and politically aware individuals striving for the commonly held goals of the 
progress and prosperity of the socialist motherland. They framed themselves as people 
who could never have constituted a threat to the People’s Republic or socialism. To con-
vey such activist identities in public would therefore have effectively led to the failure of 
the authorities’ securitisation moves.
10.4.3. The Activists’ Reverse-Securitisation of Their Adversaries
Consistent with their attempt to use socialism as their referent object of securitisation 
and desecuritisation (i.e., to make themselves its guardians), the activists framed their 
authorities suspected them of pulling the strings behind the scenes, the older activists remained distant from 
the activities on Tiananmen Square until the latter stages of the protests. The democracy movement which still 
operates outside of China has remained fractured and consequently ineffective inside China.
73  Radtke (2008, 216) also notes how notions like ‘private’ and ‘individualism’ have been regarded with 
suspicion, while notions like ‘public’ and ‘collective’ have been praised. Freedom has similarly been seen as 
detrimental to the positive value of unselfishness.
74  Still in his April 21 speech Ren Wanding (1990, 46-47) presented the demands of the students: “1) higher 
wages and oppose inflation, 2) basic housing at low prices, 3) democracy in the universities, and opposition to 
administrative hierarchy, and 4) freedom of the press to oppose counter-revolutionary thought.”
328
Chapter 10
adversaries, which were the hard-liners in the CCP, as the antithesis of socialism and the 
prosperity of the motherland. The activists made several attempts to ‘divide and rule’ the 
authorities via the fissures in the premier leadership. They argued in openly Manichean 
terms that the authorities should have targeted their repression on the CCP hard-liners, 
who constituted a fatal threat to socialism. Wang Dan and Chai Ling, the leaders of the 
student headquarters set up on the Square, were explicit on this: the struggle was “a de-
cisive battle between light and darkness” (quoted in Manion 1990, xxxvii).
Many activists in the 1989 movement also framed the struggle as one against bureauc-
ratism75 and occasionally even against a ‘privileged class’ in Chinese society.76 This dem-
onstrates how the critical diagnosis of the real socialist society that had been developed 
by radical Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution had survived into the late 1980s. 
Denunciation of cadre corruption also played a central role in the 1989 movement’s 
frames, as activists argued that “out of ten officials, nine are corrupt” and portrayed bu-
reaucrats as “greedy parasites incompetent in advanced knowledge and technology” (an 
Open Letter 1990, 50-54).  One activist also argued that bureaucrats and the system of 
“imperial descendants” (i.e., nepotism among high-ranking cadres) would throw China 
into “great turmoil.”77 Some accused the CCP of becoming “an underworld gang organ-
ized along the lines of a patriarchal family.”78 However, most activists did not frame their 
criticism so drastically, but still used negative terms, as the writer who criticised one-
party rule by asking: “How can this kind of closed organization be anything but a breeding 
ground for dictatorship, patriarchy, and personality cults?”79 Furthermore, the target of 
counter-securitisation tended to expand from the CCP hard-liners to include the whole 
CCP, as the protest dragged on and the hard-liners got the upper hand in dealing with the 
activists.80
The radical segments of the student protesters were able to keep the movement on 
an uncompromising track. A small minority could block negotiations or compromises, 
and even to back out of agreements already made. Raising the stakes on both sides of the 
struggle allowed no way out for either side, something that became evident in the state-
ments made on both sides. This was an effect of securitisation on both sides. As such, the 
‘Frankenstein’s monster’ (Grayson 2003; Collins 2005; Emmers 2007), or, more aptly, the 
‘Golem’ of securitisation, was proving to be too unwieldy for either side.
75  This line or tactic had been even stronger in the Democracy Wall movement activists’ argumentation. They 
argued that the undemocratic political system had made it possible for ‘careerists’ and ‘conspirators’ to infil-
trate the socialist state and the CCP and turn them into their personal power base, in language that was very 
reminiscent of the type of argumentation Mao and the Leftists had used during the Cultural Revolution. This 
‘careerist’ Leftist rule was described as a ‘feudal fascist dictatorship’ that was framed as the antithesis of social-
ism. Beyond ‘careerism’, another force projected as the mortal enemy of socialism was ‘bureaucratism’, defined 
as a psychological tendency of officialdom to crave for power and privileges that made it lose touch with the 
people and become a self-serving ruling stratum or even a class perverting Marxism. (Paltemaa & Vuori 2006.)
76  See ‘A Memorial and Testament to the Privileged Class’ (1990, 41-42) and ‘Reflections on the History of the 
Chinese Communist Party’ (1990, 59-60).
77  ‘Reflections on the History of the Chinese Communist Party’ (1990, 60-61).
78  ‘A Sketch of the Chinese Communist Party’ (1990, 42-43).
79  ‘Reflections on the Chinese Communist Party’ (1990, 145-48).
80  See ‘A Declaration of Emergency to all the People of the Country from the People of the Capital’ (1990, 97-98) 
for a non-student securitisation move that is quite strong in its calls for the resignation of the ruling group.
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10.4.4. Functional and Other Resisting Actors
While the students were the most visible aspect of the social foment that occurred dur-
ing the spring of 1989, other actors also affected the process of securitisation during this 
time. The support of Beijing residents was significant in creating an impression of wide 
support and justification for challenging the authorities. Another functional actor was the 
PLA after the declaration of martial law. The PLA was actually key to the whole process: 
if the PLA had not followed its orders, the government would have collapsed. While there 
indeed were reports of military commanders refusing orders, there was enough disci-
pline to manage the violent suppression of the demonstrators June 3 onwards.
Chinese journalists oscillated between being functional and desecuritising actors. The 
split in the top leadership had made it possible for journalists to engage in the greatest 
political autonomy they had ever experienced. In addition to using foreign news to im-
plicitly criticise the party, publishing stories supportive to the protesting students, and 
displaying students’ slogans in pictures and television broadcasts, journalists also took 
part in protest marches to Tiananmen Square. Some even displayed banners declaring 
‘do not believe us – we tell lies.’81
While the authorities also sought to utilise the media as their mouthpiece, the faction-
al split and the increased boldness of journalists meant that the media in many respects 
had an impeding effect on the securitisation acts of the authorities; even after the violent 
suppression, some journalists still managed to slip allegorical protests into the People’s 
Daily in the form of page layouts and the use of headlines and images (see e.g., Faison 
1990). In the aftermath of the events of 1989, the party re-established its hold on Chinese 
media. The media has subsequently played an important role in the shift to the new wave 
of patriotism that has been used to legitimise CCP-rule in the 1990s and 2000s (see e.g., 
Hughes 2006).
The transition from a totalitarian to a post-totalitarian political order is evident in the 
Chinese propaganda system which no longer focuses as much on how its people think, 
but rather on what they think about. The lesson drawn from the 1989 ‘disturbances’ and 
of the first decade of the reform period was that the party had to reinforce its propaganda 
work. Accordingly, in addition to this mouthpiece role of the media, in the 1990s Chinese 
propaganda work began to focus on agenda setting (Chan 2002). In spite of the liberalisa-
tion of the forms and voices in the media, the party still seeks to set the agenda of what 
is presented in the media. This active approach to propaganda has been influenced and 
inspired by Western methods of public relations; the party’s Propaganda Department 
is now translated as that of Public Relations (Brady 2008). The Hu Jintao – Wen Jiabao 
leadership has maintained ’thought work’, or the guidance of what people think about, 
as a major priority of the party. Thereby, the development of a ‘harmonious society’ has 
meant, in practice, continued censorship that has been targeted at ‘harmful’ news report-
ing. 
While journalists were at times functional actors, and at times resisting actors, some 
81  This unprecedented contestation was possible because the faction of Zhao Ziyang promoted greater 
autonomy for the press, and important journalists had connections with it beforehand. The fang-shou cycles 
of the 1980s had also prepared journalists for such increased contestation: with the cyclical relaxation and 




segments of Beijing workers were solely on the resisting side. Workers also established 
their own autonomous organisations and labour unions, which was a serious breach of 
party discipline and even the legal order. The Beijing Workers Union was set up in April, 
and the Beijing Worker’s Autonomous Federation was established in May. While the 
workers had their own demands82 that were separate from the students’, these ‘illegal’ 
organisations explicitly supported the students. Some of their publications formed dese-
curitisation moves (BWU 1990b, 108-109): “The Beijing Workers’ Union was established 
on April 20th to protect the rights of workers; and we published our ‘Letter’ to the people 
of the city and ‘Ten Questions.’ The April 26th editorial falsely stated that these documents 
were counter-revolutionary” – and even counter-securitisation discourses: “Democracy 
and dictatorship are in a life or death struggle. The Li Peng government has become isolated 
and counter-revolutionary, publicly raising the banner of opposition to both democracy and 
the people” (‘Letter to the Workers of the Capital’ 1990, 113). Most intellectuals and older 
democracy activists were also clearly on the side of the students. Intellectuals, however, 
preferred to keep a low profile in regard to the students’ activities, and only voiced their 
support in the final stages of the protest. They apparently did not want to create an im-
pression of being behind the movement, as this could have made the authorities allega-
tions of ‘backstage bosses’ more credible.
Thus, these various functional and ‘supporting’ actors had an effect on how the process 
finally played out. The success in mobilising the system and the failure of other functions 
becomes evident here. The deterrent function of securitisation clearly failed because 
the movement could exist over a substantial period of time. Even the function of control 
failed, as citizens of Beijing blocked the entry of the martial law troops, and some fought 
back even after the use of lethal force was authorised. In the end, the party-state was able 
to suppress the movement, but the security argument was never considered legitimate, 
even though it did eventually serve the function of long-term control. Thereby, after 1989, 
the vast majority of the Chinese have consented to the continued rule of the CCP, and the 
Chinese democracy movement has been forced to operate outside the Mainland.
10.5. Conclusions of Analysis: The Havoc of Contested Securitisation
The analysis of the case of the 1989 ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ indicates that Li 
Peng’s conservative faction, and eventually Deng Xiaoping too, interpreted the protests as 
a conspiracy designed by a small group which aimed to reject the Communist party and 
the socialist system at the deepest possible level. The whole issue was presented as be-
ing one about the core values of the Chinese political order: the Four Cardinal principles, 
the socialist system, the state and the government, were all presented as being under 
threat from a ‘counter-revolutionary rebellion’ and ‘bourgeois liberalism.’ Integral to this 
view was that without socialism and the leadership of the party, the People’s Republic 
would certainly fall and China would once again suffer the oppression of foreign pow-
ers. Furthermore, Deng linked the ‘turmoil’ with events that had occurred in Poland, and 
derived a lesson from them: ‘concessions lead to chaos.’ The party leadership seems to 
82  “We earnestly demand the following: a wage increase, price stabilisation, and a publication of the incomes and 
possessions of government officials and their families. We, the workers of Beijing, and citizens from all walks of life, 
support the university students and their fight for honesty and justice.” (BWU 1990a, 107.)
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have retained this lesson: such contestation and resistance should not be allowed to be 
repeated.
The securitisation of the student movement evolved as the events unfolded, and the in-
itial functions of the securitisation had failed. This shows how actual securitisation proc-
esses are not always clear-cut, or uncontested. There were several securitising actors that 
used securitising moves with various functions and multiple audiences. Initially, there 
were securitisation moves where the Standing Committee and the party elders were the 
relevant audience. Here, Li Peng was the most important securitising actor; Zhao Ziya-
ng opposed this line, but was defeated. As the moves to raise the issue onto the agenda 
succeeded, the issue became central on the agenda and the party elders eventually took 
charge. While formal decisions, such as the declaration of martial law were signed by Li, 
the de facto authority emanated from Deng and the other party elders.
For most of the process, a relevant audience was the group of activists on the Square 
along with the Beijing residents who supported them. Some of the securitisation moves 
were a type of deterrence strategy that aimed to dissuade the activists from any further 
action through the threat of severe punishments. However, this proved to be an utter fail-
ure. The securitisation moves for control and discipline were directed at party members, 
cadres and professionals, which were also a failure, if only partial, as some PLA forces re-
fused to follow orders and many party members even participated in the demonstrations 
themselves. The general public, and even international audiences, were also relevant for 
the securitisation moves that sought legitimacy both before and after the use of force. 
These moves too, were mainly failures, as Beijing residents resisted the declaration of 
martial law and the deployment of troops. In the global context of the fall of Socialism, the 
‘Chinese solution’ did not receive much support.
Several functional actors facilitated the escalation of the conflict. The media oscillated 
between being a functional actor and a desecuritising actor as the process went on. While 
the media served as an important forum for the securitisation moves of the authorities, 
many journalists also resisted these moves in an unprecedented fashion, with some even 
joining the protest on the Square. This impeded the securitisation moves of the authori-
ties and fuelled the optimism of both the activists and the public at large. While some pa-
pers were closed down, and discipline was eventually instilled, there were still instances 
of subsequent resistance. The autonomous organisations that the workers established 
were key factors in making the movement seem threatening to the party elders.
Beyond these functional actors, the authorities’ securitisation moves were impeded 
by many other factors. Official Chinese Communist history recognises patriotic popular 
uprisings, especially those instigated by students that have resisted feudalism and for-
eign rule. The reversal of the verdict of 1976 ‘incident’ also impeded the securitisation 
of the 1989 movement. Both of these events were used as evidence that the 1989 move-
ment was part of a revolutionary and patriotic tradition of popular protest movements 
in China. The majority of the protesters were remonstrating against corruption and nep-
otism, themes which had been recurrent throughout the history of popular discontent 
and uprisings. It was thus difficult to present the patriotic and naïve students as threats 
to the party. However, what facilitated the securitisation was the collapse of the Social-
ists in Poland; as the tanks rolled onto Tiananmen Square, Solidarity in Poland achieved 
its first electoral victory. Thus, the authorities viewed the situation of Poland as a stern 
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warning of the consequences of too much leniency towards any anti-party action. Thus, 
the alleged international conspiracy to topple Communist rule in China also facilitated 
securitisation. The ‘old guard’s’ experiences of the ‘chaos’ of the Red Guard time and the 
mass movements of the Cultural Revolution operated as warnings of the potential conse-
quences of unmanaged violence on the streets. The facilitating factors referred to by the 
authorities proved to be stronger factors than the impeding factors, such as the popular 
support for the student movement.
The culmination of unprecedented social activism is also evident in the contestedness 
and resistance that took place both within the party leadership and on the streets. While 
the securitisation of the protest was similar to the case of 1976, in that it was reactive 
and worked as part of factional politicking, the contestation within the factions was much 
stronger in 1989, as was the unrest on the streets. From the outset, the students resisted 
the securitisation of their activities; security speech became the battleground for the le-
gitimacy of both the authorities and the protest on the streets, as the protesters made 
desecuritisation and even countersecuritisation moves. Their resistance was encouraged 
by the parallel contestation of Li’s line by Zhao Ziyang, although he failed to convince ei-
ther Li’s faction, Deng, or the students on the Square. This division among the leadership 
effectively worked towards the escalation of the conflict, and provided an opportunity to 
voice grievances. However, the students were also unsuccessful, both in their attempts to 
deflect the securitisation with desecuritisation arguments, and in getting their reverse-
securitisation through.
Factional politics had a major effect on how the 1989 demonstrations played out and 
on how they were securitised. Zhao Ziyang’s way of presenting the political developments 
within the top leadership illustrates how ‘petty politicking’ can have major repercussions. 
Factions within the leadership were jockeying for the greater prize of the future line of 
reform and, ultimately, the direction of Chinese society. The social foment of the demon-
strations would seem to have provided an opportunity to make a move against Zhao and 
his position. There was even a precedent for such a move that had proved successful: 
Hu Yaobang had been demoted a few years before, under similar conditions. This time, 
however, the social situation was dramatically different to that of early 1987. The ‘Golem’ 
of securitisation was let loose via the party-political tactics that provided a chance for un-
precedented autonomous social mobilisation. Indeed, whilst decision-makers may lack 
broader horisons, their intentions may be inconsequential in regard to the actual politics 
they produce. In 1989, both the securitisation of the student movement and the counter-
discourses contesting or resisting it had counterproductive effects, even internationally. 
June Fourth 1989 is the severest and most enduring contemporary blemish on China’s 
international image. It illustrates the possible costs of securitisation on inter-unit affairs: 
even though the securitisation was a domestic affair in terms of the use of force, the ‘Go-
lem’ may nonetheless wreak international havoc.
The analysis of such contestation and resistance demonstrated how identity frame 
theory and securitisation theory can be combined to examine some of the underlying 
logics that affect the interaction between authorities and protestors. As noted in new so-
cial movement research, not all identity framings need to be essentialist in their nature. 
Identity avowals and imputations can refer both to the essential qualities of the actors, 
such as bravery and selflessness, and the social outcomes of their activities. Indeed, all 
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articulations where the activists refer to themselves in terms of ‘we/us’ or ‘I/me’ and give 
some additional attributes to these can be regarded as identity talk. Framing the activ-
ists as people who are creating a better tomorrow, or conversely turmoil, could therefore 
be as compelling as the more vague labels of ‘patriots’ or ‘counter-revolutionary dregs’. 
Such instrumental identities were fully used by both sides in the movement. The authori-
ties securitised the movement by framing its activists as people who fought for the de-
struction of socialism, the overthrow of the CCP’s leadership, and the creation of social 
instability, if not outright social chaos — all major threats to a socialist country and its 
law-abiding citizens.
Security was the grounds for the mobilisation of the system, suppression of dissent 
and the legitimisation of the whole process. Despite such arguments of necessity, the 
brutal handling of the student demonstrations has left a deep wound in the ‘collective 
memory’ of the Chinese, and the massive propaganda campaign that was launched after 
June fourth was not that successful in convincing the people (Chen & Shi 2001). In this 
sense, the securitisation of the movement can be considered a failure. Even though in the 
privacy of their minds many people did not believe the ‘big lie’, they publicly conformed 
to it and the behaviour it implied. No major movements or uprisings, followed either; in 
fact, the silence that followed the propaganda has also led to a generation gap, in which 
young people are either not interested in, or do not know, what really happened and why. 
Therefore, conversely, the securitisation of the movement was also a success: it may not 
have served the function to legitimise the actions taken by the party, but it did success-
fully serve the function of longer term control. But the nervousness with which the CCP 
leadership approached the 20th anniversary of the ‘quelling of the rebellion’ in 2009, 
betrays how significant the events and their interpretation still are for the party, and its 
legitimacy.
The 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident’ retains its official security status in China and any al-
ternative narratives of the movement are taboo. However, that the securitisation process 
was only partly successful is demonstrated in the continuous acrimony over the official 
verdict of the ‘incident’: the authorities’ securitisation campaign failed to convince the 
majority of the Chinese of the legitimacy of the harsh actions taken against patriotic and 
naïve students. Nevertheless, the securitisation was successful where it mattered the 
most; the party-elders, the military and the police forces were convinced of the neces-
sity to secure the capital and suppress the movement. Unlike in the European collapsed 
socialist systems, the Chinese political elite retained their self-legitimisation. The admin-
istration of Jiang Zemin retained the securitised status of the events, which even became 
a kind of ‘loyalty test’ for candidates for a top leadership position. For Jiang Zemin, to 
compromise on the status of the issue would also mean to compromise the events that 
lifted him to the top position.
The securitisation process has also served the function of control: while the negative 
legitimisation effects of the securitisation process were nearly as drastic within China as 
outside of it, there have been no further major democracy movements on the mainland 
after 1989. It may, however, be that should the Chinese leadership fail in maintaining the 




In terms of mass campaigns, the first half of the 1990s was a calm period for China. The 
patriotic education campaign (e.g., Hughes 2006; Wang 2008; Vickers 2009), and the de-
velopment of Chinese internet control (e.g., Paltemaa & Vuori 2009) were noteworthy 
efforts of the party-state in the field of political security. The end of the decade however 
witnessed a re-emergence of massive propaganda campaigning with an explicit aim to 
identify asymmetric relationships and dangers for the Chinese society and state. This 
campaign was accompanied by a series of incarcerations that echoed those of the Mao-
era; there were no trials for those sent to re-education camps or mental hospitals (Sey-
mor 2005). The new threat and danger presented as the reason for such practices, was 
the “evil cult” (邪教, xiéjiào)1 of Falungong2 and especially its leader Li Hongzhi. The 
battle between the CCP and FLG garnered international attention over a few years, and 
has inspired academic research for a much longer time.3
A few book-length studies of the Falungong have been published. For example, Schech-
ter (2001) is a journalistic exposé of the struggle between the FLG and the CCP,4 Chang 
(2004) analyses the religious and social aspects of FLG doctrines, while Ownby (2008) 
places the Falungong into Chinese historical, social and religious contexts. Articles and 
1  In Imperial China, there was no conceptual equivalent for religion. The current term for religion (宗教, 
zōngjiào) is a neologism introduced to China through Japanese translations of European works in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The term 教(jiào), teachings, was used in imperial China to categorise 
the kinds of activity that would be termed religion today. This concept formed a common discursive space for 
both orthodox and heterodox, that is, tolerated and intolerated teachings. (Ownby 2008, 8.) 
2  Fǎlúngōng (法轮功) literally means ‘law-wheel cultivation’, or ‘law-wheel qigong’, while Fǎlún dàfǎ (法轮大
法), the other name used by the FLG, means the ‘great law of the law-wheel.’ Falungong is commonly written as 
Falun Gong in English, but the direct pinyin transliteration of Falungong is used here.
3  How Falungong came to be a superficially recognised household term outside China as a result of the massive 
suppression campaign, once again demonstrates how unruly the ‘Golem’ of securitisation can be. The story of 
the FLG outside has China has largely resonated with the negative image of China as ‘violating human rights.’ 
The prevalence of this theme is quite evident from almost any sample of the thousands of journalistic articles 
that mention the FLG. 
4  Johnson (2004) is another journalistic book that includes the article on the FLG that earned him the Pulitzer 
prize in 2001.
11. Case IV: The Evil Cult of Falungong
Falungong’s genesis and rampant outgrowth is 
a grave political struggle waged by today’s enemies 
in and outside the country, the purpose of which is to 




book chapters that deal with the FLG are numerous. In many of them Chinese traditions 
play a central role, as, for example, in Rahn (2002) who focuses on the conflictual re-
lations of the Falungong and the CCP, as a continuation of a ‘ruler-sectarian’ paradigm, 
and in Wasserstrom (2003) who presents the FLG as representing a ‘spectre’ of religious 
revolt for the party. Penny (2003) analyses the biographies of Li Hongzhi from the view-
point of the tradition of Chinese biography. Studies that focus on the FLG/CCP conflict 
from the party’s viewpoint include Kindopp (2002), Tong (2002b), and Seymor (2005).5 
The religious aspects of the FLG have also been investigated, as, for example, Hua & Xia 
(1999) and Wong & Liu (1999) discuss the religiousness of the FLG in the wider setting of 
Chinese religious traditions,6 while Lai (2006) views it in the general context of religion 
in post-totalitarian China. Palmer (2007) studies the rise and fall of qigong7 in China, 
with the FLG as the end of the ‘qigong fever.’ Perry (2001) and Thornton (2002; 2003) are 
examples of studies that focus on the FLG as part of popular resistance in China, and look 
at the FLG’s means of resistance and the FLG as a form of resistance itself. Other writers 
have enquired into the origins of the FLG’s popularity and support, as for example, Wong 
& Liu (1999) present a sociological study of the rise of FLG, and Friedman (2006) exam-
ines the FLG as the most popular social movement of the 1990s. The organisational prac-
tices and the composition of FLG practitioners has also raised interest, as, for example, 
Tong (2002a) presents the organisational structure of the FLG, while Lu (2005) studies 
the entrepreneurial logic of Li and the FLG. 
While relevant to the proximate and distal contexts of the securitisation of the Falun-
gong, of interest here is not what the FLG is about, nor why it became as popular as it did. 
The investigation here focuses on how the Falungong came to be constructed as an issue 
of national security in China.8 
11.1. The Historical and Socio-Political Context of the Rise of 
            the Falungong
The 1980s was a decade of a crisis of faith in Chinese socialism. The last years of the Mao-
era had reduced the authority of party administrators and, along with Deng Xiaoping’s 
5  See also Munro (2000) on how judicial psychiatry has been abused in China, also in the case of the FLG.
6  Palmer (2003; see also 2007) emphasises the ‘darkness’ of the FLG’s millenarianism. While Ownby (2008) 
recognises the apocalyptic features of Li’s doctrine, he disagrees with Palmer’s depiction. Barend ter Haar’s 
website similarly contains religious analysis of the Falungong that argues that it does not meet the criteria of 
millenarian religion, see http://website.leidenuniv.nl/~haarbjter/falun.htm.
7  Qigong (气功, qìgōng) means the cultivation of qi- or cosmic energy, and is a general label for various styles 
of breathing exercises that often include esoteric beliefs.
See Palmer (2007) on the origins of qigong and its connections to socialist medicine with ‘Chinese characteris-
tics’ as well as on the ‘qigong fever’ of the 1980s and 1990s. The ‘scientific nature’ and promotion of qigong as 
part of Chinese medicine since the late 1970s were instrumental in ‘heating up’ the ‘qigong fever.’ The science 
of qigong seemed to represent all good things promoted by the CCP in the beginning of the reform-era: it was 
essentially both ancient and cutting edge Chinese, elitist and popular, and happy, healthy and whole (Ownby 
2008, 13). Qigong raised both journalist and popular support and also had political support in the 1980s. 
8  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the case of the FLG does not allow the study of published inner-party documents 
to the extent as in the cases of the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 events. 北京之春 (2001) and Zong (2002) 
however contain documents on the initial handling of the Falungong issue within the premier leadership, which 
allows the study of the initial stages of the securitisation before it was made public. However, there is no lack of 
material for analysis as the published securitisation discourse consists of perhaps thousands of articles, while 
Li Hongzhi’s resistance also consists of hundreds of pages of his talks and speeches.
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economic reforms, a loosening of socialist morals increased cynicism towards the party. 
The dissatisfaction with incessant corruption and nepotism culminated in the mass-pro-
tests of 1989 and their eventual violent suppression.
The crisis of faith and increased cynicism towards the party led many to search for 
new spirituality. This was possible because the party had, to an extent, loosened its con-
trol over religious practice in the 1980s (Lai 2006). Ownby (2008, 93-95) sees the FLG’s 
appeal as threefold: Li’s doctrine promises both a return to a lost spirituality and a major 
contribution to modern science, his doctrine is profoundly moral and promises super-
natural powers to true believers and practitioners.9 Other sources that contributed to 
strengthening the appeal of qigong included the failure of the health-care system which 
left poor, elderly people to seek alternative methods to maintain their health; 10 the nega-
tive effects of modernising society, which led to resistance against modern ideas and mo-
dernity; and new opportunities to build solidarity networks, when, for example, those of 
the work-unit were lost. As such, the majority of FLG practitioners were middle-aged or 
retired women,11which correlates with the disproportionate lay off of middle-aged wom-
en in the reforms of state owned enterprises (Perry & Selden 2003b; Lee 2003).
In the early 1990s, the party still supported the practice of qigong, which was viewed 
as an apolitical activity together with other traditional folk-beliefs, such as fengshui (风
水, fēngshuǐ; landscape positioning). The Chinese origin of qigong also meshed well with 
the calls for patriotism and nationalism that the party emphasised (Hughes 2006). It is no 
wonder then, that qigong-masters rose to celebrity status during the ‘qigong-fever’ that 
gripped China at the turn of the decade (Palmer 2007). Li Hongzhi12 was the master of 
the qigong-group that claimed to be the largest in China.13 He introduced a new qigong-
system called Falungong or Xiulian Falun Dafa (great method for practicing the Wheel of 
Law) in 1992.
Li’s doctrine differs from most qigong-systems in that it also contains religious beliefs 
and an ethical code.14 This syncretic combination includes elements of Buddhism, Dao-
9  A fourth source of appeal is the ‘Chineseness’ of Li’s teachings. This might explain why the practice has been 
popular among the Chinese diaspora too (Ownby 2008, 93-95).
10  Patricia Thornton emphasises that the non-traditional and non-medical methods of healing through the 
cultivation of paranormal capabilities is implicitly critical of ‘scientific Marxism.’ To claim the body of a practi-
tioner as a private realm or ‘open space’, and by presenting a set of radically different values and doctrines, the 
FLG departs from the CCP’s prerogative of control. The somatisation of a person’s social, moral and economic 
distress into bodily problems also translates into a metonymical criticism of the Chinese ‘body politic.’ Thus 
to claim to alter the body of the practitioner is a subversive act against Marxist doctrines. (Thornton 2002.) 
To attain ‘consummation’ in the FLG paradise would amount to the negation of the CCP and de facto defection 
from the system of state control. Although Li Hongzhi may not have viewed his doctrine as a metaphysical 
escape from the Chinese political order, by claiming an alternative truth on the world, he challenges the CCP on 
a cosmological level.
11  For information on the organisational structure and social structure of Chinese Falungong practitioners, see 
Tong (2002a) and Xiao (2001) respectively.
12  Li’s biographical information is disputed. The party presents Li as a dangerous charlatan who deceives gulli-
ble people, and  a common soldier and worker before he engaged in qigong in the late 1980s. The Falungong 
claims Li is a higher being with supernatural abilities, apparent since childhood when he was taught in ancient 
practices by monks (‘Brief Biography of Li Hongzhi’ 1999; 人民日报 23.7.1999b). Li emigrated to the US in 
1995, which affected his teachings (Ownby 2008).
13  As Palmer’s (2007) analysis shows, Zhonggong (中功, zhōnggōng) would, however, seem to have been more 
popular and financially and organisationally more clearly institutionalised.
14  The most authoritative work by Li (1996) is “Zhuan Falun.” Li’s writings can be downloaded from the FLG 
website, www.falundafa.org. Li’s Chinese texts amount to some 2000 pages, while even the English translations 
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ism and traditional Chinese folk-beliefs, all mixed in with millenarianism15 and even ‘su-
pernatural’ beliefs (Schechter 2001; Chang 2004; Ownby 2008). Since it is not a splinter 
group from any world religion, it has proven to be very difficult to classify FLG (Wong & 
Liu 1999; see also Ownby 2008).16
In the early 1990s, the FLG was known only for its qigong while the religious beliefs 
and ethical code that are an integral part of the system, were mostly unknown (Hua & 
Xia 1999). This meant that, at that time, the FLG was not considered a direct threat to 
the party and even had a legal status. The party’s control apparatus closed its proverbial 
eyes from such practices. However, as the popularity of the FLG began to increase, its 
religious and ethical aspect also received more attention. Li’s main work, “Zhuan Falun” 
(转法轮; Turning the Law-Wheel) was banned in 1996.17 A gradual increase in campaign-
ing against the sectarian group also grew, but it remained uncoordinated e.g., there were 
investigations into the FLG carrying out ‘illegal religious activities’ and being a ‘heterodox 
cult’ in 1997 and 1998 respectively (Ownby 2008, 168).
Although Li and his followers have denied having any worldly political goals (Li 1999a), 
also go beyond 1000 pages.
15  Millenarian communities generally consist of ethnocentric participants, who perceive themselves as being 
disrupted by an evil power of seemingly demonic dimensions which upsets and menaces traditional ways of 
life. In the presence of such a danger, the community perceives itself as the chosen elect, whose task is to defend 
the community so that righteousness can overcome the evil. The most receptive audiences for millenarianism 
have been found in areas undergoing rapid social and economic change, which bring about cultural shocks and 
disorientation, disrupt existing socioeconomic orders, and have powerful impacts on the ways of life. (Rinehart 
2006, 23.) The rise in popularity of qigong in general, and the FLG in particular, coincides with the rapid socio-
economic changes of 1980-90s China. Ways of living and understandings of the world that predate the CCP have 
been preserved in China, and the socioeconomic tumults of the reform period combined with the loosening of 
socialist morals, may explain the popularity of the FLG’s millenarian beliefs.
16  The FLG has not always been viewed favourably, even outside China, largely due to some of the doctrines of 
Li Hongzhi. Li is claimed to possess supernatural skills, like levitation and the ability to know the thoughts and 
doings of all his disciples (Li 2001a). Li (1997) himself also claims that aliens are among us, trying to take over 
humanity through the destruction of human morality with empirical science and computers. Further, since Li 
claims to cure his disciples, and as cultivation will keep practitioners healthy and illness free, going to hospital 
would betray their faith. He also discourages his followers from reading “evil texts” that lie about the FLG, 
meaning that only his teachings and writings are permissible. Some of Li’s views on homosexuals and modern 
society have also raised controversy. In effect, Li’s system forms an anti-science, conservative critique of current 
morals (e.g., tolerance of homosexuality and miscegenation), aesthetics (e.g., demonic children’s toys), and the 
way of modern life (e.g., ‘football madness’), spiced up with supernatural beliefs, and presented in a strongly 
Manichean way. Accordingly, Ownby (2008, 103) divides Li’s concerns on immorality into those of social and 
religious manifestations of immorality: the decadence of modern morals works towards the end of the dharma 
or kalpa, and therefore the world of today is a dangerous place with an omnipresence of demons.
The FLG is by no means an unusual type of group in China or other Asian countries: there are a number of other 
semi-religious or religious groups that profess similar beliefs of the end of times.
For some of Li’s claims see Li (1997; 2001a).
17  It would seem that Li anticipated problems as in 1995 he migrated to the US. Thereafter the FLG-community 
outside the mainland has been important in the struggle between the FLG and the CCP, as practitioners outside 
China have been instrumental in grafting the anti-FLG campaign onto the discourse of Chinese human rights 
violations. The international FLG community has also been influential in maintaining the FLG in foreign media 
reports, which have been an important arena for the struggle. However, the issue of human rights can be viewed 
as a graft, as Li himself showed no interest in such matters before the campaign. On the contrary, he has taught 
that freedom of speech has worked towards the social decay of morality, which has brought the world near its 
next destruction (Ownby 2008, 107). The international scope of the FLG was one of the reasons Tong (2002b, 
804) lists for why the CCP took its time to launch the anti-FLG campaign in earnest: both its premier leader and 
its headquarters were located abroad.
It is important to note that Li did not react to the ban on his works in terms of counter-securitisation, something 
which he would only do in the 2000s, after the anti-FLG campaign had been going on for some time.
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the banning of Li’s works was not taken favourably by its practitioners. Protests were 
organised against the defamation of the Falungong (人民日报 5.8.1999). As the ‘qigong 
fever’ began to subside in the official line of the CCP, the FLG increased its resistance to 
the denunciation of Li and his doctrine. The success of sit-ins and other protests, together 
with the limited suppression these attracted may have created a false sense of tolerance 
to such activities, or even of high-level protection. No other qigong-group had organised 
such concerted and widely spread protests earlier (Ownby 2008, 169) even though oth-
ers were more organised and financially institutionalised. Whatever the case may have 
been at the time, FLG activists seemed to become increasingly bolder in their protests.
For instance, as a response to a television interview in May 1998 with He Zuoxiu, a re-
searcher at the National Academy of Sciences who warned of the dangers of the ‘supersti-
tions’ of qigong and Falungong,18 FLG practitioners organised an eight-day sit-in outside 
the Beijing Television station. An article by He in April 1999 (He 1999) sparked further 
protest in Tianjin, where 6000 FLG supporters protested outside Tianjin University and 
the municipial offices (Ownby 2008, 171). On this occasion, riot police were called in 
resulting in some 45 arrests. Such emboldened protest culminated in the April 25 1999 
protest in Beijing that was a response to the events in Tianjin (Zong 2002, 55).
The April 25 sit-in seems to have followed the script of ‘rightful resistance’: the pro-
test near the leadership compound of the CCP sought the attention of political elites. The 
demonstration was orderly with a presentation of a petition to the authorities for official 
recognisation the FLG as beneficial to society. Such petitioning was in line with ancient 
Chinese traditions and even practices of the CCP.19 However, as has been noted by O’Brien 
(1996), even such rightful resistance has its limits. The immediate non-response by the 
authorities belied the massive campaign that was to follow a few months later.
The sudden appearance of such a massive group20 of semi-religious protesters without 
prior warning from security intelligence signalled a lapse in control. Beyond the thou-
sands of petitioners, estimates of the number involved with the FLG exceeded that of par-
ty members.21 The vagueness of the FLG doctrine and its ‘organisation without organisa-
tion’ was a cause for concern, especially as the FLG had exhibited organisational prowess 
by successfully organising concerted protest activities all around China.22 It seemed that 
the FLG had organised itself into a national network and, in the eyes of Jiang Zemin (江
泽民 2001a; see also Zong 2002), into a strong political power that could seriously chal-
lenge the party and government. Not only that, but the FLG also represented a genuinely 
Chinese alternative for moral leadership in China. When such factors were combined 
with rumours of even top-level cadres involved in its activities,23 the FLG seemed like a 
18  He had already co-authored critical articles on qigong in 1995, which likened qigong to the Aum Shinri kyo 
sect in Japan (Ownby 2008, 166).
19  Despite the fact that the appeals office is, however, not even near the Zhongnanhai compound.
The representatives of the April 25 protests also demanded in their dialogue with the authorities that the 
protests not be considered as anti-government activity, and that the protesters not be arrested. In this way, the 
activists were engaging in pre-emptive desecuritisation.
20  The number of protesters in the April 25 protest is most commonly estimated at 10 000, but Zong (2002, 
53) goes as high as 21 000.
21  While Li Hongzhi claimed some 70 million adherents, the 1999 investigation into the FLG by the CCP identi-
fied 2.3 million practising FLG, with 15.6 percent being CCP members (Zong 2002, 67).
22  cf., 人民日报 (5.8.1999).
23  In 1994 Li Hongzhi gave some lectures at the Public Security University and donated the profits to a police 
foundation (Ownby 2008, 87). Li apparently received support from cadres involved in the field of public 
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secret society, the likes of which had toppled rulers in Chinese history.24
Moreover, the year 1999 was one of several sensitive anniversaries that amplified the 
negative perception of any political challenges within the party leadership. The April 25 
protest happened to occur in conjunction with the 10 year anniversary of the April 26 
Renmin ribao editorial that had defined the student protests as turmoil in 1989, a factor 
which was not missed by Li Peng (Zong 2002). Similarly, the 80th anniversary of the May 
Fourth Movement was also just around the corner. Most significantly, the People’s Re-
public would reach its 50th anniversary on October First. As Tong (2002b) also suggests, 
these sensitive dates played into how and when the authorities responded to the FLG. 
Furthermore, the 16th Party Congress was also soon closing in, which may explain why 
Jiang Zemin was especially sensitive to such challenges against the party. Notably, he had 
risen to his premier position of power by taking swift action against student activities in 
1989. This may have worked as a factor to avoid a repeat of the indecisive responses that 
were a key problem in the escalation of the 1989 contradictions.
11.2. Authorities’ Tactics to Delegitimise the Falungong
Jiang Zemin increased the anti-FLG campaign to the level of a crackdown three months 
after the Zhongnanhai protests of 1999.25 This occurred in the context of other national 
and international crises: massive floods and the tenth anniversary of the violent suppres-
sion of the student movement of 1989 created internal pressure. Moreover, the bombing 
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces and Taiwanese President Lee Teng-
hui’s move towards ‘state-to-state’ relations in the ‘Taiwan question’ provided a sense of 
international crisis.26 
In its two-year active phase,27 the propaganda campaign employed cadres for millions 
security, with the former chair of the National People’s Congress, Qiao Shi, who had had a long career in public 
security speaking on behalf of FLG (ibid., 169). Perry (2001, 171) similarly reports how even hospital directors 
had advised high-level cadres to turn to FLG for treatment. Jiang Zemin (Zong 2002, 65-66) even delivered a 
speech to the Politburo that gave special negative emphasis to Li Qihua, a former PLA hospital director, who had 
written a letter to the General Secretary arguing that there was no contradiction between being socialist and 
belief in FLG. 
As such, these connections may explain at least some of the rumours of high-level people being involved, or 
even of Li Hongzhi as himself being part of the public security community. Luo Gan’s initial reaction, however, 
seems to work against such speculation: Zong (2002, 55) reports Luo’s initial comment was that “this Falungong 
has actually wormed itself into our party!” 
Beyond such rumours, Ownby (2008) argues that the celebrity status and wide support of qigong-masters was 
a major contributing factor to the ending of the ‘qigong-fever’ since these figures could organise themselves into 
a ‘religious party’ that could challenge the CCP.
24  Religious sectarians, espousing beliefs and practicing rituals the authorities had deemed heterodox, had 
been a major governmental concern in imperial China (Shek 1990, 87).
25  James Tong’s (2002b) analysis suggests that this was the time needed for ‘due diligence’ on the FLG, and late 
July was an opportune time to act in respect of the various ‘difficult’ anniversaries of that year.
26  See Zong (2002b) for the premier leadership’s inner discussions on these issue, and Wasserstrom (2003) for 
a contemporary academic account of the Chinese year, 1999. Wasserstrom views the way the embassy bombing 
and the FLG were handled, and how the leading figures of the FLG and the anti-NATO demonstrators were 
portrayed, as intrinsically linked: the anti-NATO demonstrations were used to ward off the spectre of May 4 
1919 and the treatment of the FLG to ward off the spectre of ‘religious revolt’ (see also Chapters 6.1. and 6.3. on 
the issue of religious revolts, and Hughes 2006 on the handling of the anti-NATO demonstrations).
27  The active phase was followed by active silencing.The FLG disappeared completely from the pages of Renmin 
Ribao after 2001, whereas between 1999 and 2001 it was mentioned in more than 1700 separate pieces in the 
paper, while before 1999 it had not appeared once. After the active phase, the FLG has come up in security 
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of hours and anti-FLG activities dominated the political agenda, even to the extent that 
television news broadcasts were extended to an hour to present this new threat to the 
state and the Chinese public. It could not be unclear to anyone that the FLG was con-
sidered dangerous by the party, and, thus, also dangerous to anyone who continued to 
practice it.28 FLG publications and tapes were confiscated and destroyed on a massive 
scale, and websites related to the practice were either closed down (websites originating 
within China) or blocked (originating outside China).
The authorities utilised a range of tactics in its anti-FLG campaign,29 which included 
securitising the FLG as a threat to socialism, ridiculing Li30 and separating the majority 
of hapless followers from a ‘small group of evildoers’, portraying the practice of FLG as 
unpatriotic, and setting the FLG into a security continuum with the international anti-cult 
campaign and even the ‘war on terror.’31
11.2.1. Falungong as a Threat to Socialism
The authorities approached the problem of the FLG from an ideological point of view, 
maintaining that Li Hongzhi had introduced a belief system that was in complete contra-
diction with communist ideology. In addition to this, Li requires that his followers give 
up their old beliefs and only follow the precepts of FLG. These elements were a serious 
concern “involving the fundamental beliefs of the communists, the fundamental ideological 
foundation of the entire nation, and the fate of our party and state” (人民日报 23.7.1999b). 
Furthermore, the activities and teachings of the FLG had “seriously endangered the gen-
eral mood of society, endangered social stability, and endangered the overall political situa-
tion” (ibid.). The FLG was said to be a “plot to overthrow China’s socialist system by hostile 
foreign powers” (人民日报 9.1.2001). This was in line with the long tradition of party 
campaigns against ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and ‘rightists’ who were pawns in the ‘inter-
national conspiracy to topple socialist rule in China.’ 
Historical experiences and international developments functioned as facilitating fac-
tors for the sense of threat attributed to the FLG. The party was keenly aware of the role of 
religious movements in the collapse of socialist systems in Europe, particularly in Poland 
(Lam 2000). China also has an impressive number of quasi-religious popular uprisings in 
its own history: in the 18th and 19th centuries almost every popular uprising was some-
how connected to religious movements (Yang 1961).32 As with the FLG, these movements 
continuums of the “three evils.”
28  The initial campaign was perceived with mixed feelings, as noted by Jakobson & Sarvimäki (2001, 149-155): 
some Chinese ironically quipped on the state of the party in China by noting that ‘the party can be threatened 
by grannies doing exercises in the park.’
29  Ownby (2008, 180-193) divides these debunks of the FLG into: 1) Criticism  from the point of view of 
religion, 2) Criticism  from the point of view of qigong, and 3) Journalistic exposés of Li.
30  This took many forms. As an example, the party’s official exposé describesLi as an “ex-army trumpet player”. 
See 人民日报 (23.7.1999b).
31  This continuum also illuminates how the social construction of threats and referent objects interact and are 
affected by issues on various levels and sectors.
32  Religious sectarians that espoused beliefs and practiced rituals the authorities deemed heterodox were 
a major governmental concern in imperial China (Shek 1990, 87). Patsy Rahn (2002) sees this as forming a 
historical ‘ruler-sectarian paradigm’, and that the anti-FLG campaign and resistance to it follow this paradigm. 
Wasserstrom (2003, 263) describes a similar pattern.
David Ownby (2008, 25-26) distances himself from this view of the FLG. He labels the FLG together with the 
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had no clear ideological or political doctrine, but they were formed around one or more 
charismatic figure and fuelled by religious euphoria generated by such leaders-cum-sav-
iours at times of general discontent.33 Li Hongzhi could be perceived as the next in line of 
these self-appointed mouths of truth, who had arrived to save the Chinese people from 
governmental oppression.34
The leadership justified its crackdown of the FLG and other “evil cults” on the basis 
of its laws and regulations on the registration and management of mass organisations, 
assembly, parades and demonstrations, the administration of public security, and the 
criminal law (Fazhi Ribao July 25 1999). To gain further legitimacy for its campaign, the 
government passed a law which prohibited heretical cults. Since the FLG did not have of-
ficial recognition, and had failed to follow regulations on the registration of mass organi-
sations, it and all its activities were deemed illegal. 
The law on heretical cults, and the judicial interpretation of the Supreme People’s 
Court, define a cult as any unauthorised group that “disturbs social order and jeopardises 
people’s lives or property” or “endangers society by fabricating and spreading superstitious 
heresies”. Particularly serious transgressions are listed in the law as: “setting up transpro-
vincial, transregional, and transmunicipial organisations,” “collaborating with overseas or-
ganisations and individuals,” and publishing “large amounts of materials.”35 A cult could 
thus be any autonomous social group capable of large scale concerted action. The word-
ing also illustrates that the authorities are actually more concerned with the organisa-
tional potential of social groups, rather than their ideology or religious beliefs (Kindopp 
2002). Such a threat is obviously considered severe, as following the legislation banning 
heretical cults, it has been possible to classify religious crimes as “crimes endangering 
national security,”36 which can carry a sentence of life imprisonment or even the death 
penalty. Even though new legislation was enacted, the old method of sending ‘class-ene-
White Lotus, folk Buddhist, sectarian, and syncretic societies as ‘redemptive societies’, which share a set of 
similar features: these groups organise around charismatic masters, who claim to preach unique messages 
of salvation experienced through the body and founded on moral beliefs, and which often sound apocalyptic. 
These groups have often maintained problematic relations with authorities, and have at times even resorted to 
violence or armed rebellion.
33  The preservation of the ‘Chinese essence’ through Western functional knowledge, has remained a central 
claim to legitimacy for both nationalist and communist elites in China (Hughes 2006, 5).
34  The CCP had also waged a campaign against sects in the 1980s (Munro 1989, 10-11).
35  These are seen by Perry and Selden (2003b) as the gravest dangers perceived by CCP leaders: cross-regional 
or –group organisation cannot be allowed; the breach of ‘proper’ societal divisions has been one of the grounds 
to suppress ‘heterodox cults’ (Perry 2001). These aspects were also evident in the 1980s campaign against 
cults (Munro 1989). The focus on the FLG as a single organisation in the initial phase of the anti-FLG campaign 
was however unprecedented even though China has battled against ‘heterodox societies’ for millennia (Perry 
2001, 170).
While protest in China of the 2000s is widespread and constant, it is characterised by localness both in terms 
of the scope of issues and segmentation of protesters: there is hardly any sign of mobilisation that would 
transcend class or regional lines (Lee & Friedman 2009; Walder 2009). While protests or unrest that is viewed 
as related to ‘separatism’, i.e., Xinjiang or Tibet, or the Falungong are often dealt with harshly, leading party 
officials seem to signal that many of the grievances villagers put forward are indeed legitimate. Such points of 
concern include corruption, selective law enforcement, and people’s livelihoods. (O’Brien 2009.) That the party 
can allow constant protest to occur is an indication that the party is confident in its system of governance in 
terms of the modulation of levels of permitted dissidence and protest; quick responses to critical events and 
the closure of networked communities, show that the vast control-systems the CCP deploys seem to be efficient 
enough for the party to stay on top.
36  The criminal law on counter-revolutionary crimes was changed in 1997 to that of jeopardizing national 
security (Dutton 2005, 271).
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mies’ to labor re-education camps with local administrative decisions without trial, was 
the preferred means to detain FLG practitioners for longer periods (Seymor 2005).
However, since the party denied that it opposed qigong or the freedom of religion,37 
it was not obvious that the spread of the FLG was a political struggle. Therefore, the FLG 
and its teachings had to be presented in direct opposition to Marxist ideology and science, 
and in contention with the position of the party, which legitimate, patriotic qigong and 
religion do not do. The FLG was presented as a matter of national security as “the genera-
tion and spread of Falungong is a political struggle launched by hostile forces both in and 
outside the country to contend with our party for the masses and for battle positions” (人
民日报 24.7.1999). Indeed, Marxist ideology was claimed to be under threat from these 
hostile forces: “we are exposing and castigating Li Hongzhi and his Falungong precisely for 
the purpose of adhering to Marxist materialism and science, opposing idealism and theism, 
and for the purpose of upholding the political beliefs of Communists and the ideological 
basis for united struggle by the people of the whole country” (ibid.). From the party’s view-
point, this justifies the use of force or any other means at its disposal. Upholding ‘stability 
and unity’ can require drastic measures.
11.2.2. Defamation of Li Hongzhi and Separation from his Followers
One of the angles of attack against the FLG was the defamation of Li Hongzhi. This was 
already evident in the early circulars of the anti-FLG campaign. For example, “The life 
and times of Li Hongzhi” (人民日报 23.7.1999b) was a biography of Li that challenged 
the supernatural abilities38 that he had according to his FLG-biographies,39 disputed his 
birth-date as coinciding with that of the Buddha Sakuyamuni, and listed various nefarious 
deeds committed by Li. Further, the CCP portrayed Li as being nothing special, dishonest, 
and merely a swindler who threatened the fortunes of ordinary Chinese and even en-
dangered their lives because of his superstitions (人民日报 23.7.1999b).40 In accordance 
37  “[B]anning cult organizations and punishing their activities is to go hand-in-hand with protecting normal 
religious activities and people’s freedom of belief” (ChinaOnline 1999). 
zhōnggōng (中功) also displays religious beliefs, and it too has been banned (Thornton 2003). Other groups 
considered as unofficial and unorthodox include unofficial Christian groups such as the Lord God Sect (主神 
教), as well as unofficial Buddhist-like, Daoist-like, and folk-religious sects, such as Guanyin Famen (观音法门) 
and Yiguan Dao (一貫道).
Nearly all of the other ‘cults’ that have been banned in China exhibit similar features; many of these groups’ 
activities are secretive and they have elaborate organisations, often with a personal and charismatic leader, 
warn about an approaching doomsday, have tight control over their members, are hostile towards the CCP and 
view it as their enemy, often condemn official religious associations and the official churches, claim to possess 
mystic and supernatural abilities, and often have links outside China, especially in Taiwan, South Korea and the 
United States  (Lai 2006, 67).
38  Placing major emphasis on the refutation of Li’s claims on his life and supernatural abilities, highlights 
the interactive nature of resistance and repression. Even the initial acts of soft-repression by the authorities 
exhibited this tendency, which was to also become apparent with Li’s resistance to the authorities’ securitisa-
tion arguments.
39  See ‘Brief Biography of Li Hongzhi’ (1999).
Since May 2001, the FLG biographies have not been available. They present Li as an extraordinary youth, who 
received special training from various masters, possessed supernatural skills and describe how Li decided to 
publish his doctrine, and follow the form of traditional Chinese religious and dynastic biographies. For a discus-
sion, see Penny (2003).
40  Li was reproduced as a charlatan-like figure that hoodwinked people in a variety of propaganda formats, 
even inclusive of comic books (Wasserstrom 2003, 258; Ownby 2008, 3).
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with these claims an arrest warrant was issued for Li, which was also pursued through 
Interpol.41
Another CCP strategy was, as in 1976 and 1989, to separate the masses from the 
‘small group of people behind the deceived masses’; these trouble-makers threatened 
the internal stability of the PRC, and not the average FLG practitioners who had only 
been deceived by Li’s dangerous superstitions. Such a tactic allowed the dismissal of the 
importance of the large numbers of FLG practitioners; the masses were not rejecting CCP 
authority or reality, but merely the anti-China forces behind Li and the FLG.42 Further-
more, this ‘standard operating procedure’ also allowed the qualification of securitisation: 
loyal Chinese should be compelled by this act of ‘securitisation for control.’ If such prac-
titioners would recant their beliefs, they could be allowed to rejoin the ranks of obedient 
citizens.43
11.2.3. “Practicing Falungong is Unpatriotic”
Since the justification for party rule in the post-Mao era has been based on symbolic 
order and social unity – considered as requirements for China’s rise – the FLG’s social 
function was problematic for the party. It labelled the FLG as a threat to social stability 
and thereby to China’s rise and prosperity. The “evil cult” was branded as unpatriotic, and 
with this the party could rekindle its patriotic struggle against hostile foreign powers. 
Jiang (Zong 2002) emphasised the foreign connections of Li Hongzhi and the Falungong 
on several occasions, even to the extent of portraying the FLG as an anti-China tool in the 
service of the CIA.44
The anti-FLG campaign also provided the authorities with another vessel of self-de-
scription and positive identity framing. As already outlined above, the use of identity 
frames has the same function for the authorities who attempt to suppress movements 
they deem undesirable, as it has for social movements that similarly attempt to frame 
their identities as positive; authorities also want to garner support and legitimise their 
policies. The use of authoritative asymmetric concepts excludes alternative representa-
tions of the state and alternative political or social orders and actors within it. The legiti-
misation of CCP rule has largely rested upon its declaration of itself as the sole guardian 
of “benevolence, truth, and glory” (Shue 1994). This also affects the images and labels the 
party is likely to give to those it deems to be its enemies.
11.2.4. The Falungong in Security Continuums
From very early on, the FLG was portrayed as part of an international struggle against 
cults. Chinese authorities often listed the FLG together with the Solar Temple cult, the 
movement of the restoration of God’s Ten Commandments, and Aum Shinrikyo (オウ
41  See ‘Wanted Order Issues by the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China’ (1999).
42  The perhaps paradoxical tactic of emphasising the dangers of FLG and denigrating its leader highlighted that 
the real danger was the anti-China forces lurking behind the charlatan-like figure of Li.
43  See e.g., Xinhua (23.7.1999b).
44  The continued resistance of Li and the FLG provide some sense of plausibility and credibility for such claims: 




ム真理教, Ōmu Shinrikyō). These types of ‘cults’ were claimed to “wantonly preach the 
fallacy of ‘the end of the world’, destroy social stability and jeopardise the lives and property 
of the public.”  (People’s Daily 9.10.2007.) The anti-cult nature45 of the party’s policy be-
came particularly prevalent after the self-immolation event on Tiananmen Square on 23 
January 2001: a video of seven people trying to burn themselves was widely broadcast 
in China. It also seemed to turn the tide in favour of the authorities’ campaign,46 as it ap-
peared to validate the dangers of following Li’s doctrines.47
After worldwide attention to terrorism after 2001, the CCP also constructed another 
security continuum by linking the legitimacy of the fight against terrorism with the FLG. 
Although mainly aimed against China’s insurgency and political separatist movements in 
Xinjiang, the campaign against the “three evils” (i.e., separatism, religious extremism and 
terrorism) linked the FLG to both separatist and terrorist groups.48 Although not directly 
presented as terrorists or separatists, this security continuum brought FLG practition-
ers’ identities into the same frame of the gravest threats to national security. The 2001 
self-immolation event facilitated this framing, as self-immolation is viewed as “religious 
extremism.” This framing was also useful in the international campaign, as the FLG was 
not only linked to the struggle against (death) cults, but also to terrorism.49
11.3. The Securitisation Process
The period between the April 25 1999 protests and the public launch of the anti-FLG 
campaign in July seemed to be necessary to gather intelligence on what the obscure FLG 
and its leading figure were (Tong 2002b). Such a preparation time attests to the lack of 
coordination in the previous investigations into the FLG: although there had already been 
some 300 protests accredited to the FLG, it would seem that none had been identified by 
public security officials to constitute a major threat. Consequently, the premier leader-
ship was ignorant of the FLG before the protest near their party’s leadership compound.
45  This continuum of “evil religions” (邪教,xiéjiào) has also been used against the 14th Dalai Lama.
46  For example, Ownby (2008, 218) concurs with this impression.
47  Li and his disciples have vehemently denied any connection to the immolators, and provided a deconstruc-
tion of the video that undermines many of the claims made by the authorities: “Recently the CCP’s lies and 
propaganda have again been pushing fabrications such as the ‘self-immolation’ and been spreading fake versions 
of the Nine Commentaries so as to further poison the minds of the world’s people.” (Li 2005.) For a version of 
the self-immolation video that contains commentary and editing by FLG-supporters, see http://www.faluninfo.
net/tiananmen/immolation.asp; For the official original video, see CCTV (2001). However, it is not of concern 
here whether the event or videos of it were hoaxes or not. That they were perceived to provide legitimacy 
for the authorities’ campaign is more relevant from a performative point of view: truth and accuracy are less 
relevant for performative acts i.e., the ‘real essence’ of the event does not matter as much as the performance 
that was received and perceived (cf., Butler 1999).
48  Whereas violent incidents in Xinjiang during the 1990s were termed ‘splittism’, after 2001 these have now 
been framed as ‘terrorism’, which neatly illustrates the practical effects of the ‘Global War on Terror’ macrose-
curitisation for China. 
49  This frame has proved to have a longer term effect that has outlasted the active propaganda campaign. 
For example, in the run-up to the 17th Party congress in 2007 the security continuum was still evident. Zhou 
Yongkang, the minister of public security and a member of the Politburo at the time, is quoted by the BBC as 
saying: “All police should […] strike hard on overseas and domestic hostile forces, ethnic splittists, religious extrem-




11.3.1. The Inner-Party Securitisation of the Falungong
In terms of available sources, studying the initiation of the securitisation process is more 
of a challenge than with the other cases studied here. The most important leaked ‘docu-
ment’ regarding the case of the FLG, namely the ‘aide-memoir’ of Zong Hairen (2002), is 
written in a narrative form. Therefore, unlike for example the main sources regarding 
the case of 1989 (e.g., 張良 2001a; 2001b), it contains neither complete documents nor 
speeches and does not allow a complete speech act analysis of the speeches and discus-
sions of the premier leadership. Nevertheless, the direct quotes that are provided are 
sufficient to get an impression of how the securitisation of the FLG evolved before the 
process in public.50
Zong (2002, 58-59) reports that Jiang Zemin responded to the April 25 1999 demon-
strations quickly by sending a letter to the Politburo Standing Committee51 in which he 
expressed the fear that the CCP would be ridiculed if it could not ‘defeat’ the Falungong. 
The immediate response also included two circulars that began the investigation into 
how many party cadres were involved in FLG activities, and which forbade military per-
sonnel from the practice of FLG. Tong (2002b) emphasises that, unlike a decade before, 
the premier leadership was neither split nor indecisive on the issue of the prosecution of 
FLG and its practitioners. It would seem that the main functions of the initial securitisa-
tion were those of control and deterrence:52 the party and state bureaucracy had to be 
purged of the FLG and it had to be suppressed even beyond the party.
In a meeting of the Standing Committee Luo Gan53 reported that the FLG was highly 
adept in using mobile phones and the internet to organise itself. Luo also reported on 
the FLG’s ‘pre-emptive desecuritisation moves’ (Zong 2002, 61-62): “At the scene of the 
50  While Andrew Nathan (2002) attests to the validity of Zong Hairen and his/their account, the quotes used 
here seem valid as most of the same language is evident form the public securitisation of the FLG. However, as 
Tong (2002b, 797) also notes, more detailed textual analysis of the inner-party process will have to wait for 
further ‘leaks’, similar to those of 張良 (2001a; 2001b) on the vents of 1989.
51  北京之春 (江泽民 2001a) published the letter. In it, Jiang labelled the sit-in as an “incident” (事件, shìjiàn). 
He paid special attention to the online capabilities of the Falungong, and to the failure to previously pay atten-
tion to this. He also highlighted how the Western media immediately ‘blew the sit-in out of proportion’, and 
raised the question of whether there could have been Western “experts” backstage (幕后高手, mùhòu gāoshǒu) 
plotting the event. He emphasised that this new signal should be taken seriously, especially in the “sensitive 
period which had already arrived,” and take measures to prevent similar events from occurring. He noted that 
this “incident” had been the largest of its kind since the “disturbance” (风波, fēngbō) of 1989. Despite his 
oft-emphasised line of “nipping evil in the bud” (防微杜渐, fángwēi-dùjiàn), and Falungong influence on party 
members, cadres, intellectuals, and workers, no-one had reported on the issue’s importance. Jiang concluded 
that the party should learn from this and the previous “sit-in incidents” (静坐的事件, jìngzuò de shìjiàn). The 
event showed for Jiang the results of laxity in political and thought work: cadres and the masses should pay 
attention to their work, lest the Falungong humiliate the party. 
52  The deterrence aspect is evident in the public declarations to the effect that those who recant the FLG will 
have no subsequent consequences, for example in Vice Minister of Civil Affairs Li Baoku’s press statement 
(Xinhua 23.7.1999b): “No action will be taken against any ordinary Falungong practitioners, so long as they leave 
the Falungong organisation of their own volition, draw a clear demarcation line, no longer participate in any 
activities of the Falungong organisations, and conscientiously uphold social stability. The tiny minority of those 
who plot, organise, and incite trouble will be punished according to law.” 
53  Luo Gan was a member of the Central Secretariat which is the top executive and policy-coordination body 
of the party. While Jiang Zemin was head of the Secretariat, and seems to have been the main securitising actor 
in the case of the FLG, Luo Gan was put in charge of implementing the policies on the FLG from the outset. PSC 
member Li Lanqing was however put in charge of the Central Leading Group on Dealing with the Falungong 
which was established on June 17 (Tong 2002b, 810).
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incident, Falungong believers repeatedly professed that they did not participate in political 
matters, were not interested in politics, would not hinder government affairs, would not dis-
turb state order, and would not create uncleanliness and confusion.” He was, however, not 
impressed. For Luo, such ‘reassurances’ were a mere guise for the insidious true inten-
tions of such activities: “Although the Falungong believers claim that this activity was spon-
taneous, unorganised, and non-political, it, in fact has a profound political background.” 
Furthermore, the massive protest was not a singular event but part of more concerted 
and serious activities: “In sum, the Falungong organisation is vying with the party not only 
for the masses but also for party members. It has also infiltrated key departments. This 
should arouse a high degree of attention.”  
In the same meeting, Jiang voiced his disappointment and worry on the failure of the 
public security system to detect the mass gathering despite two years of investigations 
into the FLG (Zong 2002, 61): “Comrades, how frightening this is! If we do not draw lessons 
from this, who can guarantee that there will not be a second or a third time?” His conclu-
sions heightened the urgency and importance of the issue and already hinted at its secu-
rity nature (ibid., 62-63): “It [the sit-in] is a grave political incident that has been carefully 
planned, meticulously organised, and plotted over a long period.” The ‘bad elements’ tactic 
was already evident: “One may say with certainty that a minority of people, in the name of 
practicing gong and spreading the fa, are deliberately fomenting trouble, preaching super-
stition and fallacies, deluding the masses, instigating disturbances, and disrupting social 
stability.” As if in accordance with the grammar of securitisation, the element of future 
was also present in Jiang’s warnings: “If we fail to see its political essence and do not take 
firm, appropriate, and prompt action to resolve the issue, we will be committing a mistake 
of historical proportions.” Jiang promoted urgent action: “We must pay close attention to 
various tendencies in society and nip the problem in the bud.” The impression of threat was 
facilitated with foreign potential: “We must not exclude the possibility of organisations be-
yond our borders taking a hand in this matter.” 
Li Peng, also present at the meeting, agreed with Jiang’s estimates and drew attention 
to the date of the incident: the sit-in occurred a decade after the April 26 Renmin ribao 
editorial on “taking a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalism” that had initiated the 
public securitisation of the 1989 protests. For him, the FLG was an ideological struggle 
(Zong 2002, 63-64): “Our struggle with the Falungong organisation is a grave ideological 
and political struggle.” Zong (2002, 65) reports that there also were more moderate views 
within the Standing Committee, but it would seem that the issue obtaining the flavour of 
security was not contested to any significant degree. The meeting’s decision was that a 
nation-wide investigation of the FLG should be started, but that large-scale action should 
be taken only after the 80th anniversary of May Fourth had passed.54 
The technocratic institutionalisation of the FLG issue took an important step in June. 
Jiang established the so called ‘610 Office’, which was charged with the prosecution of the 
anti-FLG campaign (Tong 2002b, 805; Ownby 2008, 175). At this point the CCP seems 
to have moved from ‘reaction mode’ to ‘proaction mode,’55 which is also evident in the 
54  See Perry (1999) on the importance of anniversaries for popular protest in China, and Tong (2002b) on the 
particular question  of when to deal with the FLG issue.
55  Tong’s (2002b, 810) institutional analysis suggests that the institutional choice on how to deal with the 
FLG focused more on public security than the overall management of the FLG, that ad hoc committees were 
preferred rather than permanent agencies, and that political guidance on the issue was invested in the top 
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harsher language subsequently espoused by Jiang. For example, he delivered a speech 
to the Politburo that was devoted to the Falungong issue on June 17 (Zong 2002, 65-66), 
after the effects of the embassy bombing in Belgrade had become more evident.56 In it, 
he paid special attention to Li Qihua, a former PLA hospital director who had written a 
letter to the General Secretary arguing that there was no contradiction between being 
socialist and believing in FLG. However, former Red Army revolutionaries now turning 
to Falungong gave impetus for Jiang (Zong 2002, 66) to increase the seriousness of the 
issue: “This is the most serious political incident since the ‘June 4’ political disturbance in 
1989.” The foreign element was present here as well: “One may well say that Falungong’s 
genesis and rampant outgrowth is a grave political struggle waged by today’s enemies in 
and outside the country, the purpose of which is to compete with our party for the masses 
and for positions.” The meeting concluded to set up a leading group to deal with the FLG 
issue,57 and to circulate the self-criticism of Li Qihua.
On July 19, Jiang announced to high-level cadres the intention to eradicate the FLG. 
Accordingly, arrests of FLG practitioners, including those in the PLA, and large scale con-
fiscation of materials began the next day (Zong 2002, 68-69):58 “Falungong is neither a po-
litical party nor a religious group; it is an illegal organisation that has preparations, plans, 
and premeditation. Under no circumstances should one belittle Falungong. Improperly 
dealt with, it may become a political scourge.” In the context of the NATO bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Jiang’s reference to a foreign conspiracy may have seemed 
plausible: “Forces abroad were involved behind the scenes in Falungong’s convergence on 
Zhongnanhai on April 25. This is part of the US. Central Intelligence Agency’s strategy de-
signed to split China.” A circular (1999) was also issued that outlined the threat of the FLG 
and forbade CCP members to practice it.59 
11.3.2. The Public Securitisation of the Falungong
The securitisation of the FLG and the campaign against it were made public on July 22 
1999, in the form of an order issued by the CCP Central Committee, the Ministry of Public 
Security and the Ministry of Civil Affairs.It was also broadcast on television. The order 
banned Falun Dafa seminars and announced that the Falungong was an illegal organisa-
tion that spread heretical teachings.60 This order and the various other statements that 
leadership, rather than functional state bureaucracies.
Tong’s analysis suggests the general impression that even the case of the Falungong is an instance of ‘spectacu-
lar’ rather than ‘mundane’ or ‘technocratic’ securitisation. This is why the study of the constitution of the cases 
as issues of security is more relevant for the present study than that of the technocratic prosecution of the 
securitisation in the party and state bureaucracies. The spectacular nature of the cases may also explain why 
there does not seem to be strong ‘bureaucratic politicking’ involved, and why the contestation seems to be more 
about factional than bureaucratic ‘politicks.’
56  See also 江泽民 (2001b) on how the Belgrade and the Falungong issues were linked together.
57  See Tong (2002b) for the detailed membership of the group.
58  See also Tong (2002b, 804-805) and Ownby (2008, 175).
59  These stipulations were made public on July 23, and the declarative nature of the securitisation for control 
was reiterated (Xinhua 23.7.1999a, 27-28): “Regulations for Governmental Functionaries’ stipulates that state 
functionaries must abide by the Constitution and by laws and regulations; they must uphold the security, honour, 
and interests of the state. […] It has been determined that the Research Society of Falun Dafa is an illegal organisa-
tion and that its activities jeopardise the country’s security and interests. […] The very small minority of backstage 
personages who harbour political intentions and the planners and organisers must be resolutely expelled.”
60  See 人民日报 (23.7.1999d; 23.7.1999e) and ‘Two Documents Concerning the Banning of the Research 
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attested to the danger of the FLG were published in Renmin ribao the next day. Various 
ministries convened meetings to mobilise officials to act uniformly on the issue, includ-
ing the Ministry of Public Security that was in charge of ‘maintaining peace and security’. 
The campaign also had an immediate international aspect as the Foreign Ministry made 
an international press statement, and an international arrest warrant for Li Hongzhi was 
sent to Interpol on July 28.61
Renmin ribao was the main paper to guide the campaign and thereby a vessel for the 
securitisation of the FLG. Key securitisation moves were made during the first few days 
after the launch of the public anti-FLG campaign. The July 23 issue was devoted to the 
Falungong and Li Hongzhi, and elaborated on the reasons and the effects of the ban pub-
licised the previous day. The editorial (人民日报 23.7.1999) brought forth the essential 
logic of the securitisation of the Falungong that had been evolving within the party lead-
ership and party-state bureaucracy for some three months.
The editorial claimed (Box 47) that the FLG “is a serious ideological and political strug-
gle, one that concerns the basic beliefs of Communists, the fundamental ideological basis 
of the united struggles of the peoples of the whole nation, and the destiny of our party and 
our state.” The editorial provided proof for the claim by reference to the circular that 
banned the FLG and forbade party members from its practice, as well as to the article on 
Li Hongzhi in the same issue (人民日报 23.7.1999b). The threatening nature of the FLG 
was expressed explicitly: “This illegal organisation already constitutes a grave danger to 
the state and the people.” Not only had Li Hongzhi preached various “perverse theories,” 
and “hoodwinked people,” it was also claimed that Li “exercises control organisationally, 
does his utmost to develop a nationwide organisation structure and to win over the masses, 
even infiltrating some of our party and governmental organisations and key departments in 
an attempt to develop himself into a political force that rivals our party and government.”
The editorial also presented a warning (Box 48) that made the referents being jepord-
ised explicit: “We must fully recognise the enormous danger presented to the party, state, 
and people by the development and spread of the Falungong organisations, fully recognise 
the severe, pernicious consequences Falungong brings to the physical and mental health 
of its practitioners, and fully recognise the extreme importance and urgency of solving the 
Falungong issue.” The FLG issue was labelled an existential threat for the party and the 
state: “If we cannot see its political substance and fail to resolutely and appropriately speed 
up the solution of this issue, we will be committing an error of historical proportions.” A way 
out of the threatening situation was also introduced: “To solve the Falungong issue, we 
must first clearly understand the political essence of the Falungong organisations and the 
dangers they present.”
Society of Falun Dafa’ (1999).
61  See ‘Wanted Order Issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China’ (1999).
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I speech act: claim
Propositional content
The Falungong is a serious ideological and political struggle 
[for the CCP], one that concerns the basic beliefs of Commu-
nists, the fundamental ideological basis of the united struggles 




1) The editorial refers to party circulars and another article, as 
proof of the accuracy of the claim. 
2) It is not obvious that Falungong is a political struggle [for 
the CCP], as qigong in general is not a political struggle and 
the same applies for other officially recognised religious prac-
tices. 
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the Falungong be-
ing a political struggle that concerns the destiny of the party 
and state represents an actual state of affairs.
Box 47: The claim speech act of the July 23 人民日报 editorial.
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Falungong is a danger to the party and the state, to people, and 
to Falungong practitioners. Failing to speed up the solution of 




1) The hearer has a reason to believe that Falungong could be 
a danger to the party (there is a long history of struggles be-
tween official authorities and semi-religious associations in 
Chinese history), and to the people, which is not in the hearer’s 
best interests.
2) It is not obvious that Falungong is a danger (the practice of 
qigong has even been promoted by the party).
Essential content Counts as an undertaking to the effect that failing to deal with the danger of Falungong is not in the hearer’s best interest.
Box 48: The warn speech act of the July 23 人民日报 editorial.
The editorial then sought legitimacy for measures that were to be extraordinary: “We 
must, by all means available, improve our understanding, recognise the danger, observe 
policy, uphold stability, and fight for victory in this struggle.” The editorial also presented 
the insight that even FLG practitioners would deem the measures of the party-state as 
legitimate once they became fully aware of the true nature of the FLG: “They [the great 
majority of FLG practitioners] know nothing about the political aims of Li Hongzhi and of 
that very small number of people. We believe that after they learn the true circumstances, 
their understanding will be improved, and they will uphold the interests of the whole and 
support the decision of the party and government.” Further, the maintenance of social sta-
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bility was essential: “In solving the Falungong issue, we must, by all means, pay attention 
to safeguarding social stability. Stability is the highest interest of the state and the people; it 
concerns the overall situation and accords with the will of the people.” 
Finally, the editorial required (Box 49) that “all Communist Party members must take 
a firm and clear-cut stand, integrate their thinking with the thrust of the party center, and 
integrate their actions with the dispositions made by the party center. […] Party organisa-
tions at all levels must adapt to the new situation, be more strict in administering party 
affairs, and earnestly assume political responsibility during this serious ideological and po-
litical struggle.” Thereby the function of this particular example of securitisation was to 
gain control of party members and society at large.
III speech act: require
Propositional content
Party members must take a firm and clear-cut stand and inte-
grate their thinking and actions with the party centre. Party or-
ganisations must adapt to the situation in this serious ideologi-
cal and political struggle.
Preparatory condition
content
1) The audience is able to take firm and clear-cut action.
2) It is not obvious that the audience would take firm and clear-
cut action in the normal course of events of their own accord.
3) There is a reason for taking firm and clear-cut action: the 
Falungong is threatening stability and unity under party rule.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to get party members and organisa-
tions to fall in line with the position of the party centre in virtue 
of social and political stability being threatened.
Box 49: The require speech act of the July 23 人民日报 editorial.
On the next day the onslaught on the FLG continued. A notification by Wang Zhaoguo62 
(人民日报 24.7.1999), authorised by the CCP Central Committee functioned as an anno-
uncement of the security implications of the Falungong, and listed concrete actions that 
were to be required from loyal citizens and party members. Wang himself listed the audi-
ences of the notification: all democratic parties, all non-party personages, all members of 
the All-China Association of Industry and Commerce, and intellectuals. The referent of se-
curity was explicitly the ideology of the party: “We are exposing and castigating Li Hongzhi 
and his Falungong precisely for the purpose of adhering to Marxist materialism and science, 
opposing idealism and theism, and for the purpose of upholding the political beliefs of Com-
munists and the ideological basis for united struggle by the people of the whole country.” 
(人民日报 24.7.1999.)
Beyond such explicit elements of a securitising move, Wang’s notification concurs with 
the grammar of securitisation for control. His notification contains both a claim – the 
spread of Falungong is a political struggle (Box 50) – and a threat – hostile forces in and 
outside the country try to contend with the party (Box 51) – in a single sentence: “The 
generation and spread of Falungong is a political struggle launched by hostile forces both in 
62  At the time, Wang Zhaoguo was Vice-Chairman of the CCPCC National Committee, member of its Leading 
Party Members’ Group, and Head of the United Front Work Department of the CCPCC.
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and outside the country to contend with our party for the masses and for battle positions.” 
(人民日报 24.7.1999.)
Wang also listed four requirements on how to uphold social stability together with the 
CCP, which constituted the ‘way out’ of the threatening situation i.e., the require speech 
act (Box 52) of the securitisation speech act sequence. The requirements included, among 
others, self-education, refraining from all activities that support Falungong, and the con-
cept of the rule of law. The requirements ended with a clear message: “We shall not only 
refrain from disseminating, believing, or listening to such things [rumors, provocations, and 
slander spread by people with ulterior motives in China and abroad], but shall conscious-
ly resist and fight them, and with concrete action safeguard social and political stability.” 
(人民日报 24.7.1999.)
I speech act: claim
Propositional content The spread of the Falungong is a political struggle.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) Wang lists the reasons and evidence as to the accuracy of 
the claim. 
2) It is not obvious that the spread of the Falungong is a politi-
cal struggle, as qigong in general is not a political struggle and 
the same applies for some religious practices. 
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the Falungong con-
stituting a political struggle represents an actual state of af-
fairs.
Box 50: The claim speech act of Wang’s notification (人民日报 24.7.1999).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
Hostile forces in and outside China are contending with the 
party for the masses [if the Party loses the support of the mass-
es, stability and unity will be lost].
Preparatory condition
content
1) The hearer has a reason to believe that hostile forces could 
be contending with the party for the masses (hostile forces 
have contended with the party before), resulting in the loss of 
stability and unity, which is not in the hearer’s best interests.
2) It is not obvious that stability and unity will be lost, regard-
less.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that unchecked conten-
tion of the position of the party resulting in the loss of stability 
and unity is not in the hearer’s best interest.
Box 51: The warn speech act of Wang’s notification (人民日报 24.7.1999).
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III speech act: require
Propositional content We shall safeguard social and political stability with concrete action.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The audience is able to take concrete action.
2) It is not obvious that the audience would take concrete ac-
tion in the normal course of events of their own accord.
3) There is a reason for taking concrete action: the Falungong is 
threatening stability and unity under party rule.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to get the audience to take concrete 
action in virtue of social and political stability being threat-
ened.
Box 52: The require speech act of Wang’s notification (人民日报 24.7.1999).
Whilst Wang’s notification is an example of the series of documents that set the tone 
for the massive anti-FLG campaign that followed and took a multitude of propaganda 
forms, a Xinhua commentary in 人民日报 (3.8.1999; People’s Daily 3.8.1999) is a good 
example of how the FLG issue was maintained as one of security as the campaign went 
on. The commentary claimed (Box 53) that the issue of Li Hongzhi and his Falungong 
was a “serious ideological and political struggle [which] concerns the fundamental beliefs 
of Communists, concerns the basic ideological foundation of the united struggle by the peo-
ple of the whole nation, and concerns the future and destiny of the party and the state. […] 
Falungong organisations are a political force that is attempting to contend with our party 
and government.” 63
The commentary also warned (Box 54) that “these organisations are an alien political 
force that is attempting to negate the ideology of Marxism,” and that “allowing them to 
develop and spread would not only shake our party’s mass basis and the ideological foun-
dation for united struggle of the people and of the whole nation, and would damage our 
country’s excellent situation of reform and openness. Indeed, we would be committing a 
serious mistake of historical proportions.” This warning illustrates how the basic tenets of 
the securitisation are frequently repeated, while the referents of the threat vary between 
ideology, the people, and even the reform policies. It may be that it is the combination of 
these referents that makes securitisation possible in the first place.
63  The commentary lists ‘evidence’ for the claim: “Ideologically, the Falungong organisations have propagated 
idealism and theism, spread superstition, produced a God-creating movement, befogged people’s minds, deluded 
the masses, and attempted to shake the ideological basis for the united struggles of the people nationwide. 
Organisationally, the Falungong organisations have set up venues and points level by level; have engaged in secret 
contacts and illegal assemblies; have established beliefs, leaders, and special activities; have formed a close-knit 
organisational system extending from Beijing to many localities; and have even infiltrated some of our key party 
and government departments. Politically they have plotted secretly, created incidents, disrupted stability, disrupted 
society, incited the masses who were ignorant of the true facts, besieged and assaulted news institutions, harassed 
party and government organisations, and even staged large-scale, illegal gatherings and activities to put pressure 
on the party and government. […] Craving nothing short of nationwide chaos […] in an effort to bring about a 
chaotic situation in which neither the country nor the people could have a single day of peace and tranquillity. 




I speech act: claim
Propositional content
The issue of the Falungong is a serious ideological and political 
struggle that concerns the fundamental beliefs of Communists, 
concerns the basic ideological foundation of the united strug-
gle by the people of the whole nation, and concerns the future 
and destiny of the party and the state.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The commentary lists the reasons and evidence as to the 
accuracy of the claim.
2) It is not obvious that the Falungong constitutes a political 
struggle, as qigong in general is not a political struggle and the 
same applies for some religious practices. 
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that the Falungong be-
ing a serious political struggle represents an actual state of af-
fairs.
Box 53: The claim speech act of the August 3 Xinhua commentary (人民日报 3.8.1999).
II speech act: warn
Propositional content
FLG organisations are an alien political force that is attempt-
ing to negate the ideology of Marxism and allowing them to 




1) The hearer has a reason to believe that FLG organisations 
are alien political forces (hostile forces have been in contention 
with the party before), resulting in a historical step backwards, 
which is not in the hearer’s best interests.
2) It is not obvious that a historic step backwards would hap-
pen regardless.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that allowing FLG or-
ganisation to continue unchecked, resulting in a historic step 
backwards, is not in the hearer’s best interest.
Box 54: The warn speech act of the August 3 Xinhua commentary (人民日报 3.8.1999).
The securitisation effort in this particular commentary served the function to legitimise 
the continued campaign against the FLG by strongly appealing to the readers and the 
party to respond firmly (Box 55): “Once we have recognised the political substance of the 
Falungong organisations, we must strictly observe policy demarcation lines in the struggle 
to deal with and resolve the Falungong issue; we must resolutely unite, educate, extricate, 
and rely on the great majority, and isolate a small minority.” Cracking down on the correct 
targets would be of great importance: “We must extricate those who should be extricated, 
punish those who should be punished, and resolutely crack down on those who should be 
cracked down on. Only in this way can we push this grave ideological and political strug-
gle forward in a sound and positive manner.”  The commentary thus worked towards the 
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legitimisation of the party’s line of control. It is also a good example of how securitisation 
is used to delineate intolerable behaviour and identities. The securitisation also modu-
lated the limits of the secure and the insecure. It further demonstrates how asymmetric 
political concepts continue to be deployed in Chinese politics, even though the massive 
use of labels such as ‘counter-revolutionaries’ has recently disappeared from the general 
party discourse.
In terms of the effects of the securitisation process, the issue of the FLG became all-
encompassing in the Chinese media. At the level of security action, large numbers of 
FLG practitioners were arrested in waves, on charges such as “disturbing social order, 
subverting the government, and endangering state security” (Zong 2002, 70). As Tong’s 
(2002b) analysis shows, the numbers of those involved with the FLG were too large for 
everyone to be investigated, which is why the arrests were conducted in periodic waves. 
Those who recanted the FLG were generally not punished.64 However, human rights or-
ganisations along with Falungong sources, report mistreatment and torture of those who 
refused to relinquish FLG (Amnesty International 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; Chang 2004; 
Ownby 2008).65 For example, many FLG practitioners were also committed to mental 
institutions or sent to re-education facilities without trial (Seymor 2005). 
III speech act: request
Propositional content
Everyone loyal to the party should resolutely unite, educate, 
extricate, and rely on the great majority, and isolate a small mi-
nority, and extricate those who should be extricated, punish 
those who should be punished, and resolutely crack down on 
those who should be cracked down on.
Preparatory condition 
content
1) The readers are able to do what the commentary is request-
ing.
2) It is not obvious that the readers would do what the com-
mentary requests of their own accord.
Essential content
Counts as an undertaking to the effect that everyone unites 
with the party and accepts that a small minority’s extrication 
is legitimate.
Box 55: The request speech act in the August 3 Xinhua commentary (人民日报 
3.8.1999).
In terms of control, the securitisation of the FLG was successful. As Tong (2002b, 795) 
notes, the top leadership of the Falungong was ‘decimated’, its publication activities on 
the Mainland terminated, the majority of publications confiscated and its approximately 
80 websites were removed or blocked. After the 2001 self-immolation incident, even the 
majority of public opinion seemed to turn in favour of the government’s heavy handed 
64  See Tong (2002b) for a detailed categorisation of types of punishments officially sentenced.
65  Precise figures are elusive, since it is difficult to estimate the validity and numbers of claims of torture, as 
most claims are actually from FLG practitioners. Conversely, the Chinese authorities dispute most claims, and 
do not provide any information on the possible maltreatment of detainees, and do not admit to condoning 
torture. In fact, the credibility of FLG sources is in question as their numbers of incidences varies from just over 
1400 to more than 10000 in a single source, see for example The Epoch Times (2004a, 81, 205, 211).
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response. Furthermore, it would seem that the securitisation of the FLG did not produce 
any major effects beyond the object of concern. China was, for example, accepted into the 
WTO and chosen as the host of the 2008 Olympics.66 In this respect, the FLG was not as 
influential an issue as the previous cases presented here. Nevertheless, the securitisa-
tion of the FLG demonstrates that the CCP was still perfectly capable of rolling out its old 
modus operandi when ‘core values’ are portrayed to be at stake. The active phase of the 
anti-FLG campaign ended in 2001, but the FLG remains banned in China and considered 
an issue of national security.
11.4. Resistance and Desecuritisation Moves
The Falungong has been portrayed as an “evil cult” in the service of hostile forces within 
and outside China that endangers individuals, social stability, and eventually even the 
sovereignty of the People’s Republic.  Although there does not appear to have been any 
major, or at least explicit, contestation of this securitisation within the premier leader-
ship of the CCP, Li Hongzhi and Falungong practitioners have resisted both the security 
label and eventually even the CCP. In his response to the anti-FLG campaign, Li Hongzhi 
attempted to refute this label by referance to the lofty morals and non-political aims of 
Falungong, while those sympathetic to the Falungong have also resorted to reverse-secu-
ritisation of the regime.
11.4.1. The Falungong’s ‘Rightful Resistance’ – Desecuritisation Moves 
              by Li Hongzhi
It would appear that like the various Chinese student movements, Falungong practition-
ers were also aware of the likelihood that their protest activities might be suppressed as 
an anti-governmental activity. This would then account for the ‘pre-emptive desecuritisa-
tion’ that even the representatives of the April 25 sit-in demonstrators engaged in, in their 
dialogue with the CCP authorities: they demanded that the sit-in not be considered anti-
governmental and that the people involved not be arrested (Zong 2002, 61-62). Further-
more, Li Hongzhi attempted to pre-emptively deflect charges of being anti-government 
in the same way as the Chinese democracy movements (e.g., the Democracy Wall and the 
1989 student movements). However, he did not phrase the legitimacy and rightfulness 
of his doctrine and practice in terms of socialist dogma, although his doctrines were also 
influenced by socialist morality. Li mostly drew on a much older reservoir of resonance: 
‘traditional Chinese values.’
In its identity talk, FLG is presented as a cultivation practice that promotes good health 
and moral living. Li’s teachings are presented as both non-political and non-violent. 
Through cultivation of their bodies and morality, the FLG will save the world (Li 2005): 
“We are cultivators, people walking the road to godhood, we transcend the human world, 
and we neither seek nor covet the fame and profit found in this world.” In the FLG biogra-
phies of Li, he is presented in basically the same mold as Maoist ‘model comrades’, such as 
Lei Feng. He is similarly portrayed to have a lack of interest in politics or social organisa-
66  In comparison, the 1989 events had impacted China’s attempt to host the Olympics in 2000 negatively, which 
even provoked Samuel Huntington (1996) to use it as an example of the ‘clash of civilisations.’
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tions. For instance, in his youth, he did not join the Red Guards during the Cultural Revo-
lution, although – according to the biographies – he was requested to do so many times. 
Indeed, Li’s lack of organisational interests was a positive attribute67 in 1992 for qigong 
practitioners (Penny 2003, 659), and also a means to deflect negative attention from the 
authorities.
Beyond his doctrine’s three-part moral code, viz. truth, benevolence and forbearance (
真善忍, zhēn, shàn, rěn),68 some of Li’s moral instructions are also very similar to social-
ist ones: one should tell the truth and aid the weak. Li also personally stressed his duty 
towards the people and his social rather than individual goals. He claimed to be striving 
to improve the morality and health of individuals, which, in accordance with party doc-
trines, would make society more stable (Li 1999b):69 “I, Li Hongzhi, unconditionally help 
practitioners improve human morality and keep people healthy, which stabilises society; 
and with their healthy bodies, people can better serve society. Isn’t this bringing good for-
tune to the people in power?” Li (1999a) similarly emphasised the good moral fiber of his 
disciples: “If a person wishes to do a good job of practicing gong, he or she must be a person 
with lofty morals – which is benefitional to the people and the government and causes no 
harm. […] I have always thought the government and the leaders would want to see every 
Chinese become a person with lofty morals.”
As the anti-FLG campaign progressed, Li (2005) directly refuted both the party’s self-
descriptions and its representations of the FLG as unpatriotic: “Following its failure in 
persecuting Falun Gong, the CCP rolled out a saying: “Falun Gong is colluding with anti-Chi-
na forces.” After Falun Gong exposed the truth about the CCP’s persecution, the CCP again 
stirred people up, saying, “The Falun Gong are unpatriotic.” Such comments illustrate the 
interactive nature of the struggle. However, they also seem to indicate that the party’s 
tactics and campaigns have been successful (ibid.): “That has resulted in Falun Gong stu-
dents indeed seeing, as they go about exposing the persecution and clarifying the facts, that 
some Chinese won’t listen one bit to what they have to say. Those people truly believe that 
what the Party says is surely correct, that what the Communist government says is surely 
correct, and they believe that Falun Gong really is as the CCP portrays it.” His solution was 
to ‘unmask’ the party and show its ‘true’ nature (ibid.): “What should be done, given these 
circumstances? The only thing that can be done is to strip naked this vile party that per-
secutes Dafa disciples and let the Chinese people and people of the world see this party–a 
party they have believed and that has always claimed to be “great, glorious, and correct”–
for what it really is.” 
Once the soft-repression of the FLG was initiated in earnest, Li responded by reiterating 
the self-representations already constructed in his previous writings, but now empha-
sised aspects of them as desecuritisation arguments. He continued the line of not having 
67  See Lu (2005) for an analysis of the entrepreneurial logic in the FLG’s activities.
68  The party’s anti-FLG material also subverts the FLG principles, by for example a publication titled 不是“ 真善
忍”而是真残忍 (bùshi “zhēn, shàn, rěn” érshì zhēn  cánrěn): Not “truth, benevolence, forbearance” but really 
ruthless, where the change of one character completely changes its meaning. 
69  Ironically perhaps, the current dogma of the CCP also emphasises harmony in society, and espouses similar 
morals of truthfulness and working hard for the motherland. For Hu Jintao’s criteria of honour and disgrace, 
see Mille (2007). Jiang Zemin had (already) stressed that the task of the party is to serve the masses. Given that 
Li’s appearance in public life was accredited to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘imperial tour of the South’ and the deepening 
of reform in one of his biographies (Penny 2003, 658), had things gone differently, Li might likely have picked 
up Jiang’s and Hu’s line as well.
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any worldly political goals, and of definitely not being anti-party in his open letter to the 
Central Committee of the party (Li 1999a): “Falun Gong is merely a popular activity for 
practicing gong. It has no organization, and even less does it have any political objectives. 
Nor has it ever participated in any antigovernmental activity. I am a [gong] practitioner 
and have never had anything to do with political power.” The avoidance of “getting po-
litical” has remained an important aspect of Li’s desecuritisation moves also later on (Li 
2007): “The crux of the matter, it would seem, is that a cultivator’s motive is to stop the 
persecution, and not to ‘get political’ for the sake of gaining human political power. Cultiva-
tors have no desire for power among men: just the opposite, cultivators are to let go of any 
attachment to power.” 
In accordance with his claims of ‘not having gone political’, Li separated himself from 
The Epoch Times, the newspaper founded and run by Li’s disciples in the US,70 although 
he has endorsed it at times. The Epoch Times published the Nine Commentaries on the 
Communist Party,71 which lay out a history of CCP oppression, portray the CCP as an “evil 
cult” itself and Jiang Zemin as a “tool of evil”, and place the FLG among the most oppressed 
groups in world history undergoing a “genocide” at the hands of the CCP. These Com-
mentaries have also been noted by the party, and have found their way into Li’s (2005) 
commentaries: “After The Epoch Times carried the Nine Commentaries on the X Party, the 
CCP again started cooking up stories and telling lies, alleging that, “Falungong is getting 
political.” The fact is, whoever has something to say about the party will be called “getting 
political,” and that is in turn used to deceive the Chinese people. As such comments attest, 
the Commentaries is a clear anti-party document,72 which is perhaps why Li (2005) does 
not attribute it to himself: “Falungong is not involved in politics. […] If our efforts to stop 
and expose the persecution by evildoers and the CCP are now being labelled as getting po-
litical, then we might as well spell things out completely–like what Falungong is, what the 
malevolent CCP is, and why the malevolent CCP wants to persecute Falungong. […] We have 
no political motives.” While the Epoch Times is ‘run by disciples and not the Dafa itself ’, Li 
views the Commentaries favourably: “The Nine Commentaries aim to save all beings whose 
minds have been poisoned by the evil, which includes members of the malevolent CCP, those 
in the CCP’s most powerful organs, and the common people. The goal is to help beings in 
all realms see clearly the factors behind the malevolent CCP.” The Epoch Times also views 
such activities as successful as it claims that over 27 million Chinese have resigned from 
the CCP.73
70  According to the Epoch Times self-description, it is a privately owned, general purpose newspaper founded 
in New York, 2000, in response to the arrest of Chinese journalists. The Epoch Times favours the FLG and 
opposes the CCP and is a major outlet for the FLG securitisation of the CCP. According to Li Hongzhi, the Epoch 
Times was founded by FLG disciples, but “it’s Dafa disciples who are initiating things themselves and organizing 
to do it, and it’s not Dafa itself that’s doing that” (Li 2003).  FLG disciples have also established their own radio 
and televisions stations.
71  九评共产党 (2004); in English The Epoch Times (2004a). Li’s position on the Commentaries is also compli-
cated: “In order to prevent misunderstandings by those who have lost their way in the Party’s culture, I told Dafa 
disciples in Mainland China not to incorporate the Nine Commentaries as they clarify the truth” (Li 2005).
72  “The Chinese need to help themselves; they need to reflect, and they need to shake off the CCP” (The Epoch 
Times 2004e, 268); “the CCP is the real source of turmoil” (The Epoch times 2004f, 275).
73  See http://en.epochtimes.com/211,95,,1.html. The number of resigned people comes from a web-service 
The Epoch Times provides (http://tuidang.epochtimes.com/), which cannot be accessed from the Mainland. 




11.4.2. Upping the Ante: Counter-Securitisation of the CCP and Jiang Zemin
In the 1990s, the majority of FLG practitioners’ desecuritisation moves were identity 
frames, which aimed to refute the securitisation moves of the authorities. These acts fo-
cused on self-description and only implicitly criticised the CCP. However, in the 2000s 
this has changed. 
Just as ‘heterodox’ religious organisations were harassed and driven underground in 
Confucian China, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of them ‘going political’, the party 
appears to have driven the “evil cults” of today underground. The campaign against such 
organisation has led them – irrespective of original intentions – to engage in ‘politics’ and 
eventually overtly resist party rule.74 This resistance is manifested outside of China in 
protests at the gates of Chinese embassies, during Chinese state visits, and in publications 
that support the FLG.75 The battle is also waged online:76 the FLG spreads its message on 
the Internet and it is thereby one of the major targets of China’s Internet-control.
Indeed, Falungong practitioners have continued to defy the rituals of complicity and 
the landscape of conformity by publicly performing FLG and protesting the campaign 
against it – their resistance continues a decade after the launching of the anti-FLG cam-
paign. Self-representation in terms of good morals and avoidance of politics is still a 
major part of the FLG’s activities in its struggle with the CCP. Yet, such desecuritisation 
moves soon proved to be unsuccessful, as the campaign against the FLG became more in-
tense. Consequently, beginning in late 2000 Li (2001b) declared that FLG disciples were 
undergoing a period of “Fa-rectification”:77 “Dafa disciples amidst Fa-rectification have a 
different situation from when personal cultivation was done in the past. In the face of the 
groundless harming, in the face of Dafa’s persecution, and in the face of the injustice forced 
upon us, we cannot handle things or categorically accept things the way it was done before 
in personal cultivation, because Dafa disciples are now in the Fa-rectification period.” Such 
a period of rectifying the ‘great law’ would mean that personal cultivation is not enough, 
because the ‘evil’ persecuting the FLG is beyond individuals (ibid.): “If a problem isn’t 
caused by our own attachments or mistakes, then it must be that the evil is interfering or 
doing bad things. […] When a problem arises, we have to examine ourselves first to see 
whether things are right or wrong on our part.” Such ‘evil’ would have to be eradicated 
(ibid.): “As for the interference by evil in other dimensions, we must seriously eradicate it 
with righteous thoughts.”
Fa-rectification initiated an ‘exceptional’ period for FLG-practitioners. Such a dec-
laration by Li had several repercussions for his doctrine and disciples. Firstly, Li, FLG 
74  Some of the most radical acts have also been reported in Western news media. FLG supporters have for 
example been able to hijack television signals and to broadcast Li’s doctrines (Ownby 2008).
75  For examples of anti-party opinions on FLG-supporters, see The Epoch Times (2004a); and Mo (2002).
76  See for example www.falundafa.org, www.faluninfo.net, www.clearharmony.net,
and www.epochtimes.com.
77  The period of Fa-rectification seems to parallel the idea of kalpa-disasters (the end of ‘great aeons’; this 
has been noted by Ownby [2008] as well), which mark the end of a world (Li claims that the world has already 
been destroyed several times, and that aliens are the beings that have survived the previous destructions of the 
world): for Li, the current world seems to have shifted from the period of the ‘true doctrine’ (正法, zhèngfǎ) to 
the ‘counterfeit doctrine’ (像法, xiàngfǎ) and now to the ‘end of the doctrine’ (末法, mòfǎ). The belief in the 
cosmic crisis and Li’s role in saving his disciples, and even the whole of humanity, are typical characteristics of 
a Chinese sectarian group (cf., Shek 1990, 88-98).
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practitioners and other groups sympathetic to the FLG, began to express the struggle 
in terms of defining the opponent, the CCP and especially Jiang Zemin. In this counter-
securitisation discourse among FLG practitioners, Jiang Zemin is portrayed as “the high-
est representative of the evil force in the human world” who is being used by higher beings 
to persecute the FLG.78 Thus, only by elimination of this evil can FLG practitioners return 
home through consummation of the Falun Dafa paradise; if disciples fail and recant the 
Fa, they cannot reach consummation. As a result, Jiang Zemin is an existential threat to 
the Falun Dafa paradise and by extension the salvation of its practitioners. Furthermore, 
since Li Hongzhi’s task is to save humanity during this period of the “end of times” by 
the restoration of humanity’s morality,79 Jiang appears to be an existential threat to the 
entire world: “The moment the Party and that evil ringleader [i.e., Jiang Zemin] exclaimed 
that they wanted to “defeat Falun Gong,” the gods gave the verdict that the Party must be 
dissolved and destroyed.” (Li 2005.)
While the CCP securitises the FLG as a threat to socialism, FLG practitioners answered 
this with an engagement in counter-securitisation to demonise Jiang Zemin. In Chinese 
traditional beliefs, demons are believed to reside in liminal spaces, such as doorways, 
bridges, and cross-sections of roads, and liminal times; e.g., the 15th day of the 7th month is 
the period of the ghost festival. Precipitously, Li’s declaration of the era of fa-rectification 
coincides with this belief: during fa-rectification, the whole world is in a liminal state, 
where demons abound.80
This counter-securitisation discourse comes close to Barend ter Haar’s (1997; 2002) 
‘demonological paradigm.’ The division of ‘all under heave’ (天下, tiānxià) and ‘demons’ 
(妖怪, yāoguài) as a concept and practice had a long tradition and there was widespread 
awareness of demonic folklore in China,81 and thus cultural resonance that could be used 
to guide popular traditions in support of the CCP.82 Individuals could be defined in de-
monic terms, after which they could be combated through anti-demonic means and tar-
geted with the most severe and violent acts. 83 In the Mao-era “struggle” and “counter-
78  Quoted in Rahn (2002, 44). 
79  “China’s Labour Re-education Camps are dark dens of evil forces. Most of the disciplinary guards there are 
reincarnated minor ghosts from hell. As for the people who have been ‘reformed’, it was arranged in history that 
they would persecute the Fa this way. No matter how well they acted when arrested or beaten, all of that was 
setting the stage for their leaping out today to persecute the Fa and confuse students. I hope that students don’t 
listen to or believe their evil lies.” (Li 2000a.)
80  He has also used demonisation against other forms of qigong by labelling them as xiejiao (邪教, xiéjiào; 
heterodox teachings, evil religion, evil cult), which is the same label used by the CCP to describe the FLG, and 
the demonisation of even the practitioners who claim to cultivate FLG.
For example: “Recently, a wretch in Hong Kong who lost her senses has been severely interfering with Dafa by 
saying absurd things, having bred demons in her mind, about how a Law Body of mine was telling her what to do. 
She even caused damage by using a telephone call I made to her, and has been constantly doing bad things.”  (Li 
2000b.)
81  The popularity of the FLG’s beliefs in the ‘end of times’ shows how millenarian ideas have been carried on 
even in socialist China as elsewhere in the world (see Rinehart 2006). 
82  Political legitimacy in some other Asian societies also depends on exercising political power in ways 
that resonate with religious notions of righteousness and world order, for example in Cambodia (Kent 2006, 
350-351).
83  For example, from 1850 onwards the Taipings referred to both external conflict and internal strife in demonic 
terms; the Taipings were the divine army needed to combat the demons, while real people ranging from local 
opponents to the Manchus, were represented as demons (Haar 2002, 47; see also Haar 1997). Li’s writings after 
2000 seem to follow the same pattern: Li’s true followers are divine in nature, while the persecutors of the FLG 
are demons from the netherworld.
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revolution” repleaced ‘demons’, but the grammatical relationships of the demonological 
paradigm was retained: counter-revolution was a violent threat that had to be answered 
with equal counterviolence (Haar 2002, 54). This paradigm is clearly in operation in Li’s 
avowals as well.
Secondly, this counter-securitisation of the CCP and Jiang Zemin has legitimated – if 
not breaking – at least altering the rules of the FLG. In Li’s early teachings, disciples were 
told to give up their worldly attachments while cultivating among humans. Still in 1999, 
as a response to the anti-FLG campaign, Li stated: “We do not oppose the government now, 
nor will we do so in the future. Other people may treat us badly, but we cannot treat other 
people badly. We cannot regard people as enemies.” (Li 1999c.) However, in the period of 
Fa-rectification i.e., under an existential threat to faith itself,84 it is allowed to “go beyond 
forbearance” (Li 2001c):  “If the evil has already reached the point where it is unsavable and 
unkeepable, then various measures at different levels can be used to stop it and eradicate it. 
Going beyond the limits of Forbearance is included in the Fa’s principles.” Li distinguishes 
personal cultivation and the ‘exceptionality’ of this struggle against the ‘evil’ (ibid.):85 
“Completely eliminating the evil is for Fa-rectification, and not a matter of personal cultiva-
tion. In personal cultivation, there is usually no ‘going beyond the limits of Forbearance’.” 
However, also the nature of personal cultivation has changed: only by eradicating this 
evil can consummation be reached, as Li will not allow his disciples to “leave” until the 
campaign is over.
This struggle against the ‘evil’ has meant various tasks for Li’s disciples: during fa-
rectification, all disciples should “step forward” and actively engage the “evil”. Thus far, 
“stepping forward” has meant going to Tiananmen Square, “clarifying the truth”, and other 
activities that express true faith and challenge the CCP. The interactive nature of counter-
securitisation is also apparent when Li legitimises “stepping forward” (Li 2000c): “All dis-
ciples who have stepped forward, Master thanks you! […] Every one of us is doing for Dafa 
things of Fa-rectification, Fa-spreading, and clarifying the truth. We haven’t been involved 
in political struggles, whether it be our going to Tiananmen Square, going to Zhongnanhai, 
or clarifying the truth to people in all sorts of situations.” While such acts take place in the 
human world, it would seem that the “evil” that Li claims to be fighting is still in other 
“dimensions” (Li 2004b): “[W]hen you send righteous thoughts you need to have your mind 
be more focused, purer, and steadier, so as to mobilize your greater abilities, disintegrate 
84  For a discussion of faith as a referent object of security, see Laustsen & Wæver (2000) and Wæver (2008a; 
2008b); Wæver (2008b, 588) notes how fundamentalism as security action portrays faith or the ‘true’ version 
of religion, being so threatened that mere traditionalism will no longer suffice. Li’s period of Fa-rectification 
seems very close to this general disposition of religious ‘security logic.’ 
Similarly to the referent object of Li’s securitisation acts i.e., the Fa (法; the Law; the dharma), Kent (2006, 357) 
recognises the dhamma (in Pāli: धम), or eternal cosmic order as the ultimate referent object in Cambodian 
(Buddhist) security. See Footnote 12 of Chapter 4 above for Indian notions of security vis-à-vis the dharma (in 
Sanskrit: धर्म) in Hinduism and Buddhism.
85  David Ownby’s (2008, 214-215) field-work among FLG-practitioners in North-America supports the inter-
pretation of the fa-rectification (i.e., the securitisation of faith) as justifying the ‘breaking of rules’: “Falungong 
followers in North America I spoke to at the time understood the message to mean that they should not have 
qualms about resisting the suppressive measures employed by the Chinese state. […] They should not feel that 
they are violating the dictum to not be involved in politics. Li had given them the permission to stop ‘acting like 
sheep’ […] they were, in a word, free of whatever constraints the necessity to ‘forbear’ had previously placed 
upon them […] without having to worry about violating the cardinal tenet of ‘forbearance.’”
While Ownby’s (2008, 214-215) interviewees did not view this as a call to violence, it clearly represents 
‘extraordinary measures’ in Li’s doctrine.
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all of the dark minions and rotten demons, and eliminate the final disruptions that are in 
other dimensions.” 
Patsy Rahn (2002), however, sees the potential of the demonological paradigm to le-
gitimise not only acts against “demons” in “other dimensions”, but also the use of violence 
in the human world.86 To date though, Li limits the measures required against the op-
pressors to only “sending righteous thoughts” and “stepping forward” (Li 2004a): “[Y]ou 
may stop them [human beings doing acts against gods] by taking all kinds of approaches, 
such as exposing the evil acts, clarifying the truth, and directly telephoning those people. 
[. . .] [Y]ou can stop them with righteous thoughts.” Indeed, negative effects on the ‘wicked 
policemen’ would be attributed to their own actions: “When [. . .] the wicked policemen 
are using electric batons or when bad people are injecting drugs to persecute you, you can 
use your righteous thoughts to redirect the electric current or the drugs back to the person 
doing violence to you.” 
Finally, after denying having ‘gone political’ for many years, in 2007 even Li admit-
ted that assuming an active political role is what the FLG should be doing (Li 2007): “If 
when the world’s media are kept silent by incentives and disincentives from the CCP, Dafa 
disciples’ forming their own media to counter the persecution and save the world’s people 
is labelled “political,” then let’s go ahead and confidently make use of “politics” to expose 
the persecution and save sentient beings!” The change in Li’s stance once again displays 
the interactive nature of such struggles, and the uptake of the CCP’s anti-FLG campaign 
(ibid.): “The Party-culture that the wicked CCP has infused into the world’s people, and 
that has, most notably, poisoned the Chinese people, along with the lies it has fabricated 
about Falun Gong during the persecution, have led some who have blindly complied with 
the CCP–and in particular those who know full well that this is persecution but have sold 
out to the CCP on account of self-interest–to render humankind’s immediate prospects for 
the future even more tragic. And those are the reasons it is so hard for Dafa disciples to save 
people.”  The ultimate explanation for the change in his stance was, however, the survival 
of humanity (ibid.): “Since Dafa disciples are responsible for saving all lives at this critical 
juncture in history, do give it your best effort. As for those who really can’t be saved, that is 
those people’s own choice.”
Through fa-rectification, as the above examples indicate, Li has engaged in counter-
securitisation of the “evil” that is the CCP. His disciples in the Epoch Times have, however, 
exhibited features of reverse-securitisation in their contrary securitisation of the CCP 
and Jiang Zemin. In the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, the CCP is portrayed 
as the largest cult in history (Epoch Times 2004b, xix), in effect reversing the authori-
ties’ own accusations that the FLG is an “evil cult”: “The Communist Party is essentially an 
evil cult that harms mankind” (Epoch Times 2004e, 236). Further, the CCP is placed on 
an anti-cult continuum as the worst case along with death cults like Aum Shinrikyo and 
86  David A. Palmer (2003; 2007) also views FLG as ‘militant qigong’, and emphasises the darkness of Li 
Hongzhi’s millenarianism vis-à-vis other qigong doctrines. However, it should be noted that not all sectarian 
groups in Chinese history have resorted to the use of violence (Harrell 1990, 14), and in the case of the FLG, this 
is also not a necessity. While consistent with typical features of millenarianism, Li’s preachings do not concur 
with James F. Rinehart’s (2006, 30) definitional criteria for millenarian terrorism. While many millenarian 
groups that resort to the use of violence believe that the world has to be destroyed, Li claims to be trying to save 
the world from destruction instead. Li claims to be working for the security of humanity, and would seem to be 
constructing a cosmological macrosecuritisation discourse of his own. 
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the Solar Temple cult (ibid., 246).87 Jiang Zemin’s family background is also claimed to 
be fabricated, mirroring what the CCP has claimed for Li Hongzhi’s biographies (Epoch 
Times 2004c, 118-119, 126). Moreover, the CCP is claimed to directly contradict tradi-
tional Chinese culture and undermine the very cohesiveness of the Chinese nationality 
(Epoch Times 2004d, 156, 185), much in the same way as the CCP portrays FLG as totally 
opposite to Marxist science.
11.5. Conclusions of Analysis: Success and Sustained Resistance
The analysis of the case of the Falungong indicates that there was no particular need for 
continued arguments for ‘raising the issue onto the agenda’: while Falungong had been 
investigated by public security officials for several years, it would seem that there were 
no major moves to securitise it. Thereby, the securitisation of the FLG appears to have 
been a reactive rather than a proactive process, and to have been initiated only after the 
protest of April 25 1999. This suggests that it was the ‘spectacularity’ of the sit-in in the 
vicinity of the Zhongnanhai compound that garnered the attention of the premier lead-
ership. With this act, the FLG had overstepped the threshold of permitted autonomous 
social mobilisation, and rightful resistance. 
In this instance, unlike a decade earlier, it would seem that there was no clear division 
on the issue among the party leadership. Jiang Zemin took the lead to transform the issue 
into one of security. While all Standing Committee members may not have deemed the 
issue of the FLG to be as dire as it was presented, they do not appear to have contended 
the label of security. The various sensitive anniversaries that fell due in 1999 may have 
concomitantly made the issue seem more sensitive than in other situations; had the se-
curitisation not occurred a decade after the 1989 process, where the issue of securitising 
the student movement had effectively split and paralysed the party, the issue may well 
have been contested to a greater degree. As such, there was no repeat of history in 1999: 
Jiang mobilised the party and its security apparatuses in prompt fashion.
Most of the securitisation moves that have become available for study seem to have 
been for control and deterrence, while the politics of the securitisation more broadly 
provided opportunities for positive identity avowals and the reproduction of discipline. 
Moves for control were directed at party members and state bureaucracies, but those for 
deterrence were directed at FLG practitioners. The same grammatical structures were 
87  In this respect, the campaign against the FLG has been portrayed for its practitioners as a persecu-
tion ordained in history, and perpetrated by evil forces. However, most of the identity framings directed at 
‘non-anointed-ones’ do not focus on the ‘supernatural evil’ of the CCP, but on the violation of human rights in 
the party’s campaign. For example, Li has emphasised that the Nine Commentaries on the CCP should not be 
part of the material that explains FLG. Indeed, FLG should rather be framed as a pacifist meditation exercise, 
the practitioners of which are being persecuted by the CCP in violation of their human rights, which frame 
conveniently resonates with Western ideals and media. Interestingly, the actual teachings of FLG often do not 
appear in foreign media beyond restating the three-part moral code, viz. truth, benevolence and forbearance. 
Thereby the story on the FLG is most often framed as Chinese human rights violations.
While FLG activists outside China have joined forces with the democracy movement, and emphasise the treat-
ment of FLG practitioners as a human rights issue, it is noticeable that such freedoms as of speech, conscience, 
or religion were not of apparent significant concern to Li or his doctrine, before the suppression of the FLG 
began (Ownby 2008, 126). Indeed, ironically, just a cursory inspection would reveal that many of Li’s teach-
ings contradict many tenets of activists working within the ‘human rights discourse’ e.g., Li’s stated views on 
homosexuals, interracial offspring and freedom of speech.
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used as in the other cases studied here, with the omission of the vocabolary of counter-
revolution, but the threat was qualitatively different. The FLG was not presented as a 
danger eminating from within the party. The FLG was not a form of revisionism, nor a 
movement for restoring capitalism. The FLG was presented as superstition that threat-
ened Marxist science and the health of individual people: Li Hongzhi and his doctrine 
were a threat to the core values of the political order from outside the party. Not only that, 
the group and its activities were presented as the tools of foreign anti-China forces.
The emanation of the FLG from outside the party worked for the party in the social 
situation of the late 1990s: talk of revisionism and counter-revolution was old-fashioned 
and already even removed from the penal code. Beyond this, international events, the 
history of tensions with obscure semi-religious organisations, and the timing of the pro-
tests, all worked towards the facilitation of the securitisation of the FLG within the party 
leadership. The politics of securitising the Falungong also permitted a campaign to renew 
the bond between the party and loyal citizens, and further to maintain the legitimacy of 
the party as the guarantor of stability and unity and the safety of the people. Even more 
so for Jiang, as the campaign compelled party and state bureaucracies to toe his line and 
thereby demonstrate their loyalty to the ‘core’ of party leadership. Such a tactic does 
not seem to have raised extra costs as the bureaucratic system appears to have operated 
without much friction, and the issue has not spilled over.
In terms of facilitating/impeding factors, the balance seemed to eventually tilt in fa-
vour of the authorities. The massiveness of the anti-FLG campaign and the benign char-
acter of the majority of FLG practitioners seemed to impede the success of legitimisation 
moves. It was not clear why ‘grannies excercising in the park’ would threaten the socialist 
system. However, prudent people understood the message to keep clear. Moreover, the 
2001 self-immolation event appears to have provided the requisite plausibility for the 
authorities’ claims. Indeed, the securitisation moves have been successful on the Main-
land both in terms of control and legitimacy. The impression of success is strengthened 
by the absence of major international fallout, irrespective of the continued resistance of 
Li and his most devout followers on the Mainland, and especially outside China. 
In terms of contestation of and resistance to the securitisation of the FLG, the analysis 
suggests the latter. While there does not seem to have been much contestation within the 
party, the targets of securitisation resisted. Li and his disciples had used identity frames 
in their avowals in a manner that can be described as ‘pre-emptive desecuritisation’ al-
ready before the anti-FLG campaign began. This was evident even during the April 25 
1999 demonstration where the representatives of the FLG denied any interest in politics. 
Similarly, as the supression of the FLG began, Li continued to use the types of identity 
avowals that strived towards defusing the sense of threat and danger that the securitisa-
tion moves of the party represented. Initially, then, the FLG’s activities conformed with 
“rightful resistance”, but after the soft repression by the authorities began in earnest, 
Li was forced to engage in clear-cut desecuritisation moves in his identity framings. As 
this desecuritisation failed and the authorities turned to hard repression, Li launched his 
counter-securitisation moves, identifying the CCP as the tool of evil that threatened the 
paradise of his disciples, and indeed, by extension, the entire world. All in all, Li and his 
followers have used a mixture of desecuritisation, reverse-securitisation and counter-
securitisation moves in their resistance to the CCP.
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Beyond the FLG having been ‘decimated’ on the Mainland by the anti-FLG campaign, 
Li’s counter-securitisation has had major impacts on his doctrine and the practice of FLG. 
Li’s declaration of a period of ‘fa-rectification’ seems to equal an existential threat for 
faith itself. In such a securitised situation, FLG practitioners are allowed to go ‘beyond 
forbearance’ and ‘actively engage the evil’ beyond personal cultivation. Such a change 
in Li’s doctrine can be attributed to the anti-FLG campaign, and thus to the interactive 
nature of securitisation processes. In terms of doctrine, it even seems that Li’s securitisa-
tion moves entailed more drastic measures than the CCP’s securitisation moves, although 
the practical activities suggest the exact opposite. Indeed, while Li claims to battle ‘evil’ 
in other ‘dimensions’, the CCP has sent FLG practitioners to mental hospitals and labour 
re-education camps without trial.
While Li’s securitisation moves have been successful among the faithful, both his secu-
ritisation and desecuritisation moves towards the general public and the CCP have failed. 
Unlike in 1989, the general public did not support those the authorities targeted with 
their securitisation moves. The social situation in the late 1990s was much different to 
that of the late 1980s. China had continued to prosper and rise under the leadership of 
the party, which had also increasingly used the Chinese sense of patriotism in its favour. 
There was also no such sense of social activism that had been the case in the 1980s. It 
seems that many had turned to taking care of themselves rather than to engaging in poli-
tics that was deemed to be dangerous. The Falungong could also not draw on the positive 
connotations attached to protesting students. In contrast, Li Hongzhi and his doctrine 
seemed obscure, and potentially dangerous. The self-immolation incident appeared to 
corroborate the authorities’ claims, irrespective of whether or not it was a hoax.
The massive campaign launched against the FLG and the treatment of resisting practi-
tioners, illustrates how the party can still resort to its old modus operandi, whenever core 
values are represented as in jeopardy. However, that the use of these discourses and prac-
tices has been reduced from those of the Mao era and even as late as the 1980s, would 
seem to indicate that the party perhaps feels more secure in its position than before, 
despite the fact that it still is more often securitised than the state of the People’s Repub-
lic. The party appears to let things happen and only clamps down when it deems some 
threshold being breached in terms of organisation or spread of protest. The case of the 
FLG illustrates how securitisation theory can be used to examine the use of asymmetric 
political concepts both during the Mao-period, and even during contemporary Chinese 
politics which are quite far removed form it. Furthermore, the analysis of the FLG’s own 
securitisation discourse illustrated how flexible the framework is: the approach can pro-
vide insights into non-state actors whose discourse deals with otherworldly threats.
In sum, it can be concluded that the case of the FLG was qualitatively different to the 
other cases. The analysis of securitisation continues to reflect changes in Chinese society 
as the four cases span different decades. Overall, the general effects of the securitisation 
process of the FLG were more limited than in the prior three cases presented in this study. 
Its securitisation was successful in being limited to its object of concern, and interna-
tional repercussions have remained unremarkable, for even though the issue has been 
used as part of the human rights abuse discourse that is negative for China’s internation-
al image, it still did not prevent China’s membership of the WTO nor China hosting the 
2008 Olympics. Thus, while the continued existence of the FLG and Li Hongzhi’s activities 
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may remain an embarrassment, the FLG has effectively and with apparent acquiescence 
(beyond its practitioners) been eradicated from Mainland China. On this occasion the 
Golem’ of securitisation did its master’s bidding and was successfully kept under control. 
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This study has sought to enhance our understanding of the political use of language. Of 
concern have been the political functions of security utterances i.e., the power politics 
of a concept. The investigation navigated through contemporary theoretical debates on 
this theme, prevalent in (mainly) European academic discussion. As the title of the study 
already suggests, its approach has been based on speech act theory and its illocutionary 
logic. The study was initiated with the intention to critically develop and improve the 
means of analysis available for the research programme of Securitisation Studies.
My main argument here has been that the five main strands of securitisation explicat-
ed above – securitisation for raising an issue onto the agenda, for legitimating future acts, 
for deterrence, for control, and for legitimating past acts or for reproducing the secu-
rity status of an issue – demonstrate how ‘security speech’ can have a variety of political 
functions. Such functions range from the raising of an issue onto the agenda of decision 
making, to legitimising policies, deterring threats and controlling subordinates. The main 
contribution has been the explication of these functions by the means of speech act logic. 
Concepts worth explication have contexts, which are precise and clear enough to be use-
ful. ‘Securitisation’ has proven to be just such a concept in the liberal democratic context. 
The purpose of the explication here has been to preserve the clarity and usefulness of 
this concept in the favoured liberal democratic context, while honing it for application to 
broader contexts. This kind of terminological expansion is crucial because ‘Securitisation 
Studies’ can provide insights into other types of political orders as well. Conversely, the 
security practices of such orders are essential objects of study for students of ‘security’. 
This elaboration can hopefully bring the Copenhagen School approach to securitisation 
closer to the ideal of the provision of a, if not universal, at least more encompassing ‘ma-
trix’ for International Security Studies, along with an artificial metalanguage to study the 
social construction of security and its political functions in domestic and international 
politics.
I believe that the clarification of the five strands of securitisation enhance the research 
programme of Securitisation Studies, for the new model can incorporate ‘anomalies’ de-
tected by the various critics of the original approach, whilst retaining the results of stud-
ies conducted within the original model. Thereby, the refined model or concept has a 
12. Conclusions of the Study: Explicating Securitisation 





broader extension than the original, and thus expands the types of acts and discourses 
that can be analysed with it. The explication of the illocutionary logic of the acts of securi-
tisation provides the theoretical means for conceptual travel without conceptual stretch-
ing. The strands can be used to understand – or perhaps even explain – the political func-
tions of security arguments in political orders beyond liberal democracy. 
As regards the main theoretical research interest in this study – how political func-
tions can be inferred from political speech in general and in ‘security speech’ in particu-
lar – I have demonstrated how speech act logic and the main strands of securitisation, 
even in the absence of ‘security words’, can be used to infer political functions of security 
speech. This is made possible by the fact that ‘security rationale’ or a ‘security modality’ 
is dependent on a fairly stable constellation of meanings. Although the ‘true’ intentions 
of speakers remain inaccessible, the meaning of their utterances can be inferred. Because 
speech acts rely on conventional sets of rules and practices, once such relevant rules are 
manifested in a certain context, the meaning of the particular discourse sample can be 
inferred. Furthermore, by examining what the ‘security rationale’ in a particular instance 
entails, assumptions of what the act of securitisation linked to this instance was utilised 
for, can also be made.
Certain caveats are in order. While illocutionary speech acts are conventional, perlocu-
tionary effects (usually) are not. In other words, we can infer the meaning of an utterance 
by analysing it, but we cannot grasp the effect such a meaning may have had on the per-
ceiver. Indeed, a single illocutionary act may not produce the same perlocutionary effects 
on different hearers, or even the same hearer in different situations. Furthermore, illocu-
tionary speech acts may have unintended perlocutionary effects. In sum, this approach to 
the functions of security speech operates under an assumption of strategically behaving 
speakers, but the situation of the communicative interaction is open: the speaker cannot 
decide what the hearer comprehends or interprets. Thereby, one person’s reassurance 
remains another’s threat. Indeed, discourse samples that contain illocutionary acts may 
not reveal much about the perlocutionary effects of these acts, as most types of securi-
tisation moves do not have conventional consequences; not all acts of securitisation are 
akin to, say, marriage declarations, as most have to be argued in some way and depend 
on the acceptance of the ‘hearer’. This means that the analysis of perlocutionary effects of 
securitisation i.e., the analysis of the success or failure of securitisation requires means 
beyond the analysis of illocutionary speech acts, as does also the analysis of the success 
of the politics of such moves.
Yet, irrespective of the perlocutionary ‘success’ of illocutionary acts, the act in the ut-
terance of an illocution may already transform a situation: a securitising actor commits 
to a status transformation for the issue concerned in voicing ‘security’, which on its own 
may already have consequences in certain social settings. Indeed, while the perlocution-
ary aspect is important in respect to the ‘success’ of securitisation, and particularly the 
success of the politics of securitisation, it is also important not the let go of the illocution-
ary aspect of securitisation. Not all strands of securitisation have conventional perlocu-
tionary outcomes, but they all are illocutionarily conventional. If acts of securitisation 
did not have conventionally expected consequences, they would not be used: there has 
to be some expectation of what will result from a securitisation move, and the strands of 
securitisation reveal that such assumptions can be plural.
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In sum, the approach here indicates that the analysis of elementary speech acts can 
be used to infer the political function of complex speech acts of securitisation. How se-
curitisation can be used (at least) to argue for raising an issue onto the agenda of formal 
decision makers, to provide legitimacy for future or past acts, as a means of control, and 
as a form of deterrence was demonstrated here via illocutionary logic. This variety of 
functions entails that actors without formal authority to enact security measures can also 
speak security. While previous studies have argued that ‘public’ and ‘private’ securitising 
actors use security speech differently, the strands explicated here can be used to gain a 
more exact bearing on this through the study of actually occurred speech.
Beyond these main general arguments, I divide my concluding points into two sets: those 
that concern securitisation theory and those that deal with the function of political secu-
rity in the People’s Republic of China.
Concluding Arguments on Securitisation Theory
This study has sought to reflect upon most of the critical debates that have dealt with se-
curitisation theory. Along the way, I have presented my own viewpoints, reasonings, and 
contentions. It is now prudent to provide a synthesis.
Perhaps the most crucial point along the way has been that the ‘model of securitisation’ 
should not be restricted to the practices of certain types of political orders, or even theo-
ries of politics. Such a view dictates that the model must remain fairly abstract, and that 
empirical appliers need to provide their own operationalisations. For example, who has 
to be convinced in order for an issue to gain the status of a security matter, as well as, 
who can wield ‘security’, varies not only from one type of political order to another, but 
also within types of political orders, and even particular political orders. It would not be 
helpful to define the audience in the theory in any specific way, since audiences are de-
pendent on the socio-historical situation of the context; the person or persons who have 
to be convinced of the necessity of a security action is malleable. Moreover, there may be 
several audiences ranging from an inner ring of fundamentalists to the general public.
The cases studied here illustrated how even in such a hierarchical political order as 
that of the PRC can have a multitude of securitising actors and audiences. Mao Zedong 
was the eminating source of socio-political capital in the first two cases, but other actors 
also wielded this power. Similarly, at times Mao was the audience, but at others it was 
the party bureaucracy and the general public. Such a multitude has not diminished in the 
post-Mao era; the exact opposite may actually be the case.
Beyond the issue of who or what a relevant audience is, there are also issues of how suc-
cessful or convincing a securitisation move has been. Some audiences may have been 
moved on a fundamental level, they may even change their worldviews. Others may ap-
proach the same move indifferently or on a superficial level. It may also be that some 
members of an audience are ‘non-believers’ for whom the move has failed completely.
The varied levels of success among different audiences were quite evident in the cases 
examined here. For example, some leading cadres contested the line of the Cultural Revo-
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lution and not all units of the PLA agreed to be ‘seized’. Contestation within the party 
leadership was most evident in the 1989 case. Also the targets of securitisation may be 
conviced to varying degrees. For example, in 1976, most demonstrators left the Square 
after Wu De’s securitising speech, but some remained. The worry of Falungong practi-
tioners recanting their beliefs is quite evident in Li Hongzhi’s statements. At the same 
time, many of his followers have risked captivity by continuing the ‘clarify the truth’ and 
to ‘step forward’.
While the possibility of various types of audiences (e.g., an audience may be necessary 
to gain legitimacy or to mobilise resources) and various leves of success can be contem-
plated theoretically, assessing this is an empirical issue, and not something to be handled 
within the model in much detail. The shape of securitisation speech acts can change as 
the process continues. Such variation even within a single process implies that the rel-
evant audience(s) of securitisation depends on the function(s) the securitisation act is 
intended to serve. The way I posit this within the model is that an audience has to be such 
that it has the ability to provide the securitising actor with whatever they seek to accom-
plish through the securitisation move. To reiterate once more: operationalisation beyond 
this should be a task for each specific empirical analysis.
The securitisation processes that were traced in the cases here illustrated how securi-
tisation moves indeed change shape and can have varying functions as the process goes 
on. The case of 1989 is perhaps the most illustrative. We can find moves for raising the 
issue of the student protest onto the agenda of the Politburo. Once such moves were suc-
cessful, we find moves for deterrence and for legitimising possible future acts, and finally, 
moves for post hoc legitimisation. Actual securitisation processes are diffuse, and they 
may not be a one-off affair, as this case also illustrated.
I also presented the view that some types of securitisation acts are directed at audiences 
beyond the domain of the securitising actor. For example, securitisation, and its counter-
part, desecuritisation, can be directed at both sides of a conflict. Securitisation and dese-
curitisation can be used to ‘move’ or ‘swing’ audiences in favour of the actor, but securiti-
sation can also be used as a deterrent i.e., a threat of possible severe acts. The ‘target’ of 
these moves can use desecuritisation as a counter-argument to such threat claims. This 
also means that desecuritisation can be an active political move or tactic, and not merely 
a ‘withering away’. Desecuritising a matter may be ‘good politics’ in certain situations, 
and politicians may be explicit in voicing such views. I also noted that ‘desecuritisation’ 
can be ‘pre-emptive’. In certain situations, political actors may assume that their actions 
are deemed dangerous by other actors. In such a situation the former may present argu-
ments or identity frames that already work against those that would present their actions 
as negative or dangerous.
The desecuritisation of the Cultural Revolution and the 1976 incident are prime exam-
ples of how desecuritisation may be ‘good politics’. Their desecuritisation subsequently 
seems to have influenced protest activity in the 1980s, including the case studied here. 
Protest movements in China have framed their identities in ways that appear to be aimed 
at pre-emptively deflecting negative identity imputations. The same appeared to be the 
case with Li Hongzhi and the Falungong.
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One of the theoretical emphasises of this study has revolved around the interactive na-
ture of securitisation processes, particularly that between securitising actors and the ‘tar-
gets’ of securitisation i.e., the claimed threats. As I have tried to demonstrate, securitising 
moves may be contested by actors with formal authority and they can be resisted by ac-
tors without formal authority. Desecuritisation moves can play a part here, whether they 
be pre-emptive or a reaction to actual securitising moves. Furthermore, such ‘reactions’ 
may escalate to include reverse-securitisation or counter-securitisation. Indeed, it would 
seem that parties involved in conflicts will often portray themselves as virtuous and non-
threatening, while counter-claiming that the other party is the actual threat and guilty 
of causing difficulties. Such interactions demonstrate how securitisation moves may be 
directed beyond audiences that are under the authority of the securitising actor.
All the cases displayed some form of desecuritisation moves. Securitisation during the 
Cultural Revolution was not effectively contested, but the main targets it was directed 
against were desecuritised fairly soon after Mao’s death. The desecuritisation of the 1976 
incident played a major role here as well. The case of 1989 allowed examination of major 
contestation and resistance, while the case of the Falungong is an example of sustained 
resistance. In these two cases, when the stakes became higher and higher, the resisters 
resorted to reverse-securitisation and counter-securitisation. It seems that the possibili-
ties for such contestation and resistance have been enhanced in the post-Mao era of Chi-
nese politics.
Such struggles over meaning are also closely related to the issue of the success of se-
curitisation moves, and to the success of the politics of securitisation as such. Here, the 
role of speech acts is crucial. I have posited that it is securitisation, and not security, that 
should be considered a speech act. This entails that the perception of threats, securitisa-
tion moves and security action are logically, and at times, also practically separate. This 
means that whether or not we can observe a policy change or some other practical con-
sequence of a securitisation effort cannot be a necessary or even sufficient criterion for 
the success of this move – this is of course dependent on the functions of the securitising 
move; perceived threats may or may not be securitised, accepted securitisation moves 
may or may not lead to policy, and security measures may or may not be taken after 
securitisation moves. The success of speech acts depends on uptake and other factors 
connected to perlocutionary effects. The success of the politics of securitisation demand 
different approaches to its study, such as interviews and opinion polls. 
Such an approach to securitisation has at least three consequences for how securitisa-
tion should be studied. Firstly, studies of securitisation should begin from securitisation 
moves as these define the area of interest within ‘infinitely complex phenomena’. Second-
ly, the indeterminacy of the three aspects identified entails that security action cannot be 
a sufficient, or a necessary criterion for the success of securitisation. And thirdly, accord-
ingly, the absence of action cannot be a necessary nor sufficient criterion for the failure 
of securitisation. As such, this entails an unsatisfactory answer for some of the critical 
points raised by previous appliers: the success and failure of securitisation is a more 
complicated issue than, for example, the reallocation of resources. Indeed, the success of 
specific illocutionary acts of securitisation should be evaluated by studying their perlocu-
tionary effects. Beyond specific speech acts, the success of the politics of securitisation re-
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quires moving beyond the study of discourse samples that manifest securitisation moves. 
To study illocutionary moves cannot reveal whether or not they have been ‘successful’ 
as this depends on the perlocutionary effects of illocutions, unless we are dealing with 
securitisation moves that have conventional consequences e.g., declaring martial law or 
war. Similarly, the success of the politics of securitisation is an issue beyond illocutionary 
speech act analysis.
The cases studied here had varying degrees of success. Securitisation during the Cul-
tural Revolution seems to have provided Mao with the utility that he was seeking. The 
case of the Falungong is another example of ‘successful securitisation’, although with 
much more limited consequences. The case of 1976 transpired to be a failed form of poli-
tics for the securitising faction within the party. The case of 1989 illustrates how success 
can be a mixed bag: the moves for legitimacy were generally a failure but the function 
of long-term control has succeeded. Neither the Falungong nor the events of 1989 have 
been desecuritised.
As regards the critical debate on silence, I have reasoned that the possibility of ‘silence’ is 
positive for the theory: the possibility to ‘falsify’ empirical assumptions drawn from the 
theory provides explanatory potential. Indeed, securitisation discourses that are in place 
in some political contexts can be non-existent in others. That securitisation discourses 
are not present everywhere we expect to find them, means that the theory can help us 
understand and, at times, perhaps even explain, some aspects of the political dynamics 
of such situations.
The examination of China’s alignment in global security discourse illustrated how a 
state can be extensively involved in one discourse and remain completely without anoth-
er. This seems to suggest that at least some macrosecuritisation discourses can be used 
for more parochial interests than the survival of ‘humanity’ or ‘civilization’.
On the issue of what kind of a theory securitisation theory should be, I have followed a 
middle-ground position. The context of utterance is important in ‘real’ processes of se-
curitisation and their empirical study. But such study should be theoretically grounded 
on illocutionary linguistics, so as to avoid conceptual stretching, and to allow the identi-
fication of discourses of securitisation. Thereby, what is required is a combination of an 
artificial model with empirical analysis. Illocutionary logic provides the meta-language 
that makes an abstract distance from the empirical contexts possible.
The analysis of the cases illustrates how such a combination can be achieved: the 
grammatical models are the abstract way of modelling functions of security speech, but 
the historical, social and political features of Chinese politics play an important role in the 
types of vocabulary used, as well as in who can speak security and to whom. Retaining ab-
stract distance allows such operationalisation to be made in a great variety of contexts.
Hence, I argue that the analysis of illocutionary acts of securitisation should be the 
foundation of securitisation theory, but, in order to assess the perlocutionary effects i.e., 
the success or failure of such acts, other socio-linguistic methods may be necessary. Har-
nessing the linguistic root of the theory will make the approach firmer, and will then 
encourage branching out in terms of combining the theory with other approaches e.g., 
Regional Security Complex Theory, theories of mobilisation, actor network theory and 
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agenda setting, the study of asymmetric political concepts and conceptual transforma-
tion, and even democratic peace theory. Furthermore, the explicated grammar also pro-
vides the necessary meta-language to do cross-cultural/political/temporal analyses of 
securitisation processes. As such, this reinforcement of the theory allows for the explora-
tion of new empirical issues. To understand the process of securitisation in various politi-
cal and social contexts is vital for the tasks set for Securitisation Studies.
The above understanding of the purposes or functions of acts of securitisation avoids 
the formation of an orthodoxa within Securitisation Studies: securitisation can be about 
more than just the legitimisation of the breaking of rules or the enactment of extraordi-
nary measures. It also distinguishes securitisation from decisionism: the ‘political’ can be 
seen as one way to wield asymmetric political concepts, but the theory of securitisation 
often yields better analytical results. Certain political actors in certain situations and po-
litical orders are able to make a decision on, for example, martial law, but securitisation 
needs to be understood as an open social process that most of the time has to be argued 
or explained in some way, as was quite drastically illustrated by the 1989 challenge to 
martial law in China.
In respect of the interests of knowledge, in my view, the approach to analysing securitisa-
tion as presented here can be used to serve a variety of interests. Securitisation theory 
can be used to deal with real problems in an instrumental fashion, as it can illustrate how 
issues of security are constructed. Thereby, it can, for example, be the basis for investigat-
ing how ‘security’ relates to conflict processes. Such an investigation can also be the start-
ing point for hermeneutical studies of security i.e., investigations into how security is 
understood in various societies at various times, opening up interesting avenues for the 
study of conceptual change. Investigating how security issues are constructed can further 
be used in an emancipatory fashion to reveal the political nature of such issues, whereby 
their element of choice can be demonstrated. These kinds of investigations can be used 
to present alternative interpretations of situations, and thus to open up space for what 
could be seen as ethical interventions. As such, the explication of acts of securitisation as-
sists in accomplishing all of these types of tasks: the strands provide the means for more 
nuanced studies and can help to understand the functions and dynamics of processes in 
a more elaborate fashion. Realising that processes of securitisation do not have a single 
political function, but that even single processes of securitisation may have various func-
tions, can assist in various kinds of investigations into the social construction of security 
– irrespective of the interest of knowledge that guides such studies.
In terms of further theoretical development, the current research endeavour opened up 
two new avenues for study. Firstly, the expanded framework can enlighten us on how 
macro-level securitisation discourses function on a micro level; a study of the major cri-
ses of the Cold War or an investigation of how such macrosecuritisation discourses oper-
ate in various political contexts beckons. Secondly, the next step to develop the approach 
of the theory of securitisation would be the incorporation of a general theory of signs and 
semeiosis into the framework, and beyond, the combining of the framework with various 




as a way of understanding the relationships of actors, objects and meanings – in the end, 
to a comprehension of the functioning of power.
The Function of Political Security in the People’s Republic of China
In respect of the empirical aspect of this study, my concluding argument is that it suc-
cessfully set forth a method of analysis for securitisation processes in non-democratic 
political orders without conceptual stretching, and thus demonstrated that securitisation 
theory can be applied to the empirical study of Chinese politics in different decades and 
leadership eras. Such conceptual travel from Europe, the liberal-democratic context and 
the first decade of the 2000s, has provided new insights for the general objectives of Se-
curitisation Studies. Concomitantly, the revised framework proved to be useful as a tool 
to analyse, interpret, and understand Chinese politics.
The empirical aim of this study was to analyse securitisation processes in China and 
to note whether these processes conform to the grammar of securitisation as previously 
postulated and herein explicated. I reasoned and argued that the manner in which secu-
rity was constructed in the case studies indeed conformed to the explicated grammars. 
The examples of the four securitisation processes illustrated how securitisation speech 
acts can shift during the securitisation process, and also how they can display various 
functions as this process progresses. Outside the functions of any particular speech acts, 
the entire process of securitisation was demonstrated to have various political functions. 
Features such as differing and prevailing conditions and socio-historical contexts, suc-
cessful and failed securitisation moves as well as desecuritisation moves and processes 
in toto were identified from the cases. 
Thereby, for the present study, securitisation has been viewed as a ‘grammar’ of certain 
types of human interaction, while resonant values in certain situations viewed as its ‘vo-
cabulary’. Following this reasoning through ‘spectacular’ instances of securitisation in the 
political sector of security, during three major leadership eras of the PRC, revealed that 
‘counter-revolution’ was, for a long time, an institutionalised basis for securitisation, into 
which particular instances and chains of events were grafted. This demonstrates how, in 
one way, social artefacts – here issues of security – are sedimented into the ‘background’ 
of social reality. Although labels like ‘turmoil’ and ‘well planned plots’ would not seem 
to fit well into European political rhetoric, the language Chinese officials have used to 
construct official security realities is remarkably consistent with the ‘grammar’ that the 
theory of securitisation would predict, making it unnecessary to distort ‘culturally alien’ 
concepts to fit into the theory. Besides causing chaos or social instability, collusion with 
foreign powers is another oft-used political label for debasing opponents. 
Therefore, the PRC has its own set of institutionalised master signifiers, or watchwords 
of security. The logic of such institutionalised categories can remain constant, but the sig-
nifiers that refer to institutionalised signifieds can change. For instance, ‘Lin Biao’ was 
transformed from being originally a chief securitising actor and even Mao Zedong’s heir 
apparent, to eventually, completely contrarily, an institutionalised signifier of ‘counter-
revolution’. In the same vein, the operationalisation of official ideology has now shifted 




with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are compared to the Three Represents of 
Jiang Zemin. 
Yet, when necessary, the authorities would still seem to fall back onto the fundamental 
core of the political order. This was explicit in 1989, and the same logic has remained in 
the securitisation of the Falungong as well. Moreover, this demonstrates that while the 
vocabulary may evolve, the underlying logic appears to remain remarkably consistent 
throughout the political transitions from the Mao to the post-Mao eras of Chinese politics. 
Securitisation in the political sectors is no longer as present in the everyday as it was dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, but when political crises do escalate, the same logic appears 
to rise to the fore, more or less reliably. This suggests that securitisation theory can be 
used to examine both Mao and post-Mao era politics through the same framework, which 
attests to its value for future investigations within China Studies. 
However, the cases studied here would also suggest that there is a significant differ-
ence in how securitisation has been utilised in the two most definitive eras. In Mao’s 
China, securitisation was used as a means to mobilise the ‘masses’ to fight inner enemies 
within the party and society, for example, through ‘rectification’. It seems that in post-Mao 
China, securitisation is used as a reaction to more autonomous inputs or processes which 
emanate from within its society. In Mao’s China, securitisation was used as a means to 
mobilise society; in post-Mao China, securitisation has conversely been used to suppress 
autonomous mobilisation in society. The case of the 1976 Tiananmen Incident seems to 
be a hinge-event in this sense. The uncovering of such a change seems to reflect general 
changes in Chinese society indicated by many other studies of China conducted with very 
different methods. Securitisation theory allows the examination of such change without 
recourse to grand explanations, such as the ‘end of the political’.
It seems that political security has served several functions in the PRC. It has been used 
to foment social unrest and to legitimise changes in party leadership. It has also been 
used as a means of control and deterrence, both to mobilise bureaucratic systems and to 
quell autonomous social unrest. Negative labels, such as the counter-revolutionary, have 
been consistent tools in factional party-politicking, which many times resulted in the ‘Go-
lem’ of securitisation breaking loose and resulting in negative results. Political security 
has also been used as autocommunication, as a means of compelling bureaucracies to 
toe the line regarding a certain political formulation. It has also been used to reproduce 
a bond between the ‘people’ and the ‘party’: the party has had many opportunities to 
present itself in a positive light as the guardian of all good in Chinese society against those 
who would do it harm, whether those be revisionists, counter-revolutionaries, foreign 
powers, or religious fundamentalists.
Such general impressions of the role of political security in the PRC create an avenue for 
future research in the form of the investigation of the dynamics of popular protest and 
its suppression in China, also in comparison to other political orders. Thus far, the ma-
jority of studies of securitisation, mainly investigating European and ‘Western’ contexts, 
have not focused on either the ‘targets’ (i.e., the identified threats) of securitisation, nor 
the interaction between the claims of securitising actors and the claims of the ‘targets’. 
However, this study outlined some angles of approach for such studies. Indeed, some pro-
cesses of rhetorical struggle between authorities and social movements utilise security 
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discourse, to either legitimise or block social mobilisation in the political arena. The com-
bination of securitisation/desecuritisation theory and identity frame theory demonstrat-
ed here how protest legitimisation and repression can both be conceptualised within the 
same framework, and how their underlying logic can be deciphered. Of note is that this 
approach does not deal with the sincerity of the actors or their ‘real’ motives i.e., it is of 
no consequence whether the ‘activists’ or the ‘authorities’ ‘really believe’ or are sincere 
in their identity framings of themselves or of their adversaries, or even whether they are 
merely engaged in a political game of cynical manipulation. Irrespective of the motives or 
sincerity of the proponents and opponents, the approach still assists in comprehending 
why certain types of frames are more likely to be used than others in the justification of 
soft or hard repression and the resultant resistance to repression.
In the PRC, particularly in regard to social mobilisation and repression, the stakes of 
applied identity frames are high, as they involve the right to participate in social activism 
and/or the survival of the leadership regimes, even political orders, and specifically in the 
case of the FLG even the ‘fate of the world.’ The patterns of amity and enmity that are con-
structed in securitisation processes can also be informative on how political identities, 
even agency, can be formed in China. Quite commonly, people may be engaged in their 
various activities with applicable identities, with or without a sense of these activities 
being considered political by nature. However, when the party and/or state authorities 
frame such activities in the language of threats and security, that is, when they shift the 
patterns of amity and enmity through the identification of a new threat, or even enemy, 
the affected groups will have to adjust if the same activities are to continue. It would seem 
that it is most likely that such ‘unpolitical’ groups will object to being identified as threats 
or enemies, and thereby attempt to deflect or resist the authorities’ threat-framings and 
be compelled to adjust accordingly in their identity imputations. Even if those engaged 
in the targeted activities prefer not to resist the authorities’ frames, and instead strive 
to be identified as a disruptive force, this will still affect the identity of the whole group 
engaged in the activities.
As such, I would aver that such findings can be useful in social movement research, 
since the centrality of security discourse in suppression and protest legitimisation in 
non-democratic political orders is revealed. Of course, authorities in liberal systems can 
also resort to the securitisation of their opponents, as examples in Western history of the 
suppression of radical left- or right-wing oppositions, or more recently radical Islamists, 
have demonstrated.  However, it is the exclusionary nature of non-democratic political 
orders that make them more prone to utilise security discourse as the reasoning to le-
gitimise the possible use of extraordinary means (e.g., hard repression) and thereby to 
prevent other political actors from emerging in society. Although there is no automatic 
or deterministic mechanism for deploying ‘hard’ forms of repression after ‘softer’ forms 
have already been deployed, the use of soft forms of repression will often increase the 
likelihood of hard repression, since its costs will be lowered by intimidation or provoca-
tion of activists engaged in resistance, and further, by justification of the use of violence 
in general. Thus, paradoxically, soft repression is quite quite likely to escalate tactics on 
both sides of the struggle. This would certainly appear to be the case in the conflicts of 
1989 and the Falungong. Thereby, I would like to trust that this study has paved the way 
for further research on such issues, also from a comparative perspective.
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To transcend the political sector within China in future studies would allow a greater 
understanding of the political functions of security speech. Indeed, since only the po-
litical sector of security within the PRC has been considered in this study, an enormous 
reservoir of cases, residing in various sectors and levels, to be studied in the “Chinese” 
context remains. The cases considered here were by no means an exhaustive analysis 
of securitisation even in the political sector. For example, events in Tibet in 2008 and 
Xinjiang in 2009, that occurred during the collation of this study, would lend themselves 
as ideal cases for investigation of the role and function of local versus central securitisa-
tion moves in the Chinese context. Moreover, this study has only focused on ‘spectacular’ 
instances of securitisation. Issues of more ‘mundane’ or routinised securitisation are left 
for future study. Since the Chinese political order runs the largest bureaucratic system in 
the world, although empirical investigation may accordingly be difficult, the securitisa-
tion framework may yet provide important insights into Chinese technocratic politics. 
Moving beyond China on the agenda for future research, the explicated model can 
be used to conduct studies on other non-democratic orders in Asia, and elsewhere. As 
the cases studied here have shown, the role of ‘institutionalised security’ is particularly 
strong in how securitisation functions in China. This raises the question of whether this 
is an effect of the Chinese political order, an effect of the political culture of China, or even 
an effect of how Chinese language is used.
One typical feature of Chinese political language is that it is strongly institutionalised: 
official political formulations and lines can even function as loyalty tests for subordinates. 
This kind of language use caters well to the institutionalisation of security as well, and 
shows how securitisation theory can enlighten the more general functions of political 
language use in China. Thereby, the frequent use of institutionalised security may be at-
tributed to the way language is used in Chinese politics. It would however seem that the 
referents of these ‘watchwords’ are informed by the features of the political order. In-
deed, states tend to securitise the ‘core values’ of their political orders, and China is no 
exception here.
The question then becomes: how particular is China in the use of institutionalised se-
curity in general, and the referent objects these ‘master signifiers’ refer to in particular? 
To attain an answer to this question would require empirical study of various types of 
cultural traditions and political orders. The present study can provide a baseline for com-
parative studies of how securitisation and institutionalised security have operated at cer-
tain times in, for example, the Soviet Union and Cuba (comparison among revolutionary 
socialist states), in Vietnam and Cambodia (comparison among Asian socialist states), on 
Taiwan (comparison among Chinese ‘states’), and in Indonesia and Malaysia (comparison 
among Asian ‘non-democratic’ states).
Such examination may reveal whether there are ‘Asian’, ‘European’, ‘democratic’, ‘totali-
tarian’, ‘revolutionary’, or ‘non-democratic’ ideal types or correlations in regard to how 
issues of security are constructed and utilised. These kinds of comparisons may yield the 
reward of an increasingly precise understanding of who can securitise (actors), which 
issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why (function), with what kind of effects 
(acquiescence/contestation/resistance; success/failure) and under which conditions 
(facilitation/impediment factors) i.e., such investigations may yield empirical progress 




This study has been conducted from an instrumentalist position to social science with 
an emancipatory interest of knowledge. The practical objective has been the provision of 
better means to unmask security speech. We have dealt here with some of the severest 
forms of how power operates, namely, the legitimisation and mobilisation of the use of 
force and how these can be contested or resisted. We may yet be unable to ask the right 
kinds of questions when it comes to the totality of human nature, but I hope that the re-
search programme of Securitisation Studies can bring us a little closer to asking the right 





Abrahamsen, Rita. 2005. Blair’s Africa: The politics of securitization and fear. Alternatives 30, (1): 55-81. 
Adams, Douglas. 2002 [1979]. The Ultimate Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. New York: Ballantine Books. 
A declaration of emergency to all the people of the country from the people of the capital. 1990 [1989]. In Voices 
From Tiananmen Square. Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Har-
rison, 97-99. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
Adler, Emanuel. 2005. Barry Buzan’s use of constructivism to reconstruct the English School: ‘Not all the way 
down’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 34, (1): 170-182.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2007 [1978]. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. London and New York: 
Verso. 
———. 2005 [2003]. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2001 [1996]. Keinot vailla päämäärää. Reunamerkintöjä politiikasta. Trans. Juhani Vähämäki. Helsinki: 
Tutkijaliitto. 
———. 1998 [1995]. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press. 
Aittola, Tapio, and Vesa Raiskila. 1994. Jälkisanat. In Todellisuuden sosiaalinen rakentuminen — tiedonsosi-
ologinen tutkielma, eds. Tapio Aittola, Vesa Raiskila, 213-231. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Alagappa, Mutiah. 1998. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford, CA: Stanford Cali-
fornia Press. 
Albrecht, Ulrich, and Hans Günther Brauch. 2008. Security in peace research and security studies. In Globali-
zation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther 
Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir 
Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 503-525. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
‘A letter to the citizens of Beijing’. 1990 [1989]. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 
Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 75-76. Princeton.: Princeton University 
Press. 
Alfvén, Hannes. 1981. Human IQ vs. nuclear IQ. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37, (1): 4-5. 
Alker, Hayward R. 2006. On securitization politics as contexted texts and talk. Journal of International Relations 
& Development 9, (1): 71-80. 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions issues statement. 1990 [1989]. In Beijing Spring, 1989. Confrontation and 
Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, 285-286. 
Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
A document circulated among senior party and government officials earlier this month’ 1990 [1989]. In Beijing 
Spring, 1989. Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sul-
livan, and Marc Lambert, 203-206. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
A memorial and testament to the privileged class (A poster in Beijing Shifan daxue, April 24, 1989). 1990 [1989]. 
In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu 
Han and Sheng Hua, 41-42. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. 1999 [1971]. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd 
ed. New York: Longman. 
Amnesty International. 2000a. The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called ”heretical organizations”. 
Amnesty International document, 23.3.2000. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/EN-
GASA170112000>. Accessed 4.4.2005. 
Amnesty International. 2000b. Falun Gong practitioners: List of sentences, administrative sentences and those 
detained. Amnesty International document, 29.3.2000. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/
index/ENGASA170122000>. Accessed 4.4.2005. 
Amnesty International. 2000c. China: Falun Gong deaths in custody continue to rise as crackdown worsens. 
Amnesty International document, 19.12.2000. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/EN-
GASA170482000>. Accessed 4.4.2005.
An open letter to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of China (A small 
character poster by a Wuhan University student on april 28). 1990 [1989]. In Cries for Democracy—
Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han, Sheng Hua, 50-50. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Anscombe, G. Elizabeth M. 1958. On brute facts. Analysis 18, (3): 69-72. 
Apter, David E., and Tony Saich. 1994. Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic. Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press. 
Aradau, Claudia. 2006. Limits of security, limits of politics? A response. Journal of International Relations and 
Development 9, (1): 81-90. 
379
Bibliography
———. 2004. Security and the democratic scene: Desecuritization and emancipation. Journal of International 
Relations and Development 7, (4): 388-413. 
———. 2003. Desecuritise and despair! The Copenhagen School revisited. CEU working papers. Budapest: Cen-
tral European University. 
———. 2001. Beyong good and evil: Ethics and securitisation/desecuritisation techniques. Rubikon e-Journal 
(December). 
Aradau, Claudia, and Rens Van Munster. 2007. Governing terrorism through risk: Taking precautions, (un)
knowing the future. European Journal of International Relations 13, (1): 89-116.
Arends, J. Frederik M. 2008. From Homer to Hobbes and beyond – aspects of ’security’ in the european tradi-
tion. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. 
Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha 
Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 263-278. Berlin & Heidelberg & New 
York: Springer. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1976 [1951]. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: World Publishing Company. 
Aristotle. 2009 [350 B.C.E]. Metaphysics . Trans. W. D. Ross. Available at <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
metaphysics.html>. Accessed 3.12.2009.
Ashley, Richard K. 1984. The poverty of neo-realism. International Organization 38, (2): 225-86. 
———. 1981. Political realism and human interest. International Studies Quarterly 25, (2): 204-36. 
Asikainen, Raisa, Teemu Naarajärvi and Juha A. Vuori eds. 2009. Pekingin kevät 1989: Tiananmen ja kiinalaisen 
aktivismin rajat. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
A sketch of the Chinese Communist Party (A poster in the People’s University in April 1989). 1990 [1989]. In 
Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu 
Han, Sheng Hua, 42-43. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Austin, John L. 1979 [1961]. Performative utterances. In J.L. Austin: Philosophical Papers, eds. J. O. Urumson, G. J. 
Warnock. 3rd ed., 233-252. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1975 [1962]. How to do Things with Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University 
in 1955. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ayoob, Muhammed. 1995. The Third World Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. 
Balakrishnan, Gopal. 1999. The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso. 
Baldwin, David. 1997. The concept of security. Review of International Studies 23, (1): 5-26. 
———. 1995. Security studies and the end of the Cold War. World Politics 48, (4): 117-41. 
Balzacq, Thierry. 2010a. Constructivism and securitization studies. In The Routledge Handbook of Security Stud-
ies, eds. Victor Mauer, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, 56-72. London: Routledge. 
———. 2010b. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. London: Routledge. 
———. 2010c. A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants. In Securitization Theory: How 
Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 1-30. London: Routledge.
———. 2005. The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context. European Journal of In-
ternational Relations 11, (4): 171-201. 
Barkawi, Tarak, and Mark Laffey. 2006. The post-colonial moment in security studies. Review of International 
Studies 32, (2): 329-52. 
Barnes, Barry, and David Bloor. 1982. Relativism, rationalism, and the sociology of knowledge. In Rationality 
and relativism, eds. Martin Hollis , Steven Lukes, 21-47. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Barnouin, Barbara, and Changgen Yu. 1998. Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution. London and 
New York: Kegan Paul International. 
———. 1993. Ten Years of Turbulence. The Chinese Cultural Revolution. London and New York: Kegan Paul In-
ternational. 
Barthes, Roland. 1979. From work to text. In Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism, ed. 
Josué V. Harrari, 73-81. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1977. Image-Music-Text. London: Fontana. 
Barthwal-Datta, Monika. 2009. Securitising threats without the state: A case study of misgovernment as a secu-
rity threat in Bangladesh. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 277-300. 
Baudrillard, Jean. 2010 [1981]. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press. 
———. 2002 [1986]. Amerikka. Trans. Tiina Arppe. Helsinki: Loki kirjat. 
Baum, Richard. 1996. Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 




Baylis, John, and James Wirtz. 2007 [2002]. Introduction. In Strategy in the Contemporary World, eds. John Bay-
lis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray and Eliot Cohen. 2nd ed., 1-14. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baylis, John, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen, eds. 2007 [2002]. Strategy in the Contemporary World. 
2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BBC News (5.3.2004): Blair terror speech in full. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/poli-
tics/3536131.stm>. Accessed 12.11.2009.
Behnke, Andreas. 2007. Presence and creation: A few (meta-)critical comments on the c.a.s.e. manifesto. Secu-
rity Dialogue 38, (1): 105-11. 
———. 2006. No way out: Desecuritization, emancipation and the eternal return of the political — a reply to 
Aradau. Journal of International Relations and Development 9, (2): 62-9. 
———. 2000. The message or the messenger? Reflections on the role of security experts and the securitization 
of political issues. Cooperation and Conflict 35, (1): 89-105. 
Behr, Hartmut, and Amelia Heath. 2009. Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and 
neo-realism. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 327-49. 
Beijing Review. 1995a [17.11.1978]. Tiananmen incident: A completely revolutionary action. In Chinese Politics, 
Documents and Analysis. Volume Three: The Death of Mao (1976) to the Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980), eds. 
James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes, Milton D. Yeh, 356. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
———.  1995b [1.12.1980]. Indictment of the Special Procurate. In Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. 
Volume Four: Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress, eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes, 
Milton D. Yeh, 110-142. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
———.  1995c [27.6.1981]. ’Resolution on certain questions in the history of our Party since the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China,’ adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981. In  Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume 
Four: Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982), eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes, 
Milton D. Yeh, 43-94. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Béja, Jean-Philippe. 2009. The massacre’s long shadow. Journal of Democracy 20, (3): 5-16. 
Bendrath, Ralf, Johan Eriksson, and Giampiero Giocomello. 2007. From ‘cyberterrorism’ to ‘cyberwar’, back and 
forth - how the United States securitized cyberspace. In International Relations and Security in the Digital 
Age, eds. Johan Erikson, Giampiero Giacomello, 57-82. London: Routledge. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1999a [1940]. Theses on the philosophy of history. In Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 245-
255. London: Pimlico. 
———. 1999b [1923]. The task of the translator. An introduction to the translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux 
Parisienne. In Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, 70-82. London: Pimlico. 
Berg, Elias. 1988. The meaning of legitimacy. In Rationality and Legitimacy: Essays on Political Theory, eds. Dag 
Anckar, Hannu Nurmi and Matti Wiberg, 19-30. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association. 
Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1994 [1966]. Todellisuuden sosiaalinen rakentuminen - tiedonsosiologi-
nen tutkielma. Trans. Vesa Raiskila. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Bergère, Marie-Claire. 2003 [1992]. Tiananmen 1989: Background and causes. In Twentieth Century China. New 
Approaches, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, 239-255. London & New York: Routledge. 
Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
Berman, Antoine. 2007 [1986]. Kääntämisen platonistinen olemus. In Kääntökirja. Kirjoituksia kääntämisen 
filosofiasta, ed. Tapani Kilpeläinen, 79-102. Tampere: Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura. 
Berndtson, Erkki. 1971. Emansipatorisesta tiedonintressistä ja sen suhteesta politiikan tutkimukseen. Politi-
ikka 12, (1): 10-26. 
Bernstein, Richard, and Ross Munro. 1997. The Coming Conflict with China. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Betts, Richard. 1997. Should strategic studies survive. World Politics 50, (1): 7-33. 
Bhaskar, Roy. 1986. Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London: Verso. 
———. 1978. A Realist Theory of Science. Brighton: Harvester. 
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Cynthia Weber. 1996. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bigo, Didier. 2002. Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the governmentality of unease. Alternatives 
27, (1): 63-92. 
———. 2001. Internal and external securit(ies), the Mobius ribbon. In Identities, Borders, and Orders, eds. Math-
ias Albert, David Jacobsen and Yosef Lapid, 91-116. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2000. When two become one: Internal and external securitisations in Europe. In International Relations 
Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community, eds. Morten Kelstrup, 
Michael C. Williams, 171-204. London: Routledge. 
———. 1994. The European internal security field: Takes and rivalries in a newly developing area of police 




Biswas, Shampa. 2007. Empire and global public intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an international rela-
tions theorist. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 36, (1): 117-33. 
Black, George, and Robin Munro. 1993. Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China’s Democracy Movement. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Blair, Tony. 2006. Foreword to the White Paper by the Prime Minister. In The Future of the United Kingdom’s 
Nuclear Deterrent. Cm 6694: 5.
Blasko, Dennis J. 2006. The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century. London: 
Routledge.
Bogard, William. 2006. Surveillance assemblages and lines of flight. In Theorizing Surveillance - the Panopticon 
and Beyond, ed. David Lyon, 97-122. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
Bogen, James, and James Woodward. 1988. Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review 97, (3): 303-52. 
Booth, Ken. 2007. Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2005. Critical Security Studies and World Politics. London: Lynne Rienner. 
———. 1991. Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies 17, (4): 313-26. 
Booth, Ken, and Nicholas J. Wheeler. 2008a. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2008b. Uncertainty. In Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 133-150. London & New 
York: Routledge. 
Bothe, Michael. 2008. Security in international law since 1990. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. 
Liotta, 475-486. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, ed. John B. 
Thompson. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1977 [1972]. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loic J. D. Wacquant. 1995 [1992]. Refleksiiviseen sosiologiaan. tutkimus, käytäntö ja yhteis-
kunta. Joensuu: Joensuu University Press. 
Bovigndon, Gardner. 2004. Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent. Policy 
studies 11. Washington: East-West Center Washington. 
Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. Marketing Dictatorship – Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Lan-
ham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Brauch, Hans Günther. 2008a. Introduction: Globalization and environmental challenges: Reconceptualizing 
security in the 21st century. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security 
in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál 
Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 27-44. Berlin & 
Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
———. 2008b. Conceptual quartet: Security and its linkages with peace, development, and environment. In 
Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans 
Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, 
Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 65-98. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Spring-
er. 
———. 2008c. From a security towards a survival dilemma. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. 
Liotta, 537-552. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Brauch, Hans Günther, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, 
Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote, and P. H. Liotta, eds. 2008. Globalization and Environmental Chal-
lenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Bristow, Michael. 2007. China tightens grip ahead of congress. BBC News (14 September). 
Brook, Timothy. 1998 [1992]. Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement. 
2nd ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Brooker, Paul. 2000. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. London: Palgrave. 
Brown, Chris. 2009. Structural realism, classical realism and human nature. International Relations 23, (2): 257-
70. 
Brown, Gillian, and George Yule. 1983. Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brück, Michale von. 2008. Security in Hinduism and Buddhism. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote, and P. H. 




Bubandt, Nils. 2005. Vernacular security: The politics of feeling safe in global, national and local worlds. Security 
Dialogue 36, (3): 275-96. 
Buck, David. 1991. Forum on universalism and relativism in Asian studies: Editor’s introduction. The Journal of 
Asian Studies 50, (19): 29-34. 
Brief biography of Li Hongzhi. 1999. Chinese Law and Government 32, (6): 22-38.
Bull, Hedley. 1969 [1966]. International theory: The case for a classical approach. In Contending Approaches 
to International Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr, and James Rosenau, 20-38. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Burke, Anthony. 2002. Aporias of security. Alternatives 27, (1): 1-27. 
Burke, Anthony, and Matt McDonald. 2007. Critical Security Studies in the Asia Pacific. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Burles, Mark, and Abram N. Shulsky. 2000. Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal 
Writings. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 
Burr, William, ed. 1999. The Kissinger Transcripts. The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing & Moscow. A National Secu-
rity Archive Book. New York: The New Press. 
Burroughs, Edgar Rice. 1963 [1914]. Tarzan of the Apes. New York: Random House. 
Buruma, Ian. 2001. Bad Elements: Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing. New York: Vintage Books. 
Butler, Judith. 2006 [2004]. Precarious Life - the Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso. 
———. 1999 [1990]. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. 
———. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York and London: Routledge.
———. 1993. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York: Routledge. 
Buzan, Barry. 2008. The changing agenda of military security. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. 
Liotta, 553-560. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
———. 2006. Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new cold war? International Affairs 82, (6): 1101-18. 
———. 2005. Not hanging separately: Responses to Dunne and Adler. Millennium: Journal of International Stud-
ies 34, (1): 183-194.
———. 2004a. From International System to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———.2004b. ’Civil’ and ‘uncivil’ in world society. In Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace 
Research, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung. London: Routledge.
———. 2001. The English School: An underexploited resource. Review of International Studies 27, (3): 471-88.
———. 1995. The level of analysis problem in international relations reconsidered. In International Relations 
Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 198-216. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. 1993. From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime theory meet 
the English School. International Organization 47, (3): 327-52.
———. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd 
ed. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
———. 1983. People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. London: Har-
vester Wheatsheaf. 
Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. 2009. The Evolution of International Security Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. 2001. Why international relations has failed as an intellectual project and what 
to do about it. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30, (1): 19-39. 
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2009. Macrosecuritization and security constellations: Reconsidering scale in 
securitization theory. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 253-76. 
———. 2003. Regions and Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1997. Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically untenable? The Copenhagen School replies. Review of 
International Studies 23, (2): 241-50. 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Buzan, Barry, Richard Little, and Charles Jones. 1993. The Logic of Anarchy: From Neorealism to Structural Real-
ism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
BWU (Beijing Workers’ Union). 1990a [1989]. Letter to the people of Beijing. In Voices From Tiananmen Square. 
Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, 107. Montréal: 
Black Rose Books.
BWU (Beijing Workers’ Union). 1990b [1989]. Letter to the compatriots of the nation. In Voices From Tiananmen 
Square. Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, 108-110. 
Montréal: Black Rose Books.
383
Bibliography
Can, Mutlu. 2011. What’s love got to do with It? Affective resonance of images on securitization moves. Paper 
presented at the ISA Conference in Montreal.
C.A.S.E. Collective. Forthcoming. Resistance and agency. Unpublished draft.
C.A.S.E. Collective. 2007. Europe, knowledge, politics — engaging with the limits: The c.a.s.e. collective responds. 
Security Dialogue 38, (4): 559-76. 
———. 2006. Critical approaches to security in Europe: A networked manifesto. Security Dialogue 37, (4): 443-
87. 
Caballero-Anthony, Mely, and Ralf Emmers. 2006. Understanding the dynamics of securitizing non-traditional 
security. In Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 
Ralf Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 1-12. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Caballero-Anthony, Mely, Ralf Emmers, and Amitay Acharya, eds. 2006. Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilem-
mas in Securitisation. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Calhoun, Craig C. 1994a. Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
———. 1994b. Science, democracy and the politics of identity. In Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern 
China, eds. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Elizabeth J. Perry, 93-110. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Callahan, William A. 2006. Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific Asia. London & New York: Routledge. 
Campbell, David. 1998 [1992]. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 2nd ed. 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 1996. Political prosaics, transversal politics, and the anarchical world. In Challenging Boundaries: Global 
Flows, Territorial Identities, eds. Hayward Alker and Michael Shapiro, 7-31. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Carlsnaes, Walter. 1992. The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis. International Studies Quar-
terly 36, (3): 245-70. 
Carnap, Rudolf. 1943. Formalization of Logic. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Carr, Edward H. 1946. The Twenty Year’s Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Rela-
tions. London: Macmillan. 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. 1985 [1973]. The Bureaucratic Society, Vols 1 and 2. Athens: Ypsilon. 
CBS. 2009. The 44th President of the United States. 60 Minutes.
CCP CC Party History Research Centre. 1991. History of the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing: Foreign Language 
Press. 
CCTV. 2001. The Lesson and Price of Evil Cult. Video Compact Disk.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1976. Resolution of C.P.C. Central Committee on dimissing 
Teng Hsio-P’ing from all posts both inside and outside the party. China Quarterly 67: 663.
Certeau, Michel de. 1988 [1984]. The Practice of Everyday Life. Trans. Steven Rendall. Berkeley & Los Angeles & 
London: University of California Press. 
Chan, Steve. 2008. China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique. London: Routledge. 
Chan, Alex. 2002. From propaganda to hegemony: Jiaodian Fangtan and China’s media policy. Journal of Contem-
porary China 11, (30): 35-51. 
Chandler, David. 2008a. The revival of Carl Schmitt in international relations: The last refuge of critical theo-
rists? Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, (1): 27-48. 
———. 2008b. Textual and critical approaches to reading Schmitt: A rejoiner to Odysseos and Pepito. Millen-
nium: Journal of International Studies 37, (2): 477-81. 
Chang, Maria. 2004. Falun Gong - the End of Days. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Chang, Maria S. 1979. ‘Fascism’ and modern China. China Quarterly 19: 553-67. 
Chen, Jian. 2001. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill and London: The University of California Press.
———. 1995. The impact of reform on the party and ideology in China. Journal of Contemporary China 9, (1): 
22-34. 
Chen, Xueyi and Shin Tianjian. 2001. Media effects on political confidence and trust in the People’s Republic of 
China in the post-Tiananmen period. East Asia: An International Quarterly 19, (3): 84-119.
Cheng, Joseph Y. S. 2006. Broadening the concept of security in East and Southeast Asia: The impact of the Asian 
financial crisis and the September 11 incident. Journal of Contemporary China 15, (46): 89-111. 
Chernoff, Fred. 2009. The ontological fallacy: A rejoinder on the status of scientific realism in international rela-
tions. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 371-95. 
———. 2007. Critical realism, scientific realism and international relations theory. Millennium: Journal of Inter-
national Studies 35, (2): 401-9. 
Chilton, Paul A. 1996. Security Metaphors - Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House. New York: 
Peter Lang. 
Chin, James K. 2008. Human smuggling and trafficking in the Taiwan Strait: Security predicament or political 
dilemma? In Security and Migration in Asia: the Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley and Sii-
Lun Wong, 100-119. London & New York: Routledge.
384
Bibliography
China Daily. 6.1.2009. China Has More than 50 Million Web Bloggers. Available at <http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2009-01/06/content_7372280.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
ChinaOnline. 1999. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on banning heretical 
cult organizations, and preventing and punishing cult activities. Available at <http://www.chinaonline.
com/refer/legal/Mmeyer_laws/pdf/pdf_e/c9111570e.pdf>. Accessed 4.4.2005. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2006 [1976]. A philosophy of language. In The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Human Nature, ed. 
John Rajchman, 117-139. New York & London: The New Press. 
Chomsky, Noam, and Michel Foucault. 2006 [1971]. Human nature: Justice vs. power. In The Chomsky-Foucault 
Debate on Human Nature, ed. John Rajchman, 1-67. London & New York: The New Press. 
Chong, Woei Lien. 2002. China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counter-
narratives. Lanham & Boulder & New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Christensen, Thomas J. 1996. Useful Adversaries. Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Con-
flict 1947-1958. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chu, Godwin. 1977. Radical Change through Communication in China. Honolulu: East-West Center. 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 1971 [45BC]. Tusculan Disputations. Trans. J. E. King. London: William Heinemann. 
Ciuta, Felix. 2009. Security and the problem of context: A hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory. Review 
of International Studies 35, (2): 301-26. 
CNN. 6.11.2001. You are either with us or against us. Available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/
gen.attack.on.terror/>. Accessed 8.10.2009.
Cohen, Stanley. 1985. Visions of Social Control. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Cohen, Ted. 1973. Illocutions and perlocutions. Foundations of Language 9: 492-503. 
Collier, David, and James E. Mahon. 1993. Conceptual stretching revisited: Adapting categories in comparative 
analysis. American Political Science Review 87, (4): 845-55. 
Collingwood, Robin George. 1938. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Collins, Alan, ed. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2005. Securitization, Frankenstein’s monster and Malaysia education. The Pacific Review 18, (4): 567-
88. 
Connolly, William. 1983. The Terms of Political Discourse. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Constaniou, Costas. 2000. Poetics of security. Alternatives 25, (3): 287-306. 
Conze, Werner. 1984. Sicherheit, Schutz. In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexicon zur Politisch-Sozi-
alen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 5, eds. Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, 831-862. 
Stuttgart: Ernst Klett. 
Cox, Robert W. 1986. Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. In Neoreal-
ism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 204-254. New York : Columbia University Press. 
Cozette, Murielle. 2008. Reclaiming the critical dimension of realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the ethics of schol-
arship. Review of International Studies 34, (1): 5-27. 
Culler, Jonathan. 1994. Ferdinand de Saussure. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto. 
Curley, Melissa G. 2004. Security and Illegal Migration in Northeast Asia. Monterey, CA: Center for East Asian 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Affairs. 
———. 2008. Levels of analysis issues in the migration-security nexus. In Security and Migration in Asia: the 
Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley, Sii-Lun Wong, 19-34. London & New York: Routledge. 
Curley, Melissa G., and Sii-Lun Wong, eds. 2008a. Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation. 
London & New York: Routledge. 
———. 2008b. Introduction: Applying securitisation theory to unregulated migration in Asia. In Security and 
Migration in Asia: the Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley, Sii-Lun Wong, 3-18. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
———. 2008c. Conclusions: Undocumented migration and the state/human security nexus in Asia. In Security 
and Migration in Asia: the Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley, Sii-Lun Wong, 179-184. Lon-
don & New York: Routledge. 
Dadhich, Naresh. 2008. Thinking on security in Hinduism: Contemporary political philosophy and ethics in 
India. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. 
Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha 
Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 243-252. Berlin & Heidelberg & New 
York: Springer. 
Dai, Jinhua. 2002. Foreword. In Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China, ed. Xiaomei 
Chen. 2nd ed., ix-xxiii. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Davenport, Christian. 2005. Introduction: Repression and mobilization: Insights from political science and soci-
ology. In Repression and Mobilization, eds. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, vii-xix. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Davis, Steven. 2002. Utterance acts and speech acts. In Essays in Speech Act Theory, eds. Daniel Vanderveken and 
Kubo Susumo, 135-150. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
385
Bibliography
Debord, Guy. 1992 [1967]. Society of the Spectacle . London: Rebel Press. 
Debrix, Francois. 2002. Language as criticism: Assessing the merits of speech acts and discursive formations in 
international relations. New Political Science 24, (2): 201-19. 
Deng, Rong. 2002. Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution: A Daughter Recalls the Critical Years. Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press.
Deng, Xiaoping. 2001 [1989]. Meeting of the eight elders. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and 
Perry Link, 339-349. London: Abacus.
———. 1995a [1977]. Setting things right in education. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-
1982). Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 
———. 1995b [1979]. Uphold the four cardinal principles. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume II (1975-
1982), 168-191. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 
———. 1995c [1980]. The present situation and the tasks before us. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 
II (1975-1982), 224-258. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 
———. 1993a [1985]. Bourgeois liberalization means taking the capitalist road. In Selected Works of Deng Xi-
aoping, Volume III. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 
———. 1993b [1985]. Speech at an enlarged meeting of the CMC. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 
III. Beijing: People’s Publishing House.
———. 1993c [1986]. Take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalism. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
Volume. III. Beijing: People’s publishing house. 
———. 1993d [1989]. First priority should always be given to national sovereignty and security. In Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III. Beijing: People’s Publishing House.
———. 1993e [1989]. We are confident we can handle China’s affairs well. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
Volume III. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 
———. 1989 [1976]. Deng delivers eulogy. In Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party 
Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976), eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh, 342-
346. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Der Derian, James. 1995. The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard. In On Security, ed. 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 24-45. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Der Derian, James, and Michael J. Shapiro, eds. 1989. International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings 
of World Politics. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2007 [1985]. Kääntämisen teologia. In Kääntökirja. Kirjoituksia kääntämisen filosofiasta, ed. 
Tapani Kilpeläinen, 55-78. Tampere: Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura. 
———. 2003. Autoimmunity: real and symbolic suicides - a dialogue with Jacques Derrida. In Philosophy in a 
Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ed. Giovanna Borradori, 85-136. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2005 [1994]. The Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins. London & New York: Verso. 
———. 1998 [1967]. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Corrected ed. Baltimore: The John’s 
Hopkins University Press. 
———. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
———. 1979. Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles; Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche. Trans. Barbara Harlow. Chicago & Lon-
don: Chicago University Press. 
———. 1978 [1967]. Writing and Difference. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
———. 1976 [1967]. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The John’s Hopkins Uni-
versity Press. 
Deudney, Daniel. 1990. The case against linking environmental degradation and national security, Millennium 
19, (3): 461-476.
Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. 1926. The International Anarchy, 1904-1914. New York & London: Century. 
———. 1916. The European Anarchy. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 
Dickson, Bruce. 1994. Dilemmas for party adaptation: The CCP’s strategies for survival. In State and Society in 
21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation, eds. Peter Heys Gries and Stanley Rosen, 141-
158. London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Dietrich, Craig. 1998. People’s China: A Brief History. 3rd ed. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dillon, Michael. 2004. Xinjiang - China’s Muslim Far Northwest. London: Routledge. 
Dillon, Michael. 1996. Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought. London: 
Routledge. 
Dittmer, Lowell. 2002. Rethinking China’s cultural revolution amid reform. In China’s Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution - Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives, ed. Woei Lien Chong, 3-26. Lanham & 
Boulder & New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 
———. 1974. Liu Shao Chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Djilas, Milovan. 1966. The New Class. London: Allen & Unwin. 
386
Bibliography
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1999. Immigration and the politics of security. Security Studies 8, (2): 71-93. 
Duhem, Pierre. 1969 [1908]. To Save the Phenomena. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1954 [1906]. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dunne, Tim. 2005. System, state and society: How does it all hang together? Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 34, (1): 157-169.
Dutton, Michael. 2005. Policing Chinese Politics - A History. Durham & London: Duke University Press. 
Duvall, Raymond. 2007. Travelling in paradox: Edward Said and critical international relations. Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 36, (1): 83-99. 
Eastman, Lloyd E. 1979. Fascism and modern China: A rejoinder. China Quarterly 19: 838-42. 
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case study and theory in political science. In Handbook of Political Science 7: Strategies of 
Inquiry, eds. Fred E. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 94-137. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. 
Edelman, Murray. 1972 [1964]. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana & Chicago & London: University of Illinois 
Press. 
Editors. 1990. Ten minutes to midnight. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 46, (3): 3. 
Einstein, Albert. 1949. Remarks concerning the essays brought together in this co-operative volume. In Albert 
Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul Albert Schipp, 665-688. Evanston: Library of Living Philoso-
phers. 
———. 1938. The Evolution of Physics. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Einwohner, Rachel L. 2002. Bringing the outsiders in: Opponents’ claims and the construction of animal rights 
activists’ identity. Mobilization 7, (3): 253-67. 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1961. Military-industrial complex speech. In Public Papers of the Presidents., 1035-
1040. 
Elbe, Stephan. 2006. Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking HIV/AIDS and security. 
International Studies Quarterly 50, (1): 119-44. 
Elliott, Lorraine. 2007. Transnational environmental crime in the Asia Pacific: An ‘un(der)securitized’ security 
problem? The Pacific Review 20, (4): 499-522. 
Elman, Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman. 2002. How not to be Lakatos Intolerant: Appraising progress in IR 
research. International Studies Quarterly 46, (2): 231-262.
Elo, Kimmo. 2005. Die Systemkrise eines totalitären Herrschaftssystems und ihre Folgen. Eine aktualisierte Totali-
tarismustheorie am Beispiel der Systemkrise in der DDR 1953. akademische dissertation. Münster: LIT. 
Emmers, Ralf, Beth K. Greener, and Nicholas Thomas. 2008. Securitising human trafficking in the Asia-Pacific: 
Regional organisations and response strategies. In Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Secu-
ritisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley and Sii-Lun Wong, 59-82. London & New York: Routledge. 
Emmers, Ralf. 2007. Securitization. In Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins, 109-125. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
———. 2004. Non-Traditional Security in the Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitisation. Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish International. 
———. 2003. ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in Southeast Asia. The Pacific Review 16, (3): 
419-38. 
Eriksson, Johan. 2001a. Introduction. In Threat Politics: New Perspectives on Security, Risk and Crisis Manage-
ment, ed. Johan Eriksson, 1-17. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
———. 2001b. Cyberplagues, IT and security: threat politics in the information age. Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management 9, (4): 211-22. 
———. 2000. Machiavelli and critical security studies? Cooperation and Conflict 35, (1): 107-8. 
———. 1999a. Observers or advocates? On the political role of security analysts. Cooperation and Conflict 34, 
(3): 311-30. 
———. 1999b. Debating the politics of security studies - response to Goldman, Wæver and Williams. Coopera-
tion and Conflict 34, (3): 345-52. 
Esherick, Joseph W., Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds. 2006. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as His-
tory. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Esherick, Joseph, and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. 1994. Acting out democracy: political theatre in modern China. In 
Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China, eds. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry, 
35-54. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Faison, Seth. 1990. The changing role of the Chinese media. In The Chinese People’s Movement: Perspectives on 
Spring 1989, ed. Tony Saich. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Fay, Brian. 1996. Contemporary Philosophy of Social Sciences: A Multicultural Approach. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Fazhi, Ribao. 1999. Laws exist for the banning of Falun Gong. Chinese Law and Government 32, (5) (25.7.1999): 
43-5. 




Ferree, Myra Marx. 2005. Soft repression: Ridicule, stigma, and silencing in gender-based movements. In Re-
pression and Mobilization, eds. Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, 128-158. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Fewsmith, Joseph. 2001. China Since Tiananmen. The Politics of Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Feyerabend, Paul. 1995. Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. London: New Left Books. 
Fierke, Karin. 1996. Multiple identities, interfacing games: the social construction of Western action in Bosnia. 
European Journal of International Relations 2, (4): 467-97. 
Fiske, John. 1992 [1990]. Merkkien kieli: johdatus viestinnän tutkimukseen. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Floyd, Rita. 2007a. Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: Bringing together the Copenhagen School 
and the Welsh School of security studies. Review of International Studies 33, (2): 327-50. 
———. 2007b. Human security and the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach: Conceptualizing human 
security as a securitizing move. Human Security Journal 5, (4): 38-49. 
Fodor, Jerry A. 1976. The Language of Thought. Hassocks: Harvester. 
Forguson, L. W. 1973. Locutionary and illocutionary acts. In Essays on J.L. Austin, ed. G. J. Warnock, 160-185. 
Clarendon: Oxford University Press. 
Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. 2002. China’s Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in 
the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issue. Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/
gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15318.htm>. Accessed 10.11.2009.
Foucault, Michel. 2007 [2004]. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-1978, ed. 
Michel Senellart. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
———. 1983 [1973]. This is not a Pipe. Trans. James Harkness, ed. James Harkness. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
———. 1979a [1975]. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Allan Sheridan. London: Penguin 
Books. 
———. 1979b. The History of Sexuality. Vol. I, an Introduction. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
———. 1979c. What is an author? In Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism, ed. Josué V. 
Harrari, 141-160. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
———. 1972 [1969]. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books. 
———. 1970 [1966]. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Tavistock. 
Fourteen Beijing press units send open letter to CPC Central Committee and State Council. 1990 [1989]. In Bei-
jing Spring, 1989. Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Oksenberg, Michel, Lawrence R. 
Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, 283-284. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Fraasen, Bas C. van. 1984. To save the phenomena. In Scientific Realism, ed. Jarrett Leplin, 250-259. Berkeley & 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Freedman, Lawrence. 2003 [1981]. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd ed. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Frege, Gottlob. 1977a [1918]. Thoughts: A logical enquiry. In Logical Investigations, ed. Peter Geach, 1-30. Lon-
don: Yale University Press.
———. 1977b [1918]. Negation. In Logical Investigations, ed. Peter Geach, 31-53. London: Yale University 
Press. 
———. 1966 [1892]. On sense and reference. In Translations from the Philosphical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 
eds. Peter Geach and Max Black, 56-72. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Friedman, Edward. 2006. The most popular social movement in china during the 1990s. In The Power of Ideas. 
Intellectual Input and Political Change in East and Southeast Asia, eds. Claudia Derichs and Thomas He-
berer, 221-236. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 
Friedrich, Karl, and Zbiegniev Brzezinski. 1956. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Frye, Northrop. 1957. Anatomy of Crisis: Four Chapters. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the New Man. London: Hamish Hamilton. 
Gallie, William B. 1962 [1956]. Essentially contested concepts. In The Importance of Language, ed. Max Black, 
121-146. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Galtung, Johan. 1990. Cultural violence. Journal of Peace Research 27, (3): 291-305. 
Gamson, William A. 1988. Political discourse and Collective action. In International Social Movement Research— 
From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, eds. Bert Klandermans, 
Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, 219-44. London: JAI Press.
Garside, Roger. 1981. Coming Alive – China After Mao. New York & St. Louis & San Francisco & Hamburg & 
Mexico: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
388
Bibliography
Gecas, Viktor. 2000. Value identities, self-motives, and social movement. In Self, Identity, and Social Movement, 
eds. Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens and Robert W. White, 93-109. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press. 
George, Alexander L. 1969. The ‘operational code’: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and 
decision-making. International Studies Quarterly 13, (2): 190-222. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Gill, Stephen, ed. 1993. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Gilpin, Robert. 1984. The richness of the tradition of political realism. International Organization 38, (2): 287-
304. 
Gittings, John. 1968. Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute. A Commentary & Extracts from the Recent Polemics 1963-
1967. London & New York & Toronto: Oxford University Press.
Givón, Talmy. 1979. On Understanding Grammar. New York: Academic Press. 
Goldman, Kjell. 1999. Issues, not labels, please! Reply to Eriksson. Cooperation and Conflict 34, (3): 331-3. 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. 
Grayson, Kyle. 2003. Securitization and the boomerang debate: A rejoiner to Liotta and Smith-Windsor. Security 
Dialogue 34, (3): 337-43. 
Greenhalgh, Susan, and Edwin A. Winckler. 2005. Governing China’s Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Bio-
politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Grice, Paul H. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, eds. Peter Cole and Jerry 
Morgan, 41-58. New York: Academic Press. 
Gries, Peter H., and Stanley Rosen, eds. 1994. State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention and 
Legitimation. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Guo, Sujian. 2000. Post-Mao China: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism? Westport, CT: Praeger. 
———. 1998. The totalitarian model revisited. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, (3): 271-85. 
Guo, Xuezhi. 2002. The Ideal Chinese Political Leader. A Historical and Cultural Perspective. Westport, CT: 
Praeger. 
Guzzini, Stefano. 2000. A reconstruction of constructivism in international relations. European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 6, (2): 147-82.
Guzzini, Stefano, and Dietrich Jung, eds. 2004a. Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research. 
London: Routledge. 
———. 2004b. Copenhagen peace research. In Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, 
eds. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, 1-12. London: Routledge. 
Haacke, Jürgen, and Paul D. Williams. 2008. Regional arrangements, securitization, and transnational security 
challenges: The African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations compared. Security Studies 
17, (4): 775-809. 
Haar, Barend J. ter. 2002. China’s inner demons: The political impact of the demonological paradigm. In China’s 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution - Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives, ed. Woei Lien 
Chong, 27-68. Lanham & Boulder & New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 
———. 1997. China’s inner demons: The political impact of the demonological paradigm. China Information 
11, (2): 54-88. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 2007 [1968]. Knowledge and Human Interest. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. 1984. Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1: Reason and Realization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press. 
———. 1979. What is universal pragmatics? In Communication and the Evolution of Society., 1-68. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
———. 1977 [1971]. Theory and Oractice. London: Heineman. 
Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hakovirta, Harto. 2008. Paradigmaattisuus kansainvälisten suhteiden teoriassa. In Tieteenteoriat ja kansain-
välisten suhteiden oppialan kehitys. Kairauksia - avauksia – koeviljelmiä. Acta politica aboensia A2, eds. 
Harto Hakovirta and Juha A. Vuori, 215-237. Turku: Department of Political Science. 
Hall, Patrik. 1998. The Social Construction of Nationalism: Sweden as an Example. PhD dissertation. Lund: Uni-
versity of Lund. 
Han, Dongping. 2000. The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Educational Reforms and Their Impact on China’s Rural 
Development. New York and London: Garland Publishing.
Han, Minzhu, and Sheng Hua, eds. 1990. Cries for Democracy – Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese 
Democracy Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
389
Bibliography
Hanafi, Hassan. 2008. Security conceptualization in Arab philosophy and ethics and Muslim perspectives. In 
Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans 
Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Be-
hera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 279-288. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: 
Springer. 
Hansen, Lene. 2011. Theorizing the image for security studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad car-
toon crisis. European Journal of International Relations XX, (X): 1-24.
———. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian war. London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 2000. The Little Mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence of gender in the Copenhagen 
school. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, (2): 285-306. 
Hansen, Lene and Ole Wæver. 2002. European Integration and National Identity: Challenge of Nordic States. 
London & New York: Routledge.
Hanson, Norwood Russell. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Haraway, Donna. 1988. Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of the partial 
experience. Feminist Studies 14, (3): 575-99. 
Harrell, Stevan. 1990. Introduction. In Violence in China - Essays in Culture and Counterculture, eds. Jonathan N. 
Lipman and Stevan Harrell, 1-26. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Hartfield, Robert, and Brian L. Job. 2007. Raising the risks of war: Defence spending trends and competitive 
arms processes in East Asia. The Pacific Review 20, (1): 1-22. 
Haukkala, Hiski. 2008a. Miksi tehdä tiedettä, kun helpommallakin pääsee? Totuudenkaltaisuus, teoreettinen 
integraatio ja kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimus. In Tieteenteoriat ja kansainvälisten suhteiden kehitys. 
kairauksia – avauksia – koeviljelmiä, eds. Harto Hakovirta and Juha A. Vuori, 33-54. Turku: Department 
of Political Science. 
———. 2008b. Multi-Causal Social Mechanisms and the Study of International Institutionalism: The Case of EU-
Russia Strategic Partnership. PhD Dissertation. Turku: University of Turku Press. 
Havel, Václav. 1992. The power of the powerless. In Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965-1990, ed. Peter Wilson, 
124-214. New York: Vintage Books. 
Hawking, Stephen. 1998 [1988]. A Brief History of Time. 10th Anniversary Edition. New York: Bantam Books.
Hayes, Jarrod. 2009. Identity and securitization in the democratic peace: The United States and the divergence 
of response to India’s and Iran’s nuclear programmes. International Studies Quarterly 53, (4): 977-999. 
He, Henry Yuhuai. 2001. Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe.
He, Zuoxiu. 1999. I do not approve of teenagers practicing qigong. Teenager science and technology outlook 
19.4.1999. Chinese Law and Government 32, (5): 95-8. 
Heinzig, Dieter. 2004 [1998]. The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alli-
ance. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
Heiskala, Risto. 2000. Toiminta, tapa ja rakenne. Kohti konstruktionistista synteesiä yhteiskuntateoriassa. Hel-
sinki: Gaudeamus. 
Hempel, Carl G. 1952. Fundamentals of Concept Formulation in Empirical Science. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press. 
Herz, John H. 1950. Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. World Politics 2, (2): 157-80. 
Heyes, Cressida J, ed. 2003a. The Grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy. London: Cornell 
University Press. 
———. 2003b. Introduction. In The grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy, ed. Cressida J. 
Heyes, 1-13. London: Cornell University Press. 
Hietanen, Aki. 1981. Näkökulmia suomen puolustusdoktriiniin. Rauhaan Tutkien 10, (2): 1-18. 
Hietanen, Aki, and Pertti Joenniemi. 1982. Varustelu, kieli ja maailmankuva; puolustusrevisionin ja parlamen-
taaristen puolustuskomiteoiden mietintöjen tarkastelua. Rauhaan Tutkien 11, (1): 18-44. 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1999 [1651]. Leviathan, eli kirkollisen ja valtiollisen yhteiskunnan aines, muoto ja valta. Trans. 
Tuomo Aho. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Holdcroft, David. 1978. Words and Deeds: Problems in the Theory of Speech Acts. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1991 [1990]. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford and 
New York: Clarendon Press. 
Holm, Ulla. 2004. Algeria: Securitization of state/regime, nation and Islam. In Contemporary Security Analysis 
and Copenhagen Peace Research, eds. Stefan Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, 217-228. London: Routledge. 
Holsti, Ole. 1970. The ‘operational code’ approach to the study of political leaders: John Foster Dulles’ philo-
sophical and instrumental beliefs. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science 
Politique 3, (1): 122-57. 
Hook, Berian, Dick Wilsin, and Michael Yahuda. 1976. Quarterly chronicles and documentation. China Quarterly 
67, (661): 694. 
390
Bibliography
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. 2002 [1947]. Dialectic of Enlightmenment. Trans. Edmund Jephcott, 
ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Howard, Russ. 2001. Discussion of ‘the Chinese security conception and its historical evolution’. Journal of Con-
temporary China 10, (27): 285-92. 
Hu, Jintao. 2007. Construct and enjoy a harmonious society together. People’s Daily Online October 11 2007. Avail-
able at <http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6281098.html#>. Accessed 15.6.2011.
Hu, Sheng, ed. 1994. A Concise History of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
Hua, Shiping and Xia Ming. 1999. Guest editors’ introduction. Chinese Law and Government 32, (6): 25-13. 
Huang, Philip. 1991. The paradigmatic crisis in Chinese studies: Paradoxes in social and economic history. Mod-
ern China 17, (3): 299-341. 
Hughes, Christopher R. 2006. Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. London: Routledge. 
Hughes, Geoffrey. 1988. Words in Time: A Social History of English Vocabulary. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hunger Strikers at Tiananmen. 1990 [1989]. Hunger strike declaration. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and 
Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 200-201. Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press.
Hunt, Scott A., Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow. 1994. Identity fields: Framing process and the social 
construction of movement identities. In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, eds. Enrique 
Laraña, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield, 185-206. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Huysmans, Jef. 2008. The jargon of exception – on Schmitt, Agamben and the absence of political society. Inter-
national Political Sociology 2, (3): 165-83. 
———. 2006a. The Politics of Insecurity - Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. London & New York: Routledge. 
———. 2006b. International politics of insecurity: normativity, inwardness and the exception. Security Dia-
logue 37, (1): 11-29. 
———. 2005. What is Politics? Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
———. 2002. Defining social constructivism in security studies: The normative dilemma of writing security. 
Alternatives 27, (1): 41-62. 
———. 1998a. Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the creative development of a security studies agenda in Europe. 
European Journal of International Relations 4, (4): 488-506. 
———. 1998b. The question of the limit: Desecuritisation and the aesthetics of horror in political realism. Mil-
lennium: Journal of International Studies 27, (3): 569-90. 
———. 1995. Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of securitizing societal issues. In Migration and Euro-
pean Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, eds. Robert Miles and Dietrich Thärenhardt, 
53-72. London: Pinter. 
Huxley, Aldous. 1998 [1932]. Brave New World. New York: HarperPerennial.
Important meeting minutes, April 25. 2001. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link. 
London: Abacus.
Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2008): China’s Policies and Actions 
for Addressing Climate Change. Available at <http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/
node_7055612.htm>. Accessed 10.10.2009.
———.  2006. China’s National Defence in 2006. Beijing: Waiwen chubashe.
———. 2005. White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development Road. Available at < http://www.chinese-embassy.
org.za/eng/zt/pd/t248048.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
———. 2004. China’s National Defence in 2004. Beijing: Waiwen chubashe.
———. 2002. “East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity. Available at <www.fmprc.gov.
cn/ce/cegv/eng/xwdt/t88226.htm>. Accessed 10.10.2009.
Internet World Stats. Internet usage and population in Asia. 2009. Available at <http://www.internetworld-
stats.com/stats3.htm#asi>. Accessed 1.6.2009.
Itkonen, Esa. 2003. What is Language? A Study in the Philosophy of Linguistics. Publications in general linguistics 
8. Turku: University of Turku. 
———. 1997. Maailman kielten erilaisuus ja samuus. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
———. 1983. Causality in Linguistic Theory, A Critical Investigation into the Philosophical and Methodological 
Foundations of Non-Autonomous Linguistics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
———. 1978. Grammatical Theory and Metascience. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 
Jackson, Nicole J. 2008. Human trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia: A critique of the securitization frame-
work. In Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley and Sii-Lun 
Wong, 83-99. London & New York: Routledge.
———. 2006. International organizations, security dichotomies and the trafficking of persons and narcotics in 
post-soviet Central Asia: A critique of the securitization framework. Security Dialogue 37, (3): 299-317. 
391
Bibliography
Jackson, Richard. 2005. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Jahn, Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre, and Ole Wæver. 1987. European security: Problems of research on non-military 
aspects. Copenhagen Papers: 1. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
Jakobson, Linda and Marja Sarvimäki. 2001. Perinteen taika – Nykyaika Kiinassa, Etelä-Koreassa ja Japanissa. 
Helsinki: WSOY.
Jarvis, Darryl S. L. 2000. International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics 30, (2): 167-214. 
———. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Jiang, Zemin. 2002. On the “Three Represents”. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 
Joffe, Ellis. 1996. Party-army relations in China: Retrospect and prospect. China Quarterly 146: 299-314. 
Johnson, Ian. 2004. Wild Grass: Three Stories of Change in Modern China. New York: Pantheon. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. Is china a status quo power? International Security 27, (4): 5-56. 
———. 1999. Strategic culture revisited: Reply to Colin Gray. Review of International Studies 25, (3): 519-23. 
———. 1998. China’s militarized dispute behaviour 1949-1992: A first cut at the data. China Quarterly 153: 
1-30. 
———. 1996a. Prospects for Chinese nuclear force modernisation: Limited deterrence versus multilateral arms 
control. The China Quarterly 146: 548-76. 
———. 1996b. Cultural realism and strategy in Maoist china. In The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein, 216-268. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1995a. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
———. 1995b. Thinking about strategic culture. International Security 19, (4): 32-64. 
Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, Phnom 
Penh, 4 November 2002. Available at <http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm and http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dlczgdm/t26290.htm>. Accessed 11.11.2009.
Joint Publication 3-12 (2005): Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Final Coordination (2) 15 March 2005.
Joseph, Jonathan. 2007. Philosophy in international relations: A scientific realist approach. Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 35, (2): 345-59. 
June Four: A Chronicle of the Chinese Democratic Uprising. 1989. London: University of Arkansas Press.
Jung, Dietrich. 2001. The political sociology of world society. European Journal of International Relations 7, (4): 
443-74.
Jutila, Matti. 2006. Desecuritizing minority rights: Against determinism. Security Studies 37, (2): 167-85. 
Kaakkuri-Knuutila, Marja-Liisa, and Kaisa Heinlahti. 2006. Mitä on tutkimus? Argumentaatio ja tieteenfilosofia. 
Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Kannetzky, Frank. 2002. Expressibility, explicability, and taxonomy – Some remarks on the principle of express-
ibility. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions with John R. Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf 
and Georg Meggle, 65-82. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kaplan, Morton A. 1969 [1966]. The new great debate: Traditionalism vs. science in international relations. In 
Contending Approaches to International Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, 39-61. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Käpylä, Juha, and Harri Mikkola. 2009. Kriittinen realismi kriittisin silmin – huomioita erään metateorian ongel-
makohdista. Politiikka 51, (4): 248-67. 
Katz, Jerrod J. 1977. Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force. A Study of the Contribution of Sentence 
Meaning to Speech Acts. Sussex: The Harvester Press. 
Katzenstein, Peter J, ed. 1996. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Kau, Michael Y. M. 1975. The Lin Biao Affair. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kaufman, Franz-Xaver. 1970. Sicherheit als Soziologisches und Sozialpolitisches Problem: Untersuchungen zu ei-
ner Wertidee Hochdifferenzierter Gesellschaften. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke. 
Kauppinen, Marko. 2006. Canon vs. Charisma. ”Maoism” as an Ideological Construction. PhD thesis. Jyväskylä: 
University of Jyväskylä.
———. 2005. Ajattelusta teoriaan – ideologinen muutos Kiinassa 1990-luvulla. In Kiinan yhteiskunta muutok-
sessa, eds. Raisa Asikainen and Juha Vuori, 203-216. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
Kemmerling, Andreas. 2002. Expressing an intentional state. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions 
with John R. Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, 83-91. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
Kenny, Anthony. 1975. Wittgenstein. London: Penguin Books. 
Kent, Alexandra. 2006. Reconfiguring security: Buddhism and moral legitimacy in Cambodia. Security Dialogue 
37, (3): 343-61. 
392
Bibliography
Keohane, Robert O. 1988. International institutions: Two approaches. International Studies Quarterly 32, (4): 
379-96. 
Kiikeri, Mika, and Petri Ylikoski. 2004. Tiede tutkimuskohteena: Filosofinen johdatus tieteentutkimukseen. Hel-
sinki: Gaudeamus. 
Kindopp, Jason. 2002. China’s war on cults. Current History 101, (656): 259-66. 
Kingdon, John W. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York & Montreal: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers. 
Kissinger, Henry. 1957. A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822. Bos-
ton: Houghton Hill. 
Kivimäki, Timo. 2007. Can development and democratization address the root causes of terrorism in Southeast 
Asia? The Pacific Review 20, (1): 49-73. 
Klein, Bradley S. 1994. Strategic Studies and World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Kluver, Alan R. 1996. Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms - A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Knorr, Klaus, and James Rosenau, eds. 1969a. Contending Approaches to International Politics. Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press. 
———. 1969b. Tradition and science in the study of international politics. In Contending Approaches to Interna-
tional Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, 3-19. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Knudsen, Olav. 2001. Post-Copenhagen security studies: Desecuritizing securitization. Security Dialogue 32, (3): 
355-68. 
Koivusalo, Markku. 2001. Ihminen vailla ääntä. In Keinot vailla päämäärää. reunamerkintöjä politiikasta. Trans. 
Juhani Vähämäki, ed. Giorgio Agamben, 83-121. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto. 
Koivusalo, Markku, and Mika Ojakangas. 1997. Carl Schmitt poliittisena ajattelijana. In Carl schmitt: Poliittinen 
teologia., 25-40. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto. 
Korhonen, Pekka. 1983. Hans Morgenthau. Intellektuaalinen historia. Julkaisuja 46. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yli-
opiston valtio-opin laitos. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2004a. Futures Past, on the Semantics of Historical Time. Trans. Keith Tribe. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press. 
———. 2004b [1979]. The historical-political semantics of asymmetric counterconcencepts. In Futures Past, on 
the Semantics of Historical Time. Trans. Keith Tribe, 155-191. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Koskela, Hille. 2009. Pelkokierre. pelon politiikka, turvamarkkinat ja kamppailu kaupunkitilasta. Helsinki: Gau-
deamus. 
Krause, Keith. 1998. The research programme of ‘critical security studies’. Cooperation and Conflict 33, (3): 
298-333. 
Krause, Keith, and Michael C. Williams, eds. 1997. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. London: UCL 
Press. 
———. 1996. Broadening the agenda of security studies: Politics and methods. Mershon International Studies 
Review 40, (2): 229-54. 
Kubálková, Vendulka. 1998. The twenty Year’s catharsis: E. H. Carr and IR. In International Relations in a Con-
structed World, eds. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, 25-57. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kubálková, Vendulka, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert. 1998. Constructing contructivism. In International Rela-
tions in a Constructed World, eds. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, 3-21. Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 2000. The road since structure. In Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical 
Interview, eds. James Conant and John Haugel, 90-104. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 1996 [1962]. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Kukla, André. 2000. Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science. London and New York: Routledge. 
Kurki, Milja. 2007. Critical realism and causal analysis in international relations. Millennium: Journal of Interna-
tional Studies 35, (2): 361-78. 
———. 2006. Causes of a divided discipline: Rethinking the concept of cause in international relations theory. 
Review of International Studies 32, (2): 189-216. 
Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 2001 [1985]. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Demo-
cratic Politics. 2nd ed. London & New York: Verso. 
Lai, Hongyi H. 2006. Religious policies in post-totalitarian china: Maintaining political monopoly over a reviving 
society. Journal of Chinese Political Science 11, (1): 55-77. 
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lake, David. A. 2011. Why “isms” are evil: Theory, epistemology, and academic sects as impediments to under-
standing and progress. International Studies Quarterly 55, (2): 465-480.
393
Bibliography
Lakoff, George. 2004. Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate. the Essential Guide for 
Progressives, Including Post-Election Updates. White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green. 
Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. 2000. Jiang compares sect’s threat to solidarity. South China Morning Post. 
Lammenranta, Markus. 1993. Tietoteoria. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Laozi. 2004 [300 B.C.]. Dao De Jing. The Book of the Way. Trans. Moss Roberts. Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: 
University of California Press. 
Lapid, Yosef. 1989. The third debate: On the prospects of international theory in a post-positivist era. Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 33, (3): 235-54. 
Laraña, Enrique, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. 1994. Identities, grievances, and new social move-
ments. In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, eds. Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston and 
Joseph R. Gusfield, 3-35. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Laudan, Larry. 1990. Science and Relativism. Some key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
———. 1984. Science and Values. The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press.
———.1977. Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Laustsen, Carsten Bagge, and Ole Wæver. 2000. In defence of religion: Sacred referent objects of securitization. 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29, (3): 705-40. 
Leander, Anna. 2000. A “nebbish presence”: The neglect of sociological institutionalism in international politi-
cal economy. In Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, ed. Ronen Palan. London; New York: 
Routledge.
Lee, Ching Kwan, and Eli Friedman. 2009. The labor movement. Journal of Democracy 20, (3): 21-4. 
Lee, Eun-Jeung. 2008. Security in Confucian thought: Case of Korea. In Globalization and Environmental Chal-
lenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, 
Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote 
and P. H. Liotta, 221-234. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Lee, Chin-Chuan. 1990. Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism. New York: Guilford Press. 
Lee, Ching Kwan. 2003. Pathways of labour insurgency. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, eds. 
Elizabeth J. Perry, Mark Selden. 2nd ed., 71-92. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Leech, Geoffrey. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. 
Leites, Nathan. 1951. The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York & Toronto & London: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company. 
Lenin, V.I. 2004 [1917]. The State and Revolution. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing. 
Léonard, Sarah, and Christian Kaunert. 2010. Reconceptualizing the audience in securitization theory. In Se-
curitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 57-76. London: 
Routledge. 
Letter to the workers of the capital. 1990 [1989]. In Voices From Tiananmen Square. Beijing Spring and the De-
mocracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, 113. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
Levinson, Stephen C. 1980. Speech act theory: The state of the art. Language Teaching and Linguistics: Abstracts 
13, (1): 5-24.
Lewis, Jeffrey. 2007. The Minimum Means of Reprisal. China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
Lewis, John Wilson, and Litai Xue. 1988. China Builds the Bomb . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Li, Hongzhi (2007): Further remarks on “politics”. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/arti-
cles/2007/2/22/82932.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2005. We are not “getting political”. Avalaible at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/arti-
cles/2005/1/29/57020.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2004a. Stop the evil acts with righteous thoughts. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/
articles/2004/2/15/45145.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2004b. Eliminate the dark minions with righteous thoughts. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.
net/emh/articles/2004/3/17/46155.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2003. Teaching and explaining the Fa at the Metropolitan New York Fa Conference. Available at <http://
www.falundafa.org/book/eng/jw_93.htm>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2001a [1993]. Falun Gong [Law Wheel Qigong]. Available at <http://www.falundafa.org /book/chibig/
pdf/flg_2001.pdf>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2001b. Fa-Rectification and cultivation. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/arti-
cles/2001/7/8/12052.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.




———. 2000a. Suffocate the evil. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2000/10/23/9116.
html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2000b. Drive out interference. Available at <http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/arti-
cles/2000/7/7/9120.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 2000c. Teaching the Fa at the Western U.S. Fa Conference October 21, 2000 in San Francisco. Available at 
<http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2000/11/5/9115.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 1999a. Letter to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee and to the Leadership. Chinese Law 
and Government 32, (6): 24-25.
———. 1999b. A brief statement of mine. Available at <http://www.falundafa.ca/library/english/jw/
jw9907221 e.html>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
———. 1999c. My statement. Chinese Law and Government 32, (6): 26-27.
———. 1997. Falun fofa (zai Meiguo jiangfa) [Buddha Fa (Lectures in the United States)]. Available at <http://
www.falundafa.org/book/chbig/mgjf.htm>. Accessed 4.4.2008. 
———. 1996 [1994]. Zhuan Falun [Turning the Law-wheel]. Available at <http://www.falundafa.org /book/
chibig/zfl.htm>. Accessed 4.4.2008.
Li, Peng. 1990a [1989]. Speech of premier Li Peng at the special meeting of Central and Beijing municipial party, 
government, and army cadres on May 19, 1989. Excerpts. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches 
from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 255-258. Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press.
———. 1990b [1989]. Li Peng delivers important speech on behalf of Party Central Committee and State Coun-
cil. In Beijing spring, 1989. Confrontation and conflict. The basic documents, eds. Oksenberg, Michel, Law-
rence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, 309-315. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
———. 1990c. Continue to work for stable political, economic, and social development in China. In The Third 
Session of the Seventh NPC of the PRC., 7-56. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. 2004 [1995]. Governing China: From Revolution to Reform. 2nd ed. London & New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth G., and David M. Lampton, eds. 1992. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decisionmaking in Post-Mao 
China. Oxford: University of California Press. 
Lieberthal, Kenneth G., and Michael Oksenberg. 1988. Policymaking in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Lijphart. 1971. Comparative politics and the comparative method. American Political Science Review 65, (3): 
682-93. 
Limnéll, Jarno. 2009. Suomen uhkakuvapolitiikka 2000-luvun alussa. PhD dissertation. Vol. Julkaisusarja 1: 
Strategian tutkimuksia No 29. Helsinki: National Defence University. 
Lin, Biao. 1989 [1969]. Lin Piao’s report to the 9th Party Congress, April 1, 1969. In Chinese Politics, Documents 
and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth party congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976), eds. James T. Myers, 
Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh, 57-85. Columbia: South Carolina University Press.
Link, Perry. 1992. Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China’s Predicament. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Linz, Juan. 2000 [1975]. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Liow, Joseph Chinyong. 2006. Malaysia’s approach to Indonesian migrant labor: Securitization, politics, or ca-
tharsis? In Non-traditional Security in Asia, Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf 
Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 40-65. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Lippmann, Walter. 1943. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D, ed. 1995. On Security. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Liu, Huaqiu. 1999. No-First-Use and China’s Security. Henry L. Stimson Centre.
Los, Maria. 2006. Looking into the future: Surveillance, globalization and the totalitarian potential. In Theoriz-
ing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond, ed. D. Lyon, 69-94. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
Lotman, Yuri. 1990. Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Lu, Ning. 1997. The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China. Oxford: Westview Press. 
Lu, Yunfeng. 2005. Entrepreneurial logics and the evolution of Falun Gong. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 44, (2): 173-85. 
Lukin, Alexander. 2000. Russian perceptions of the China threat. In China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality, 
ed. Herbert Yee. Surrey: Curzon Press. 
Luo, Guanzhong. 1999 [14th century]. Three Kingdoms: A Historical Novel. Trans. Moss Roberts. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press. 
Lüthi, Lorez M. 2008. The Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War in the Communit World. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press.
Lyon, David. 2007. Surveillance Studies: An Overview. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. 2006. Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond. Devon: Willan Publishing. 
———. 1994. The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
395
Bibliography
Lyotard, Jean Francois. 1984 [1979]. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Benning-
ton and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 
Mabe, Jacob Emmanuel. 2008. Security in African philosophy and historical ideas. In Globalization and Envi-
ronmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula 
Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia 
Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 289-298. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
MacFarquhar, Roderick. 1997. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Vol. III. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
———. 1983. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Vol. II. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1974. The Origins of the Cultural Revolution. Vol. I. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1972. Sino-American relations 1949-1971, Documented and Introduced by Roderick MacFarquhar. New-
ton Abbot: David & Charles. 
MacFarquhar, Roderick, and Michael Schoenhals. 2008 [2006]. Mao’s Last Revolution. Cambridge & London: The 
Belkap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Mak, Jun Nam. 2006. Securitizing piracy in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, the International Maritime Bureau and 
Singapore. In Non-Traditional Security in Asia, Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, 
Ralf Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 66-92. Ashgate: Ashgate. 
Manion, Melanie. 1990. Introduction: Reluctant duelists. The logic of the 1989 protests and massacre. In Beijing 
Spring, 1989. Confrontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Oksenberg, Michel, Lawrence R. Sul-
livan, and Marc Lambert, xiii-xlii. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
Mannheim, Karl. 1997. Collected Works of Karl Mannheim, Volume Seven: Essays on the Sociology of Culture. 
London: Routledge. 
———. 1954. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Kegan Paul. 
———. 1952. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mao, Zedong. 1986 [1957]. Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 Moscow Conference. Journal of Communist Stud-
ies 2, (2): 109-25. 
———. 1974a [1966]. A letter to the Red Guards of Tsinghua University Middle School, 1 August 1966. In Chair-
man Mao Talks to the People. Talks and Letters: 1956-1971, ed. Stuart Schram, 260-261. New York: Pan-
theon House. 
———. 1974b [1969]. Talk at the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 
In Chairman Mao Talks to the People. Talks and Letters: 1956-1971, ed. Stuart Schram, 282-289. New 
York: Pantheon House. 
———. 1969 [1946]. Talk between Anna Louise Strong and Mao Zedong. In Selected Works of Mao-Tse Tung, Vol. 
IV. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
———. 1957. On the correct handling of contradictions among the people. Available at < http://www.marxists.
org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
———. 1949a. The Chinese people have stood up!. Available at <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/
mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
———. 1949b. Proclamation of the Central People’s Government of the PRC. Available at <http://www.marx-
ists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-7/mswv7_003.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
———. 1926. Analysis of the classes in Chinese society. Available at < http://www.marxists.org/reference/
archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
Markopolous, M. 1995. Sicherheit. In Historiches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol 9., 745-750. Basel: Scwabe 
Verlag. 
Maslow, Abraham H. 2002 [1966]. The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance. Chapel Hill: Maurice Bassett 
Publishing. 
Materials for the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, 
eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 569-573. London: Abacus.
Materials from the Big Meeting of Central and Beijing Municipal Party, Government, and Military Officials. 2001 
[1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 296-300. London: Abacus.
Mathews, Jessica T. 1989. Redefining security. Foreign Affairs 68, (2): 162-77. 
Matz, Johan. 2001. Constructing a Post-Soviet International Political Reality: Russian Foreign Policy towards the 
Newly Independent States 1990-95. PhD dissertation. Uppsala: University of Uppsala. 
McAdam, Doug. 1994. Culture and social movements. In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, eds. 
Enrique Laraña, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield, 36–57. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
McCrea, Frances B., and Gerald E. Markle. 1989. Minutes to Midnight: Nuclear Weapons Protest in America. New-
bury Park: Sage. 
McDonald, Matt. 2008a. Securitization and the construction of security. European Journal of International Rela-
tions 14, (4): 563-87. 




McSweeney, Bill. 1999. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
———. 1998. Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A response to Buzan and Wæver. Review of International 
Studies 24, (1): 137-40. 
———. 1996. Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. Review of International Studies 22, (1): 
81-93. 
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/1995. The false promise of international institutions. International Security 19, (3) 
(95): 5-49. 
———. 1995. A realist reply. International Security 20, (1): 82-93.
Mehnert, Klaus. 1969. Peking and the new left: At home and abroad. Center for Chinese Studies China Research 
Monographs no. 4. Berkeley: University of California. 
Merton, Robert K. 1973. The Sociology of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Mesjasz, Czeslaw. 2008. Security as attributes of social systems. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. 
Liotta, 45-62. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Michel, Torstein. 2009. Pigs can’t fly, or can they? Ontology, scientific realism and the metaphysics of presence 
in international relations. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 397-419. 
Mille, Alice. 2007. Hu Jintao and the Sixth Plenum. China Leadership Monitor 20. 
Millward, James. 2004. Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment. Policy studies 6. Washington: East-
West Center Washington. 
Minsky, Marvin. 1987. The Society of Mind. London: Heineman. 
———. 1975. A framework for representing knowledge. In The Psychology of Computer Vision, ed. Patrick Henry 
Winston, 211-277. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Minutes of an Important Meeting on May 18.  2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and 
Perry Link, 269-278. London: Abacus.
Minutes of the April 24 Politburo Standing Committee Meeting. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. 
Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 77-80. London: Abacus.
Minutes of the May 17 Politburo Standing Committee meeting. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. 
Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 252-255. London: Abacus.
Minutes of the Politburo Standing Committee meeting, June 3. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. 
Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 485-488. London: Abacus.
Mitchell, Timothy. 1990. Everyday metaphors of power. Theory and Society 19, (5): 545-77. 
Mo, Wen. 2002. Poisonous Deceit – How the Chinese Government (Literally) Gets Away with Murder by Lying, 
Deceiving, and Fabricating Its Evidence against Falun Gong. Deep Six Publishing. 
Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2006. The Philosophy of the Daodejing. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Möller, Frank. 2008. Visuaalinen rauhantutkimus. Kosmopolis 38, (3): 7-26. 
———. 2007. Photographic interventions in post-9/11 security policy. Security Dialogue 38, (2): 179-96. 
Moore, Alan. 1995 [1986]. Watchmen. New York: DC Comics. 
Moore, George Edward. 1993 [1939]. Proof of an External World. Reprinted in G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, ed. 
T. Baldwin, 147-70. Routledge, London 
———. 1962 [1953]. Some main problems of philosophy. New York: Collier Books. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. 2006 [1948]. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th ed. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
———. 1972. Science: Servant or Master? New York: New American Library. 
———. 1970. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade 1960-1970. London: Pall Mall. 
———. 1947. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. London: Latimer House. 
Mosher, Steven W. 2000. Hegemon – China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World. San Francisco: Encounter 
Books. 
Mouffe, Chantal. 2005 [1993]. The Return of the Political. London & New York: Verso. 
———. 1999. The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso. 
Moural, Josef. 2002. Searle’s theory of institutional facts. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions with 
John R. Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf, Georg Meggle, 271-286. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers. 
Mufti, Aamir. 2005. Global comparativism. In Edward Said: Continuing the Conversation, eds. Homi Bhabha and 
W. J. T. Mitchell, 109-126. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mulder, Niels. 1998. Mysticism in Java: Ideology in Indonesia. Amsterdam: Pepin. 
Muna, Riefqi. 2006. Securitizing small arms and drug trafficking in Indonesia. In Non-Traditional Security in 
Asia, Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 93-111. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Mundle, C. W. K. 1970. A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
397
Bibliography
Munro, Robin. 2000. Judicial psychiatry in China and its political abuses. Columbia Journal of Asian Law 14, (1): 
106-20. 
———. 1989. Syncretic sects and secret societies: Revival in the 1980s. Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 21, 
(4): 10-1. 
Mutimer, David. 2009. My critique is bigger than yours: Constituting exclusions in critical security studies. Stud-
ies in Social Justice 3, (1): 9-22. 
Myers, James T., Jürgen Domes, and Erik von Groeling, eds. 1986. Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis. Vol-
ume One: Cultural revolution to 1969. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Myers, James T., Jürgen Domes, and Milton D. Yeh, eds. 1995a. Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume 
Three: The death of Mao (1976) to the fall of Kuo-Feng (1980). Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press. 
———. 1995b. Chinese politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Four: Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth 
Party Congress. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
———. 1989. Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of 
Mao (1976). Columbia: South Carolina University Press. 
Nathan, Andrew J. 2009. Authoritarian impermanence. Journal of Democracy 20, (3): 37-40. 
———. 2002. Guest Editor’s introduction. Chinese Law and Government 35, (1): 3-16. 
———. 1997. China’s Transition. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 1985. Chinese Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Nathan, Andrew J., Perry Link, and Zhang Liang, eds. 2001. The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s 
Decision to Use Force against Their Own People – in Their Own Words. New York: Public Affairs. 
Nathan, Andrew J., and Robert S. Ross. 1997. The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
NATO PR/CP(2001)121. Statement by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson. <http://www.nato.int/
docu/pr/2001/p01-121e.htm>, accessed on 20.10.2009.
NATO PR/CP(2001)122. NATO reaffirms Treaty commitments in dealing with terrorist attacks against the US. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0910/e0912a.htm>, accessed on 20.10.2009.
NATO PR/CP(2001)124. Statement by the North Atlantic Council.  <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-
124e.htm>, accessed on 20.10.2009.
NATO Speech. October 2 2001. Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson. <http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm>, accessed on 20.10.2009.
NATO Speech. October 4 2001. Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North 
Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 Sep-
tember Attacks against the United States. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm>, 
accessed on 20.10.2009.
Neal, Andrew W. 2006. Foucault in Guantánamo: Towards an archaeology of the exception. Security Dialogue 
37, (1): 31-46. 
Neocleous, Mark. 2007. Return the gift: Violence, emancipation, critique. Paper presented at Keynote at Criti-
cal Approaches to Security in Europe III: Emancipation, resistance, Violence Joint Seminar for Younger 
Scholars Programme, University of Southern Denmark 29 November – 1 December 2007. 
———. 2006. From social to national security: On the fabrication of economic order. Security Dialogue 37, (3): 
363-84. 
Neumann, Iver B. 2002. Returning practice to the linguistic turn: The case of diplomacy. Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 31, (3): 627-51. 
———. 2001. Kosovo and the end of the legitimate warring state. In Kosovo and the End of an Era, eds. Sergei 
Medvedev, Peter Van Ham. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
———. 1998. Identity and the outbreak of war: Or why the Copenhagen School of security studies should in-
clude the idea of ‘violitisation’ in its framework of analysis. International Journal of Peace Studies 3, (1): 
7-22. 
New China News Agency. 1995 [26.1.1981]. Written Judgement on the Special Court under the Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court of the People’s Republic of China. In Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Four: 
Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress, eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Milton D. 
Yeh., 143-166. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
———.  1986 [1.11.1968]. Communique of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the CPC Eight Central Com-
mittee. In Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis. Volume One: Cultural Revolution to 1969, eds. James T. 
Myers, Jürgen Domes and Erik von Groeling, 388-392. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
New York Times. 1989 [20.5.1989]. A-6.
Nevanlinna, Tuomas. 2002. Totalitarismista. In Natsimyytti, eds. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, 91-
126. Helsinki: Tutkijaliitto. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2003 [1886]. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Trans. Judith 
Norman, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
398
Bibliography
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 2000 [1980]. Johdatus tieteenfilosofiaan. Käsitteen- ja teorianmuodostus. Helsinki: Otava. 
Nissenbaum, Helen, and Lene Hansen. 2009. Digital disaster, cyber security, and the Copenhagen School. Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 53, (4): 1155-75. 
Nojonen, Matti. 2008. Jymäyttämisen taito. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1973. Theories of the Propositions: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of 
Truth and Reality. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Nurmi, Hannu. 1971. Selittämisestä, ymmärtämisestä ja politiikan tutkimuksen tavoitteista. Politiikka 12, (1): 
1-9. 
Nye, Joseph, and Sean Lynn-Jones. 1988. International security studies: A report of a conference of the state of 
the field. International Security 12, (4): 5-27. 
Obituary for Zhou Enlai. 1989 [1976]. In Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party 
Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976), eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh.,  341. 
Columbia: South Carolina University Press.
O’Brien, Kevin J. 2009. Rural protest. Journal of Democracy 20, (3): 25-8. 
———. 1996. Rightful resistance. World Politics 49, (1): 31-55. 
———. 1994. Neither transgressive nor contained: Boundary-spanning contention in china. In State and Society 
in the 21st-century China, eds. Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen, 105-122. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Odysseos, Louiza, and Fabio Petito. 2008. Vagaries of interpretation: A rejoiner to David Chandler’s reductionist 
reading of Carl Schmitt. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37, (2): 463-75. 
———. 2007. The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt. Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global 
Order. London & New York: Routledge. 
Ojakangas, Mika. 2002. Kenen tahansa politiikka. Kohti ulossulkematonta poliittista yhteisöä. Helsinki: Tutkijali-
itto. 
Okamoto, Mitsuo, and Tamayo Okamoto. 2008. Security in Japanese history, philosophy and ethics: Impact on 
contemporary security policy. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security 
in the 21st century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál 
Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 99-112. Berlin & 
Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Oksenberg, Michel, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, eds. 1990. Beijing spring, 1989. Confrontation and 
Conflict. The Basic Documents. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Ong, Russell. 2007. China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century. London and New York: Routledge. 
Onuf, Nicholas. 2009. Structure? What structure? International Relations 23, (2): 183-99. 
———. 1998. Constructivism: A User’s manual. In International Relations in a Constructed World, eds. Vendulka 
Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert, 58-78. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
———. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press. 
Orwell, George. 1992 [1949]. Nineteen Eighty-Four. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Osborn, Ronald. 2009. Noam Chomsky and the Leftist Tradition. Review of International Studies 35, (2): 351-
70. 
Osiander, Andreas. 1998. Begriffsgeschichte: Sicherheit, Frieden und Krieg. AMI: Antimilitarismus Information 
(5): 13-27.
Our ’April student movement’ and the ’April fifth movement’. 1990 [1989]. In Voices From Tiananmen Square. 
Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, 54-56. Montréal: 
Black Rose Books. 
Ownby, David. 2008. Falun Gong and the Future of China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Palmer, David A. 2007. Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China, 1949-1999. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 
———. 2003. Modernity and millennialism in china: Qigong and the birth of Falun Gong. Asian Anthropology 
2: 79-109. 
Palmujoki, Eero. 1995. Revolutionary Pragmatism and Formal Marxism-Leninism: An Analysis of Vietnam’s For-
eign-Policy Argumentation from the Fall of Saigon to the Collapse of the Socialist World System. PhD The-
sis. Tampere: University of Tampere. 
Paltemaa, Lauri, and Juha A. Vuori. (Forthcoming 2012). Johdatus Kiinan nykyhistoriaan: Kansantasavallan aika 
1949-2009. Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press.
———. Freedom, security, and the politics of insecurity in Chinese practices of internet control. Unpublished 
draft.
———. 2009. Regime transition and the Chinese politics of technology: From mass science to the controlled 
internet. Asian Journal of Political Science 17, (1): 1-23. 
———. 2006. How cheap is identity talk? A framework of identity frames and security discourse for the analy-




Patomäki, Heikki, and Colin Wight. 2000. After post-positivism? The promise of critical realism. International 
Studies Quarterly 44, (2): 213-37. 
Paul, T. V. 2009. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
PBS. 2001. President Bush on September 12, 2001. Available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/
terroristattack/bush_speech_9-12.html>. Accessed October 5 2009.
Peking Review. 10.6.1966. A great revolution that touches the people to their very souls. Available at < http://
www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1966/PR1966-24d.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
Penny, Benjamin. 2003. The life and times of Li Hongzhi: Falun gong and religious biography. The China Quar-
terly 175: 644-61. 
People’s Daily. 9.10.2007. Carrying forward Buddhism or fuelling evil cults? Available at http://english.people.
com.cn/90001/90780/6279537.html. Accessed 12.11.2007.
People’s Daily Online. 12.9.2001. Chinese President expresses sympathy to Bush, US Government and people for 
disastrous attacks. Available at < http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200109/12/eng20010912_79944.
html>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
Perelman, Chaïm. 1996 [1977]. Retoriikan valtakunta. Tampere: Vastapaino. 
Perry, Elizabeth J. 2007. Studying Chinese politics: Farewell to revolution? The China Journal 57, (1): 1-22. 
———. 2002a. Casting a Chinese ‘Democracy’ movement: Legacies of social fragmentation. In Challenging the 
Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry, 309-335. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
———. 2002b. Moving the masses: Emotion work in the Chinese revolution. Mobilization 7, (2): 111-128.
———. 2001. Challenging the mandate of heaven: Popular protest in modern china. Critical Asian Studies 33, 
(2): 163-80. 
———. 1999. Chinese anniversaries in international perspective. Harvard Asia Quarterly 3, (3). 
Perry, Elizabeth J., and Xun Li. 2003 [1993]. Revolutionary rudeness: The language of Red Guards and rebel 
workers in China’s Cultural Revolution. In Twentieth Century China. New Approaches, ed. Jeffrey N. Wass-
erstrom, 221-236. London & New York: Routledge. 
Perry, Elizabeth J., and Mark Selden, eds. 2003a. Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance. 2nd ed. London 
& New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
———. 2003b. Introduction: Reform and resistance in contemporary China. In Chinese Society: Change, Conflict 
and Resistance, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry, Mark Selden. 2nd ed., 1-22. London & New York: RoutledgeCur-
zon. 
Pettiford, Lloyd, and Melissa G. Curley. 1999. Changing Security Agendas and the Third World. London: Pinter. 
Pfaff, Steven. 1996. Collective identity and informal groups in revolutionary mobilization in East Germany 1989. 
Social Forces 75, (1): 91-118. 
Pickering, Andrew. 1995. The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency and Science. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 1984. Constructing Quark: A Sociological History of Particle Physics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Pieke, Frank N. 1994. The use of making history: Chinese traditions of protest. Issues & Studies 30, (1): 13-36. 
Pin-Fat, Véronique. 2000. (Im)possible universalism: Reading human rights in world politics. Review of Interna-
tional Studies 26, (4): 663-74. 
Polletta, Francesca, and James M. Jasper. 2001. Collective identity and social movements. Annual Review of So-
ciology 27, (1): 283-305. 
Popper, Karl. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Porta, Della. 1996. Social movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of protest. In Comparative Per-
spectives on Social Movements, eds. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, 62-93. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Powell, Ralph L. 1965. Great powers and atomic bombs are paper tigers. The China Quarterly 23, (3): 55-63. 
Provisional Students’ Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges special bulletin on April 26. 1990 [1989]. 
In Cries for democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu 
Han and Sheng Hua, 72-73. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pye, Lucian W. 1992. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1990. Tiananmen and Chinese political culture: The escalation of confrontation from moralizing to 
revenge. Asian Survey 30, (4): 331-47.
———. 1985. Asian Power and Politics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1981. The Dynamics of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain. 
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1997. Empirismin kaksi dogmia. In Ajattelu, kieli, merkitys. Analyyttisen filosofian 
avainkirjoituksia, ed. Panu Raatikainen, 133-153. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Raatikainen, Panu. 2004. Ihmistieteet ja filosofia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. 1969. Scientists and youth in revolt. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 25, (4): 16-7. 
400
Bibliography
———. 1947. Editorial: Let’s have clear thinking. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3, (6): 137-8. 
Radtke, Kurt W. 2008. Security in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese philosophy and ethics. In Globalization and En-
vironmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula 
Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia 
Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 203-220. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Rahn, Patsy. 2002. The chemistry of conflict: The Chinese government and the Falun Gong. Terrorism and Politi-
cal Violence 14, (4): 41-65. 
Ramiah, Ilavenil. 2006. Securitizing the AIDS issue in Asia. In Non-Traditional Security in Asia, Dilemmas in Secu-
ritisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitay Acharya, 136-167. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2008 [2004]. The Politics of Aesthetics. Trans. Gabriel Rockhill. London & New York: Con-
tinuum. 
———. 2007 [2003]. The Future of the Image. Trans. Gregory Elliott. London & New York: Verso.
Reflections on the Chinese Communist Party (A Beijing University poster, May 17 1989). 1990 [1989]. In Cries 
for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han 
and Sheng Hua, 145-48. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Reflections on the history of the Chinese Communist Party (A poster in the People’s University, April 16, 1989). 
1990 [1989]. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Move-
ment, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 59-61. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Remarks of Comrade Zhao Ziyang’. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry 
Link, 153-156. London: Abacus.
Ren, Wanding. 1990 [1989]. Why did the rally in memory of Hu Taobang turn into a democracy movement. In 
Voices From Tiananmen Square. Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. 
Frank Harrison, 42-46. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
Renmin ribao. 3.4.1980. The distinction between Marxism and Revisionism.
———. 22.12.1976. The crux of the Gang of Four’s crimes is to usurp Party and State power. In Chinese Politics, 
Documents and Analysis. Volume Three: The Death of Mao (1976) to the Fall of Kuo-Feng (1980), eds. 
James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes, Milton D. Yeh, 84-91. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
———. 28.3.1976. Beat back the right deviationist attempt to reverse verdicts, promote industrial production. 
In Chinese Politics, Documents and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of 
Mao (1976), eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh, 356-358. Columbia: South Carolina 
University Press.
———. 10.3.1976. It is contrary to the will of the people to reverse previous verdicts. In Chinese Politics, Docu-
ments and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976), eds. James T. 
Myers, Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh, 353-355. Columbia: South Carolina University Press.
Reus-Smit, Christian, and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Rigby, T. H. 1970. Politics in mono-organisations. In Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe, ed. Andrew C. 
Janos, 555-602. Berkeley: California University Press. 
Rinehart, James F. 2006. Apocalyptic Faith and Political Violence: Prophets of Terror. New York: Palgrave MacMil-
lan. 
Roberts, Moss. 2004. Introduction. In Dao De Jing. The Book of the Way, ed. Moss Roberts, 1-24. Berkeley & Los 
Angeles & London: University of California Press. 
Rockhill, Gabriel. 2008. Translator’s introduction: Jacques Rancière’s politics of perception. In The politics of 
Aesthetics., Jacques Ranciére, 1-6. London & New York: Continuum. 
Roe, Paul. 2008. Actor, audience(s) and emergency measures: Securitization and the UK’s decision to invade 
Iraq. Security Dialogue 39, (6): 615-35. 
———. 2006. Reconstructing identities or managing minorities? Desecuritizing minority rights: A response to 
Jutila. Security Dialogue 37, (3): 425-38. 
———. 2004. Securitization and minority rights: Conditions of desecuritization. Security Dialogue 35, (3): 279-
94. 
Rokeach, Milton. 1979. Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal. New York: Free Press. 
Rothchild, Emma. 1995. What is security? Daedalus 124, (3): 53-98. 
Ruggie, John Gerard, ed. 1998. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Rumelhart, David, and Andrew Ortony. 1977. Understanding and summarizing brief stories. In Basic process in 
reading: Perception and comprehension, eds. David Laberge and S. Jay Samuales. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erblaum. 
Russell, Bertrand. 1991 [1961]. History of Modern Philosophy. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. 
———. 1905. On denoting. Mind 14, : 479-93. 
———. 1912. The problems of philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
401
Bibliography
Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella, eds. 2006. World politics: The Menu for Choice. 8th ed. Belmont: 
Thomson Wadsworth. 
Ruzicka, Jan. 2009. Have you seen a failure lately? Why failed cases of securitization matter. Paper presented at 
ISA 2009. 
Sæther, Elin. 2008. The conditional autonomy of the critical press in China. Department of Sociology and Human 
Geography, University of Oslo. 
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 1995. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A debate. Lanham: University Press 
of America. 
Saich, Tony. 2001. Governance and Politics in China. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave. 
———. 1990 (ed.). The Chinese People’s Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989. Armonk & London: M.E. Shar-
pe. 
Said, Edward W. 2001 [1994]. Ajattelevan ihmisen vastuu. Helsinki: Loki. 
———. 1994. Travelling theory reconsidered. In Critical Reconstructions, eds. Robert Polhemus and Roger Hen-
kle, 436-452. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
———. 1983. Travelling theory. In The World, the Text, and the Critic, ed. Edward W. Said, 226-247. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
———. 1979 [1978]. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books. 
Salisbury, Harrison E. 1989. Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June. Boston & Toronto & London: Little, Brown 
and Company.
Salter, Mark B. 2010. When securitization fails: The hard case of counter-terrorism programs. In Securitization 
Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 116-131. London: Routledge. 
———. 2009. Falling on deaf ears: A model of failed securitization moves. Paper presented at ISA 2009. 
———. 2008. Securitization and desecuritization: A dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Secu-
rity Authority. Journal of International Relations and Development 11, (4): 321-49. 
———. 2007. On exactitude in disciplinary science: A response to the network manifesto. Security Dialogue 38, 
(1): 113-22. 
Sánchez, Georgina. 2008. Security in Latin American philosophy, ethics, and history of ideas. In Globalization 
and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, 
Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, 
Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 299-310. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Sanford, Anthony J., and S. C. Garrod. 1981. Understanding written language: Explorations of Comprehension 
Beyond the Sentence. Chichester: Wiley. 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1984. Guidelines for conceptual analysis. In Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, ed. 
Giovanni Sartori, 15–85. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
———. 1970. Concept misformation in comparative politics. American Political Science Review 64, (4): 1033-
53. 
Sbisà, Marina. 2002. Speech Acts in Context. Language & Communication 22, (4): 421-436.
———. 2001. Illocutionary force and degrees of strength in language use. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 1791-
1814.
Schächter, Josef. 1973 [1935]. Prolegomena to a Critical Grammar. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Schank, Roger C., and Robert P. Abelson. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence 
Erblaum. 
Schechter, Daniel. 2001 [2000]. Falun Gong’s challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult? A Report and 
Reader. New York: Akashic Books. 
Scheurman, William E. 2008. Realism and the left: The case of Hans J. Morgenthau. Review of International Stud-
ies 34, (1): 29-51. 
Schiffer, Stephen R. 1972. Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2007 [1838]. Eri kääntämismetodeista. In Kääntökirja. Kirjoituksia kääntämisen 
filosofiasta, ed. Tapani Kilpeläinen, 7-38. Tampere: Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura. 
Schmitt, Carl. 2005 [1922, rev. ed. 1934]. Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Trans. 
George Schwab. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2003 [1950]. The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. Trans. G. 
L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press. 
———. 1996 [1933]. The Concept of the Political. Trans. George Schwab. Chicago & London: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
———. 1933. Majority of authority. Europäische Revue. 
Schoenhals, Michael. 2002. Was the Cultural Revolution really necessary? In China’s Communist Revolutions: 
Fifty Years of the People’s Republic of China, eds. Werner Draguhn and  David S.G. Goodman, 159–176. 
London: RoutledgeCurzon.
———. 1996. China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969. Not a Dinner Party. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe. 
402
Bibliography
———. 1992. Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Stud-
ies. 
———. 1991. Selections from propaganda trends organ of the CCP central propaganda department. Chinese 
Law and Government, a Journal of Translations 24, (4). 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2005 [1891]. Taito olla ja pysyä oikeassa – eristinen dialektiikka. Tampere: Eurooppalai-
sen filosofian seura. 
Schrecker, John E. 1991. The Chinese Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective. Westport: Praeger.
Schrimm-Heins, Andrea. 1991. Gewissheit und Sicherheit: Geschichte und Bedeutungswandel der Begriffe cer-
titude und securitas. Archiv Für Begriffsgeschicte 34, : 123-213. 
Schultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. 2008. Towards a nuclear-free world. The 
Wall Street Journal, 1.15.2008.
Schutz, Alfred. 1954. Concept and theory formation in social sciences. Journal of Philosophy 51, (9): 257-73. 
———. 1953. Common-sense and scientific interpretation in human action. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 14, (1): 1-38. 
Schwartz, Benjamin. 1960. The legend of the ‘legend of Maoism’. China Quarterly 1, (2): 16-34. 
Schön, Donald A., and Martin Rein. 1994. Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Contro-
versies. New York: Basic Books
Scobell, Andrew. 2001. The Chinese cult of defence. Issues and Studies 37, (5): 100-27. 
Scott, David. 2007. China stands up. In The PRC and the International System. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
———. 1987 [1985]. Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press. 
Searle, John R. 2002a [1989]. How performatives work. In Essays in Speech Act Theory, eds. Daniel Venderveken 
and Susumu Kubo, 85-107. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
———. 2002b. Speech acts, mind and social reality. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions with John 
R. Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, 3-16. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
———. 2000 [1999]. Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. London: Phoenix. 
———. 1996 [1995]. Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.
———. 1995. Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press. 
———. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1979 [1975]. A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In Expression and Meaning, ed. John R. Searle, 1-29. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1975. Indirect speech acts. In Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, eds. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan, 
59-82. New York: Academic Press. 
———. 1973 [1968]. Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts. In Essays on J. L. Austin, ed. G. J. Warnock. 
Clarendon: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, John R., and Daniel Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Security Dialogue. 2008. Special Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political 35, (3): 345-387.
Seymor, James D. 2005. Sizing up china’s prisons. In Punishment, and Policing in China, ed. Børge Bakken, 141-
170. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers. 
Shakespeare. 1993. Macbeth. In The Illustrated Stratford Shakespeare. All 37 plays, All 160 Sonnets and Poems., 
776-789. London: Chancellor Press. 
Shambaugh, David. 2007. China’s propaganda system: Institutions, processes and efficacy. The China Journal 
(57) : 25-58. 
———. 2002. Modernizing China’s Military. Progress, Problems, and Prospects. Berkeley & Los Angeles & Lon-
don: University of California Press.
———. 1992. Editor’s introduction for the making of the big lie: Content and process in the CCP propaganda 
system. Chinese Law and Government, a Journal of Translations 25, (1). 
Shamsul, A. B. 2007. Embedding security in culture: A critical reflection on the making of the Malaysian ‘secu-
rity-sensitive’ mindset and its culture of governance. Keynote Paper for the Conference Culture and the 
Configuring of Security: Using Asian Perspectives to Inform Theoretical Discussion in Lund 7-9 November 
2007. 
Shek, Richard. 1990. Sectarian eschatology and violence. In Violence in China, eds. Jonathan N. Lippman and Ste-
van Harrell, 87-114. Essays in Culture and Counterculture. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Shue, Vivienne. 1994. Legitimacy Crisis in China? In State and Society in 21st-century China: Crisis, Contention 
and Legitimation, eds. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, 26-49. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
403
Bibliography
Siebel, Mark. 2002. What is an illocutionary point?. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions with John 
R. Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, 125-139. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers.
Simpson, Mary M. 1960. The scientist in politics: On top or on tap? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. A Magazine 
of Science and Public Affairs 16(1): 28-29.
Singer, J. David. 1961. The level of analysis problem in international relations. In The International System: Theo-
retical Essays, eds. Klaus Knorr and Sydney Verba, 77-92. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1960. International conflict: Three levels of analysis. World Politics 12, (3): 453-61. 
Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 1994. Correlates of War project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992. 
Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Sjöstedt, Roxanna. 2008. Exploring the construction of threats: The securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia. Secu-
rity Dialogue 39, (1): 7-29. 
Skinner, Quentin. 2002. Visions of Politics. Volume I: Regarding Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
———. 1998. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume I: The Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Smith, Graham. 2005. Into Cerberus’ lair: Bringing the idea of security to light. The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 7, (4): 485-507. 
Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1992. Master frames and cycles of protest. In Frontiers in Social Move-
ment Theory, eds. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 133-155. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press. 
———. 1988. Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. In International Social Movement Re-
search from structure to action: Comparing social movement research across cultures, eds. Bert Klander-
mans, Hanspeter Kriesi and Sidney Tarrow, 197-217. London: JAI Press. 
Snow, David A., and Doug McAdam. 2000. Identity work process in the context of social movements: Clarifying 
the Identity/Movement nexus. In Self, Identity, and Social Movement, eds. Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. 
Owens and Robert W. White, 41-67. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sokal, Alan. 2008. Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1998a [1996]. Transgressing the boundaries: Towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum 
gravity. In Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science, eds. Alan Sokal and Jean 
Bricmont, 212-258. New York: Picador. 
———. 1998b [1997]. Some comments on the parody. In Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse 
of Science, eds. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, 259-267. New York: Picador. 
———. 1998c [1996]. Transgressing the boundaries: An afterword. In Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intel-
lectuals’ Abuse of Science, eds. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, 268-280. New York: Picador. 
Sokal, Alan, and Jean Bricmont. 1998 [1997]. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. 
New York: Picador. 
Some PLA officers send open letter to Central Military Commission. 1990 [1989]. In Beijing Spring, 1989. Con-
frontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc 
Lambert, 282-283. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
Sousa Melo, Candida Jaci de. 2002. Possible directions of fit between mind, language and the world. In Essays 
in Speech Act Theory, eds. Daniel Vanderveken, Susumo Kubo, 109-117. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins. 
S/RES/1269. 1999. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 (1999) Adopted by the Security Coun-
cil at its 4053th meeting, on 19 October 1999.
S/RES/1368. 2001. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) Adopted by the Security Coun-
cil at its 4370th meeting, on 12 September 2001.
S/RES/1373. 2001. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) Adopted by the Security Coun-
cil at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001.
S/RES/1377. 2001. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377 (2001) Adopted by the Security Coun-
cil at its 4413th meeting, on 12 November 2001.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1978. Assertion. In Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, ed. Peter Cole, 315-332. New York: 
Academic press. 
Staniszkis, Jadviga. 1992. The Ontology of Socialism. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Starr, John Bryan. 2001. Understanding China. A guide to China’s Economy, History, and Political Structure. 2nd 
ed. London: Profile Books. 
———. 1973. Ideology and Culture: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Stegeman, Beatrice. 1969. Science as art. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 25, (4): 27-30. 
Stern, Maria. 2006. ‘We’ the subject: The power and failure of (in)security. Security Dialogue 37(2): 187-205.
404
Bibliography
Strauss, Leo. 1996 [1932]. Notes on Carl Schmitt, the concept of the political. In The Concept of the Political. 
Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Strawson, Peter F. 1964. Intention and convention in speech acts. The Philosophical Review 73, (4): 439-60. 
Stritzel, Holger, ed. 2009. The transnational spread of threat images: Securitization as a politics of translation. 
Paper presented at ISA 2009. 
———. 2007. Towards a theory of securitization: Copehagen and beyond. European Journal of International 
Relations 13, (3): 357-83. 
Suettinger, Robert L. 2003. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000. Washington: The 
Brooking’s Institution. 
Sullivan, Lawrence R, ed. 1995. China Since Tiananmen: Political, Economic, and Social Conflicts. Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Sunzi. 2005 [206 BC – 220]. Sodankäynnin taito. Trans. Matti Nojonen, ed. Matti Nojonen. Helsinki: Gaudea-
mus. 
Swaine, Michael D. 2004. China: Exploiting a strategic opening. In Strategic Asia: Confronting Terrorism in the 
Pursuit of Power 2004-05, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, 67-102. Seattle: National Bureau of 
Asian Research. 
———. 1996. The PLA in China’s national security policy: Leadership, structures and processes. China Quar-
terly 146: 260-93. 
Sylvester, Christine. 2007. Anatomy of a footnote. Security Dialogue 38, (4): 547-58. 
Tannen, Deborah. 1993. Framing in discourse. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tannenwald, Nina. 2007. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tanner, Murray Scot. 2004. China rethinks unrest. The Washington Quarterly 27, (3): 137-56. 
Tarasti, Eero. 2005. Vastarinnan semiotiikkaa: Oleminen, muisti, historia - merkkien vastarinta. Synteesi 24, 
(1): 2-29. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Taureck, Rita. 2006a. Securitization theory and securitization studies. Journal of International Relations and 
Development 9, (1): 53-61. 
———. 2006b. Securitisation theory – the story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-
structural realist. Paper for Presentation at the 4th Annual CEEISA Convention University of Tartu, 25 -27 
June 2006. 
Teiwes, Frederic C., and Warren Sun. 2004. The first Tiananmen incident revisited: Elite politics and crisis man-
agement at the end of the Maoist era. Pacific Affairs 77, (2): 211-35.
Telegram, Zhao Ziyang to Standing Committee. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan 
and Perry Link, 98. London: Abacus.
The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Adopted by the Ninth National Congress of the CPC, April 
4, 1969. 1986 [1969]. In Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis. Volume One: Cultural Revolution to 
1969, eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Erik von Groeling, 393-397. Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press.
The Epoch Times. 2004a. Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party: A Book that Has Shocked All Chinese 
around the World: A Book That Is Disintegrating the Communist Party. Gillette, NJ: Yih Chyun Corp & The 
Epoch Times. 
———. 2004b. Introduction. In The Epoch Times: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party. Gillette, NJ: Yih 
Chyun Corp & The Epoch Times. 
———. 2004c. Commentary five: On the collusion of Jiang Zemin and the CCP in persecuting the Falun Gong. 
In The Epoch Times: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party., 115-148. Gillette, NJ: Yih Chyun Corp 
& The Epoch Times. 
———. 2004d. Commentary six: On how the Communist Party destroyed traditional culture. In The Epoch 
Times: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party., 149-192. Gillette, NJ: Yih Chyun Corp & The Epoch 
Times. 
———. 2004e. Commentary eight: On how the communist party is an evil cult. In The Epoch Times: Nine Com-
mentaries on the Communist Party, 235-270. Gillette, NJ: Yih Chyun Corp & The Epoch Times.
———. 2004f. Commentary nine: On the unscrupulous nature of the Chinese Communist party. In The Epoch 
Times: Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, 271-314. Gillette, NJ: Yih Chyun Corp & The Epoch 
Times.  
The Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement. 1965. Peking: Foreign Language 
Press.




Thornton, Patricia. 2003. The new cybersects: Resistance and repression in the reform era. In Chinese Society: 
Change, Conflict and Resistance, eds. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden. 2nd ed., 247-270. London & New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon. 
———. 2002. Framing Dissent in Contemporary China: Irony, Ambiguity and Metonymy. China Quarterly 171: 
661-681.
———. 1994. Comrades and collectives in arms: Tax resistance, evasion and avoidance in Post-Mao China. In 
State and Society in 21st-century China, eds. Peter H. Gries and Stanley Rosen, 87-104. London: Routledge-
Curzon. 
Thurston, Anne F. 1990. Urban violence during the Cultural Revolution: Who is to blame? In Violence in China: 
Essays in Culture and Counterculture, eds. Jonathan N. Lippman and Steven Harrell, 149-174. Albany: 
State University of New York Press. 
Tickner, Ann J. 1992. Gender and International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Tickner, Arlene B., and Ole Wæver (eds.). 2009. International Relations Scholarship around the World. London: 
Routledge.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Timperlake, Edward, and William Triplett. 1999. Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to Amer-
ica. Washington D.C.: Regnery. 
Tong, James. 2002a. An organizational analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, communications, financing. China 
Quarterly 171: 636-60. 
———. 2002b. Anatomy of regime repression in China. Timing, enforcement institutions, and target selection 
in banning the Falungong, July 1999. Asian Survey 42, (6): 795-820. 
———. 1988. Party documents on anti-bourgeois liberalization and Hu Yaobang’s resignation, 1987. Chinese 
Law and Government 21, (1). 
Torfing, Jacob. 2003 [1999]. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. Oxfordshire: Blackwell. 
Tow, William T. 1994. China and the international strategic system. In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Prac-
tice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, 115-157. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Trask, R. L. 1999 [1995]. Language, the Basics. Cornwall: Routledge. 
Tribe, Keith. 2004. Translator’s introduction. In Futures Past, on the Semantics of Historical Time, ed. Reinhart 
Koselleck, i-xx. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Trombetta, Maria Julia. 2008. Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 21, (4): 585-602. 
Truman, Harry S. 1963. Special message to the congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. In In 
Public Papers of the President of The United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947., 176-180. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Press. 
Tucker, Robert C. 1961. Towards a comparative politics of movement-regimes. The American Political Science 
Review 55, (2): 281-9. 
Two Documents Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of Falun Dafa. 1999. Chinese Law and Govern-
ment 32, (5): 31-32.
Unger, Jonathan, ed. 2002. The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. 
United States Department of State. 2004. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. Available at < http://www.state.
gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/c12153.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
Upadhyaya, Priyankar. 2006. Securitization Matrix in South Asia: Bangladeshu migrants as enemy alien. In Non-
Traditional Security in Asia, Dilemmas in Securitisation, eds. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and 
Amitay Acharya, 13-39. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Urgent Notice on Doing Current Work Well and Carefully Preventing the Situation from Getting Worse’. 2001 
[1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, 81-82. London: Abacus.
Van Ness, Peter. 1970. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation. 
Cambridge: University of California Press. 
Vanderveken, Daniel. 2002a. Universal grammar and speech act theory. In Essays in Speech Act Theory, eds. Dan-
iel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, 25-62. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
———. 2002b. Searle on meaning and action. In Speech Acts, Mind and Social Reality. Discussions with John R. 
Searle, eds. Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, 141-169. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
———. 1980. Illocutionary logic and self-defeating speech acts. In Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, eds. John 
R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer and Manfred Bierwisch, 247-272. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
 Vanderveken, Daniel, and Susumo Kubo. 2002. Introduction. In Essays in Speech Act Theory, eds. Daniel Vander-
veken and Susumu Kubo, 1-22. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 




———. 1995. The post-positivist debate: Reconstructing scientific enquiry and international relations theory 
after enlightenment’s fall. In International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 733-
744. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Veivo, Harri, ed. 2007. Vastarinta/resistanssi. Konfliktit, vastustus ja sota semiotiikan tutkimuskohteina. Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus. 
Vickers, Edward. 2009. The opportunity of China? Education, patriotic values and the Chinese state. In Education 
As a Political Tool in Asia, eds. Marie Lall and Edward Vickers, 53-82. London & New York: Routledge. 
Vilhu, Osmi. 1979. Einstein ja tieteen menetelmät. In Albert Einstein: Tutkija ja ihminen, eds. Heikki Oja and 
Osmi Vilhu, 161-167. Helsinki: Tähtitieteellinen yhdistys Ursa ry. 
Vogel, Ezra F., Yuan Ming, and Akihiko Tanaka, eds. 2004. Age of Uncertainty: The U.S.-China-Japan triangle from 
Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2001). Harvard East Asia Monographs Online. 
Vultee, Fred. 2010. Securitization as a Media Frame. In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge 
and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 77-93. London: Routledge. 
Vuori, Juha A. 2011. Towards a Methodology for Studying the Semiotics of Securitization. Paper presented at 
ISA 2011.
———. 2010a. A timely prophet? The doomsday clock as a visualization of securitization moves with a global 
referent object. Security Dialogue 41, (3): 255-277.
———. 2010b. Religion Bites: Falungong, securitization/desecuritization in the People’s Republic of China. In 
Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. Thierry Balzacq, 186-211. Lon-
don: Routledge.
———. 2009. Media Environments as Sites of Securitisation and Contestation in China. Paper presented at ISA 
2009.
———. 2008a. Tiedonintressit ja teorioiden käytännöllisen arvon perusta kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuk-
sessa. In Tieteenteoriat ja kansainvälisten suhteiden oppialan kehitys, eds. Harto Hakovirta and Juha A. 
Vuori, 3-32. Turku: Department of Political Science, University of Turku. 
———. 2008b. Illocutionary logic and strands of securitisation: Applying the theory of securitisation to the 
study of non-democratic political orders. European Journal of International Relations 14, (1): 65-99. 
———. 2007. Securitization in a totalitarian regime – combining micro-level analysis with a macro-level model. 
In Chinese Securitisation - Broadening the Scope of Securitisation Studies with Three Case Studies in the 
Context of the People’s Republic of China, ed. Juha A. Vuori, 45-81. Turku: Department of Political Science, 
University of Turku. 
———. 2005. Desecuritising the Tiananmen incidents. In Perspectives on China, ed. Raisa Asikainen, 151-180. 
Helsinki: Renvall Institute. 
———. 2004. Turvallistaminen totalitaarisessa poliittisessa järjestelmässä – makrotason mallin ja mikrotason 
analyysin yhdistämisestä. Kosmopolis 34, (3): 4-28.
———. Security as Justification: An Analysis of Deng Xiaoping’s Speech to the Martial Law Troops in Beijing on 
the Ninth of June 1989. Politologiske Studier 6, (2): 105-118.
Wæver, Ole. 2009. Waltz’s theory of theory. International Relations 23, (2): 201-22. 
———. 2008a. Peace and security: Two evolving concepts and their changing relationship. In Globalization 
and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, 
Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, 
Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 99-112. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
———. 2008b. The changing agenda of societal security. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Recon-
ceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw Mes-
jasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. Liotta, 
581-594. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
———. 2007a. 10x10. In 10x10, eds. Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Ole Dahl Rasmussen and Ole Wæver. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Press. 
———. 2007b. Still a discipline after all these debates? In IR theories: Discipline and Diversity, eds. Tim Dunne, 
Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, 288-307. 
———. 2005. European integration and security: Analysing French and German discourse on state, nation, and 
Europe. In Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, eds. David R. Howarth 
and Jacob Torfing, 33-67. Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press. 
———. 2004a. Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New schools in security theory and their origins between core 
and periphery. Paper Presented at International Studies Association Conference, Montreal March 17-20 
2004. 
———. 2004b. Peace and security — two concepts and their relationship. In Contemporary Security Analysis 
and Copenhagen Peace Research, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, 51-65. London: Routledge.
———. 2003. Securitisation: Taking stock of a research programme in security studies. Unpublished Draft. 
———. 2001. Identity, communities and foreign policy. In European Integration and National Identity: The chal-
lenge of the Nordic States, eds. Lene Hansen, Ole Wæver, 20-50. London: Routledge. 
407
Bibliography
———. 2000a. The EU as a Security Actor — Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign 
security orders. In International Relations Theory & European Integration: Power, Security & Community, 
eds. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 250-294. London: Routledge. 
———. 2000b. Security Agendas Old and New - and how to survive them. Buenos Aires: Paper Presented for a 
Workshop on ‘The Traditional and the New Security Agenda: Inferences for the Third World, Universi-
dad Torcuato Di Tella Buenos Aires, 11-12 September. 
———. 1999. Securitizing sectors? Reply to Eriksson. Cooperation and Conflict 34, (3): 334-40. 
———. 1998. Four meanings of international society: A Trans-Atlantic dialogue. In International Society and the 
Development of International Relations, ed. Barbara Allen Roberson, 80-144. London: Pinter. 
———. 1997a. Concepts of Security. PhD Thesis. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen. 
———. 1997b. Figures in international thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms. In The Future of 
International Relations — Masters in the Making, eds. Iver B. Neumann, Ole Wæver, 1-37. Chatham, Kent: 
Routledge. 
———. 1996. The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate. In International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. 
Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysa Zalewski, 149-185. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1995. Securitization and desecuritization. In On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46-86. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
———. 1992. International society — Theoretical promises unfulfilled? Cooperation and Conflict 27, (1): 97-
128.
———. 1989a. Security the speech act: Analysing the politics of a word. Working paper no. 1989/19. Copenha-
gen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research; no. 1989/19. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict 
research. 
———. 1989b. Conflicts of vision — visions of conflict. In European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East- West 
Confrontation, eds. Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer, 283-325. London: MacMillan. 
———. 1989c. Beyond the beyond of critical international theory. Working paper no. 1. Copenhagen: Centre for 
Peace and Conflict Research; no. 1. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict research. 
Wæver, Ole, and Barry Buzan. 2007. After the return to theory: The past, present, and future of security studies. 
In Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins, 383-402. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. 1993. Identity, Migration and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe. New York: St. Martins Press. 
Wagnsson, Charlotta. 2000. Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, Nato and Chechnya - Se-
curitisation Theory Reconsidered. Stockholm: Statsvetenskapliga Institut. 
Wakeman Jr., Frederic. 1997. A revisionist view of the Nanjing decade: Confucian fascism. China Quarterly 37, 
(2): 395-432. 
Walder, Andrew G. 2009. Unruly stability: Why China’s regime has staying power. Current History (September): 
257-63. 
Walker, Rob B. J. 2007. Security, critique, Europe. Security Dialogue 38, (1): 95-103. 
———. 1997. The subject of security. In Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams, 61-82. London: UCL Press. 
———. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Walt, Stephen. 1991. The renaissance of security studies. International Studies Quarterly 35, (2): 211-39.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2008 [2003]. Thoughts about assaying theories. In Realism and International Politics, ed. Ken-
neth N. Waltz, 92-95. New York & London: Routledge. 
———. 2004. Neorealism: Confusions and criticisms. Journal of Politics and Society 15, (1): 2-6. 
———.  1979. Theory of International Politics. Lanham: University Press of America. 
———. 1959 [1954]. Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wang, Dan. 1990 [1989]. The star of hope rises in Eastern Europe. In Voices From Tiananmen Square. Beijing 
Spring and the Democracy Movement, eds. Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, 37-38. Montréal: Black 
Rose Books.
Wang, Hongying. 2003. National image building and Chinese foreign policy. China: An International Journal 1, 
(1): 46-72. 
Wang, Yizhou. 2005. Defining Non-Traditional Security and Its Implications for China. Institute of World Econom-
ics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Wang, Zheng. 2008. National humiliation, history education, and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic 
education campaign in China. International Studies Quarterly 52, (4): 783-806.
Wanted order issued by the ministry of public security of the People’s Republic of China. 1999. Chinese Law and 
Government 32, (5): 33-4.
Warren, Mark. 1990. Ideology and the self. Theory and Society 19, (5): 599-634. 
408
Bibliography
Was it Dialogue – Or a lecture (Shifan Daxue students’ handbill on April 30, 1989). 1990 [1989]. In Cries for 
Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and 
Sheng Hua, 113-113. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. 2009. Middle-class mobilization. Journal of Democracy 20, (3): 29-32. 
———. 2003. The year of living anxiously: China in 1999. In Twentieth Century China. New Approaches, ed. Jef-
frey N. Wasserstrom, 256-265. New York & London: Routledge. 
———. 1994. Afterword: History, myth and the tales of Tiananmen. In Popular Protest and Popular Culture in 
Modern China, eds. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry. 2nd ed., 279-289. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Wayne, Martin I. 2008. China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-Insurgency, Politics and Internal Security. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Weber, Max. 1994. Max Weber, Sociological Writings, ed. Wolf Heydebrand. London & New York: Continuum.
Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall, eds. 1999. Cultures of Insecurity: States, Com-
munities, and the Production of Danger. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press. 
Weldes, Jutta. 1999. Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Weller, Robert P. 1994. Resistance, Chaos and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts and Tiananmen. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
Wendt, Alexander E. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1998. On constitution and causation in International Relations. British International Studies Associa-
tion.
———. 1995. Constructing international politics. International Security 20, (1): 71-81. 
———. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Orga-
nization 46, (2): 391-425. 
———. 1991. Bridging the theory/meta-theory gap in international relations. Review of International Studies 
17: 383-92. 
———. 1987. The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International Organization 41, 
(3): 335-70. 
Westby, David L. 2002. Strategic imperative, ideology, and frame. Mobilization 7, (3): 287-304. 
White, Hayden. 1978. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Whiting, Allen S. 2001. China’s use of force, 1950-96, and Taiwan. International Security 26, (2): 103-31. 
Whorf, Benjamin. 1956. Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. J. B. Carroll. 
New York: MIT Press. 
Wiberg, Håkan. 1987. The security of small nations: Challenges and defences. Journal of Peace Research 24, (4): 
339-63. 
Wiberg, Matti. 1988. Between Apathy and Revolution - Explications of the Conditions for Political Legitimacy. PhD 
Thesis. Turku: University of Turku. 
Wierzbicka, Anna. 1991. Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: The Semantics of Human Interaction. Berlin & New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Wight, Colin. 2007a. Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off. Journal of International Relations and De-
velopment 10, (1): 40-56. 
———. 2007b. A manifesto for scientific realism in IR: Assuming the can-opener won’t work! Millennium: Jour-
nal of International Studies 35, (2): 379-98. 
———. 2006. Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Wilde, Jaap H. de. 2008. Environmental security deconstructed. In Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, eds. Hans Günther Brauch, Úrsula Oswald Spring, Czeslaw 
Mesjasz, John Grin, Pál Dunay, Navnita Chadha Behera, Béchir Chorou, Petricia Kameri-Mbote and P. H. 
Liotta, 595-602. Berlin & Heidelberg & New York: Springer. 
Thomas, Caroline and Peter Wilkin. 1999. Globalization, Human Security, and the African Experience. London: 
Lynne Rienner.
Wilkinson, Claire. 2010. The limits of spoken words: From meta-narratives to experiences of security. In Under-
standing Securitization Theory, ed. Thierry Balzacq. London: Routledge. 
———.2007. The Copenhagen School on tour in Kyrgystan: Is securitization theory useable outside Europe? 
Security Dialogue 38, (5): 5-25. 
Williams, Michael C. 2007a. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2007b. Introduction. In Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Rela-
tions, ed. Michael C. Williams, 1-17. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
409
Bibliography
 ———. 2007c. Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security. London & New 
York: Routledge. 
———. 2005. The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press. 
———. 2003. Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. International Studies Quarterly 
47, (4): 511-31. 
———. 1999. The practices of security: Critical contributions. Reply to Eriksson. Cooperation and Conflict 34, 
(3): 341-4. 
———. 1998. Modernity, identity and security: A comment on the ‘Copenhagen controversy’. Review of Interna-
tional Studies 24, (3): 435-9.
Williams, Paul D. 2008a. Security Studies: An Introduction. London & New York: Routledge. 
———. 2008b. Security studies: An introduction. In Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 1-12. 
London & New York: Routledge. 
Winch, Peter. 2008 [1958]. The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. Routledge classics edition 
with introduction by Raimond Gaita. London & New York: Routledge. 
Wishnick, Elizabeth. 2008. The securitisation of Chinese migration to the Russian Far East: Rhetoric and reality. 
In Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation, eds. Melissa G. Curley and Sii-Lun Wong, 
83-99. London & New York: Routledge. 
Wittfogel, Karl A. 1960a. The legend of Maoism, part 1. China Quarterly 1, (1): 72-86. 
———. 1960b. The legend of Maoism, part 2. China Quarterly 1, (2): 16-34. 
Wittfogel, Karl A., Benjamin Schwartz, and Henryk Sjaardema. 1960. Maoism - legend or legend of a ‘legend’? 
China Quarterly 1, (4): 88-101. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1999a [1953]. Filosofisia tutkimuksia. Trans. Heikki Nyman. Juva: WSOY. 
———. 1999b [1969]. Varmuudesta. Trans. Heikki Nyman. Juva: WSOY. 
———. 1996 [1921]. Tractatus logico philosophicus eli loogis-filosofinen tutkielma. Trans. Heikki Nyman. Por-
voo: WSOY. 
Wittner, Lawrence S. 2003. Toward Nuclear Abolition: A history of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 
through 1971 to the Present, Vol. III of The Struggle against the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
———. 1998. Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1954-1970, 
Vol. II of the Struggle against the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
———. 1993. One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953, Vol. I of 
the Struggle against the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
———. 1984. Rebels against War: The American Peace Movement 1933-1983. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Relations. Baltimore & London: The 
Johns Hopkins Press.
———. 1952. National security as an ambiguous symbol. Political Science Quarterly 67, (4): 481-502. 
Wong, John, and William Liu. 1999. The Mystery of China’s Falun Gong, Its Rise and Its Sociological Implications. 
Singapore: World Scientific & Singapore University Press. 
Wright, Georg Henrik von. 1987. Tiede ja ihmisjärki. Keuruu: Otava.
Wright, Teresa. 1999. State repression and student protest in contemporary china. China Quarterly 157: 142-
72. 
Wu, Han. 1986 [1961]. Hai Jui’s dismissal from office (preface only). In Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis. 
Volume One: Cultural Revolution to 1969, eds. James T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Erik von Groeling, 59-63. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Wu, Baiyi. 2001. The Chinese security concept and its historical evolution. Journal of Contemporary China 10, 
(27): 275-83. 
Wu, Tianfu, ed. 1999. Schools of Nuclear Strategic Thinking in the World. Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Press.
Wu’er, Kaixi. 1990 [1989]. New May Fourth Manifesto. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 
1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 135-137. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Wunderlich, Dieter. 1980. Methodological remarks on speech act theory. In Speech Act Theory and Pragmat-
ics, eds. John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer and Manfred Bierwisch, 291-312. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company. 
Wyn Jones, Richard. 2005. On emancipation: Necessity, capacity, and concrete utopias. In Critical Security Stud-
ies and World Politics, ed. Ken Booth, 215-236. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
———. 1999. Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Xiao, Lan, ed. 1979. The Tiananmen Poems. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
Xiao, Hongyan. 2001. Falun Gong and the Ideological Crisis of the Chinese Communist Party: Marxist Atheism 
vs. Vulgar Theism.  East Asia: An International Quarterly 19, (1-2): 123-143.
410
Bibliography
Xinhua. 26.5.2003. Role of Xinjiang Production, Construction Corps Important: White Paper. Available at 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
———. 23.7. 1999a. Ministry of Personnel issues notice stipulating that state functionaries may not practice 
Falun Dafa. Chinese Law and Government 32, (5): 26-28.
———. 23.7. 1999b. Relevant persons in charge at the Civil Affairs Ministry point out at a press conference that 
the decision to ban the Research Society of Falun Dafa was made in accordance with the law. Chinese Law 
and Government 32, (5): 39-42.
———. 12.3.1980. Resolution of the Fifth Session of the Eleventh CCP CC rehabilitating Comrade Liu Shaoqi. 
FBIS-CHI 22.3.1980, L1.
———. 28.9.1979. Ye Jianying speech at rally. FBIS-CHI 1.10.1979: L16.
———. 16.10.1964. China detonated her first atomic bomb on Oct. 16, thereby becoming the fifth nuclear Pow-
er after the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. Available at <http://www.british-
council.org/learnenglish-central-history-first-chinese-atomic-bomb-test.htm>. Accessed 10.8.2011.
Xinhuanet. 27.5.2005. Chairman Mao, Liu Xiang on top ten heroes list. Available at <http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2005-05/27/content_3016616.htm>. Accessed 3.4.2008. 
Yang, Ch’ing-k’un. 1961. Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and 
Some of Their Historical Factors. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Yang, Guobin. 2000. The liminal effects of social movements: Red Guards and the transformation of identity. 
Sociological Forum 15, (3): 391. 
Yang Shangkun’s Talk to a Small-Group Meeting at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission, 
May 23. 2001 [1989]. In The Tiananmen Papers, eds. Nathan, Andrew J. and Link, Perry. London: Aba-
cus. 
Yao, Wenyuan. 1986 [1965]. On the new historical play, Hai Jui’s dismissal from office, Wenhui Pao, November 
19, 1965. In Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis. Volume One: Cultural Revolution to 1969, eds. James 
T. Myers, Jürgen Domes and Erik von Groeling, 116-133. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Yee, Herbert, ed. 2000. China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality. Surrey: Curzon Press. 
Yee, Herbert, and Feng Zhu. 2000. Chinese Perspectives of the China Threat: Myth or Reality? In China Threat: 
Perceptions, Myths, and Reality, ed. Herbert Yee. Surrey: Curzon Press. 
Yergin, Daniel. 1977. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oakes, CA: Sage. 
Yong, Deng. 1998. The Chinese conception of national interest in international relations. The China Quarterly 
154: 308-29. 
You, Ji. 2002. The supreme leader and the military. In The Nature of Chinese Politics - from Mao to Jiang, ed. Jona-
than Unger, 274-296. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Young, Adam J., and Mark J. Valencia. 2003. Conflation of piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and 
utility. Comparative Southeast Asia 25, (2): 269-83. 
Yu, Mok Chiu, and J. Frank Harrison. 1990. Voices from Tiananmen Square. Beijing Spring and the Democracy 
Movement. Montréal: Black Rose Books. 
Yuan, Mu. 1990 [1989]. State Council spokesman Yuan Mu holds news conference. In Beijing Spring, 1989. Con-
frontation and Conflict. The Basic Documents, eds. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc 
Lambert, 363-375. Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
Yuan Mu and others hold dialogue with students. 1990 [1989]. In Beijing Spring, 1989. Confrontation and Con-
flict. The Basic Documents, eds. Michel Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan and Marc Lambert, 218-243. 
Armonk & London: M.E. Sharpe.
Zerilli, Linda M. G. 2003. Doing without knowing: Feminism’s politics of the ordinary. In The Grammar of Politics, 
ed. Cressida J. Heyes, 129-148. London: Cornell University Press. 
Zhang, Shu Guang. 1999. China: Traditional and revolutionary heritage. In Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, eds. Ken Booth and Russell Trood. London: Macmillan. 
Zhang, Tiejun. 2002. Chinese strategic culture: Traditional and present features. Comparative Strategy 21, (2): 
73-90. 
Zhao, Dingxin. 2004. The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Zhao, Ziyang. 2009. Prisoner of the State. The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang. Trans. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang and Adi 
Ignatius, eds. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang and Adi Ignatius. New York & London & Toronto & Sydney: Simon 
& Schuster. 
Zhao, Ziyang. 1990 [1989]. Remarks by secretary general Zhao Ziyang to delegates at the Asian Development 
Bank annual meeting. In Cries for Democracy—Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy 
Movement, eds. Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, 132-135. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zhao, Yuezhi. 2000. Watchdogs on party leashes? Contexts and implications of investigative journalism in Post-
Deng China. Journalism Studies 1, (2): 577-97. 
411
Bibliography
———. 1998. Media, Market, and Democracy in China. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Zhou, Enlai. 1989 [1975]. Report on the work of the government to the 4th NPC. In Chinese Politics, Documents 
and Analysis. Volume Two: Ninth Party Congress (1969) to the Death of Mao (1976), eds. James T. Myers, 
Jürgen Domes and Milton D. Yeh, 293-299. Columbia: South Carolina University Press. 
Žižek, Slavoj. 2002a. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion. London: 
Verso. 
———. 2002b. Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related Issues. London: Ver-
so.




不是“ 真善忍”而是真残忍 [Not “truth, benevolence, forbearance” but really ruthless] 2001. 北京: 学习出版
社.
巴瑞布赞, 奥利维夫, 迪怀尔德 [Barui Buzan, Aoli Weifu, Di Huaierde]. 2002. 新安全论 - security: A new frame-
work for analysis. 浙江: 浙江人民出版社.
中共中央党史研究室编. 1986. 中共党史大事年报 [Chronology of major events in the history of the CCP]. 北京: 
人民出版社.
陳希同说 [Chen Xitong’s speech] 2001 [1989]. In June Fourth: The True Story – 中国”六四”真相, ed. 張良 [Zhang 
Liang]. USA: Mirror Books.
邓小平 [Deng Xiaoping]. 2004 [1989]. 在接见首都戒严部队军以上干部時的讲話 [Address to officers at the 
rank of general and above in command of the troops enforcing martial law in Beijing]. In 邓小平军事文
集 [Collected writings of Deng Xiaoping on military affairs] vol. 3, 302-309. 北京: 军事科学出版社.
———.  2001a [1989]. 鄧家召開常委會議 [The Standing Committee convenes for discussion at Deng’s home]. 
In June Fourth: The True Story – 中国”六四”真相, ed. 張良 [Zhang Liang], 440-447. USA: Mirror Books.
———.  2001b [1989]. 中共元老决定戒嚴 [Party elders decide on martial law]. In June Fourth: The True Story 
– 中国”六四”真相, ed. 張良 [Zhang Liang], 481-488. USA: Mirror Books.
九评共产党 [Nine commentaries on the Communist Party]. 2004. Sunnyvale, Calif.: Broad Press.
江泽民 [Jiang Zemin]. 2001a [April 25, 1999]: 江澤民同志給政治局常委及其他有關領導同志的信. In 北京之
春 [Beijing Spring].
———. 2001b [June 7, 1999]. 江泽民同志在中央政治局会议上关于抓紧处理和解决“法轮功”问题的讲话. In 北
京之春 [Beijing Spring]. 
———. 1998. 认真学习邓小平同志的革命风格 [resolutely study the revolutionary style of comrade Deng Xi-
aoping], in 中共中央文献研究室 [Party Documentation Centre] Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin 
Talk on World View, Views of Human Live and Views of Values, pp. 408-409. 香港: 名流出版社.
两次天安门事件 [The two Tiananmen Incidents]. 1989. Hong Kong: Tianhe Publishing House.
林彪 [Lin Biao]. 1966. 在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命
文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Data-
base].
刘跃进 [Liu Yuejin]. 2004. 国家安全学 [the study of national security]. 北京: 中国政法大学出版社. 
毛泽东 [Mao, Zedong]. 1966. 炮打司令部──我的一张大字报 [Bombard the headquarters - my big-character 
poster]. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中
国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
毛泽东对毛远新关于四月六日中央政治局讨论天安门事件情况报告的批语 [Instructions of Mao Zedong in re-
sponse to the report by Mao Yuanxin on the discussion of the Tiananmen Incident at the April 6 meeting 
of the CCP CC Politburo]. 2002a [1976]. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》
编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 (The Cultural Revolution Database). 
毛泽东关于天安门事件性质问题所写的字迹及毛远新和毛泽东谈话的笔记 [Handwriting by Mao Zedong con-
cerning the nature of the Tiananmen Incident; notes of Mao Yuanxin’s conversation with Mao Zedong]. 
2002b [1976]. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大
学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
倪世雄 [Ni Shixiong]. 2001. 当代西方国际关系理论. 上海: 复旦大学出版社.
人民日报 [Renmin ribao]. 9.1.2001. 警惕西方敌对势力利用“法轮功”的政治图谋 [Commentary Warns 
Against West’s Political Plots Using Falun Gong].
———. 5.8.1999. 三百多次围攻的政治目的 [The political objective of over 300 attacks].
———. 3.8.1999. 工人阶级要站在揭批“法轮功”斗争前列. [The working class wants to criticise and uncov-
er the “Falungong”].
———. 247.1999. 受中共中央委托,王兆国向各民主党派中央,全国工商联领导人和无党派人士: 通报中央处
理”法轮功”问题的文件精神 [Notification from Wang Zhaoguo Regarding the Essence of the Central 
Government Documents on Handling the “Falun Gong” Issue].
———. 23.7.1999a. 提高认识看清危害把握政策维护稳定 [Improve Our Understanding, Recognise the Danger, 
Maintain a Hold on Policy, and Uphold Stablity].
———. 237.1999b. 李洪志其人其事 [Li Hongzhi: the man and his deeds].
———. 23.7.1999c. 各地干部群众坚决拥护党和政府处理“法轮功”决定崇尚科学破除迷信维护稳定 [Cad-
res and the masses in various areas firmly support the party and the governments handling of ”Falun 
Gong” by upholding science, removing superstitions, and safeguarding stability].
———. 23.7.1999d. 中华人民共和国民政部已于1999年7月22日认定法轮大法研究会及 [Decision of the min-
istry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Banning of the Research Society of 
Falun Dafa].




———. 21.5.1989. 李鹏总理签署国务院令北京部分地区实行戒严 [Order of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China on the implementation of martial law in parts of Beijing, Signed by Premier Li Peng].
———. 20.5.1989. 中华人民共和国国务院关于在北京市部分地区实行戒严的命令 [Order of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China on the implementation of martial law in parts of Beijing].
———. 26.4.1989. 必須旗幟鮮明地反對動亂 [The Necessity for a Clear-cut Stand Against Turmoil].
———. 21.12.1978. 人民万岁——论天安门广场革命群众运动 [“Long live the People; on the Revolutionary 
Mass Movement of 1976 in Tiananmen Square”].
———. 16.5.1976. 文化大革命永放光芒──纪念中共中央一九六六年五月十六日 《通知》十周年 [The cul-
tural revolution shines forever: commemorating the 10th anniversary of the CCP CC “May 16 Circular”]. 
———. 18.4.1976. 天安门广场事件说明了什么？ [What does the Tian’anmen Incident illustrate?].
———. 10.4.1976. 伟大的胜利 [A Great Victory].
———. 8.4.1976a. 天安门广场的反革命政治事件 [The Tian’anmen Square Counterrevolutionary Political In-
cident].
———. 8.4.1976b. 吴德在天安门广场的广播讲话 [Wu De’s broadcasted speech at Tiananmen square].
———. 1.6.1966. 横扫一切牛鬼蛇神 [Sweep away all monsters and demons].
陶西喆 [Tao Xizhi]. 2007. 揭开中国网络监控机制的内幕 [Revealing the Inside Story of the Chinese Internet 
Control Mechanisms]. Reporters Without Borders and Chinese Human Rights Defenders.
王震 [Wang Zhen]. 2001 [1989]. 王震打电话给邓小平 [Wang Zhen’s telephone remarks to Deng Xiaoping]. In 
June Fourth: The True Story – 中国”六四”真相, ed. 張良 [Zhang Liang]. USA: Mirror Books.
張良 [Zhang Liang]. 2001a. June Fourth: The True Story – 中国”六四”真相. USA: Mirror Books.
———. 2001b. June Fourth: The True Story – 中国”六四”真相. USA: Mirror Books.
解放军画报社 [People’s Liberation Army Pictorial], ed. 1989. 北京平息反革命暴乱 [Quelling the Counterrevo-
lutionary Rebellion in Beijing]. 北京: 长春出版社.
中发 [1976］16号 [Zhongfa 16, October 18, 1976]. 中共中央关于王洪文、张春桥、江青、姚文元反党集团事
件的通知. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 
中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中发 [1967］ 160 号 [Zhongfa 160, May 17, 1967]. 中共中央关于纪念毛主席《在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话》
发表二十五周年宣传工作的意见. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委
会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中发 [1966] 542号 [Zhongfa 542, October 25, 1966]. 林彪同志在中央工作会议上的讲话. In 宋永毅 [Song 
Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及
出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中发  [1966］267号 [Zhongfa 267, May 5,1966]. 中国共产党中央委员会通知及原件附件之二 [CCP Circular 
with the original appendix 2]. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编
纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中国共产党第十届中央委员会第三次全体会议关于恢复邓小平同志职务的决议  [Resolution of the Third Ses-
sion of the Tenth CCP CC rehabilitating Comrade Deng Xiaoping]. 2002 [1977]. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] 
ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The 
Cultural Revolution Database].
中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第五次全体会议关于为刘少奇同志平反的决议 [Resolution of the Fifth Sessi-
on of the Eleventh CCP CC rehabilitating Comrade Liu Shaoqi 1980.02.29]. 2002 [1980]. In 宋永毅 [Song 
Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及
出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中央政治局四月四日会议记录及毛远新关于中央政治局四月四日讨论天安门事件情况给毛泽东的报告 [Mi-
nutes of the April 4 meeting of the CCP CC Politburo; report by Mao Yuanxin to Mao Zedong on the 
discussion of the Tiananmen incident at the CCP CC Politburo April 4 meeting]. 2002 [1976]. In 宋永毅 
[Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制
作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中央政治局四月五日会议记录. [Minutes of the April 5 meeting of the CCP CC politburo]. 2002 [1976]. In 宋永
毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 
制作及出版 [The Cultural Revolution Database].
中共中央. 1966a. 中共中央批转文化革命五人小组关于当前学术讨论的汇报提纲. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 
美国《中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The 
Cultural Revolution Database]. 
中共中央. 1966.b 中国共产党中央委员会关于无产阶级文化大革命的决定. In 宋永毅 [Song Yongyi] ed. 美国《
中国文化大革命文库光盘》编委会 编纂 香港中文大学• 中国研究服务中心 制作及出版 [The Cultural 
Revolution Database].





320. Sihvonen, Tanja. Players Unleashed! Modding The Sims and the Culture of
 Gaming. 2009. 
321. Leppänen, Pia. Behavioral Responses in Mice Selectively Bred for High and Low
 Levels of Open-Field Thigmotaxis. 2009. 
322. Myoung Soo Kwon. Effects of Mobile Phone electromagnetic Field: Behavioral
 and neurophysiological Measurements. 2009. 
323. Pyykkönen, Pirita. The Importance of Semantics: Visual World Studies on 
 Drawing Inferences and Resolving Anaphors. 2009. 
324. Raunio, Anu. Conversioni al cattolicesimo a Roma tra Sei e Settecento. La 
 presenza degli scandinavi nell’Ospizio dei Convertendi. 2009. 
325. Junttila, Niina. Social competence and loneliness during the school years 
 — Issues in assessment, interrelations and intergenerational transmission. 2010.  
326 Kyrölä, Katariina. The Weight of Images. Affective Engagements with Fat 
 Corporeality in the Media. 2010. 
327. Tenkanen, Atte. Comparison Structure Analysis. 2010. 
328. Maijala, Minna. Integration und Vermittlung landeskundlicher Inhalte 
 im Fremdsprachenunterricht. 2010. 
329. Meretoja, Hanna. The French Narrative Turn. From the Problematization of
 Narrative Subjectivity in Alain Robbe-Grillet´s  Dans le labyrinthe to its Hermeneutic 
Rehabilitation in Michel Tournier´s Le Roi des Aulnes. 2010. 
330. Ruokonen, Minna. Cultural and textual properties in the translation and 
 interpretation of allusions. An analysis of allusions in Dorothy L. Sayers’s detective
 novels translated into Finnish in the 1940s and the 1980s. 2010. 
331. Egharevba, Stephen. Understanding the Racial Nature of Police and Immigrant
 Relations in Finland. The Case of Africans in Turku. 2011. 
332. Hakola, Outi. Rhetoric of Death and Generic Addressing of Viewers in American
 Living Dead Films. 2011. 
333. Häikiö, Tuomo. Reading Development During Elementary School Years: Evidence 
from Eye Movements. 2011. 
334. Hongisto, Ilona. Soul of the Documentary. Expression and the Capture of the
 Real. 2011.
335. Heikkilä, Pauli. Imagining Europe, Imagining the Nation. Estonian Discussion 
	 on	European	Unification,	1923-1957.	2011.	
336. Vuori, Juha. How to Do Security with Words — A Grammar of Securitisation in 
 the People´s Republic of China. 2011.
Myynti/Distribution: Turun yliopiston kirjasto
   Turku University Library
   FI-20014 TURUN YLIOPISTO, FINLAND
	 	 	 http://kirjasto.utu.fi/julkaisupalvelut/	,	julkmyynti@utu.fi
   ISBN		978-951-29-4700-3	(PRINT)
	 	 	 ISBN		978-951-29-4701-0	(PDF)
	 	 	 ISSN		0082-6987
   Uniprint — Turku, Finland 2011
TURUN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA
ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS TURKUENSIS
